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Abstract 
Before the ‘European Miracles’. Four Essays on Swedish Preconditions for Conquest, Growth, and 
Voice. (Publications of the Department of Economic History, School of Economics and 
Commercial Law, Göteborg university no 93) 
ISSN 1403-2864. ISBN 91-85196-61-4 Göteborg 2005 
Author: Erik Örjan Emilsson 
Doctoral Dissertation at the Department of Economic History, Göteborg University. (Written in 
English). 
Distribution: the Department of Economic History, Göteborg University, Box 720, SE-405 30 
Göteborg, Sweden. 
This thesis consists of four studies that further develop the perspectives introduced in the 
author’s licential dissertation, Sweden and the European Miracles: Conquest, Growth and Voice 
(1996). The dynamic properties of the European system of independent but interacting societies 
are traced back to the institutional polystruc-turality of European feudalism and the peculiarities 
of Sweden’s historical experience are asserted to be  part of this intersocietal heritage. Sweden’s 
contributions to the developments resulting in (World) Conquest, (sustained economic) Growth 
and (extensive political) Voice are discussed, and the Medieval roots of the social configurations 
that make possible military expansionism, growing peasant affluence, and institutionalized 
political negotiations are explored. 
The almost permanent power struggles between oligarchic and monarchic regimes that 
characterize medieval Sweden are viewed as a crucial factor behind the survival of communal 
self-rule and the resultant compromise is interpreted as a form of parallel, competitive state-
building, predicated upon the institutional separation of the land and the peasantry into two 
‘separate economic bases’: a public and a private (noble) sector. The so called Engelbrekt 
rebellion is seen as a crucial watershed in these developments, and the role of the regional 
judges – the lawspeakers (lagmän) are emphasized.  
In the second study, the Swedish peasantry is discussed: its subdivision according to nature of 
land tenure and manner of political representation, and its economic stratification; also trends in 
peasant wealth and in the degree of inequality. Evidence from property taxations is used in 
order to resolve these questions for sample parishes and the results of earlier research are 
scrutinized and criticized. Different kinds of economic dynamics are discussed and a change 
from ‘feudal’ to modern economic dynamics is inferred. The ‘shortcut’ explanation where the 
free Swedish peasantry is interpreted as a survival from the Viking Age is also rejected. Peasant 
self-representation and affluence were in the main independent of tenure, and the strong 
position of peasant proprietors in 19th century Sweden is a late development connected to the 
rise of market production and to the extraneous interest in freehold property rights, leading tax 
peasants to political standpoints and alliances that eventually would fracture the peasantry. 
The role of lagmän (‘lawspeakers’) in medieval Swedish society is explored in the final chapter, 
arguing their central role in state-building and in the formation of oligarchic factions opposing 
absolutist tendencies. The ‘lawspeaker myth’ of independent regional spokesmen risen from the 
local peasantries is shown to have no foundation in known facts – on the contrary all of the 
early lawspeaker whose families we know anything about were closely related to the royal and 
ducal dynasties. 
KEYWORDS: aristocracy, agrarian history, comparative history, Early Modern Sweden, economic 
dynamics, evolutionary social science theories, institutional theories, jurisdictional system, 
lawspeakers (lagmän), Medieval Sweden, parliamentary politics, peasant categories, peasant 
rebellions, political contestation, political representation, property taxations, Sweden’s Great 
Power Age, theories of feudalism, transition to capitalism 
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Preface 
To indulge in such an egocentric and time-consuming activity as an 
academic dissertation is, unfortunately, almost impossible without 
inflicting damage on the people that surround you, and on your 
relationship to them. The conventional form for writing this kind of 
preface is to thank everyone that has helped you along the way, and 
then at the very end declare your gratitude for the unswerving loyalty 
and patience of your partner. That would, in my case, feel both 
hypocritical and ungrateful. My wife Anna Wide has shown much 
more loyalty to me as a person than to the abstruse project that has 
consumed too much of the time to our disposal, and the strongest 
impetus behind the final appearance of this book is her determination 
to put limits to her patience with this neverending story. These are 
the things I really want to thank her for. 
During the long and winding journey of this dissertation project, 
many people have helped me by showing interest in the problems I 
have been addressing. From the beginning Lars Herlitz, my first 
advisor, encouraged me to believe in the relevance of the questions I 
have been asking, and many of my friends and colleagues at the 
Department of Economic History have been willing to discuss the 
most far-fetched subjects. From early on Kent Olsson, Martti 
Rantanen, Staffan Granér, and Jan Jörnmark have been frequent 
discussion partners; later also Ann Ighe, and Per Hallén. Christina 
Dalhede has made important comments on the early modern period. 
My treatment of numerical evidence has benefited from the sharp 
eyes of Jan Bohlin, Linda Lane and Svante Larsson. Linda is also a 
very congenial roommate, and has a keen ear for when my English 
gets carried away.  
When Lars Herlitz retired, our new professor Ulf Olsson at first 
seemed rather wary of my pretentions, but his later support feels 
even more encouraging because of this. Carl-Johan Gadd bravely 
accepted to take over responsibility for my dissertation project, and 
has provided constant support as well as resistance when that has 
been necessary.  
Back in the early 80’s Christer Winberg examined a very early 
paper where some of these questions were first raised, and Urban 
Herlitz later supervised my major thesis in Economic History. The 
discussions during a theory course jointly lead by Urban and Luis 
Bertola provided the intellectual climate that inspired me to write a 
more broadly based paper which finally grew into a licential 
dissertation. 
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Discussions with Jan Hultin, Johan Fornäs, Anders Frenander and 
many others were also important in the early stages. My old friend 
Sten Dahlstedt introduced me into the modern debate on nationalism. 
Ola Fransson, Jan-Olof Jörnryd and Margareta Widmark have 
followed and discussed the different stages of my formulations all the 
way. 
Encouraging comments from people outside the spheres of 
department colleagues and friends have been very important: Mats 
Andrén’s and Martin Peterson’s discussion of my licential dissertation 
during a seminar at the European studies program, Charles Tilly’s few 
but appreciative remarks about my book, Lars G Sandberg’s positive 
review in JecH, a reference in a book by Jan Glete and interested 
comments by John Ward. Janken Myrdal, Johan Söderberg and 
Thomas Lindkvist have all shown an encouraging interest in earlier 
papers that have entered into this remix. 
My three children Måns, Ylva and Elsa are important reasons for 
the drawn-out character of this project – an earlier publication date 
would have been bought at too high a price. It is a privilege to be 
involved with their lives, and I hope that if they do not read this 
book, it will be because of their high standards of exciting literature 
rather than from feelings of resentment against the work that has 
occupied me so often. 
My parents Eric Bertil and Majvor have also been kept waiting for a 
long time. Their support has been invaluable, and without it the strain 
on the rest of my family would have been impossible to bear. 
The material necessity of labouring for my sustenance has been 
another delaying factor. The Swedish Post Office, Mark’s 
Gymnasieskola, and the History Course within the Teacher’s Training 
Programme at Göteborg University have provided this after I had 
used up my four years as a doctoral student, but I have also enjoyed 
the support of a grant from the Gustavus Adolphus Academy and the 
Per Nyström award for ‘younger historical researchers with the 
courage to walk their own paths’. This award was very encouraging – 
especially being called a ‘younger historian’ at the mature age of 49. I 
hope this means that the better part of my life still lies before me! 
As I am writing these words I realize that I should also express my 
thanks to my old friend Siri Reuterstrand, who is busy doing pre-press 
treatment of the rest of the script. Let us hope that we will make the 
deadline. 
 
Erik Örjan Emilsson 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The four essays that comprise this book are a continuation of the 
project I began with my licential dissertation, Sweden and the 
European Miracles: Conquest, Growth and Voice – to situate the 
historical development of Sweden within the debates concerning the 
transition to modern society. From one aspect the purpose is to test 
European explanations and theoretical models on the Swedish 
development. From another it is an attempt to bring the Swedish 
experience into the general debate on European development and 
thus to provide material for a broader-based analysis of Europe.  
The only real point of consensus I have found in the debate 
concerning the ‘European advantage’ – to just choose the least 
provocative label – is the crucial role given to the simultaneous 
independence and interpendence of the constituent sub-societies, 
providing institutional variety, multiple ‘testing’ of development paths, 
and imitation of successful practices. This means that the 
contributions of all the countries participating in this interaction need 
to be brought into the picture1. I have already made this argument in 
Sweden and the European Miracles, but here I endeavour to make 
further substantiations of the claim, and to specify the Swedish 
historical experience in closer detail. 
 
The first essay, Feudal Dynamics and the Roots of Early-Modern 
Swedish Society was written quite a long time after chapters two and 
three, and when the research for chapter four was nearly completed. 
The original intention was to sum up the argumentation and to point 
out the implications contained in the other articles, but it soon 
became necessary to also incorporate previews of ongoing research 
and modifications of earlier positions in the light of current debates 
and new publications. My interpretation of feudalism, in particular, 
had to be more clearly specified, its role in the evolutionary 
perspective underlined, and my objections to the widespread view of 
Sweden’s non-feudal past had to be more forcefully argued. These 
are the subjects of the first section of chapter one, which proceeds to 
                                                   
1 In the Swedish case at least including an efficient administrative organization, 
military innovations, an exceptionally broad basis of popular representation and 
the earliest experiments with parliamentary rule. 
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discuss evolutionary theories within social science, and the Swedish 
version of what I have called the European ‘Triple Miracle’: (World) 
Conquest, (sustained) Growth, and (extended political) Voice 
(Emilsson 1996).   
The following articles are printed in the order in which they were 
written, and therefore to some extent mirror a gradual modification of 
positions. 
The second study, Social Structure in Imperial Sweden – the 
Peasantry, discusses the Swedish peasantry, its subdivision according 
to nature of land tenure and manner of political representation, and 
its economic stratification; also trends in peasant wealth and in the 
degree of inequality. Evidence from property taxations is used in 
order to resolve these questions for sample parishes and the results of 
earlier research are scrutinized and criticized. Different kinds of 
economic dynamics are discussed and a change from ‘feudal’ to 
modern economic dynamics is inferred. The consequences for the 
traditional conception of the Swedish peasantry are spelled out: The 
strong position of peasant proprietors in 19th century Sweden is a late 
development connected to the rise of market production and in no 
way represents a survival of pre-feudal peasant ownership rooted in 
Viking Age communities of free and equal peasants. The long and 
strong tradition of peasant freedom in Sweden is in the main 
independent of the nature of land tenure; freeholders and tenants on 
noble or ecclesiastical land as well as on Crown domain, had equal 
community rights including jury service and eventually, representation 
in the Diet. The particular economic strength of peasant property, and 
the political importance of the Swedish peasantry are therefore two 
phenomena that have to be investigated separately, and neither can 
be reduced to a symptom of the other; the interrelations are more 
complex and involve the fracturing and political redefinition of the 
peasantry. 
 
The third article is called Swedish State-building as a Process of 
Parallel Centralization. The Medieval Background. The first part of it 
advances the dynamic view of feudalism which has now been further 
developed in essay number one, and discusses the peculiarites of 
Swedish state-building. The most important aspect, in my opinion, is 
that state formation was strengthened, not weakened, by the 
‘pendulum swings’ between monarchic self-assertion and aristocratic 
dominance emphasized by Michael Roberts and Perry Anderson. 
Furthermore, this ‘double’ or competitive version of state-building 
was predicated upon the institutional separation of the land and the 
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peasantry into two ‘separate economic bases’, which is seen as an 
important factor behind the survival of a large sector of freeholders. 
The second part of the article consists of a reconsideration of the 
revolution against Eric of Pomerania (1434-1441) and of the first and 
formative phase of the revolution: the Engelbrekt rebellion (1434-36), 
together with analyses of earlier aristocratic network building which 
provide part of the background. Despite the difference between the 
two sections of the essay, it has proved difficult to separate them: the 
general discussion in part one is needed for the analysis in part two, 
but also builds on the evidence presented in that section.  
My general argument is that the particular Swedish road to a 
broadly inclusive political representation is contingent on the 
trajectory of the state-building process whose distinctive traits I 
formulate here, and that this ties into the arguments I have been 
making in the second essay.  
 
The final study, Lawspeakers and Aristocracy in Medieval Sweden, 
is an inquiry into the role of lawspeakers in the medieval Swedish 
state-building process. The analyses in the third essay required further 
underpinning as well as a reconsideration of the earlier periods of 
recurrent power struggles, rebellions, and civil wars. The analysis of 
the Swedish version of feudalism required a further specification of 
the disjunction between judiciary and military-administrative power. 
The reconsideration of Swedish ‘peasant freedom’ required a 
deconstruction of the myth of local community ‘peasant chieftains’ as 
the basis of the lawspeaker institution. This article is thus a ‘prehistory 
of the prehistory’ of the miracles, but is also an important part of my 
project to undermine the ‘shortcut’ explanation of Swedish peasant 
property – as a survival from the Viking Age, whether this period is 
interpreted as a communitarian Garden of Eden or as an age of 
unrestrained entrepreneurs. 
 
Together, the four essays make a case for the civic independence 
of Swedish peasants (an important factor in the development of 
political Voice in Sweden) as completely separate from the wide-
spread property rights (an important factor in early economic 
Growth). None of these two factors can be reduced to the other, 
although their interconnection is obvious.  
It would be premature to offer an answer as to the complex 
interconnection with the Miracle of Conquest, but the constant 
negotiation for men and means was obviously important for peasant 
representation in the Diet. Furthermore: if my suggestion of a shift 
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from Hiltonian to Herlitzian dynamics is not entirely off the mark, 
both the war burden and the release from it stimulated growth, albeit 
in very different ways. 
All in all, my argument is that reductionism is wrong, that 
interrelations are complex, and that their very complexity constitute 
diversity – which is dynamic, in social as well as in natural evolution. 
The European case for pluralism will be strengthened, not weakened, 
if we include the Swedish experience in the debate on the European 
Miracles. These miracles: world Conquest, sustained economic 
Growth, and political Voice, may be ever so densely interconnected, 
but as the example of Sweden indicates, the second and third were in 
no way hampered by the ultimate failure of the first. 
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CHAPTER I 
FEUDAL DYNAMICS AND THE ROOTS OF EARLY-
MODERN SWEDISH SOCIETY 
This essay, summarizing and synthesizing findings from the three 
other chapters and from further research in progress, is divided into 
three parts:  
Part one discusses the ambiguous concepts of feudalism and the 
notion that the history of Sweden falls outside the domain of feudal 
societies. My conclusion is that a polystructural concept of feudalism 
inspired by Perry Anderson and Aaron Gurevich is central to the 
explanation of inter-European dynamics, and fully compatible with 
the Swedish historical experience.  
Part two relates this diccussion to evolutionary approaches in social 
science and the problem of selection in institutional evolution.  
Part three discusses  
1. Swedish expansionism during the Imperial Age (Sweden’s 
involvement in the dynamics leading to the Miracle of 
Conquest) and its preconditions in the competitive state-
building processes of the late Middle Ages.  
2. Indications of a shift from ‘feudal’ to modern economic 
dynamics in Swedish agriculture around this period (a 
Swedish version of the Miracle of Growth), and a 
reconfiguration of the social structure of the peasantry. 
3. The social realignments behind the first emergence of a 
broadly based anti-aristocratic political program in 1650 as 
a background for the rise of parliamentary party politics and 
inter-Estate negotiation during the Age of Liberty (the 
premature breakthrough for the Miracle of Voice in 18th-
century Sweden).    
Mechanisms pertaining to all of the three aspects of the ‘European 
Miracle’ are thus in effect during the 108 years between Sweden’s 
intervention into the Thirty-year War, and the first example of a 
shift of power based on party majority in a parliamentary assembly. 
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Don’t hide from hindsight – feudalism read 
backwards 
The more evidence that has been assembled indicating that the 
terms feudal, feudalism and feudal society are in essence post-
medieval: products of hindsight and of attempts to explain the type of 
society that European modernity emerged from and superseded, the 
more reasonable it seems to me to accept that these terms are overtly 
teleological. There is a trade-off between (1) the gains in our 
historical understanding to be made through respecting the specificity 
of a historical period, and (2) the explanatory gains to be made 
through searching for the sources of modern phenomena. Most of the 
criticism against the word ‘feudalism’ has been formulated from 
standpoint (1), which appears to restrict its usefulness to the domain 
of (2).  
Ellen Meiksins Wood (1999) has suggested a broad reinterpretation 
of the nowadays largely discredited2 notion of ‘bourgeois revolution’ 
along the lines of Marx' comment on the French revolution: that it 
cleared away the ‘medieval rubbish’ still obstructing the emergence of 
modern society. It is to this context3, I will argue, that the concept of 
Feudal society is still relevant and, in fact, indispensable4 - as a 
designation for those aspects of the medieval legacy constraining the 
full emergence of modern society, while at the same time constituting 
the foundation for this development. 
                                                   
2  Primarily, the concept of a ‘rising bourgeoisie’ overthrowing an obsolescent social 
order has been undermined by the less than heroic record of identifiably 
bourgeois groups in the concrete historical analysis of revolutions (Cobban 1962, 
Skocpol 1979, Comninel 1987) 
3  Not only to the neo-Marxist context of Wood and her discussion partners, but as 
much to the neo-institutionalist context of Douglass North and his followers, 
where the removal of constraints is a central explanatory category. 
4  ‘Ancien Régime’, ‘Alteuropa’ (Brunner),  or ‘old order’ (Blum), have been 
employed as alternative labels, but the advantage with ‘feudal society’ is that the 
usage of the word in this sense is familiar and well-established, however irritating 
it may be for those who prefer unambiguous terms. What we need here, though, 
is a term for an inescapably ambiguous concept, and to create a new, and more 
‘precise’ term, would be to pretend to an accuracy we have not yet achieved, or, 
worse, a conformity which never existed. As a heuristic concept, we are quite 
simply stuck with ‘feudalism’ until we have found a better explanation of what it 
really was that happened to exactly what kind of group of European societies 
sharing which characteristics at exactly which points of the whole process. 
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As the modern usage of the terms ultimately derives from  
• descriptions of obsolescent customs5,  
• the defense and systematic exploitation of such customs6  
and 
• struggle against and declarations of the abolishment of such 
customs7, 
I see no reason to abandon the term in these specific contexts – 
that would only force us to coin a new unsatisfactorily ambiguous 
term with the added disadvantage of being unfamiliar and unlikely to 
be accepted by anyone proposing a different analysis of the basic 
nature of pre-modern8 European society. When we discuss feudal 
society we at least have compatible views as to what we are 
disagreeing about. That the term is contested and ambiguous seems 
to me a good reason to stick to it - as a heuristic label and as a 
shorthand for a specific but very wide area of historical debate. 
Swedish ‘feudalism’ and the full scope of definitional 
debate: Ward’s ten foci of feudal definitions 
reappraised  
There have been many attempts to survey and classify the 
competing usages of the f-words  but John O. Ward’s 1985 article9 
stands out for two important reasons. He classifies a number of 
different standpoints  
                                                   
5 One of Reynolds’ central arguments is that the notion of a specific, consistent 
feudal law is derived from a body of learned 12th century comments on an 
ordinance issued by Conrad II in order to settle a conflict between the 
archbishop of Milan and knightly tenants of the Church (Reynolds 1994:199-207, 
215-230). These tracts, labeled the Libri Feudorum, were often attached to the 
books of Roman Law studied by university-trained lawyers, and became – 
Reynolds argues – the foundation for the conception of feudalism as a coherent 
system, formulated at a time when early modern lawyers and historians tried to 
make sense of the many obsolescent customs they encountered.  
6 Cf the specialist corps of French attorneys dedicated to the exploitation of such 
customs, generally referred to as ‘feudists’. 
7 The abolishment of ‘feudal tenure’ during the English revolution and the 
declaration of the abolishment of all droits féodaux in France 1789 (cf Markoff 
1996) NB: also the abolition of ’feudal tenure’ in England (Halsbury’s Laws of 
England). 
8 Read pre-statist, pre-rationalistic, pre-capitalist or whatever, as these discussions 
intersect and are almost impossible to keep separate. 
9 The anthology in which it appears (Leach-Mukherjee-Ward 1985) proved to be 
inaccessible in Sweden, why I am greatly indebted to Dr Ward for kindly sending 
me a copy. 
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• according to their focus rather than on formal definitions or 
theoretical underpinning, and thereby  
• succeeds to convey both the fluidity and overlapping usage 
of the terms10 and the wide scope of definitions. 
I will take his analysis as my point of departure, and add a few 
examples and suggestions of my own. Then I will discuss some of the 
most frequent objections to describing medieval Sweden as feudal, 
and also briefly discuss the remaining foci, to see what light they 
might throw on the issue, before I return to the question of feudalism 
in general, and why I still consider it a useful term. 
In the table below I try to present Ward’s categories in as compact 
a form as possible. My own additions and modifications are put 
within square brackets and preceded by an asterisk. E g: Focus VI [b], 
where the subcategory is discerned by Ward, but lacks a specific 
designation, in contrast to the two foci Va and Vb. The references are 
heavily and quite arbitrarily edited. To give a fair presentation of each 
focus, I would have to reproduce the full exemplifications and 
qualifications of Ward’s article. As my purpose here is only to use it 
as a check-list for alternative usages which the Swedish debate can be 
measured against, and I do not want to pilfer Ward’s overview of the 
general debate, I settle for a rudimentary list.   
                                                   
10 As the focus can shift within a single author’s oeuvre, or even within a single 
study. 
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Table 1. Feudalism: ten foci (Ward 1985. Edited by present author.) 
 
designation    focused characteristic     
- references to authors 
 
focus I vassalage (ties of personal dependence)   
-  Dopsch, Bloch, Le Goff  
focus II the conditionality of fief-holding   
-  Stenton, Strayer 1956 ('feudalism stage 2') 
focus III  union between benefice and vassalage   
-  Ganshof, H Brunner, White 
focus IV military service in exchange for land   
-  H A Cronne, H Brunner, White 
focus V a  parcellation of authority   
- Dopsch, Mitteis, Boutruche, Anderson, Bisson, Elias 
focus V b  obligations as tools for centralization   
-  Barraclough, Strayer 1966, Bisson 
focus VI [a] combination of vassalage, fief and rights of justice   
-  Hoyt, Boutruche11 
focus VI [b]   ditto   + the castle as a site for this combination   
-  J Evans, Bisson 
focus VII    dominance of the knightly class  
-  Duby 1973 
focus VIII  an entire society or type of civilization   
-  Bloch, R A Evans  
focus IX [a]  manorialism (seigneurial property)   
-  Weber, Duby 1978 [D North] 
focus IX [b]  bonded dependence of peasant class   
-  Marx, Anderson, Dobb, Kula 
focus X a "compromise with anarchy"   
-  Erickson, Ward 
                                                   
11 Reynolds 1994:2,n5: ‘Many recent formulations correspond more or less with J O 
Ward’s ‘focus VI’, though some slide into other foci.’ 
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Swedish feudalism – for and against 
My purpose with this discussion is to show that according to most 
of the different formulations of what is taken to be crucial citeria of 
feudalism, Sweden would qualify and thus has a share in the 
European polystructurality which, I will argue, is the foundation of 
European dynamics. This particular view of feudalism I present as an 
eleventh focus, although it might also be seen as a more positive 
reinterpretation of focus X. The most holistic focus, number VIII, 
will of course also be compatible, but in a way all of the foci can be 
seen as aspects of polystructurality. If it is the coexistence of different 
institutional patterns that contains the potential for development, then 
the differently focused definitions is a symptom of the diversity 
characteristic of feudal society. 
I discuss the foci in a somewhat erratic order, as I want to analyze 
the debate on feudalism in Sweden with the help of Ward’s 
categories; not to use the Swedish examples to illustrate his list. 
‘Absence of regional separatism’ – a narrow version of 
focus Va 
If we look at the discussions of whether something that might be 
called feudalism has ever existed in Sweden through the various 
lenses provided by Ward’s typology, we might start with Heckscher’s 
classic denial (1952:36f), based on the fact that some of the richest 
Swedish landowners of the Middle Ages did not strive to make their 
estates autonomous. This objection would reasonably fall into the 
domain of focus V a (parcellation of authority), but is in fact even 
more narrow, as it is based on the absence of regional separatism. His 
example is Bo Jonsson (Grip), officialis generalis and High Steward 
(drots) during Albrecht of Mecklenburg’s Swedish reign (1365-88)12 
and the collector of the vastest domain ever controlled by a private 
Swedish citizen. That Bo Jonsson did not attempt to concentrate his 
holdings in order to set himself up as a semi-independent regional 
overlord, but instead seems to have maximized their dispersion across 
the country, and that similar strategies were followed (Abraham 
Brodersen, Arvid Trolle) or anticipated (Nils Turesson) by many of 
the Swedish magnates, was to Heckscher an obvious symptom of 
non-feudal conditions.  
                                                   
12 In 1365, Bo Jonsson and other exiled Swedish magnates returned together with 
the Mecklenburger invasion forces to depose King Magnus Eriksson. Bo became 
Albrecht’s ‘general official’ in 1369 and High Steward in 1371.  
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However, enfeoffment could certainly fragment authority also in 
Sweden, and I would suggest that it was the very parcellation of 
authority under the Mecklenburg regime13 that made feasible Bo 
Jonsson’s struggle for a goal much more ambitious than feudal 
separatism: to wrest not just a region, but the entire country from the 
grasp of the King, and to put it under the collective control of a 
narrow oligarchic magnate faction led by himself. 
My argument is that the oligarchic strategy coming into the open at 
least 14 by the time of the compromise settlement after the 1371 rising, 
has led to a particular Swedish version of state-building conflicts: not 
the familiar feudal/absolutist struggle between a centralizing monarch 
and de-centralizing aristocrats with local power bases, but a struggle 
over the control of a power centre constructed and coveted by 
monarchic pretenders and oligarchic conspiracies alike15.  
Ties that bind – focus Vb 
What, then, about the opposite perspective of focus Vb, where the 
web of feudal obligations is instead viewed as a mechanism for 
creating a centripetal state? My discussion above would obviously fall 
under this heading, but so would also the mainstream picture of the 
Realm of Sweden as originating in a loose federation of landskap – 
regional communities with separate law codes – centralized into a 
single state by royal power in close cooperation with the church, 
employing oaths of allegiance, castle fiefs and the enforcement of 
sworn Peace laws. This picture, however, usually focuses on the non- 
or pre-feudal regional variation, rather than on the feudal aspects of 
the centralization. As the imported institutions of ecclesiastical 
organization, royal power, and written laws, are the means by which 
                                                   
13 Both a result of the financial distress caused by ‘feudal’ conquest and of the 
conflict-ridden collusion with the magnate faction which had deliberately 
fragmented Magnus Eriksson’s attempt to reconstruct royal control after a period 
(1304-18)  of  something which can only be called classic feudal disintegration: 
civil war, division of the realm into first two, then three principalities, finally 
culminating in fratricide, royal exile, and the election of a three-year-old king. 
(See Chapter 4 for fuller analyses) 
14 Its foundation, though, was laid already in 1319, when the council constituted 
itself as a ruling body during Magnus Eriksson’s minority (Beckman 1953), 
redefining itself as a Council of the Realm and delimiting royal power through a 
‘letter of freedom’ specifying the conditions for elective monarchy. 
15 This, I also argue, is the foundation for the ‘oscillation’ between royal authority 
and collective aristocratic power described by Roberts and Anderson, which in 
my opinion is an important part of the explanation of the strength of the  
Swedish state: it was, so to speak, ‘built from two directions’. See page 56, 139. 
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the various regions in this new state are being integrated, I insist on 
the feudal character of this integration. 
Non-inheritable fiefs – an ‘anti-focus’ 
Another common argument against ‘Swedish feudalism’ is to point 
out that Swedish fiefs did not become inheritable, in contrast to what 
is taken to be the typical feudal pattern. The focus on fief-holding, 
however, number II, only emphasizes its conditionality – 
inheritability is not put into focus by any of the variants charted by 
Ward. The point of reference for the inheritance argument seems to 
be the traditional explanation of how inheritable fiefs are supposed to 
have originated from land granted by early medieval war-leaders to 
their followers. Reynolds describes this as a ‘myth of origin’ 
(1994:229) based upon a ‘small piece of conjectural history put 
forward in the early twelfth century by one of the Lombard lawyers 
whose little treatises were soon after combined into the Libri 
Feudorum’ (1994:475). Reynolds’ denunciation of the historical 
relevance of this story is unequivocal.  
This is not to deny that the inheritability of fiefs seems to have 
been widespread in medieval Europe, as it is even within Reynolds’ 
survey; just that it does not appear to have been made a central 
defining characteristic by scholars participating in the international 
feudalism debates, and that the extent to which inheritable noble 
property really had originated in royal grants may have been grossly 
exaggerated16. 
The sources do not suggest that nobles and free men thought of 
their property as having originated in a grant from a king or other 
lord, except, of course, when one of them had just received a grant of 
land in addition to what he had inherited from his ancestors 
(Reynolds1994:61) 
According to the discussion in Rosén 1949:75-9 it seems that Earl 
Birger in mid-13th century had donated parts of the inalienable Royal 
domain (Uppsala öd) to his younger sons, which they – especially the 
Duke-Bishop Bengt – later appear to have sold or donated. This 
suggests a certain confusion between enfeoffment and allodial 
donation, or more probably: an absence of the kind of precise 
distinctions that terms like these presuppose. Reasonably, this is more 
                                                   
16 Also cf Bloch’s quote about fiefs de réprise below, page 237 – in cases where the 
land ‘granted’ by the Lord was originally the fiefholders’ own land which had put 
under the Lord’s protection, inheritability was a self-evident condition of the 
arrangement. 
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or less the same kind of process that takes place in the ‘feudal core-
lands’: royal land slipping from conditional tenure into private 
property through the very lack of unambiguous terms and rules17. 
Examples of grants given with inheritable rights to famuli and fideles 
can be found among the abalienations listed by Rosén18. 
There is of course no reason to postulate that Ward’s list is 
exhaustive – I will suggest other possible additions later – but the 
quite frequent Swedish equation of feudalism with inheritable fiefs 
does not seem to be derived from analyses of feudal societies. Instead 
it gives the impression of an ‘anti-focus’ designed to prove the 
‘otheness’ or non-feudal character of Sweden. I can see no really 
useful purpose of such a definition. 
Conditionality – focus II – and subinfeudation 
How about the real focus II, then? Within this focus the 
impermanence and conditionality of Swedish castellanies would no 
longer constitute an argument against feudal relations; on the contrary 
– that would be what made them feudal!  
Another common argument for incomplete feudalization in 
Sweden, is a supposed relative lack of subinfeudation. I have found 
only one example in Rosén 194919, but that is certainly because what 
he is listing is abalienations of Crown land, and this example of an 
abalienation passed on as a sub-fief just happened to be obvious 
enough to remark on. However, I have also found it almost 
impossible to hunt down any likely references when searching for the 
words förläna, förläning (grant or enfeoff; grant, fief or enfeoffment) 
in the electronic register of Swedish medieval charters (SMB).  
Apart from grants made by the King, by a regent or by groups of 
councillors seemingly acting as collective regents, almost all of the 
entries refer to the relations between bishops and lower clergy, and 
appear to concern the control of churches rather than land. This is 
hardly subinfeudation in the usual sense of the word. Some entries 
seem to use the words more figuratively, and some concern the 
                                                   
17 Cf Reynolds 1994:82 about the ‘kind of slow embezzlement’ that transformed 
royal land ‘attached to offices’ and then ‘ending up as ... hereditary property’ ; 
also pp12-14, 119-23 on the ambiguity of ‘feudal’ terms.  
18 1949:131-174. E g #32: Karl Elofsson, who immediately proceeded to donate is as 
morgongåva to his wife (DS 588);  #59: Werner Brunkow (DS687); #80 archdean 
Andreas Andrae, and his brother, the lawspeaker Israel Andersson (DS 914). 
19 op cit p148, #60 Bengt Magnusson, grandnephew of Earl Birger, grandson of 
Bishop Bengt Magnusson, lawspeaker of Östergötland and probable castellan of 
Kalmar, enfeoffed a ‘predium’ Rinxhult in Småland to Nils Sigridsson, later 
lawspeaker of Tiohärad. (DS 700). 
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granting of single homesteads to people who would might at best 
have been fairly humble reeves if not ordinary peasant tenants. 
Remains a handful of examples all of which might just as well have 
been benefices granted to clients out of private (allodial) land. 
This seems to confirm the low degree of subinfeudation – but only 
as long as we do not consider pantlän (mortgage fiefs) to be ‘real’ 
fiefs20. See the discussion below. 
Then of course there is the question of how ubiquitous and 
essential to feudal societies the practice of subinfeudation really was. 
A sceptic viewpoint is encouraged by Reynolds 1994:100 and 222. A 
focus on subinfeudation might be something of an ‘anti-focus’, like 
the emphasis on inheritability. It is, however, closely related to 
Anderson’s concept of ‘scalar property’ or Bloch’s ‘hierarchical 
complex of bonds between the man and the soil’ (Bloch 1965:116), 
both of which have been seriously forwarded as constitutive traits of 
feudal society. Bloch’s notion has been developed for the Swedish 
case by Winberg 198521, although he tends to use the word ‘feudal’ to 
characterize a certain ideological program during the property rights 
struggles of the 17th and 18th century, when the very concept of 
ownership was being redefined (1985:80f: the ‘feudal doctrine’). In 
my focus, the earlier ‘hierarchical complex’ would be more feudal. 
Serfdom and manors – focus IX 
The lack of serfdom is another standard reason for designating 
Sweden a non-feudal society, but among the Marxist definitions 
predominating within focus IX [b] there are several formulations 
quite compatible with the Swedish case. If we follow Rodney Hilton, 
the facts that Swedish peasants disposed over their means of 
production, but were deprived of their surplus product through extra-
economic coercion would put skattebönder (freeholders on taxable 
land) as well as frälsebönder (tenants on tax-exempt, noble-owned 
land) firmly within the continuum of different shades of peasant 
dependence varying in its degree of oppressiveness22.  
                                                   
20 Fritz 1972:121 gives examples of secondary mortgage enfeoffment, 122: 
concerning the source material: ‘to a quite large extent second- and third-hand 
impignation’. 1973:93 describes the subimpignation of Kalmar, which Vicke von 
Vitzen evidently came to hold as a sub-fief under several successive fiefholders, 
who ‘all in turn became indebted to him’, so that Kalmar became his own 
collateral. (My translations.) 
21 The quote from Bloch on page one even supplies the name for the book 
(‘ramifications’). 
22 As has generally been argued by Swedish historians with a Marxist inclination.  
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The subcategory which I refer to as IX [a], where the manor is in 
focus rather than the serf, corresponds to a long-ranging Swedish 
debate, partly intersecting with the regional separatism issue. The 
later policy of ‘scattered estates’ may have been preceded by a period 
of consolidated manors as suggested by Andrae 1960. Recent attempts 
at estate reconstitution (Rahmqvist 1996, Berg 2003) suggest a pattern 
of early landowning supporting his interpretation, and if the proposed 
change in aristocratic landownership strategies occurs at some point 
further into the 14th century, it should fit nicely into my oligarchic 
centralism hypothesis23.  
However, also manors of a more dispersed character could be 
functional economic enterprises, where the landlord often strived to 
utilize his access to different regional specializations (Munktell 1982, 
Ferm 1990), and a quite serious case might even be made for the later 
institution of bruk (the standard format of ironworks, sawmills etc far 
into the 19th century – at least) as a kind of quasi-industrialized semi-
feudal manor, partly dependent on labour dues and/or wages in kind, 
and held under the command of an entrepreneur carrying the 
blatantly feudal title of patron. 
The Marxist analysis is, however, not exhausted by identifying the 
form of surplus exaction. At least in Hilton’s version the struggle for 
rent becomes the dynamic element of the feudal mode of production. 
The fact that peasants are not separated from the means of 
production (land, animals and tools) is what requires ‘extra-economic 
coercion’ in order to extract the surplus from the peasant into whose 
hands it is collected. Thus the ‘tug-of-war’ over the agrarian surplus 
becomes the internal dynamic of feudalism24. 
Fighting for land – focus IV 
Focus IV (military service in exchange for land) may also seem 
questionable from the Swedish standpoint, as horseman’s service was 
in general rewarded not by land, but by tax exemption for land 
already possessed, according to King Magnus Barnlock’s statute of 
1280 (known as Alsnö stadga from the place of issue). However, 
                                                   
23 See chapter 3. In that case it would be efforts towards collective control over the 
nascent state that made aristocrats scatter their holdings. This must have led to 
greater collective control as well as to a higher degree of interdependence – a 
‘cartelization’ of seigneurial resources in order to maximize their collective stake 
in central power, instead of a cut-throat competition for the most attractive 
regions. 
24 Hilton offers this conclusion – based on his own research but also on Duby’s –
within the context of the Dobb-Sweezy debate (Hilton(ed) 1978). Anderson has 
further developed this analysis, to which I also subscribe (see below). 
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military service as a precondition of noble privilege might seem like a 
fairly equivalent basis. Cf Birgitta Fritz’ discussion of a unique 
example of a letter of fidelity from the early 14th century: 
It is, however, hard to determine to what extent the military service 
is connected to the enfeoff-ment itself, as a fiefholder owed his lord 
the king armed service in general. He owed it for the tax exemption 
he probably enjoyed and for the homage relationship 
[mansförhållande], which was the basis of the very enfeoffment. 
(1972:105. My translation) 
Also, when horseman service for noble property became quantified 
towards the end of the Middle Ages the quota seem to have been 
applied to enfeoffed land (län) as well as to allodial noble land 
(Nilsson 1947:18-21). However, as Reynolds concludes that 
 Outside England the obligation to military service, so often seen as 
a key feature of ‘feudal tenure’, was generally nominal. (1994:69), 
we might not have to worry too much about the military aspect of 
feudalism being underplayed in the Swedish case, where loss of 
noble privilege due to neglected horseman service was enforced 
throughout the 16th century (Forssell 1869-75, Jägerskiöld 1945, 
Nilsson 1947, Samuelsson 1993)25. 
Remaining foci – I: ties of personal dependence  
The remaining foci have seldom entered the Swedish delimitational 
debate, and may be delt with in a more cursory way. To the extent 
that they seem compatible with the Swedish evidence, this can 
however be said to support a more encompassing definition of 
Sweden as a feudal society. 
As to number I, the word ‘vassal’ has seldom been used in 
Sweden,  except in connection with enfeoffment to (or by) non-
Scandinavians,  but ties of personal dependence have certainly been 
salient, and other terms with a ‘feudal’ flavour have been in much 
more frequent use, like ‘fidelis’ or ‘man’ in the sense connected to the 
relationship of homage. I do not claim that these words ‘mean’ vassal 
in any supposedly strict sense, pace Reynolds 1994:X, where she 
points out occasions where editors have supplanted the ’technical 
terms’ of feudalism for presumed synonyms found in the original 
                                                   
25 Also cf Reynolds’ comment on ‘[r]estraint in making demands on the powerful’ as 
applying to military service (referring to France in the period 900-1100): ‘there is 
no evidence that French nobles in general held their lands on the formal 
conditions that they should serve in their lords’ armies, let alone that they should 
provide any specified amount of service’ (Reynolds 1994:131). 
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texts, and thus created the illusion of a ubiquitous and consistent 
nomenclature. 
  I only point out that they are signs of the importance of personal 
dependence relations. 
 ‘Fully developed feudalism’ – focus III 
The so-called ‘union between benefice and vassalage’ 26 (focus III) 
often taken to mark the full development of feudal relations, was 
discussed by Löfquist in his pathbreaking study of Swedish 
knighthood. He pointed out some evidence for the early 14th century 
(1935:85ff) but concluded that it seemed to ‘belong to the 
characteristics of the Nordic länsväsende, that these components 
never became fully locked or chained to each other’27. He did not, 
however, suggest that this made the knights and esquires of medieval 
Sweden non-feudal.  
It is a feudal terminology that rules, and usual feudal habits and 
notions, that determine the bond between king and man, that finds 
expression in letters of fidelity and revocation, and that dictate the 
men’s demands on their lord. (loc cit; my translation) 
Still he saw the feudal influence as limited: ‘It determined form 
more than content’, but this was primarily due to the ‘watered down’ 
version of homage. Towards the end of the Middle Ages to be 
someone’s ‘man’ was becoming more or less indistinguishable from 
other kinds of service. Löfqvist’s reservations about Swedish (Nordic) 
feudalism thus relate to the late-medieval period, and are based on 
the attenuation of focus I (vassalage)28 
To Reynolds this criterion is one of the most serious sources of 
confusion within the feudalism discourse: 
where the concept of vassalage has been particularly misleading has 
been in the suggestion that there was a period – whenever historians 
put it for their respective areas – at which the ‘union of fief and 
                                                   
26  Reynolds 1994:33: ‘at best little more than a neat but meaningless phrase’. 
27 1935:215 (my translation; ‘fully locked’ stands for fastlåst. Länsväsende is, like the 
German Lehnswesen, from which it is borrowed, both a more general term than 
‘feudalism’ or féodalité, more abstractly descriptive than theoretical, and  more 
restrictive, pace Reynolds 1994 who only notes the second distinction: ‘that is, 
feudalism in its supposedly more precise sense’(396) or ‘feudo-vassalic 
relations’(473). 
28 NB in a very restrictive interpretation: when other kinds of personal dependence 
converge with stricte sensu vassalage, the feudal character of society dissolves, in 
his view. 
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vassalage’ altered the general pattern of relations so that ‘personal’ 
relations were ‘territorialized’. (1994:46) 
‘Three dimensions of seigneurial power – focus III 
If the combination of vassalage and fief is dubious enough, the 
further addition of justice rights to form focus VI [a] would seem to 
be even more unlikely, but in a triple focus it is reduced to one single 
side of the triangle, and will therefore carry much less weight29. The 
three-dimensional seigneurie emphasized by Duby (in The Three 
Orders) may be seen as another way of formulating the same 
phenomenon: seigneurie banale becomes the final complement to 
domestic lordship and landlordship. However, the Swedish judiciary 
system was based upon ting, local moots (usually hundred moots – 
häradsting – or regional moots – landsting), presided over by 
magnate or gentry judges, but also involving a jury, which at least at 
the hundred level consisted of peasants. The question at issue here, 
though, would be: who is the judge, and what other authority might 
he possess (see below)? 
Castles and feuds – focus VIb 
 The Castle as an integrating factor for the three-dimensional 
lordship – VI [b] – may appear relevant in the few cases where castle 
fief, allodial estates and judicial office coincide30, but in general the 
top-down structure of castle fiefs did not coincide with the bottom-
up31 structure of hundred moots and lawspeakerships. During the 
rebellion (1434-1440) against Eric of Pomerania32 we can see how 
potentially explosive this tension is. The gentleman miner and 
peasant-levy commander Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson successfully 
                                                   
29 I e the most important aspect is no longer the specific form of the personal 
dependence and the land grant, but their combination with localized and 
personalized justice rights.   
30 Among the regional subcaptains of the rebellion appointed  by the revolutionary 
council of 1435, Knut Jonsson (Tre Rosor), was also the lawspeaker of the same 
region, which might appear as a step towards an integrated lordship. Further 
examples in Chapter 4. 
31 I will argue that the top level – the lawspeakers – were, at least in the beginning, 
aristocratic magnates closely related to the Crown. See chapter 4. Still, the judicial 
structure of villages, parishes, hundreds and provinces (lawspeakerships) is built 
on conflict-resolution in communities solved on the appropriate level and moved 
upwards only when unresolved. In contrast to this, castle fiefs and bailiwicks 
were structures for economic exaction and the physical (when necessary) 
enforcement of central state or local power requirements. 
32 See below, Chapter 3. 
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negotiates the surrender of a large number of castles, including the 
castle of Örebro, which he ransoms with his own money  and take 
over. Then he is murdered by the son of Bengt Stensson (Natt och 
Dag), the regional lawspeaker, in what is usually (but with 
surprisingly vague specification) described as a ‘private feud’.  
Immediately afterwards the murderer, Magnus Bengtsson, tries to 
capture the castle and thus to merge both of these dimensions of 
regional feudal power within his father’s ‘constituency’. He fails, 
however, and the next time we hear about the castle (about one year 
later) Engelbrekt’s brother-in-arms Erik Puke has also failed to capture 
it; this time from a deputy of the Marshal Karl Knutsson (Bonde), 
Engelbrekt’s rival for the captaincy of the rebellion33. The 
lawspeakership appears to remain with Bengt Stensson, though, 
perhaps even during the period when the Stensson brothers34 appear 
as leaders of a royalist counterrevolution, and while most of the other 
lawspeakers still seem to be preserving a united front against both of 
the contenders for the Crown35. 
The case of mortgage fiefs 
As Birgitta Fritz has argued (1972:121), the Mecklenburg period 
(1365-89) witnessed a transformation in the function of mortgage 
fiefs. They were no longer just a financial emergency measure, but 
had become a standard method of compensation for assistance in the 
conquest and occupation of Sweden. The financial investment at first 
appearing in the guise of a loan made against the security of a fief, 
would in such a case silently have been transformed into a kind of 
retroactive purchase sum for a share in the venture, endowing the 
fiefholder with a stake in the juridico-political-fiscal power of the 
state. To me this appears simply as just another variant of ‘feudal 
disintegration’. Idiosyncratic – yes, aberrant – maybe, but if we do not 
even describe such a blatant conflation of economic, political and 
judicial authority as feudal, the term would be of very limited use 
indeed.  
The further complications resulting from Bo Jonsson’s strategy, 
where such fiefs are bought up with money largely borrowed from 
                                                   
33 How this actually occurred has not been commented upon by any of the 
historians I have read, not even those discussing Karl Knutsson’s possible 
complicity to the murder. 
34 Nils Stensson (Natt och Dag), a former co-commander of Engelbrekt’s, becomes 
King Eric’s Marshal in 1439 backed by his brothers Bengt and Bo. 
35 Eric of Pomerania and Karl Knutsson (Bonde) – provided that the latter has 
already set his mind on the Crown by this time, which seems likely. 
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the church are impossible to analyze until we have an up-to-date 
analysis of the period. As the rationale for such purchases seems to 
be largely political, a device to put land outside the reach of the 
monarch, this may compound the analytical difficulties beyond 
possible disentanglement. Such actions became possible through the 
‘feudal’ lack of a clear separation between economic and political 
control, which might, however, deserve a focus of its own36. 
The world of the knights – focus VII and VIII 
Focus VII – dominance of the knightly class, appears to be quite 
incontrovertible, notwithstanding the importance and high degree of 
independence of the freeholding peasantry. As far as I can recall, no 
modern Swedish historian has claimed otherwise37, though some of 
the National Romanticist historians tended to interpret the members 
of the aristocratic ruling class as something more resembling 
prominent spokesmen for the yeomanry (bondehövdingar – ‘peasant 
chieftains’).  
What about VIII – ‘feudal society’ as an entire civilization as it was 
envisioned by Bloch38? That is probably what most of the Swedish 
historians finding the term useful have in mind, but of course a lot 
depends on how widely the concept is interpreted, and as I will 
argue for a very broad version, it may at this point be sufficient to 
notice that although Thomas Lindkvist and Dick Harrison – the 
                                                   
36 Aaron Gurevich (1970; Gurevitj 1979)  and Ellen Meiksins Wood (1981) have 
stressed this aspect most emphatically. 
37 There is a wide spectrum of variety, though, as to the degree of chivalric 
dominance vis-á-vis the counterbalance of independent freeholders. 
Reinholdsson 1997 and Småberg 2004 tend toward the emphasis of knightly 
dominance, while Myrdal (1995, 1999) underlines the independent activities of 
the peasants. 
38 Which , I take it, does not necessary mean that Bloch’s definition has to be 
followed – later research has added new aspects, nuances, and emphases. E A 
Brown’s list of factors in medieval society that should be studied to achieve a 
broader understanding may very well be read as a checklist for attemptr to 
improve on Bloch’s picture. 
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authors of the two current textbooks of medieval Swedish history39– 
take opposite viewpoints as to the relevance of the feudal label: their 
descriptions of Swedish medieval society are quite similar. Myrdal, in 
his agrarian history of the period, formulates a very broad version 
which I will have reason to return to. 
Compromising with Chaos – contestability and ambiguity. 
Ward’s focus X and my focus XI 
At the end of Ward’s list is the alternative which he himself tends to 
advocate – ‘a compromise with chaos’ (focus X). I would prefer to 
interpret this as: ‘a compromise between order and chaos’, a sort of 
makeshift attempt to structure a world in flux – or perhaps many 
overlapping attempts to create different kinds of order? And, in that 
case, isn’t chaos just the other attempts seen from outside? I think that 
there might be other foci worth considering besides those highlighted 
by Ward40, but here I will limit myself to the focus which I find most 
fruitful, and which is arguably just a more positive angle on focus X.  
Perry Anderson and Aaron Gurevich have both in their quite 
different ways ended up emphasizing the polystructurality of feudal 
society, and, as I will argue, the dynamic potential of the times and 
regions where the description ‘feudal’ seems most appropriate, is best 
captured by focusing on this aspect. However, another aspect closely 
related to this trait, is the ensuing ambiguity of just about any aspect 
of society. The ownership of land is a classic point of contention not 
only in the ex post historical analysis of feudal societies, but within 
the ongoing development of these societies in their own time as well, 
and this has the further consequence of a general contestability, not 
only of landownership, but of several – maybe even all – institutions 
of these societies. My own [focus XI] (or should it be X[b]?) I 
therefore formulate as: “ambiguous and contestable polystructurality”. 
                                                   
39 Lindkvist describes Sweden as ‘feudal’ in the broad sense, while Harrison discards 
the term. Harrison 2002c, Lindkvist-Sjöberg 2003. Lindkvist’s co-author Maria 
Sjöberg covers the early modern period, and might therefore be thought to fall 
outside the comparison. This is not quite adequate, as analyses of Swedish 
feudalism often stretch into the 17th or even 18th century. The third volume of 
the five-part Swedish agrarian history (Det svenska jordbrukets historia), written 
by Janken Myrdal, is subtitled ‘Agriculture under feudalism 1000-1700’. However, 
Sjöberg’s analysis has a detachedly impartial attitude to the different and 
conflicting theories she accounts for, and therefore tends to fall outside in 
another way. 
40 For instance, ’scalar property’ (Anderson) or ’lack of separation between economy 
and politics’ (Wood), or why not the original meaning of the concept, which still 
seems to be the one closest to the intuitive use of the term: ‘obsolete privileges 
for landowners’? 
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The tug-of-war over the agricultural surplus product, which Hilton 
and Anderson put at the centre of the economic dynamic of Medieval 
Europe of course fits into this focus – it is formulated in order to 
accommodate such dynamics and to emphasize their context. The 
tension between the different elements uneasily ‘compromised’ 
together in the feudal synthesis41 allow peasants to consider their 
rights to the fruits of intensified labour self-evident, while at the same 
time their landlords are equally confident about their property rights 
in any surplus yielded (cf Herlitz 1974 ch. IV). Thus it is the very 
ambiguities of feudal society that make property rights so contestable, 
and make possible a dynamic struggle over the control and 
expansion of the agricultural surplus.  
The ‘emulation effects’ possible when many different systems 
coexist, overlap and compete, make a similar type of evolutionary 
dynamics possible within a (moderate level of) ‘feudal chaos’ as has 
been argued for the European state-system42; attempts to increase 
power over others lead to the attempts to create higher degrees of 
self-determination, and the tug-of-war between local communities 
and central states may lead in the long run to higher levels of 
collective power (the communities’ degree of control over external 
conditions) locally and centrally, as a resultant of the struggle for 
distributive power (power over others within the community).43 
A ‘family-type’ definition 
‘Feudalism’ in this sense becomes a comprehensive ‘family-type’ 
term (Wittgenstein), defined through the similarities that can be found 
between any two of the societies included, even if the same 
characteristics will not be evident in every comparison. Against this, it 
can be argued that only strict definitions can be made operational 
and thus truly scientific. This depends on how you use your theory. If 
deductive models that allow the formulation of unambiguous 
predictions which can be conclusively tested against objectively 
                                                   
41 Or, if we reserve the term synthesis for a true fusion of separate elements into a 
new entity, the competitive eclecticism which feudal societies tended to 
comprise. 
42 By Anderson and Jones, as well as Tilly, Mann and others. 
43 Cf Mann 1993; the terms are borrowed from Talcott Parsons. Bendix 1978:12 
discusses the ‘demonstration effect’ from an example by Pirenne: ‘The merchant 
and craft guilds of a few cities used force (in the eleventh century) to win 
recognition of their independent jurisdiction from feudal overlords. Agood many 
rulers took the hint and negotiated a settlement with their own towns before 
armed conflict occurred’.  
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measured data, are your only criterion for scientific method, then 
anything less than that can only aspire to narrative description. 
However, inductive thought is also an important and indispensible 
component of scientific reasoning44, and in the social sciences, purely 
deductive reasoning is rarely applicable, certainly not in cross-cultural 
comparations over time and space, where any model tends to turn 
into a caricature of limited applicability.  
                                                   
44 From where would concepts derive without induction? For an interesting 
discussion of comparative social thought, and the role of ‘analytic induction’ in 
the social sciences, see Skocpol-Somers 1980. 
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Marc Bloch’s classic definition45 has been criticized as ’over-
comprehensive’ – for containing far too many factors46 – which is why 
I think it can still be useful, although it would really need further 
amplification rather than reduction. E A Brown’s (1974:1087) wide 
check-list of what medieval historians should focus on instead of on 
the barren question of ‘feudal institutions’ can actually be taken as a 
blue-print for a maximum-norm definition of feudal society in the 
wide sense. The same thought seems to have occurred to Ward, who 
observes that she would fit nicely into focus VIII (feudalism as an 
entire society or type of civilization). 
Of course, it may be said that my discussion, and those whose 
arguments I am building on, are reductionist in an inverted sense: 
that the European diversity arguments are culturally solipsistic, and 
require as a backdrop a caricature of ‘non-European stagnation’ as 
simple-minded as a generalized Wittfogel thesis. If diversity is the 
key, Europe may offer too limited a range, it could be argued. 
Perhaps, but we still need to explain why Europe in some vital 
respects – including sustained economic growth, viability under 
military competition, and the hard-won privilege of holding our rulers 
accountable47 –  did, for a period, become dynamic enough to 
‘transform the world into its likeness’ (Hobsbawm in Hilton(ed)1978). 
This is still an important question, and although I would expect that 
similar dynamics appear in many places and times, we need a lot 
more knowledge and a lot more comparison48 before we can even 
begin to formulate a theory that applies to the whole of human 
history. Yet we already have to deal with the question: how can we 
preserve enough diversity in a world under strong homogenizing 
pressure?  
                                                   
45 And as his definition I would consider not only the almost universally quoted six 
semi-coloned clauses enumerated on page 1961:446, but at least the whole 
section 443-447, if not the whole of Feudal Society. 
46 Too many, that is, to function as a strict delimitational model according to the 
deductive-theory ideal. 
47 I e the ’Triple Miracle’ I discuss in Emilsson 1996. 
48 Minimally, we should be able to discuss the differences between development in 
the Yangtze Delta and Greater Yunnan in as much detail as we do with England 
and France. (as Brad DeLong’s commented on what will be needed to stay in the 
business of teaching economic history for more than five years, made after 
hearing a lecture by Kenneth Pomeranz. Three of those years have already 
passed) 
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‘Swedish feudalism’ – why does it matter? 
The reason I have kept insisting that almost all of the ingredients of 
the feudal mix have been present also in Sweden, is that I consider 
the feudal polystructurality to be the precondition and point of 
departure for the institutional evolution leading up to the ‘Triple 
Miracle’, and the constant ambiguity of ownership and authority to be 
the basis of the recurring contestation of relationships of power and 
subjugation. This is why feudal societies have a dynamic  potential, I 
will argue, following Hilton and Anderson, and the relevance of the 
Swedish example to this discussion requires a definition wide enough 
to include the Swedish experience. 
I will therefore go on to the discussion of these more general 
‘feudal’ dynamics, and return to the question of Sweden further on. 
Perry Anderson: Feudalism as dynamic 
polystructurality 
Anderson’s elastic definitions of feudalism are alternately generous 
and restrictive, culturally specific or universal, dogmatic49 or 
innovative. However, as I point out in Emilsson 1996:72, his central 
argument about the European advantage is constructed around a 
consistently dynamic conception of feudalism connecting the 
Hiltonian theoreme of rent-struggle as the prime mover of feudalism 
to his own explanation of the dynamic advantage of European state 
system. The feudal synthesis is envisioned as a fusion of the complex 
institutional heritage of the ancient world (transmitted in different 
variants by the cities, the Church and the Empire), with the forms of 
community and collective jurisdiction of Germanic tribal society, 
thereby creating a ‘polystructural’ society endowing Europe with a 
uniquely wide repertory of alternative organizational models, making 
institutional innovation possible in several different ways. 
Eric Jones’ (1981) description of the European states system as  
‘a portfolio of competing and colluding polities whose spirit of 
competition was adapted to diffusing best practices’ (115)  
                                                   
49 At one point he argues as if a close enough reading of Marx’ polemical writings 
could carry evidential significance for a stricter definition of feudalism, though he 
at other places emphasizes the deficiencies in the historiography available to 
Marx. (Emilsson 1996:XX) 
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is quite compatible with Anderson’s and his persuasive exposition 
of these dynamics in chapter 6 of The European Miracle can be used 
to reinforce Anderson’s argument.  
The problematic concept of ‘fusion’ 
One of the weaker aspects of Anderson’s feudalism is the 
traditional conception of feudalism as a ‘fusion’ between Germanic 
and Ancient society. Bloch emphasized (1961:443) that the crucial 
aspect was the ‘forcibl[e] uniting [of] two societies originally at very 
different stages of development’ rather than the specific components 
of the two cultures, and Gurevich, who also emphasizes polystructure 
as a distinctive characteristic of feudal society, adding an important 
stress on the interaction between horizontal and vertical organization, 
usually speaks of ‘barbarian society’ as the non-Roman component, 
including Slavic and Celtic peoples as well as Germanic, and – in 
general – resisting the tempation to generalize it into a model. 
The term ‘Germanic’ is infelicitous because of its connotations in 
the directions of ethnicity, lingustic cohesion, forestland freedom, and 
mobile warbands. In Sweden, it is almost impossible to use, as we 
still have to struggle with the heritage of generations of historians 
making liberal use of Tacitus to supplement the meagre historic 
source material.  
In The European Miracle Eric Jones discusses the combination of 
what he describes as discussion of the ‘two strands’ of European 
heritage: The city life that developed around the Aegean, and the 
iron-age agricultural society ‘which found the rule of Rome a passing 
intrusion (1981:12f). This distinction might serve the same basic 
function as the Roman/Germanic dichotomy: to provide a starting-
point for the history of polystructurality.  
Chris Wickham: ‘peasant-based society’ and the role of 
 ‘Big men’ 
A somewhat more sophisticated alternative along similar lines is 
Wickham´s tentative category ‘peasant-based society’, which is 
interpreted through social-anthropological categories50, but is 
envisioned as an important element of hybrid medieval societies in 
general, interacting with elements of an aristocratic society (“which I 
am still content to call by the much-abused word ‘feudal’” /217/) and 
a system based on state tax-raising. In the contrasting examples 
                                                   
50 Wickham 1994:220, with reference to Stone Age Economics (London 1964) and 
other work by Marshall Sahlins. 
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provided, ninth-century Brittany is described as a case of the first two 
systems coexisting on more or less separate levels, while Iceland is 
used to illustrate a ‘purer’ form of ‘peasant-based society’. Such 
societies are not envisioned as egalitarian but the only way for the 
dominant members of the society to get their poorer neighbours to 
do as they said, would be to negotiate with them, like the goðar of 
Iceland, the machtierns of Brittany or the ‘big men’ of New Guinea: 
leaders who must personally construct their power over others, and 
whose ability to accumulate wealth is constrained by the necessity to 
provide what their followers expect from them, to prevent them from 
transferring their allegiance to someone else. (Wickham 1994:220) 
This discussion is obviously relevant to the history of Sweden, 
especially if we are careful not to fall into the trap of identifying 
Swedish peasant society with that of Iceland, a tradition as deeply 
rooted and as deformative as the Germanic one. Brittany might be a 
more adequate point of reference, as Sweden was also a ‘mixed case’ 
– that is: polystructural. Within the judicial system we can discern 
components of:  
1. ‘feudal’ dominance in the aristocratic sense,  
2. of ‘a system based on state tax-raising’,  
as well as  
3. ‘peasant-based’ institutions and the need to ‘personally 
construct power’.  
The Swedish hundred court was staffed by a jury of twelve 
peasants and led by a häradshövding (‘hundred sheriff’51), who in 
general belonged to the local gentry or semi-gentry rather than the 
real aristocracy – perhaps more so during the earliest period – but 
whose office seems to have been slowly subsumed into the general 
aristocratic patronage networks, until it turned into something more 
and more resembling a benefice. This process may well have some 
resemblance to Wickham’s examples from Brittany52, but from my 
perspective, the most important aspect would be the ‘polystructural’ 
survival of the hundred jury53, and thus of regular and habitual 
                                                   
51 Roberts translates häradshövding as ‘sheriff’, but as the area under their 
responsibilty was a hundred instead of a shire, I add this as a qualification: 
‘hundred sheriff’. On häradshövdingar, cf Almqvist 1954 (LDS), Claësson 1987, 
and Småberg 2004. 
52 Wickham 1994: 220-1, with references to Wendy Davies: Small Worlds, (London, 
1987) and JHM Smith: Province and Empire (Cambridge, 1992). 
53 And, as a precondition for this, lower instances of self-regulation and conflict 
resolution such as  the village moot (bystämma), the vestry or parish jury 
(sockennämnd), and – occasionally – thriding or farthing moots. 
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negotiation between noblemen and peasant representatives. Within 
this particular mixture even the aristocrats might have to construct his 
power personally. 
Balanced synthesis or scope of variation? 
Also, Anderson’s use of expressions like a ‘classical feudalism’ 
embodying a ‘balanced synthesis’, are leftovers from traditional 
conceptions of feudal society (cf Wickham 1994), while he should – 
to be true to the logic of his exposition – rather have emphasized the 
importance of the scope of variation between different institutional 
mixes.  
As I have argued earlier (Emilsson 1996:71), Anderson’s denotation 
of ‘feudalism’ is less to be understood as a set of societal structures 
than as a set of development paths, ‘trajectories’, tying the feudal 
dynamic to the further development of state-system interaction 
through his conception of a ‘displacement’ of feudal power (and 
thereby also feudal competition) towards ‘the top of the pyramid’, as 
a result of struggles ultimately founded on the tug-of-war over the 
agricultural surplus. Thus the early medieval coercive competition 
between rival knights and warlords moves step by step up to the 
level of full-scale war between states, tied into the dynamic 
interdependence of the wider European system like the knights were 
tied into the elastic inter-dependencies of feudal society. 
Dynamic possibilities of feudal society interpreted in  
this way: 
Where different institutional structures could co-exist within the 
same political unit, further societal development could follow 
different possible tracks: royal or imperial proto-state structures could 
compete with ‘feudal’ chains of devolved authority, royal and/or 
seigneurial retinues, guilds and leagues of different kinds, lordships 
based on ‘allodial’ possessions, manorial systems (whether of the 
Gutswirtschaft or Grundherrschaft variety), village communities, city 
networks, monastic or knightly orders, bishoprics, parishes54 and 
other ecclesiastical institutions etc. Which institutions that would win 
out and shape the further development of state and civil society, 
depended on local conditions as well as on Europe-wide tendencies 
and interactions. However, the differential outcomes ensured an even 
wider polystructural gamut. 
                                                   
54 In Sweden, the community of the parish was often more important than that of 
the village. 
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A political unit with a more efficient institutional structure could 
conquer others, and thus spread or be imitated by them55, or attract 
mobile elements such as merchants and money-changers, errant 
knights or mercenaries, clerics or other intellectuals, as well as groups 
of non-conforming refugees like Spanish Jews and French huguenots, 
adding further variety of experience and ideas to their new societal 
contexts56.  
If necessary, new institutional arrangements could also be created 
through analogy as when secular institutions have been modelled on 
ecclesiastical ones, or through the ‘resurrection’ of defunct models (In 
general: the Renaissance! More precisely: sophisticated institutional 
achievements such as ancient military-strategic theory or the property 
rights formulations within Roman jurisprudence.) 
The engine fuelling these developments is the struggle for the 
agricultural surplus between lords and peasants. A rising rent pressure 
forces the peasants to intensify agriculture, develop or adopt 
productivity-raising practices and to raise the output, in order to 
maintain their standard of life, while the demands of the seigneurial 
class, and, increasingly, also the state, are rising in order to finance 
the growing complexity of early-modern society57. 
Such a reinterpretation of feudal society would not really be 
vulnerable to Susan Reynolds’ criticism, but might rather be 
strengthened by it: if feudalism ‘in the strict sense’ is a mirage created 
by the efforts of late medieval professional lawyers to make sense of 
earlier customs, and to turn them into a coherent system compatible 
with the institutional structure of their own time, then a relevant 
analysis of the dynamics of the ‘actually existing’ medieval society, 
would have to make itself completely independent of all ‘feudist’ 
traditions.  
If we view the state-system dynamic as an extension or later phase 
of Anderson’s ‘feudal dynamic’58 the whole medieval-to-modern 
period might be fitted into a loose evolutionary framework with a 
                                                   
55  As Sweden’s organizational innovations in efficient fiscal and military statebuilding 
was emulated by Brandenburg/Prussia and Russia (Anderson 1974b, Attman, 
Kan). 
56 In this manner Sweden also attracted an influx of tradesmen, military specialists 
etc, which were often “nationalized” through ennoblement (Nilsson 1990 , 
Roberts 1967). 
57 In Sweden the “see-saw” of parallel rises in rents and taxes adds further 
components to this mechanism. 
58 Explicitly argued by Brenner 1987 under the somewhat infelicitous label of 
‘political accumulation’. 
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strong affinity to Nelson-Winter’s theory of evolutionary economics 
(as developed for modern economics). 
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Nelson-Winter’s evolutionary economics 
Nelson and Winter (1982) succeeded to transfer the logic of neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory into the study of human society 
bypassing the pitfalls of simplistic sociobiology through a very 
important reformulation: instead of using individuals59 as the units of 
competition analysis, they focus on behaviour, on competing 
practices. The mode of transmission is thus entirely different from that 
in biological evolution, where the unit of analysis – the gene – is 
transmitted through biological reproduction, and is selected or 
deselected through survival (and mating success). In the Nelson-
Winter model the practices of firms are transmitted through imitation, 
and selected or deselected within the decision process on the basis of 
success or failure. The relevance of this model to the kind of 
dynamics argued here for feudal society and for the European states-
system should be obvious.   
The problem of selection 
However, there is a crucial difference between the contexts of 
Nelson-Winter and of Anderson or Jones. Within modern economics, 
best practices are selected by capitalist functionaries whose common 
and consistent measure of success is profitability, and who can only 
survive as professional decision-makers if their performance in 
selecting is satisfactory at least in the medium run.  When it comes to 
the development of entire societies, the questions of which kinds of 
practices are selected, and where and how this is done, are much 
more complex and inconsistent 
                                                   
59  Or firms, as in other attempts. 
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‘Selection in two dimensions’ 
We might envision feudal Europe as organized through overlapping 
and partly competing institutional arrangements – ‘under 
construction’, as it were – subject to ‘survival of the fittest’-type 
selection in (at least) two simultaneous dimensions: economic 
efficiency and viability under military competition. A case could be 
made also for the selection of institutions along the dimension of 
persuasive power; a diversity of competing political institutions is of 
course an almost trivial component in the historical development of 
democracy60, but a similar case has also been argued for juridical 
institutions61: 
On the other hand, there was an instrument which we might call 
‘institutional competition’. The authority of princes and kings did not 
deny either the existence or the legitimacy of pre-existing or in any 
case non-state statutes, customs, and jurisdictions, but placed its own 
laws, officials , and jurisdiction alongside them in an attempt to gain 
ground at their expense. (Padoa-Schioppa 1997:357) 
Military selection 
Within the military dimension, the selection process appears quite 
straightforward62: 
After all, military competition was the profession and ideology of 
the knightly class (cf Duby 1985), and the ‘displacement’ of coercive 
power and inter-feudal rivalry ‘towards the top of the feudal pyramid’ 
which Anderson describes, is a process where states and rulers will 
have an ever stronger incentive to intervene into the procedure of 
selection. 
                                                   
60 The attempt to reconstitute the Third Estate as a General Assembly during the 
French revolution would hardly have succeeded if the invitation to members 
from the other Estates had been flatly refused. Reform Bills and other competing 
proposals for the extension of franchise are even more obvious examples. 
61 With explicit reference to the Swedish coexistence of provincial codes and Land 
Law (Lindkvist 1997:215), as well as to the competition between royal and 
seigneurial or manorial justice in France and England. 
62 This dimension is stressed by Brenner: “The feudal state can itself be seen to 
have evolved over time through a ‘field of natural selection’ constituted by intra-
lordly, politico-military competition and by lord-peasant struggle, with a long-run 
tendency, within the European feudal economy as a whole, for ever larger, more 
complex, and more coercively effective states to win out, or be selected” 
(Brenner 1996:.249). He seems to discern no economic dimension of selection, 
though. 
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Economic selection 
 The economic dimension is more difficult to overview. To a 
certain extent, the need to accumulate means of coercion will have as 
a corollary the necessity of accumulating the financial resources63 
required to achieve this. However, political measures to increase 
military capacity (alliances, the exchange of privileges for obligations, 
subinfeudation, conscription, press gangs, piracy, encouraging 
technical innovations etc) could hardly be brought into purely 
economic calculations at a time when stable and continuous markets 
hardly existed except in the most basic necessities (grain, salt etc), 
when the art of efficient accounting was something of a well-kept 
trade secret, state budgets were rudimentary, and the concept of 
alternative costs unimaginable64. Furthermore, the yardstick for 
success in this respect – military efficiency – was not convertible into 
monetary units anyway (except for free-wheeling military 
entrepreneurs). 
Indirect pressures for efficiency 
Still, alternative ways of financing the same measure could be 
weighed against each other, and the increasingly frequent use of 
credit entailed an economic pressure as an ex post incentive for cost-
cutting and rationalization. In these ways, an indirect pressure to 
select economically efficient routines would appear as a by-product. 
Of course there also existed a purely economic interest in obtaining 
the means to finance a state at all, and with state expenditures rising 
in step with increasing ambitions, including but not limited to strictly 
military goals, there was soon a constant pressure for more money. 
The demonstration effect of how increasing trade could make a 
country rich and powerful, made the Netherlands, and later England, 
into ‘reference societies’ (Bendix 1978:292) which other countries 
strove to emulate, and though the colonial booty of Spain may have 
lured some rival states into wasting resources on unsuccessful 
                                                   
63 I avoid the term ‘capital accumulation’ in this context, as it would blur the 
distinction between: indirect consequences of extra-economic pressure (which is 
what is argued here) and the purely economic incentives and compulsions 
resulting from capitalist market competition (as in the Marxist analysis of fully 
developed capitalist dynamics). 
64 NB: As I argue the salience of the feudal dynamic quite far into the modern era I 
have to add that these strictures refer to the earlier stages of the process. As 
they cease to apply, military competition ties more and more self-evidently into 
the logic of economic competition, and the two selection processes tend to 
merge. 
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colonizing ventures, the emulation effect still served to turn the focus 
of attention onto profit. Even if states appear as selectors in this 
argumentation, the units of evolution are – as in Nelson-Winter’s 
theory – behavioural routines and not organizations: the economic 
policies of the competing states.  
States have traditionally been the subjects in evolutionary theories, 
which makes for uncomfortable circularities in the argumentation: the 
states appear to select themselves. Even in many of the more 
sophisticated variants – as for instance, within the analysis of Hendrik 
Spruyt – this circularity tends to remain. 
Evolutionary political science: Hendrik Spruyt 
Hendrik Spruyt’s evolutionary conception of institutional change 
(1994), adresses the question of how ‘the (sovereign) state’ won over 
its ‘competitors’: other types of political organizations. He does not 
consider other forms of political organizations to qualify as states, 
neither the original competing ‘institutional orders’ of empire, church 
and feudal lordships, out of which the competing forms of sovereign 
monarchy, city-state and city league grew; nor the city-states and city-
leagues within the posited second phase of insitutional competition 
which is his real field of inquiry. Although he acknowledges in 
footnotes that the word ‘state’ could be given a wider denotation, he 
chooses not to do so, but reserves the term for the type of state 
which emerged out of the sovereign monarchy.  
As far as I can understand, this is because his focus is set on states 
as the fundamental units of the state-system. This, however, embeds 
the term in a teleology quite analogous to that resulting from taking 
nation-states as units of analysis65.  
Spruyt makes the important point that the types of units change 
over time: the state (in his sense) did not exist in the early Middle 
Ages, and may be on he way out in the future. His analysis is an 
interesting attempt to evade unilinearity (cf 1994:20), but in order to 
render his inquiry easier to grasp, he postulates a two-stage model of 
institutional competition which imposes its own logic on the analysis. 
Surely empires, churches and ‘feudal’ forms of lordship were still 
taking part in the same ‘organizational competition’ as were sovereign 
states, city-states and city-leagues during his ‘second stage’ (cf Tilly 
1990)? The two-phase model thus eliminates a series of possible 
comparisons from the discussion, as well as the important aspect of 
                                                   
65 And also to the teleological aspects he criticizes in Wallerstein and Anderson 
(Spruyt 1994:19). 
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interaction between more primitive and further developed institutions, 
which Bloch considered to be the fundamental aspect of feudalism 
(Bloch 1961:443). 
When he criticizes the general discussion on war as a selection 
mechanism, he makes things too easy for himself by attacking a 
straw-man hypothesis:  
The prevalent view that war is the all-decisive selective mechanism 
needs to be amended. Warfare did not obliterate the alternatives to 
the state. There were no decisive battles to end the Hanse league or 
the Italian city-states. (Spruyt 1994:178)  
Well, did there have to be? To drop out of the military competition 
when you realize that no longer have the edge in naval warfare is a 
way of accepting defeat that would not require losing one decisive 
battle but certainly at least a few small ones66. 
Basically, this is what Spruyt himself admits:  
War did not work as an evolutionary process that selected among 
types of units, but it did indicate to political elites and social groups 
which type of organization was the more efficient, and they 
subsequently adopted the most competitive institutional form.  
That is: the consciousness of the necessity of having to be able to 
survive warfare acted as a competitive pressure. This, I take it, is what 
most people who discuss this mechanism really mean. I doubt that 
anyone has seriously forwarded so simplistic an idea of military 
competition, as that which Spruyt objects to. But even in Spruyt’s 
formulation, war is the selection mechanism. The selection, though, is 
– as Spruyt points out – made by people inside the state, not by the 
state itself as a collective actor.  
Furthermore: in an evolutionary perspective, I think it is more 
fruitful to say that they selected routines – in this case policies – than 
that they selected institutions. Only when routines become repeatedly 
and habitually selected do they deserve to be called institutions (see 
the argument below). 
Individual and collective selection 
If we return to Nelson-Winter’s focus it should be clear that states 
were by no means the only actors who could select efficient routines 
                                                   
66 Napoleon certainly lost through one big final battle, but how typical was 
Waterloo? We can in retrospect see that Poltava marked the death-knell of the 
Swedish imperial state, but it certainly was not sufficient to make Charles XII 
pack up and start tending his garden. 
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for imitation67. Although merchants typically preferred to pursue 
privileges rather than engage in competition, this left space for new 
categories emerging ‘within the cracks of the system’.  
Merchants disfavoured by the privilege-granting regimes, tried to 
find ways to circumvent the regulation, for instance through 
approaching the rulers of other polities68. ‘Interlopers’69 were attracted 
to potentially lucrative markets, thus eroding monopolies, sharpening 
competition, and creating a pressure for price convergence70. 
Although money-lenders found many ways to by-pass the interest 
ban, the difficulty of charging enough to offset the risk, would have 
tended to make them more risk-averse. While this can hardly have 
promoted the emergence of capitalism, it could have served as a 
purge of the most inefficient enterprises, and thus as a factor 
deselecting uneconomic routines. 
Imitation of best practices 
Imitation of best practices should, on the whole, have been a self-
reinforcing tendency, as princes, warriors, merchants, artisans and 
cultivators who took this into account should have had a higher 
survival rate than those who didn’t bother or understand. 
I do not mean to say that capitalism emerged naturally from efforts 
to do a good job; just that growth, and to some extent economic 
rationality, are possible also in a pre-capitalist context71. This cannot 
explain the transition to capitalism, but in the process some of the 
preconditions will have been produced72. 
Collective selection of informal institutions  
Another approach to the problem of selecting the most viable 
institutions – which is really what is at stake here – we can find via 
                                                   
67 It is only fair to mention that Spruyt also puts great emphasis on imitation 
(‘mimicry’). 
68 Thus competitors of the VOC chartered their East India Companies in Denmark or 
Sweden. 
69 The important role of interlopers is emphasized both within Ekelund-Tollison 
1981, and Brenner 1993, notwithstanding the contrasting political biases of their 
respective analyses. 
70 Which took a long time to emerge to a measurable extent. O´Rourke-Williamson 
find only slight evidence for price convergence before the 1820’s. 
71 Cf Persson 1988 for a general discussion of this problematic. 
72 Also cf Jones 1988, where he argues that extensive growth is a wide-spread 
historical phenomenon, and a precondition for intensive growth, i e increasing 
productivity. 
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North’s discussion of ‘informal institutions’, which are really patterns 
of behaviour, habitual actions, or ‘unwritten rules’ (the fullest 
discussion can be found in North 1990, passim). When a pattern of 
behaviour tends to be repeated in a predictable way, it has become 
“institutionalized”, has developed into an institution, and in this 
manner institutions can be collectively selected. If peasants in 
precarious situations tend to turn to a strong local nobleman for 
support, strengthening vertical networks, or if they tend to turn to 
their peers within the village, parish or hundred, strengthening 
horizontal networks, different patterns emerge and are 
institutionalized through what is in effect a collective selection 
process73.  
The ‘feudal’ polystructurality, however, comprised much more than 
just a shifting balance between the principles of allegiance and peer 
support. It contained a whole gamut of different, competing and/or 
complementary networks, basing themselves on protection and/or 
plunder, on cooperation or competition in the fields of production or 
consumption, on mutual defense or social exclusion, on religion 
and/or warfare, on legitimacy or on naked power74. 
The ‘feudal realization problem’ 
Surplus realization under capitalism and feudalism 
Under capitalism, ‘realization’ means converting commodities into 
money, so that the surplus value or profit75 – the difference between 
value invested and value produced – can be realized, made real (in 
contrast to the merely potential profit attained when the commodities 
have been produced, but not yet sold). Under feudalism76, a 
somewhat analogous realization problem exists: the lord can extract 
                                                   
73 The contrast between the resultant class conditions is Brenner’s fundamental 
argument for the different dynamics in Western and Eastern Europe. The contrast 
between Northern and Southern Italy is in Putnam 1993 ascribed to factors which 
are also related to the difference between vertical and horizontal networks. 
74 Cf Bisson’s discussion of violentia in the ‘feudal revolution’ debate. 
75 To make the contrast between capitalist and pre-capitalist conditions more easily 
visible, I deliberately conflate terms pertaining to different levels of abstraction in 
the analysis of capitalism. I will also try not to indulge in too much Marxese, as I 
believe that these questions should be important to discuss, whatever evaluation 
(and interpretation) of Marxian theory one happens to hold.    
76 I purposely avoid discussing how general this problem is. Obviously, analogous 
problematics have existed within a wide variety of societies, but my present 
discussion is limited to the feudal version. 
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the surplus product from his tenants, but unless he can convert it into 
the necessities of life on the lordly level, he cannot reproduce himself 
as a lord. Without this conversion he would be able to eat and live 
like a very wealthy peasant, but he cannot live like a lord77. Meat, 
wine, expensive spices, fine garments, well-bred horses, skilfully 
crafted weapons and armour have to be procured by means of the 
grain, butter, wool, salted pork, dried fish or whatever goods are 
produced by his peasants. 
This is what I call the ‘feudal realization problem’78.  There are 
several ways of dealing with it.  Basically, the lord can take it upon 
himself to solve it, and accept the ensuing transaction costs; he can 
shift the burden onto his peasants, or he can use a middleman. Each 
of these routes will lead to a marketplace, close by or at a distance, 
and thus the very exaction of feudal rent requires trade, even long-
distance trade, thereby promoting the growth of cities as a 
requirement of the feudal reproduction cycle (Hibbert 1978, Hilton 
1978, Merrington 1978). 
The coexistence of different ways of solving this problem adds to 
the flexibility and polystructurality of feudal society. Commutation of 
produce or labour rent into money rent means shifting the problem 
onto the tenants, and thus promoting the growth of peasant markets, 
but commutation was often reversible: lords who retained the 
possibility to revert could insulate themselves against the corrosive 
effects of inflation79.  The various systems of realization interact with 
the form of rent and the organization of the manor, and the vices or 
virtues of each such combination for the parties involved, will result 
in a conflict or compromise whose outcome amounts to a ‘natural’ 
selection of the fittest alternative, given the balance of class forces80. 
Swedish expansionism as path dependence 
A seldom acknowledged motive for Swedish expansionism and for 
the ‘historical compromise’ (Englund) between crown and nobility 
which was formed around the expansionist policy, is the fiscal 
opportunity for expansive militarism presented by the medieval Land 
                                                   
77  ‘Minimally, his castle had to be a center of lavish display’ (Brenner 1987). 
78  Note that in the feudal case it is the use value of the surplus that has to be 
transformed. Under capitalism it is an increase in exchange value that has to 
materialize. 
79 Hilton 1978, Aston-Philpin 1985. Dovring 1951 and Herlitz 1974 for the Swedish 
case. 
80 Cf the variety of examples brought up in the Brenner debate (Aston-Philpin 
1985, passim). 
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Law. The only open discussion I have found, is, of course, by 
Lindegren81, who has – since at least 1980 – constantly argued the 
externalization of class struggle as the fundamental impetus behind 
Swedish expansionism. He considers it to be no more than a local 
Swedish version of a general feudal development, and argues that it 
is part of the mechanism driving the military competition between 
early modern states. In his analysis it becomes an important link 
between feudal competition and the military state formation. Here I 
will not discuss how general such dynamics are – Lindegren makes 
an interesting case for France, but what about Spain and Holland?82 – 
but will explore Swedish expansionism as a possible case of path 
dependence, which of course implies that other paths should have 
been viable alternatives.  
I do not think that Eric XIV (1560-8) was forced to venture into 
protection-selling in the Baltic area (cf Glete 2002:185), but there 
were certainly also later junctures at which a return to non-
expansionist strategies would have been feasible. The very last phase 
of the Thirty-years War – the struggle for economic ‘satisfaction’ – 
was, as Sven A Nilsson has shown (1971, 1990), a clear case of 
economic lock-in, where projected gains already consumed in 
advance had to be cashed in before peace could be affordable. 
Somewhere in between these dates the point of no return must have 
been passed. 
Let’s return to the Land Law: according to this law – and, as I will 
argue, the breadth of the alliance againt Eric of Pomerania83, and the 
principal lawspeakers’ support for the insurgent peasants, had already 
tied the aristocratic leadership to the principle of taxation by consent 
–extraordinary taxes were only permissible in a few carefully 
specified cases: coronations, royal marriages, defensive warfare and 
castle-building. Thus the ‘extra surplus’ possible to exact during wars 
was not transferable to other state expenses, unless Sweden entered 
                                                   
81 Most consistently in Lindegren 2000. His argument is interesting and important, 
but the article is marred by an unclear exposition of war loss calculations, 
resulting in a heavily exaggerated percentage of Swedish war losses during the 
Imperial Age. 
82 Cf Glete 2002, Ch.3 (Spain) and Ch. 4 (the Netherlands). The experiences of 
France during the Hundred Years’ War, referred to in Lindegren p 174 have 
certain obvious similarities to those of Sweden during the more than 160 years 
of intermittent warfare starting with Valdemar Atterdag’s recapture of Scania in 
1360. To generalize from two similar cases may lead to results of limited 
applicability. 
83 Especially during the part of the rising dominated by Engelbrekt 1434-35 (see 
chapter 3). 
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into a permanent state of war, which would also permit the exaction 
of  peasant conscripts84, who might in this context be viewed as a 
very specialized form of labour rent or corvée. These additional fiscal 
resources would not have been available to the state in peacetime, 
and must thus – after the possibility of exploiting them had become 
habitual – have formed a strong incitement for continuing warfare85. 
The constant negotiation of war resources slowly became 
institutionalized, especially after the summoning of hundred 
representatives for such purposes had become routine during the 
Civil War, and when the Diet was finally regulated into its definitive 
four-Estate pattern, the Peasant Estate had become a permanent 
component of the political representation. 
This is a classically pure example of path dependence logic: even if 
increasing returns from continued warfare dried up, decreasing 
returns from reverting to an economy of peace combined with 
prohibitive readjustment costs locked Sweden into perpetual militarism 
– at least until the Great Reduction transformed the whole 
institutional structure86. 
                                                   
84 The use of peasant conscripts is also a Swedish peculiarity closely tied to its late 
medieval history (see below). Cf Lindegren 1980 and later. Lindegren has 
repeatedly emphasized that taxation and conscription were different but parallel 
and partly substitutable ways of exacting resources from local society. 
85 Cf Roberts’ remark on Sweden as a permanent war economy. In Lindegren’s 
analysis, the opportunity of raising taxes even appears to cause the wars:  ‘War 
was a vehicle by which the state could introduce new kinds of taxes.’ (2000:176) 
86  If the reduction really did succeed in breaking up the lock-in, the later, Caroline 
phase of Swedish militarism becomes facultative: a personal whim (one of those 
inevitable by-products of absolutism, like Louis XIV’s vanity or Ivan the terrible’s 
paranoia) or maybe rather a reactive phase, a backlash caused by indirect 
consequences of earlier actions: the very success in war against neighbours 
meant that many prospective enemies were waiting for a chance to retribute. 
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A comparison with traditional explanations 
What about the traditional87 explanations? 
1. Defense of the protestant religion88.  
2. Geopolitical defense. 
3. Control over baltic trade. 
4. Defense of dynastic legitimacy89. 
5. Externalization of class struggle. 
Are any of those compatible with a path dependence interpretation?  
None of them is totally incompatible, as the ‘lock-in’ mechanism 
could take effect irrespective of what had sparked off the state of 
war. However, the third argument could easily be combined with it in 
a mutually reinforcing way, and that would be even more so in case 
number five – as in the analysis of Lindegren which we have already 
discussed. 
If the state had become dependent upon the war taxation, also in 
the respect that it thus financed a growing state apparatus and the 
new social strata whose growth was intimately connected to its 
increasing volume and requirements, then a war ‘feeding itself’ as 
contemporaneous strategy prescribed, would release the war-tax 
resources for general state-building purposes. This, however, would 
make peace an even less viable option – unless defeat did force it 
upon the state. 
                                                   
87 The ‘new school’ (explanation #3) referred to in Michael Roberts’ discussions has 
been mainstream orthodoxy for generations, and the 5th argument at least dates 
back to Axel Strindberg (a nephew of August Strindberg, whose historical plays 
seem to hint at similar explanations). Thus I count all of these arguments as 
pertaining to well-established traditions. 
88 Emphatically not defense of religious freedom, even though it might appear so 
on German soil, where eradicating Catholicism would have been an unrealistic 
objective. Within Sweden, though, propagating religious freedom would remain a 
seditious crime until the latter half of the nineteenth century, and complete 
religious freedom was actually the last of the civil liberties to be fully attained in 
Sweden, only in 1951(!) according to the Swedish National Encyclopedia (NE). 
89 An old argument updated by Ringmar 1996 into a version of  ‘identity formation’, 
but also – in a more substantial way – considered as an important side aspect by 
Glete. 
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The internal basis of expansionist success 
In Jan Glete’s discussion of Swedish expansionism – in his 
comparative study of fiscal-military statebuilding (2002) – he turns the 
attention to a different question:  
It is striking that the explanations of Sweden’s expansionist policy 
focus on driving forces, not on the causes of success. (2002:176) 
If we formulate the fiscal opportunity argument as a general 
mechanism – which Lindegren does – it becomes difficult to explain 
success, but if we see it as a case of path-dependence we may argue 
that it was the success that created the opportunity. So, what was the 
reason for success?  
Glete’s list runs like this (2002:210): 
1. resource mobilization [efficient administration] 
2. political interest aggregation [participation legitimizes 
burdens] 
3. army units with long-term coherence  
4. professional and bureaucratic skills 
5. officers and civilian bureaucrats loyal to the state [career 
opportunities] 
6. an aristocratic elite that identified its interests with those of 
the state 
Many of these factors are connected to or compatible with the 
arguments I am making about late medieval Swedish state-building. 
Point 6 is a consequence of what I call parallel centralization90 – the 
aristocracy had a strong interest in an efficient state and were 
periodically responsible for running it; they wanted to control it, not 
to weaken it. This I view as a legacy of the late medieval tug-of-war 
over state control – the shifting success of oligarchic aristocratic juntas 
and individual pretenders led to state-building ‘from two directions’ 
and thus to a stronger and more efficient state, which also 
strengthened at least points 1 and 4.  
The King as a military entrepreneur – a medieval 
background 
The other – individual – side of the power struggle was also 
special, in that there were contenders on (at least) two levels of 
geographic aggregation: not only patrimonial princes but also 
                                                   
90 Cf chapter 3. 
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entrepreneurs constructing their personal political power in 
innovative ways. Glete considers the Vasa kings to have been their 
own military entrepreneurs, (Glete 2000:329, also cf 2002:177. 187, 
208) and I would connect this to the innovation represented by the 
popular agitators Engelbrekt, Erik Puke and Peder Ulfsson during the 
revolution against Eric of Pomerania. They showed – most 
convincingly in Engelbrekt’s case, as he was the one who made the 
most spectacular career – that it was possible to construct a personal 
political power through the levying of peasant militias. He was 
murdered – and so was Puke and evidently also Peder Ulfsson91 – but 
a whole generation of Swedish power-players had watched and 
learned. Karl Knutsson may have played as important a part in this 
learning process as he showed the limitations of a too old-fashioned 
aristocratic political style (Kumlien 1933:95f, Harrison 2002b:102ff) 
Nils Sture and Sten Sture learned from the examples of Engelbrekt, 
Erik Puke and Peder Ulfsson, and from the mistakes of Karl 
Knutsson92, and developed a Swedish version of plebeian93 
condottiere power in a close mutual race, and in constant competition 
with other state-building strategies: 
                                                   
91 As Karl Knutsson had to raise a 12-man jury of oath-helpers to defend himself 
against an accusation of complicity in Peder’s death (Kumlien 1937:196f). Peder 
was an aristocrat of even more exalted descent than Erik Puke. He belonged to 
a baronial sideline (illegitimate) of the old Norwegian dynasty, and was a brother-
in-law of the hated bailiff Jens Eriksen, the initial target of the Dalecarlian peasant 
rising sparking off the general rebellion against king Eric in 1434. 
92 Neither should we underestimate the lessons to be learned from the ruthless 
type of castellans favoured by Queen Margaret – among them Nils Jonsson 
Svarte Skåning, Abraham Brodersen, and Nils Sture’s maternal grandfather Sven 
Sture –  who were often trained in the hard school of piracy (cf Linton 1971). 
93 This refers to the expansivity of their recruitment tactics, and is not intended as a 
slur on the impeccable aristocratic pedigrees of these gentlemen. In contrast to 
Engelbrekt they all started from the basis of an independent aristocratic retinue, 
but their competitive advantage in the Swedish race for individual power rested 
with their ability to “play the peasant card”. The exact nature of Engelbrekt’s 
original power base is unknown to us, but the strong collective economic 
interests of the mining-law districts must have had their own organizational 
structure, and at the very moment Engelbrekt first appears in the sources from 
the rebellion he is already well established as the spokesman of the local 
community in a long-running dispute with the regional representative of the 
King. His mixed miner-gentry-burgher family background must have given him a 
wide and variegated social network. 
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• princely proto-absolutism (Eric of Pomerania),  
• theocratic conciliarism (Johannes Benedicti),  
• aristocratic oligarchy (Bo Jonsson’s testamentarians, and a 
series of juntas developing out of or emulating them) and  
• the city-league organizational form represented by the 
diplomacy of compromise, and deeply entangled in the 
Swedish cities (the Hanse94, Hans Kröpelin).  
• the inter-Scandinavian landlord-trader interests represented 
most obviously by the Axelsson brothers (Lönnroth 1934, 
1959; Enemark 2001), had the severe limitation of being a 
collective strategy dependent on a geographic integration 
on a level which could only be united through individual 
power – thus they were dependent upon finding an alliance 
partner strong enough to unite the whole  of Scandinavia, 
and therefore they never succeeded to become an 
independent alternative.  
When Gustavus Vasa, as the last and most successful of these 
peasant-levy commanders wins power over the Swedish-Finnish part 
of the contested area, he goes on to eliminate all the competing state-
building projects one by one95 through crushing the independence of 
their power centres:  
• local aristocratic power (the rebellion of the västgötaherrar, 
(‘Lords of Västergötland’) led by Ture Jönsson, the last of 
the independent lawspeakers)96; 
• the bishops (through reformation and confiscation of all 
landed Church property); 
• the regional communities of the peasant levies (the peasant 
rebellions in Dalecarlia, which had backed his rise to 
power, were stamped out with exemplary brutality; the 
initially much more successful Dacke rebellion in the 
southern border province of Småland led to an important 
military innovation: as the rebellion proved – once again – 
that under suitable circumstances Swedish peasants were 
able to fight almost as efficiently as expensive foreign 
mercenaries, Gustavus negotiated a conscription deal with 
the province of Dalecarlia (Larsson 1967 and later); 
                                                   
94 To which Stockholm, Visby, and maybe Kalmar had been affiliated. 
95 In this respect, the strategy of Karl Knutsson was certainly a useful precedent. 
96 Central-level aristocratic power had not yet recovered from the massacre of its 
leadership in the ‘Bloodbath of Stockholm’, and it was never given the chance to 
do so during Gustavus’ reign. 
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• the semi-independent status of Stockholm was also curbed 
when Gustavus’ had become strong enough to attack the 
dominance of his earlier backers from Lübeck. 
Still – his rise to power had been based on forging an alliance 
combining allies from all of these projects97, but as they together had 
eliminated the absolutist threat on the Union level, the road was now 
open for him to construct a local Swedish absolute state. 
Individualized incentives 
Dynamics under pressure 
The state economic interest in maximizing taxable output tended to 
create – as a sort of mirror-image – incentives for economic 
maximization on part of the tax-peasants (skattebönder). Gustavus 
Vasa separated the individual economies of households earlier taxed 
as a collective unit, in order to bring the extra surplus of more well-
to-do peasants within the Crown’s reach, and to create a pressure to 
improve or perish onto the less successful peasants, who under the 
new individualized cadastral tax assessments were deprived of the 
protective buffer provided by their wealthier neighbours. Originally, 
the gärder (units for collective tax-paying) had been put together 
from equal numbers of richer and poorer peasants in order to ensure 
stability, but now maximization of each individual tax became a more 
important objective (Dovring 1951). 
 In response to this, the poorer peasants reasonably had no choice 
but to increase labour input wherever possible. The more well-to-do 
husbandmen would at first have experienced a relief. Not having to 
compensate for their insolvent neighbours, they would have been 
able to retain part of their surplus, while the hardening climate of 
state surplus exaction should have given them an incentive to reinvest 
this in order keep a safer margin in case of crop failure. 
Three years of unpaid taxes led to skattevrak (‘tax eviction’), i e 
permanent loss of freehold status, according to the more severe 
practice that was now introduced. Many peasants were later prepared 
to buy freehold rights at rather high prices during the periods when 
                                                   
97 Archbishop Gustav Trolle’s feud with Sten Sture the younger made him support 
the absolutist ambitions of Christian II. As this alliance became responsible for 
the Bloodbath (we do not have to concern ourselves here with the delicate 
question of where to pin the ultimate blame) including the murder of two 
bishops, the remaining bishops led by Hans Brask became an important part of 
the revolutionary alliance (Larsson provides the most up to date account). 
55 
this became possible, although the level of tax exaction on the 
purchased freehold was no lower than the rents they had already 
been paying. This shows that freehold per se must have been so 
attractive that there would also have been an incentive for spending 
effort on prevention of its loss. 
According to the logic of the Hilton-Anderson dynamic, increasing 
rent pressure would tend to stimulate productivity as long as a 
peasant can rationally expect to retain secure tenure and to escape 
confiscatory98 exactions. For peasants hovering on the brink of 
subsistence failure, mere self-preservation would seem to ensure 
maximum input, at least in the absence of viable alternative 
maintenance, but for more substantial husbandmen too severe 
exactions might yield a counterproductive effect, and lead to “surplus 
evasion”99; to ‘eat better and work less’ (Wickham 1994) might under 
such circumstances be an attractive alternative to maximizing output. 
If any increase in surplus production would lead to raised exactions, 
this would be a disincentive for productive investment in agriculture. 
However, all incentives are by definition subjective, and if rising taxes 
are perceived to be independent of rising production (e g motivated 
by war or other external factors), their productivity-raising potential 
should remain intact. 
These were the dynamics relevant to the frälsebönder, the exempt 
tenants of the Nobility? This questions brings us into the discussion of 
taxes versus rents.  
Tax and rent as categories 
 There has been a long and intricate Marxist discussion (see for 
instance Hindess-Hirst 1975:193-200, 223-59) concerning the 
categories of tax and rent: are they ‘modally’ different – i e capable of 
defining different modes of production, or are they just variants on 
the same theme: exploitation through ‘extra-economic coercion’? 
Chris Wickham, who tried to make a case for a modal difference in 
‘The Uniqueness of the East’ (1985), backs off in a postscript to his 
reprint of the article (Wickham 1994). While still considering the 
contrast between tax-based and rent-based societies to be salient, his 
studies of early medieval peasantry has made him more aware of the 
fluid and ambiguous demarcation between rent and tax. From the 
viewpoint of studying early-modern Swedish peasant categories, I can 
                                                   
98 I e additional rent or tax exactions eliminating the fruits of productivity gains, and 
thus nullifying the incentive for improvement. 
99 Cf Chayanov, Brenner, Fridén.  
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only concur: the very words may be quite interchangeable at times100. 
Still: the difference between rent as an individually, and tax as a 
collectively extracted surplus101, carried formative significance within 
the Swedish class/estate configuration.  
The ‘two-sector’ model whereby peasants either paid tax102 to a 
state dominated by the aristocracy, or rent to the individual 
noblemen, ensured a balance between the individual reproduction of 
the separate aristocratic families, and the collective reproduction of 
the state that guaranteed their noble status and supplied them with 
office and salary. I will argue that this particular institutional solution 
is the result of and precondition for the ‘pendulum swing’ or 
‘oscillation’ between absolutism and oligarchy emphasized by Roberts 
and Anderson, and that the roots of what Englund has termed a 
‘historic compromise’ between royal power and aristocracy are to be 
found in the path of ‘parallel centralization’ whereby alternating 
monarchic and aristocratic regimes built a strong state structure ‘from 
two directions’. As I will argue, in Sweden the power struggle 
between aristocracy and the ‘new monarchy’ (late medieval proto-
absolutism) did not take the form of a struggle between royal 
centralization and aristocratic decentralization. Both sides helped to 
build a strong centralized state, and their struggle concerned: on 
whose terms was the strong state to be built? 
The two-sector model required a balance between the sectors, and 
therefore also a rough balance between the demands made on 
different peasants. As there was no restriction on mobility between 
tenures, burdens had to be callibrated to avoid a labour shortage in 
either sector, and thus the conditions of the  frälsebönder had to – 
roughly – mirror those in the state sector103. 
Modern economic or feudal dynamics? 
What we might call the Herlitz-Gadd-Winberg model104 of the 
transformation of Swedish peasants into proprietors is ultimately 
based upon Herlitz’ (1974) discovery of rising prices on tax-land 
                                                   
100 As in the formulation that ‘a peasant may not tax a peasant’ in the prohibition of 
subtenancy. Furthermore, in the cadastral land registers the heading ‘annual rent’ 
includes freeholders’ tax as well as the rents accruing to the Crown. 
101 The contrast between tax and rent is discussed in these terms in Brenner 1986. 
102 Or, on Crown domain, rent. 
103 For instance, Revera 1984 considers the stabilization of tax and Crown rent 
pressure around 1650 to have been parallelled within the exempt sector. 
104 As Winberg 1990 is the most explicit statement of the ‘peasants into proprietors’ 
thesis, synthesizing the findings described below, I put his name last. 
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relative to noble land during the Age of Liberty105. In his analysis, a 
stagnating nominal rent, inflation, and the institutional safeguarding of 
property rights, combined to create incentives for productive 
investment. That the tax-land peasants had acted on these incentives 
was indicated by the rising land prices, by rising production (Gadd 
1983), and by the growing inequality between tax-land and exempt 
land tenants (Winberg 1975), ultimately leading to the disintegration 
of the peasantry, who were polarized106 into a class of proprietors 
(hemmansägare – ‘homestead owners’) and a growing landless 
proletariat.   
To evaluate this development, and compare it to other dynamic 
transformations in Europe (and elsewhere), obviously requires a focus 
on class (differential access to productive factors) as well as on Estate 
(differential institutional constraints), on property relations as well as 
on property rights. 
If Hilton and Anderson are right about feudal dynamics, a rising 
rent pressure will tend to stimulate productivity as long as it is not 
destructively high, while North (postulating universal economic 
dynamics rather than system-specific) would expect a rising 
productivity to be the more or less automatic consequence of secure 
property rights. As a slackening tax/rent pressure is an important 
component of the Herlitz dynamic, it conforms to North’s model rather 
than to Hilton’s. This is either an argument for universal-ist or liberal 
or formalist viewpoints as against particularist or Marxist or 
substantivist ones, or a symptom that modern dynamics were already 
in effect within the economic life of 18th century Sweden. As I will 
argue in the next section, there is evidence for both of these kinds of 
dynamics within the economy of 16th-17th century Sweden. 
A shift of dynamics 
In Myrdal/Söderberg’s study of Swedish agrarian development 
during the ‘long 16th century’, they paint a picture of rising peasant 
living standards at least before Swedish entry into the thirty-years war, 
but contradictory tendencies with respect to peasant inequality. As 
this takes place during a period of growing state demands, it would 
seem to indicate ‘feudal’ dynamics. My own investigation of this 
period corroborates the rise in living standards but suggests a more 
                                                   
105  During forty years of inflation, tax-land prices in the investigated area rose more 
than twice as fast as those on exempt land. 
106  Polarized in the aspect of property rights, but therefore not necessarily in the 
aspect of wealth. The survival of small-scale ownership remained an important 
feature of Sweden’s social configuration. 
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general tendency towards homogenization among the peasantry107 
(though varying in strength).  
For the subsequent period, I found indications that another rise 
must have occurred somewhere between the eve of the permanent 
war period and its final years. Maybe most surprisingly, it shows that 
the category of peasants who could best reap the benefits of this 
growth varied between different parts of Sweden. In one of my cases, 
freeholding tax peasants, in another tenants on Crown land, and in 
the third: tenants on tax-exempt (noble-owned) land. Thus we may 
suspect that the feudal dynamics effect may have been more or less 
independent of the nature of tenure (although it presupposed a 
reasonable security of tenure). 
It was not yet the case that tax peasants had an advantage in 
achieving economic growth, and neither – despite a widespread 
opinion among historians, based on deficient calculations (see 
chapter 2) – had they yet become a wealthier stratum of the 
peasantry.  
Somewhere along the road from the second growth period, (which 
occurred somewhere between 1640 and 1713), and the rise of 
freehold value 1730-1770, conditions have changed, and another kind 
of dynamic takes over. If this is a correct interpretation of the data, 
the earlier discussion of Herlitz can already be reformulated. It is no 
longer a question of choosing between Hilton’s dynamics and 
North’s.  
The new question must be: when and how do the dynamics of 
modern economic growth replace the feudal dynamics of rent-struggle?  
 
With respect to the later disintegration of the peasantry, I would 
connect this change to the recomposition of the Peasant Estate. 
Originally, also the tenants on tax-exempt (noble-owned) land had 
been represented in the Diet’s Peasant Estate (see below, page 79ff) – 
despite the persistent dissemination of the misconception that the 
Estate only represented the tax and Crown peasants – but their 
number seems to have been decreasing over time, and in the earliest 
Statutes of the Peasant Estate (1723), the constituency was delimited 
to tax and Crown peasants. The Nobility’s long campaign for the right 
to represent ‘their own peasants’ had finally won out. 
Given the lack of internal documents from the earlier period, it is 
probably impossible to find conclusive evidence, but there had been 
an increasing degree of cooperation between the non-noble Estates, 
                                                   
107 Thus conforming to Isacsson’s analysis rather than Österberg’s (see chapter 2). 
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at least since the ‘strife of the Estates’ in 1650, where the Clergy, the 
Burghers and the Peasantry united around a formal programme 
emphasizing equal career opportunities and peasant property rights, 
opposing the alienation of Crown and tax land, and the formal 
closure of the Noble Estate. To me, this suggests an alliance between 
external political interest and the separate group interests of the tax 
peasants (or some of them). 
‘Careerists’ and the front of Commoners 
North and his different co-writers postulate the existence of 
individuals free to act on the ‘improved’ incentives of better specified 
property rights etc. To do this – in the English case, at least – is to 
presuppose a somewhat undifferentiated middle class as the norm. 
The necessary foundation for even being able to envision such a 
category in an early-modern European society, is the existence of a 
broad common ground of commercial involvement, uniting burghers, 
improving landowners as well as absentee rentier ones, substantial 
husbandmen, commercial farmers and emerging middle classes in a 
shared appreciation of gainful pursuits. This specific feature of the 
English situation: that something resembling a capitalist mentality can 
be found among at least a fraction of every social stratum but the 
lowest, seems to make the utility-maximizing homo oeconomicus an 
admissible and not too unrealistic a postulate. Persons not acting in 
the presupposed manner can then be explained away as 
conservative, narrow-minded or duped. A non-simplistic analysis, 
however, must take conflicting rationalities into account. Ekelund-
Tollison’s Mercantilism as a Rent-seeking Society, offers a more 
complex picture, where it should be possible to also integrate the 
factors emphasized by Robert Brenner.108 
In early-modern Sweden, the fast growth of the state apparatus, the 
military personnel, and the new diplomatic and commercial 
entanglements appearing along the road to great power status is 
constantly producing mobile strata of persons of changing or 
uncertain Estate. A growing residual of this category is to find no 
place in the Estate system, and will later be subsumed under the 
awkward heading ‘non-noble persons of standing’.  From early on, 
however, ‘careerists’, people seeking to better, retain or regain their 
                                                   
108 Property  rights as property relations, the constant reproduction and resilience of 
the feudal social system. Differential strength of conflicting class interests and 
their collective expressions etc. That North despite his routine adherence to 
methodic individualism sometimes falls back on class explanations I have shown 
in 1996:107. 
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native station in life, are in evidence. Not only when they succeed109: 
attain a learned degree, enter a profession, receive employment in the 
service of the state or of a private magnate, move up through the 
ranks of a growing military hierarchy in constant need of 
replacements etc. However, the actions of careerists before they 
succeeded, or even: whether they ever succeeded or not, is a hidden 
and therefore neglected aspect of the social forces in play during this 
period. 
Common causes – careerists and their allies 
In the Swedish case, I think that the really important aspect is that 
large parts of the various careerist strata had important points of 
common interest with groups represented within the Estate system, 
which allowed members of these strata to form a pressure group for 
such interests, pushing for reforms in the fields of secure property 
rights and equal opportunity. Possible alliance partners could be 
found in each of the Estates:  
 
• the clergy were in their ordinary lines of duty largely a part 
of the state machinery, registering the population, taking a 
prominent part in the processes of tax assessment110 as well 
as conscription, disseminating state propaganda as a regular 
item in church services etc. In their capacity as farmers of 
the vicarage, the parsons usually ranked among the very 
richest husbandmen of the parish. As they usually had very 
large families, and – on an average – at the most111 one of 
the sons could be expected to find employment as a parish 
priest, they would have a strong and obvious interest both 
in open career possibilities within the state apparatus, and 
in unrestricted possibilities of land acquisition. Thus, almost 
                                                   
109 Such permanent changes of status have been charted by the pioneering studies 
of Sten Carlsson (1962) and Tom Söderberg, followed by an impressive number 
of recent monographs on different new categories: krigsbefäl – non-noble 
officers (Artéus 1986 and Nilsson 1989), secretaries (Svalenius), law students 
(Gaunt 1975), administrators (Norrhem 1994), and bailiffs (Hallenberg 2001). The 
category of courtiers (Persson 1999) may appear to fall outside this picture, but it 
certainly belongs to the context of status change. 
110 The unrivalled insight into actual property conditions which they acquired in the 
process of exacting the tithe (2/3 of which went directly into state revenue) 
made them invaluable to the state especially in the assessments for property 
taxes (see chapter 2). 
111 The constant inflow of new entrants from a burgher or peasant background 
meant a steadily hardening competition. 
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every clergyman would have to be something of a hidden 
‘careerist on behalf of his children’, whether or not he may 
have nursed any career ambitions for his own sake; 
• the burghers, besides having an obvious interest in secure 
property rights, and in the possibility of land investment, 
also contained a small but influential faction of ‘city 
bureaucracies’ – the nearest equivalent within the Estate 
system of the careerist stratum, possibly excepting... 
• arrivist noblemen, who might hold on to their former values 
and solidarities in the face of exclusionary policies and 
open disdain from the established aristocracy (Cf Lövgren 
1915:72f); 
• among the peasantry, the property rights interest of tax-
peasants would be one of the few obviously legitimate 
group interests possible to express within the Estates 
structure.  
 
Therefore an alliance based upon the defence of tax-land property 
rights became the natural foundation of a sort of ‘Commoner Front’, 
defining noble privilege as their target, and using the controversy 
over enfeoffed rents and taxes to merge the issues.  
The present consensus on the skattefrälse issue – the question of to 
what extent the grants of royal tax incomes from specified 
homesteads to noblemen that the Crown wanted to reward did 
constitute a threat to peasant freedom, as argued by an earlier 
generation of historians – appears to be that the institutions of the 
Swedish judicial system seems to have been able and willing to 
protect peasant property rights112. That this protection only extended 
to tax peasants113, must surely be one of the most important factors 
behind the eventual disintegration of the peasantry as a cohesive 
class, but the influence of allies with a strong interest in the 
possibility of investing in tax land property would have worked in the 
same direction. The obvious place to begin an analysis of converging 
and conflicting Estate interests should be the hitherto almost 
                                                   
112 Ernby 1975, Revera 1984, and, making some reservations, Winberg 1990. 
113 Also to Crown peasants in so far as they had functions in the maintenance 
system for  military resources (the so-called ‘tidiga indelningsverket’). 
Kronobönder whose land was donated or sold to noblemen became ordinary 
frälsebönder with no special privileges, though. After the Great Reduction (see 
Ågren 1973) most of the Crown peasants became involved with the Allotment 
system (indelningsverket in the strict sense) guaranteeing the upkeep of 
officers, officials, and soldiers. 
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neglected document uniting the three Commoner Estates around a 
series of specific demands.  
The programme of the Commoners 
This ‘protestation’, as it came to be known, is actually the first 
attempt by the parliamentary representatives to take the political 
initiative. Roberts considers it a ‘flash in the pan’, a ‘missed 
opportunity’ (Roberts 1962), but he saw it too much in the light of 
British constitutional history, where the aristocracy should have been 
the heroes. That aristocratic constitutionalism was the dynamic force 
in the development of  political representation was an axiom also to 
Fredrik Lagerroth and Erik Lönnroth, and the counterpoint to their 
influential perspective was always the traditional Dalin-Geijer notion 
of an alliance between King and Commonalty (cf Hessler 1943). My 
alternative is to emphasize the ‘pendulum swings’ and the two-sided 
development of Swedish political ‘Voice’:  
A. The singular breadth of representation in Sweden 
owes much to the royal need for counterweights to 
the aristocratic opposition,  
but this aspect was balanced, with sufficient frequency, by 
B. constitutional checks against royal autocracy, 
explicitly including the very early formation of a 
state apparatus approximating a bureaucracy in the 
Weberian sense (Therborn 1989, Nilsson 1990). 
This specific combination of contrasting developments is in my 
view the explanation for the peculiarities of the Swedish road to 
political representation: neither an autocratic populism nor an 
oligarchic constitutionalism but an uneven combination with 
dynamic possibilities for the future. To what extent these 
possibilities were realized, and how much that today remains of the 
imprints left by this particular trajectory, are questions that should 
be raised in another context. 
However, in the case of 1650 constitutional arguments came from 
unexpected directions, and the support the Commoner Estates 
believed that the Queen was prepared to give them, encouraged an 
unprecedented attack on the very society of privileges. 
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Parliamentary models – Sweden and England compared 
If we compare the English Parliament and the Swedish Diet, the 
House of Commons corresponds to the Estates of Burghers and 
Peasants. Like the English lower chamber they derived out of 
communal representation. The House of Comunes (Roskell 1992) 
originally signified an assembly of communities, not of ‘common’ 
people: the counties elected their ‘Knights of the Shire’, while the 
boroughs elected representatives through a wide spectrum of local 
constitutions, varying from patriarchal designation to relatively broad 
franchises. In a similar way summonses for representatives from the 
towns and the hundreds eventually led to institutionalized chambers 
for burghers and peasants in Sweden114.  
The Nobility in the House of Knights (Riddarhuset) were no 
elected representatives, though. The head of every noble family was 
expected to attend, and in this way it of course corresponds to the 
House of Lords, or the old assemblies of ‘Men of the Realm’ 
(herredagar or ‘Meetings of the Lords’); they were the persons who 
had an individual voice in the realm, who were not expected to 
speak for others.  
The Swedish Estate of the Clergy was a strangely mixed case, with 
two contrasting factions: the Bishops were of course comparable to 
the Lords spiritual in the English upper chamber, even if they had lost 
much of their medieval status; still they had individual membership as 
a matter of course and may be taken to represent their office rather 
than any ‘constituency’. The parochial clergymen, though, were 
elected by parsons and vicars, and were at least partly a sort of 
community representatives. When the discussions leading up to the 
formulation of the protestation first got under way, the parish clergy 
had kept the bishops outside, and convened secretly with the burgher 
and peasant representatives (Lövgren 1915), but by the time it had 
come to formal negotiations, many of the bishops were active and 
prominent spokesmen for the common cause.  
                                                   
114 The Swedish peasants however, elected representatives among themselves, and 
– in the beginning! - had no franchise delimitation that we know of apart from 
being landholding heads of households, while the English peasant had to be a 
freeholder, and to have land yielding at least 40 shillings per year, in order to 
take part in the election of a Knight, supposed to represent the whole county. 
This would seem to be a contrast sharp enough to invalidate the similarities, 
except in the aspect where we contrast the representatives of communities to 
the magnates representing only themselves. 
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The Protestation of the Commoner Estates – content 
and preliminary analysis 
Surprisingly, the only printed version of this document can be 
found in a rare 17th century collection of sources relevant to the 
political discussion of the time (Loenbom). In England, a text of such 
crucial importance in the development of political contestation would 
have elicited a long series of comments and analyses through the 
ages, but in Sweden only a few historians (Lövgren 1915, Wittrock 
1953, Englund 1993)115 have discussed it at all – apart from the 
demand for a reduction of Crown estate – and no one in detail. 
Originally I had planned to reprint the protestation as a supplement 
with an English translation, but I have decided to postpone that 
project in order to make a careful enough translation with a 
sufficiently detailed commentary. 
For the moment, I will only list my interpretations of the twelve 
demands. 
Demands in the protestation: interpretation and discussion 
1. Only revocable grants should be made, and allotted to the 
maintenance of specified offices, (like in the future 
Indelningsverk of Charles XI.). 
2. Royal inquiry courts should be held regularly, to ensure 
constant supervision of the administration, and the 
permanent possibility to appeal from lower courts. 
3. The closure of the Noble Estate is opposed through the 
demand for a return to the early medieval system of tying 
tax exemption directly to horseman service, and for a 
resuscitation of the Land Law’s principle of open access to 
this privilege. 
4. The state should mortgage its land to raise money, not 
sell or donate it, and on tax land the peasant shall have 
priority to do so.  
5. The principle of office and promotion by merit, not by 
privilege of birth, is clearly stated. 
6. Tax-land property rights, including pre-emptive rights for 
relatives,  are to be upheld. 
7. Restoration of the public function and local connection of 
the offices of hundred sheriff (häradshövding) and 
lawspeaker. 
                                                   
115 Internationally, we would have to add Roberts 1962. 
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8. Demand for equality before the law and against 
noblemen protecting their servants. 
9. Abolition of private courts and punishments. 
10. Resumption of Crown property. 
11. Protection against encroachments on the property rights 
of absent owners and under-age heirs. 
12. (a) That the cost of peasant representation should be 
shared by the frälsebönder.  
(b) Rights of free speech in the Diet without threats or 
intimidation. 
In the discussions of this protestation, the only points generally 
emphasized have been those demanding a reduction: 1 and 10. 
These are general demands for solving the fiscal crisis at the expense 
of the higher nobility, and reflect the interests of a vast majority of the 
population, as can be seen when it is actually carried through 30 
years later116.  
Point 4 is a proposal for an economic alternative to the dead end 
of selling and donating Crown land and taxation rights. I will discuss 
the implications of it, and possible underlying interests below. 
Better protection of property rights is demanded under points 6 
and 11. 
The restoration of law and order and, more radically, equal rights 
before the law are emphasized in points 2, 7, 8. Point 9 may be said 
to fall into the same category, but it goes a step further in that it 
attacks a prerogative of the very highest aristocracy, and is formulated 
as a direct accusation (torture is explicitly mentioned). 
Point 3 is maybe the most unexpected one, but it has received 
hardly any attention at all. Though it may sound totally anachronistic, 
the Land Law’s provision was still formally valid, and half a century 
earlier, Charles IX had been contemplating a formal renewal of it117. 
In the clause about tax land purchase, nr 6, the rights of the tax-
peasants are not emphasized, as in nr 4, but instead equal 
                                                   
116 A beginning was made under Charles X Gustavus, only five years after this Diet. 
Christina’s skilful manipulation of the Diet, where she appeared to actively 
encourage the Commoner’s protests, was designed to enforce the acceptance of 
her cousin Charles as heir to the throne. This does not have to be interpreted as 
hypocrisy, though, as she could hardly take back the extensive donations which 
she herself had had to make in order to solve the costs of war and of 
demobilization after the Westphalian peace. (S A Nilsson 1990:286ff). A new King 
would have the right to resume earlier donations, though, which should have 
been an important factor behind her abdication (cf Munthe 1971 and Nyström 
1994 about the economic motives for abdication). 
117 HSH 2:1. Lagförslag i kung Carl den niondes tid. 
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opportunity to buy tax land, only preserving the priority of close-of-
kin purchase. This defense of tax-land property rights is not only in 
the interest of tax-peasants, but also very much of the coalition 
partners in the Burgher and Clergy Estates. Is it a step towards the 
marginalization of the frälsebönder? Not yet, I think, as the 
opportunity to acquire tax land should be very important to them as 
well. 
According to Lövgren (1915:146) number 12(a) was the only 
demand that was met by the Queen, and the only positive results for 
the commoners apart from this, were  
I. that the speaker in the Hose of Knights had to sign a 
formal obligation on the behalf of his Estate, not to 
mistreat the peasants,  
II. a declaration was given concerning the word 
vanbördig (baseborn), which had been interpreted 
as showing contempt for commoners. 
III. improved privileges for the clergy were granted. 
Nr 4 can be interpreted as protection against the encroachment on 
tax-land property rights, but despite the formulation giving the tax-
peasant priority in raising mortgage money on his land, other 
interests are certainly involved. First, we must define what this kind 
of mortgage would entail, and what ‘lien’ (panträtt – explicitly 
mentioned in the demand) the mortgagee would enjoy after 
advancing money to the Crown on his own farm. We could interpret 
this as just a sign that tax-peasants would be prepared to ‘lend’ 
money to the state to ‘insure’ their land against the risk of falling 
under farmed-out taxation rights. In that case, the ‘lien’ becomes no 
more than a guarantee against further encroachment, which might be 
attractive enough under the conditions at the moment. However, 
another explanation seems much more likely if the word ‘lien’ 
(panträtt) is to carry any material sense, capable of attracting other 
presumptive moneylenders.  If we interpret the clause within the 
doctrine of two-level ownership which is already implicit in the 
institute of skattevrak118, and forms the basis for the entire skattefrälse 
construction, it would be the right to tax the peasant which the Crown 
could mortgage, instead of donating it to noblemen. The doctrine in 
question had in general been opposed by the peasantry and the 
intellectual defenders of their property rights (cf Ehrensteen), but it 
makes the suggestion in clause 4 perfectly logical: if the tax-peasant 
                                                   
118 That a skattebonde defaulting on his taxes for three years lost his freehold, and 
instead became a tenant of the Crown (Dovring 1951). 
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advances money against the Crown’s right of taxation, this would give 
him tax exemption until the mortgage is redeemed and he is paid 
back, and he could thus enjoy the equivalent of noble tax-exemption 
through a purely financial investment. 
Would this proposal really be in the interest of the tax-peasant?  
Firstly, it would be to give up the traditional peasant position on 
property rights as indivisible and tied to public rights and duties, 
while the projected gains from this exemption would probably be 
totally illusory. The next time the Crown needed money, what would 
prevent it from simply inventing new forms of taxation?  
Secondly, we do not know how many peasants that would be able 
to afford this investment, and who might be willing to spend their 
money on such an immaterial right119. 
Thirdly, what would happen to someone who did not advance the 
required money himself? In that case someone else might be 
prepared to do it, on the speculation that he might default on the 
taxes and become skattevrak. A nobleman, just as in the skattefrälse 
case, or a burgher, or a clergyman. Or a ‘commoner of standing’ 
(ofrälse ståndsperson), one of the members of the nebulous new 
middle strata finding no place in the Estate system. 
If these investors did not speculate in his possible loss of property 
rights, they would have made some other rational calculus and found 
a way to make it pay. Either way, the peasant would have to pay his 
tax to someone who had a very strong motivation for showing no 
leniency, while he would have lost the comfort and security of 
belonging to a community of tax-payers. 
The concerns of frälsebönder are not in obvious evidence here. The 
chance of acquiring skatte land is, as I pointed out above, in their 
interest, but a situation where more people, possessing more ready 
money, would be competing for the few available homesteads, would 
certainly not be in their interest. 
                                                   
119 That many Crown peasants did invest in birth rights and tax rights, may be an 
argument for the opposite contention, but in those cases it was the very 
concrete lack of safe possession which motivated the buyers. 
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The importance of external interest 
All in all, I consider this list to show a strong external interest in 
tax-right conditions, partly under the guise of protecting the tax-
peasant. Clause 3 does not sound like a peasant interest, but a 
peasant horseman getting a partial reduction of tax on his homestead 
for his cavalry service, might well balk at the injustice of a 
neighbouring nobleman enjoying an inheritable privilege of tax-
exemption on all of his land in return for a similar service. This might 
reflect a common concern of ryttarbönder and careerists, but the 
attack on the closure of the noble Estate perhaps carried a more 
symbolic significance as well. It was a protest against the Estate system 
as such: only the Nobility stood to gain when walls were built on top 
of the social demarcations and were made ever more difficult to 
climb over. 
The peasant Estate as an ally – but of whom? 
Johan Holm’s two articles (so far; Holm 2002, 2003) about the early 
history of the Peasant Estate mark an important advance on earlier 
research in this field. Not only does he analyze the options open to 
he peasant representatives but he consistently treats them as active 
subjects. This is very important, and while I will argue that interaction 
with the other commoner Estates has to be brought back into the 
discussion, I in no way wish to return to the tradition of writing about 
the peasants as puppets manipulated by other interests. 
Holm does not address the question of the frälsebönder (tenants on 
exempt land) as he is not aware of their presence in the Estate120, and 
as his discussion of possible alliances in the Diet only considers three 
actors: the King, the Nobility, and the Peasantry, his otherwise sharp 
and detailed discussion remains blinkered to a large part of the 
political landscape. An imagined alliance with the Nobility against the 
burden of state taxation is discussed by Holm as the possible 
alternative to the ‘alliance’ with the Crown depicted in his article. 
However, the realism of such an imagined alliance is highly doubtful, 
especially if we consider the fact that the peasant representatives at 
                                                   
120 Even more disconserting is his oblivion to their existence at all. Even if the 
frälsebönder had not been represented, the relation between them and their 
neighbours and partners in local self-administration should have been as 
important to discuss. 
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this time still included frälsebönder. The ‘hard supplication121’ in the 
name of the Commonalty, which was found outside the Chamber of 
the Treasury, as mentioned in the article (p 44), did not only contain 
a demand for resumption of Crown and Tax land (a reduktion), but a 
whole series of demands partly foreshadowing those formulated by 
the three Commoner Estates at the Diet of 1650 – the year of the 
famous ‘Strife of the Estates’.  
In contrast to the protestation, the ‘hard supplication’ does not 
contain any demands that are not directly related to the peasants’ 
situation, but several of these primarily economic demands are 
explicitly mentioned as being in the common interest of peasants and 
burghers: 
• tax farmers ‘ruin all of the commonalty and the cities of the 
Realm’ (item 1)  
• city tolls are unbearable (odrägeligh) to the ‘cities, burghers 
and peasants’ and dangerous (wådeligit) to the country 
(item 5) 
• item 11 does not list any specific grievance, but is an open  
attack on the Nobility, which ‘seeks to make the peasant 
into a servile (lijfegen) thrall ... and the burghers into 
peasants’. 
Through refusing to consider other possible partners Holm neglects 
the prehistory of the only indubitable alliance entered into before the 
Age of Liberty. However, his description of the active role taken by 
the peasant representatives in discussions and negotiations is an 
important step forward compared to the traditional depiction of the 
Peasant Estate as constantly manipulated by other interests122.  
Even if ‘alliance’ may be too strong a word for the relation between 
the King and the peasantry123, Holm has made it even more clear that 
it was not just a case of passive submission to an idealized father-
figure à la ‘the good Czar’; the bargaining process was for real, but so 
was also the bargaining process taking place between the Commoner 
Estates. The pattern of  political negotiation had become a general 
                                                   
121 This is the description under which it is registered in the Riksdagsacta series at 
Riksarkivet. 
122  In this respect Bäck’s (###) study of peasant politics during the Age of 
Freedom is the nost important precedent. 
123 Protection-selling seems to me as a better description of the relationship 
between king and peasants (cf Glete 2002). The ‘Commoner Front’, on the other 
hand, was indubitably a case of alliance in the true sense of the word. The 
Clergy and the Burghers were neither offering nor seeking protection; they 
wanted support for mutual causes, and were prepared to bargain about the 
separate ones. 
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phenomenon, and would hereafter be an inescapable aspect of every 
regime but one: that of Charles XII.  
King Charles, however, through suppressing all of the Estates, 
created a sort of balance between the up to that point very unequal 
Houses in the Diet (Karlsson 1994), and when the pendulum swung 
again, aristocratic leadership was no longer automatically accepted. 
The Age of Freedom is therefore not a simple antithesis of the 
absolutist phase, like in the earlier swings, but a true synthesis: an 
age of negotiation. 
On the threshold of the Triple Miracle 
By the end of the Imperial Age, Sweden is on the verge of 
establishing political voice for a large part of its population, despite 
having “sacrificed” the representation of tenants on noble-owned 
land. 
Economic growth enforced by a rising rent- and tax-pressure 
(‘feudal dynamics’) is about to be replaced by growth based on 
market incentives and secure property rights (‘modern economic 
growth’ in Kuznets’ sense, i e capitalist dynamics). 
The period of Conquest had reached its first peak seventy years 
earlier at the Westphalian peace conference, where Sweden, France, 
and the Netherlands emerge as the victorious regimes at the final 
settlement of 1648. Only two years after this the Strife of the Estates 
takes place, and noble privilege is challenged by a broad coalition of 
clergymen, burghers, and peasants. Though almost nothing seemed 
to have been achieved by all this turbulence (Roberts 1962), political 
debate had been established as an acknowledged fact of life, and the 
tax/rent pressure was prudently stabilized. In 1655 a first attempt at a 
reduction – albeit limited –  was made, and three years later the final 
climax of the Swedish conquest was attained, when the Empire 
reached its widest extent.  
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The stagnating rent level does not in itself lead to capitalist growth, 
but it would seem to be a precondition at least for the establishment 
of “Herlitzian” growth 124. Another precondition is secure property 
rights, which are demanded by the protestation in 1650 and – in the 
main – de facto recognized by courts in the following period. This is 
a mutual interest of tax peasants, other peasants saving up to buy tax 
land, and the ‘external interest’ of burghers, clergymen and ofrälse 
ståndspersoner (‘Commoner gentlemen’ outside the Estate system), 
seeking an outlet for capital investment in land. Another crucial 
threshold is crossed during the ‘contributions’ of 1713-16, when the 
tax-assessment commissions reduced tax-land and exempt-land 
ownership to a common denominator through assessing them in 
monetary evaluations possible to add up and subdivide as a lump 
sum according to the contribution quotient125.  
If we evaluate this as possible evidence for the relationship 
between the three ‘European Miracles’ of Conquest, Growth and 
Voice (Emilsson 1996), it would seem that the mechanisms of 
Conquest predated the processes of Voice and Growth which appear 
more or less simultaneously. However, the interaction is entwined in 
a tighter way all along: constant negotiations with the peasantry for 
the means of warfare (men and money) is a precondition for Swedish 
Conquest and leads to parliamentary representation and a 
complementary ‘horizontal’ negotiation with the other Commoner 
Estates. The ‘historic compromise’ (Englund) between Crown and 
Nobility – another precondition for military  expansionism – leads to 
a sharpening conflict between the Estates over the unfair distribution 
of the costs and benefits of Great Power politics, and together all 
these developments coalesce into the Strife of the Estates. At the same 
time the hardening tax pressure – resulting from the warfare – may 
have stimulated productivity (according to the Hilton model) which 
could then be transformed into a higher production when the tax 
burden lightened, and when peace and social strife put an end to 
rising surplus exaction, an economic growth very difficult to analyze 
seems to have begun.  
                                                   
124 In my interpretation: growth made possible through an inflationary redistribution 
to the advantage of the tax-peasants, and the institutional safeguarding of their 
property rights, combining to make a higher rate of agricultural reinvestment 
possible, profitable, and reasonably safe (Herlitz 1976, see page 56 ff). 
125 In the cases of individuals owning both kinds of land, as the foundry owner, the 
Mayor and the Captain in the assessment of Gladhammar 1714 (see below, page 
112). 
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• It could have been a delayed effect of Hiltonian dynamics, 
as I suggest above126.  
• It might, on the other hand, have marked the beginning of 
the “Herlitzian” phase, as stagnating tax/rent and better de 
facto protection of property rights were already at hand. 
• As the period of recurrent warfare was in no way 
exhausted, a new Hiltonian phase might have occurred at 
some point before 1713. 
The wide margins of 1640 and 1713 make it very difficult to 
pinpoint the growth period127, so we are stuck with a transitional 
period running from 1640 to 1730. During this period the 
transformative effect of Conquest is played out, and the social 
reconfigurations making the tax peasant a political ally of burghers 
and clergymen, and his land a secure object for profitable investment 
(for himself or for commercial investors) have in the main been 
completed. 
 
                                                   
126  Nilsson’s argument on the gains from peace could be interpreted in this way. 
127 No property taxes are exacted between these dates, and – at the moment – I 
can think of no other obvious indicators available.
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CHAPTER II 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN IMPERIAL SWEDEN – THE 
PEASANTRY 
Some of the findings in this article were presented to the Gustavus 
Adolphus Academy in 1999, and an earlier version of the full article 
was presented to the Swedish Economic History Meeting in 
Gothenburg, 19-21 October 2001128.  
The questions addressed in this paper are: 
• The economic and political factors subdividing the Swedish 
peasantry during the Imperial Age 
• If the contrasts between rich and poor peasants increased or 
decreased. 
• How important the differences between peasants holding 
land of diverse nature were in these aspects, and in what 
ways they differed. 
• Trends of general growth or decline as reflected in peasant 
wealth. 
• How these trends might diverge according to region and 
land nature. 
These problematics are explored through the reconsideration of 
earlier research and through a more differentiated analysis of the 
fiscal source material. An attempt is also made to connect analyses 
of the early Imperial Age to the late Caroline period through linking 
different kinds of property taxations.  
PEASANTS AND PROGRESS  SWEDISH AND 
EUROPEAN MIRACLES 
As I have argued elsewhere (Emilsson 1996) the historical 
phenomenon referred to as ‘the Rise of the West’ or ‘the European 
Miracle’ – a central historical inquiry described as an ‘old question’ 
already by Weber – should be decomposed into three separate but 
                                                   
128 That is the version cited in Söderberg-Myrdal 2002. I am obliged to Johan 
Söderberg for giving me access to his excerpts for the parishes of Danmark and 
Gladhammar, giving me the opportunity to search for the causes of certain 
discrepancies in our respective results. 
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interconnected problematics: world conquest, economic growth, and 
a widening public participation in the political system (‘voice’). The 
vigorous reopening of the ‘European advantage’ debate from the 
early seventies onward has reached a partial consensus on one single 
point: the importance of the internal dynamics of the European states 
system.  
Sweden’s role as a founding member in the formalization of this 
system, and in bringing about that ‘failure of Empire’ which made the 
unique European combination of interdependence and autonomy 
possible, would qualify her for treatment in state-centered studies 
giving priority to the Miracle of Conquest129, but a key role could be 
argued for the other two as well. Democracy is usually attributed 
either to the tortuously slow extension of the constituency underlying 
the Anglo-Saxon development of rule by law, or to a French-style 
revolution of the excluded. Starting out with a constitutionalism 
almost as ancient as and arguably broader based than the British130, 
and having carried out the earliest experiments with parliamentary 
party politics, Sweden should be indispensable to any comparative 
discussion of the Miracle of Voice. If the earlier picture of Sweden’s 
late but phenomenally fast transition to modern economic growth is 
due for revision, as it would appear (Schön 1982 and later), the effect 
will be to push the starting point backwards in time, thus 
emphasizing internal causes more than external and the parallellity to 
the English development more than the contrast. In either case 
Sweden remains a crucial example within the Miracle of Growth131. 
What has all this got to do with peasants? That is just the question – 
a central role for a country with such weak cities, and so narrow an 
aristocracy, will force us to reconsider the role of peasants. The 
traditional depiction of peasantries as inert ‘grey masses’ should – 
hopefully – have gone out of fashion in every respectable context (cf 
Jonsson et al), but just to acknowledge agency from the same grey 
                                                   
129 Ironically, this important role in developing the military superiority required to 
subjugate those parts of the world which did not lack horses, wheels and 
firearms (Roberts 1955, Parker 1988, Glete 2002), hardly lead to any active 
participation in this subjugation. On the contrary, Sweden, which appeared to 
have been one of the most thoroughly militarized early-modern states, 
reorganized the maintenance of its army in such a fashion that peace would 
ultimately become a more profitable option even for officers (Artéus 1982). 
130Certainly with a much wider constituency  before the 19th century parliamentary 
reforms. Implicit notions of constitutional principles might also be inferred from 
standard expressions used in allmogens besvär (‘Grievances of the Commonalty’), 
‘We ask to remain by the Land Law and the Cadaster’ etc. 
131 The details of all these arguments are set forth in Emilsson 1996, passim, 
including full references.  
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mass will not get us very far. We have to learn to distinguish many 
different shades of grey, or rather, to discern different colours even 
outside the spotlight illuminating the activities of privileged 
minorities. The peasantry appears differently subdivided in the light 
of each of the key processes connecting them to the Swedish 
submiracles: 
1. The central role played by Swedish peasants in providing 
soldiers for the ‘military revolution’ of Gustavus Adolphus 
undermined the chivalric definition of nobility132 and 
opened career paths - quite narrow, for sure, but factual 
nonetheless - that prevented the still barely delimited Estate 
order from fully congealing into something approaching a 
caste system.  
2. The political emancipation of the peasantry is closely 
connected to their role in the institutionalized bargaining 
processes for men and money, in which the Crown had to 
continuously engage133.  
3. The development of peasant property rights, which would 
eventually turn the nature of skatterätt (‘tax land right’) into 
the standard format of land owning in Sweden134, paved the 
way for the fast growth of population and agricultural 
production beginning (at least) from the middle 18th century 
(Winberg 1990 and the studies cited there). 
Long before the Great Reduction and the Allotment system 
(indelningsverket) reorganized the maintenance of the military and 
administrative systems, various forms of tax reduction for military 
service had been experimented with, thus creating new forms of 
                                                   
132  The memory of the original raison d’être of the nobility – the obligation to 
provide armed horsemen instead of paying taxes – was kept alive by its 
inclusion in the Land Law formally valid until 1734 and by the periodical 
mustering of noble-led troups, where a demonstrated inability to produce the 
required number of horsemen and equipment could lead to loss of noble status 
(Forssell 1869-75, Jägersköld 1945, Nilsson 1947, Samuelson 1993). 
133  Cf North’s argument, making the survival of late medieval political bargaining the 
crucial precondition for an institutional development favourable for the 
emergence of modern economic growth (see references in Emilsson 1996:45ff). 
In Sweden two parallel bargaining processes were more or less continuously 
being carried out with the nobility on the one hand, and the peasantry on the 
other.   
134  In much the same way as the nature of free and common socage in fee simple 
has become the only form of land ownership according to English law (Cf 
Campbell 1960: 112). Grand serjeanty, which is the only other form of tenure 
beside leasehold which has not been abolished, can hardly be considered as 
ownership. 
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division among the peasantry135 at the same time as the lower levels 
of the old gentry – based on tax exemption for cavalry service – were 
excluded during the constitution of the Nobility as a closed 
corporation. These divisions were independent from – or rather 
intersecting with – the divisions classifying peasants according to the 
nature of their tenures: whether they held in freehold, on Crown 
land, on noble land, or in any of the various ecclesiastical tenures. 
After the reformation the latter were gradually assimilated into krono 
– Crown tenure – together with other special categories, and 
eventually a three-tenure system emerged: skattebönder, kronobönder 
and frälsebönder; on freehold, Crown and exempt (noble) land 
respectively. The seductive simplicity of this tripartite system is quite 
misleading for the 16th and 17th centuries, when there was still a wide 
range of local variety – especially concerning forms of customary 
tenure. Neither does the difference in social and economic dynamics 
between land owing rent to institutions (universities, hospitals or 
monasteries), to private persons, or to individuals as office-holders 
(prebendal tenures, early forms of allotments or assignments etc), 
coincide with the categories of the cameral three-title system. 
The different varieties of customary tenants were in some cases 
denoted by the manner of fixing their dues: sämjebönder (‘agreement 
peasants’) or stadgebönder (‘statute peasants’), and in others by the 
type of colonization: stubbebönder (‘stub peasants’), röjselbönder 
(‘clearance peasants’), or skäriebönder (‘skerry peasants’) on islets. 
The categories of torp (‘croft’) and nybygge (settlement) slide into 
each other and were not always held separate, although crofts in 
principle were founded on land ‘belonging’ to someone, while 
settlements were founded on new clearances. The allmänningsbonde 
(Bergfalk 1832, Bjarne Larsson 1994) of the Land Law, living on the 
village or hundred common and paying his rent to the community, is 
presumably the predecessor of the different customary tenants. Most 
of these categories seem to have been more or less automatically 
absorbed under the title of krono when the tenure system was 
standardized around the turn of the 18th century, with the partial 
exception of the sämjebönder 136. 
                                                   
135  A system of tax deduction for peasants providing cavalry service evolved 
during the early modern period (also for musketeers and boatswains) and was 
later formalized on a wider scale within the indelningsverk (‘allotment system’) 
where an elite of wealthy peasants – rusthållare, who might also belong to other 
estates – were given the option of investing in tax exemption through the 
equipment and maintenance of horsemen. (Ågren 1989, Backlund 1993). 
136 And, as I have found during my revision of the Gladhammar rolls, the 
skäriebönder. 
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These were a contested category, sometimes counted as skatte, and 
at other times as krono. Hafström (1970:118) believes that they 
originate in settlements on the commons, while Almquist (1964:207) 
considers them to be skatte homesteads that through special 
agreements were to pay fixed monetary taxes, and believes that the 
similarity to the taxes paid by settlements led to a conflation between 
the categories, and thereby eventually into assimilation with krono. 
More than a century earlier, Bergfalk (1832:17-20) had claimed that 
they were a separate type of tax land, and cited examples of peasants 
transferred from sämja to skatte when the first title disappeared. This 
appears to confirm their customary character, as their destiny seems 
to have varied according to local custom. 
The wide spectrum of ecclesiastical tenures also included local 
varieties, like the quite important category of St Eriks bönder 
(Dahlbäck 1977, DMS) within the arch-diocese, paying their rent to 
the fabrica of the cathedral of Uppsala. To replace the tripartite 
system with four titles, treating all ecclesiastical holdings under the 
same heading – kyrko – may be unavoidable for statistical purposes 
(Forssell 1872-83, Larsson 1985), but is in some ways even more 
misleading and anachronistic then the three-title one137, as the church 
was not an independent and collective recipient of surplus138.  
The title of kyrko should more correctly be reserved for tenures on 
parochial church land, owing rent to the parsonage. Other 
ecclesiastical land titles included different prebendal tenures, paying 
their dues to the holder of a prebend or an office (prebendebönder, 
biskopsbönder, kanikbönder, dekanatsbönder), tenures under 
monasteries (klosterbönder), and tenure under hospitals and other 
charitable institutions (spetalsbönder). The akademibönder of Uppsala 
University might appear to be a similar phenomenon, but their tenure 
originated from a 17th century grant made out of the King’s 
patrimonial domain (arv och eget), which parallelled the grants of 
crown land to noblemen, and was therefore originally considered a 
form of frälse tenure. As the title of arv och eget was subsumed under 
krono tenure during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus (cf the account 
                                                   
137 Even before standardization, the tripartite division at least corresponds to a 
rough classification according to the title and destination of peasant dues: tax or 
rent to the crown or to noble landlords. 
138 The same thing goes for the frälse-owning gentry/nobility of course, but they at 
least formed a homologous category of individual recipients, while ecclesiastical 
rents accrued to office-holders, institutions, and even – in mixed cases – in part 
to aristocratic families (see below). 
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given by J A Almquist in CLS), the title became disputed and was 
eventually redefined into krono (cf Gadd 2004).  
The lagmansbönder (‘lawspeaker’s peasants’) in the province of 
Närke and in parts of Östergötland, appear to have been a sort of a 
secular parallel to prebendal peasants, alternatively they might have 
developed out of a more centralized level version of the common-
peasant, paying their rent to the judiciary of the province.  
Another complex in-between category was – before Reformation – 
tenure under altar foundations found primarily at cathedrals or 
monastery churches. These were prebendal tenures originating from 
private donations, and the terms under which they were run allowed 
land to be donated with partial property rights. The donor family 
could reserve some of the dues, e g fines and hospitality obligations, 
and only allot the regular rent to the holder of the prebend, who was 
usually designated by the donors. In this way noble families could 
put some of their land outside the reach of Kings and creditors, while 
still retaining it as a part of their power base. Are these prebends to 
be classified as church tenures, or as a form of noble tenure? Norborg 
(1958:99-108) concludes that they ‘were treated as private property; 
they could be given away, inherited, and enfeoffed’ (p100; my 
translation).   
The boundaries separating landed peasants from the landless rural 
population are of vital importance from both an economic and a 
political point of view. However, there are also boundaries 
subdividing the bönder – landed peasant heads of households139 – 
according to both of these perspectives.  
Economically the line of division will eventually come to run 
between the tax-paying freeholders, on the one hand, who are 
considered owners of their land, and the rent-paying tenants on the 
other, whether they are holding Crown or noble land.  
Politically, the boundaries are differently drawn: tax and Crown 
peasants are eventually represented in the Honourable Estate of 
Peasants, while peasants on noble land are supposedly represented 
by their landlords in the House of Knights. From the dawn of the Age 
of Liberty until the demise of the Four-Estate Diet (ca 1720-1865), 
these interrelations can be captured by the following table. 
                                                   
139  ‘Husbandmen’ would be the closest translation - also etymologically (a husbonde 
is the master of a household) - if we bear in mind that the Swedish term is wider 
and also includes peasants who would have been considered yeomen in England. 
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Table 2: subdivision of Swedish peasantry ca 1720-1865 
self-representation through the Estate of 
Peasants 
patriarchal representation by 
landlord 
skattebönder kronobönder frälsebönder 
landowning 
freeholders 
rentpaying tenants 
 
As if this was not complex enough, we should also observe that 
these boundaries do not appear as given at the starting point, but are 
drawn as the outcome of political struggles during the early modern 
period. The question whether skatterätt (‘tax-land right’) is to be 
considered a form of ownership, or just a form of hereditary Crown 
tenure, is hotly debated, especially around the mid-17th century, and 
the issue is not definitely closed until 1789 (Almqvist 1929, 
Bäärnhielm 1970). The electorate for peasant representation had not 
been formally delimited before the Diet Ordinance of 1723, when 
tenants on noble land were explicitly excluded, but the presence of 
frälsebönder among the deputies to the Estate all through the 
Imperial age, and the intermittent success for the perennial peasant 
demand for deputy subsidies from exempt land tenants as well as 
from other peasants, show this to be a recent development. Ågren 
(1964:8f) identified two tenants on tax-exempt (noble) land among 
the deputies of Uppland in the Diet of 1652. Ahnlund had already in 
1933 suspected that frälsebönder might at times have been returned 
as deputies, although that would in his opinion have been ‘contrary 
to the spirit of Estate’.  
When I started out trying to identify the peasants who had signed 
the Diet’s decision to collect an extraordinary property tax for the first 
Ransom of Älvsborg in 1571, I had originally expected to find an elite 
of substantial peasants – perhaps corresponding to those former 
gentrymen who had lost their tax-exempt status during the process of 
Estate formation. The results were surprising: not only were many of 
those deputies I managed to identify less affluent than the average 
peasant (40% in 1571) but there was also a modest but 
incontrovertible presence of frälsebönder among the deputies140.  
 
 
                                                   
140 Among the peasant deputies I have identified so far, the percentage of tenants 
on exempt land seems to have varied around 10-25%. (see table 3 below), 
dropping to 5% during the last period before exclusion. 
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Table 3: Deputies of the peasant Estate identified in taxation rolls. Assessed wealth 
(movable property only) measured by partly linkable indexes141 and tenure  
1571 1624 1640 1713 
number of deputies identified in taxation rolls 
68 64 107 42 
Index (ÄL1571) Index(JHM1713) 
Average 151,8 206,7 147,2 403,4 
Median 124,4 189,5 132,6 274,8 
Coefficient 
of variation 67,9 48,0 47,3 114,5 
averages for different tenures (number of cases in parenthesis) 
skatte 177,8 (18) 477,5 (29) 
krono 116,3 (7) 
211,8 (42) 149,6 (80) 
203,3 (10) 
frälse 131,0 (6) 180,6 (14) 163,9 (9) 329,7 (2) 
percentage of frälsebönder (tenants of the nobility or exempt-land 
tenants) among those whose tenure has been identified 
9,8% 24,6% 10,1% 4,9% 
percentage of peasants below index 100: 
40,9% 9,4% 23,4% 9,8% 
Sources: FBL for the names of the representatives; tax assessments and land nature taken or 
inferred from ÄL1571, BL 1623, 1624, 1639, 1640 Ksl 1713, 1714 (for some of the 
representatives, their tax assessments for earlier or subsequent years are cited, when the rolls 
for the year of the respective Diet have not been preserved for their parishes). In 1713-14 all 
of the three sectors are easily distinguishable in the rolls, as skatte and frälse were taxed as 
real estate, but assessed in different ways. In 1624 and 1640, frälse  farms can often  be 
identified through the lower tax rate. In 1624 only 7 out of the 14 counted in the frälse column 
have been identified as frälse peasants by other means than the tax rate. 
The peasant representatives in the early Riksdag were thus hardly 
an economic elite, which has often been assumed. In the later 18th 
century there were certain peasant representatives who built a large 
personal fortune, including the well-known Speakers of the Estate, 
Joseph Hansson and Anders Håkansson, and these examples have 
affected the received image of the Peasant Estate in general. 
Alexandersson also concludes from his detailed survey of the Peasant 
Estate 1760-1772, that the ‘representatives in the Diet rose above their 
voters in the economic aspect’ (Alexandersson 1975:40; my 
translation). Linde (2000), however, notes that in the beginning of the 
                                                   
141 Index(ÄL1571) refers to an average livestock assessment from the property 
taxation of 1571, while Index(JHM1713) refers to the full property assessment 
of the 1713 property taxation for an average farm in three parishes whose 
average livestock is equivalent to Index(ÄL1571). See Appendix for details and 
discussion. 
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same century, the Diet representatives from his area of investigation 
were of less than average wealth, although he makes reservations 
about the small number of instances. 
Peasants in the social structure of Imperial Sweden 
How are we to evaluate the coherence as well as the divisions 
within this vast majority142 of the population? In order to have any 
chance of understanding the dynamics of the criss-crossing lines of 
division separating landed from landless, proprietors from tenants, 
politically enfranchised from disenfranchised, we have to make 
ourselves a picture of the internal social and economic composition 
of the peasant population, and of how this structure developed over 
time. In the Swedish archives, we are fortunate enough to possess a 
huge collection of fiscal source material, and the records of property 
taxes spanning almost the entire Imperial Age should afford us an 
excellent point of departure.  
The earliest large-scale registration of peasant property in Sweden 
can be found in the assessment rolls for the (first) Ransom for 
Älvsborg (Älvsborgs lösen) from 1571 (henceforth ÄL). A thorough 
statistical treatment of the entire material – more than 50 000 
households registered within Sweden proper143 – was published in 
1872 and 1883 by the Swedish historian Hans Forssell, including 
detailed summations for each parish of all kinds of property listed – 
money, metals and livestock. Later studies have usually taken 
Forssell’s summaries as their point of departure, apart from a number 
of local studies publishing more detailed figures for single provinces, 
hundreds or parishes.  
The most ambitious present-day attempt to use the original source 
material in a general Swedish context is Myrdal-Söderberg’s 
Kontinuitetens dynamik, where the general overview of regional 
variation is based on Forssell’s summaries, but is also complemented 
by a detailed comparison between ÄL and a similar property taxation 
from 1599/1600 for a sample of Mid-Swedish parishes. Material from 
these hjälpskattelängder (aids rolls, here abbreviated Hsl) has also 
been used in Eva Österberg’s study of peasant differentiation (see 
below) and by Söderberg in 1987.  
                                                   
142 95%, according to a wide-spread estimate (Carlsson). 
143  I e excluding Finland, which was at the time an integral part of the kingdom of 
Sweden. Also excluded are, of course, those present-day provinces which at that 
time belonged to Denmark or Norway. I e: Scania, Blekinge, Halland, Bohuslän, 
Jämtland and Härjedalen. 
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The next general property taxation does not appear until 1713-1715 
when Charles XII exacted a ‘contribution’ involving self-assessment of 
the tax base by each parish in pleno as the first step, before 
determining the tax rate. In this way the parishioners would have an 
incentive not to tolerate tax-dodging from their neighbours, as that 
would increase the relative burden on themselves (Herlitz 1976, Åsa 
Karlsson 1994, Linde 2000). The most comprehensive treatment of 
data from these contributions has been made by Gunnar Olander, 
who used the rolls for the province of Skaraborg, which appear to be 
more or less complete. In his study of economic conditions in 
Sweden during the reign of Charles XII (Olander 1946), he examines 
the economic subdivision of the peasantry using the wealth 
assessment classes devised for this taxation. Unfortunately, his focus 
on the lower end of the spectrum makes his aggregated figures 
useless for discerning wealthier peasants. Among the rolls for 
different parishes in the huge Skaraborg volume there are specified 
inventories for movable property from only three parishes (and parts 
of a fourth one)144. In all the other cases the rolls just report the 
assessed value. The parishes of Jäla, Hånger and Mårby, will be used 
here to correlate the ÄL and Ksl (kontributionsskattelängd) 
assessments (see Appendix).  
For comparisons regarding relative affluence, the ÄL and Hsl figures 
and the contribution assessments should be compatible enough: 
focusing on the distribution of wealth reduces the impact of 
differences in tax-rates and assessment criteria. We can compare the 
degree of inequality, or trends of differentiation or homogenization, 
without having to worry too much about compatibility, but if we 
want to measure trends of general growth or decline the question 
becomes more complex. 
                                                   
144 In no other volumes among those I have consulted are there comparable lists. 
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The problem of measurement 
To compare the nominal monetary values of different property 
taxations would require a reliable price index, something notoriously 
difficult to achieve for earlier periods of history. However, the tax 
assessments contain within themselves a considerable real-value 
component, which should be possible to use as a foundation for 
diachronic comparison: livestock. If we use the livestock part of the 
taxes to correlate assessment values, the ‘livestock and seed grain 
rolls’ (boskaps- och utsädeslängder, hereafter BL) of 1620-40 can be 
used to fill out the first half of the long time gap between 1571 and 
1713. 
How shall we make these figures commensurable? Transformation 
into ‘cattle equivalents’ (nötkreatursenheter, Ne) in conformity with 
the conventional usage among Swedish cultural geographers145, is the 
most common solution, but whether conversion coefficients based on 
relative evaluations from the 19th century are relevant for the period 
1571-1715 seems highly questionable. An alternative scale based on 
17th century tax assessment rates was suggested by Hannerberg (1948; 
cf Lindegren1980, Larsson1983). However, the relative assessments for 
various animals are by no means consistent over the period under 
consideration146 and we may reasonably assume that the tax 
assessment committees147 were influenced by the relative tax rates 
when recording the animals under different headings. 
Elementary principles of fairness should ensure that a higher 
difference between the rates for, say, bulls and steers, would result in 
more restrictive criteria for when a steer is considered a bull. A high 
rate for heifers while calves were exempt, would also reasonable 
                                                   
145 A large number of the local historical studies of Swedish agriculture have been 
carried out by cultural geographers, and the prevalence of the Ne scale has led 
even authors sceptical of its analytical value, to employ it in order to facilitate 
comparisons.  E g Hannerberg 1948 who argued that a 19th century scale would 
hardly be relevant for relative prices of the 17th century. His suggestion of an 
alternative unit based on the relative evaluation implicit in 17th century livestock 
tax assessments, has been taken up by Lindegren 1980 and Larsson 1983:30n5, 
and is usually designated Ke (kreatursenheter or ‘livestock units’). 
146 1599 the rate between goats and bulls is 1:2 in 1620 it is 3:16, in 1624 1:4, in 
1627 3:37 and in 1634 it is 1:6 (which was probably the rate also in 1571, if bulls 
were taxed as 4-year steers, as Forssell surmises (1872:35). Hannerberg based 
the proposed Ke units on the 1624 rates. 
147 Usually consisting of the parson and the six-man parish vestry, at times 
augmented by local representatives of the Crown (bailiffs, constables, scriveners) 
or of the military (Forssell 1872:7). 
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entail a more benevolent registration practice for miserable heifers, 
and so on. The complex treatment of horses in ÄL 1571 – to be 
assessed ‘at their value’ according to the instruction – shows that 
many taxation committees were prepared to go into detailed 
consideration of differential value. Accepting the relative evaluations 
inherent in these rolls would reasonably tell us more about actual 
differences of wealth, than if we try to ‘correct’ relative values by 
superimposing a standard tied to another situation and another time.  
Therefore I prefer to use the original assessment sums for 
synchronic comparisons. In all the instances where it is possible, I 
have checked the sums exacted against the items in the assessment 
inventories. The figures are usually surprisingly accurate148, but where 
they diverge, I have had to choose the alternative that seems most 
plausible – i e to make assumptions that downplays contrasts rather 
than exaggerating them. Whether I use the full property tax 
assessment or just the livestock component will depend on the 
circumstances. 
The diachronic development I try to gauge through an index 
relating all of the taxations before 1713 to a ‘reference farm’ derived 
from the national average in 1571. To relate this index to the value 
sums in Ksl 1713, I make a comparison between the ‘reference farm’ 
of 1571, and an average farm in the only three parishes where 
livestock was separately specified in 1713. These are used for 
constructing another index, relating the assessed wealth of different 
homesteads to the wealth of the 1713 reference farm. Through linking 
the indexes I can make comparisons between 1571-1640 and 
1713/1714 (see Appendix for details). 
 WEALTH AND POVERTY AMONG THE PEASANTS  
Did the taxation system breed inequality?  
Eva Österberg (1977) examined the distribution of wealth among 
peasants around 1600 in a study of expansion and regression in the 
province of Värmland. She noticed surprisingly large contrasts 
between the peasant households, and put forward the hypothesis that 
peasant inequality was at least in part an effect of the rigid system of 
taxation, where registered farms were classified into ‘whole’ or ‘half‘ 
                                                   
148 Considering the absence of a numerical basis common to currency and to weight 
or area measures. 
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homesteads (hemman) – paying full tax or a reduced amount149 – 
with the eventual addition of even smaller units corresponding to a 
quarter of a homestead (torp) or even an eighth (halvt torp). This 
system was of course designed to equalize the tax burden, but the 
difficulty of keeping this rough evaluation up to date would leave 
many households overburdened and others under-taxed – it is quite 
easy to find half- or quarter-homesteads larger than many fiscally fully 
burdened farms150.  
The problem of overtaxation was usually mitigated through 
temporary tax-reductions and remissions, but the under-taxed farms 
must have been left with relatively higher reserves of untapped 
surplus and thus a potential for trade and investment. In this way, the 
households favoured by the cadastral assessments would find 
themselves in a position to increase their relative advantage, and 
inequality among peasants will tend to increase over time as an effect 
of the taxation system. This is the logic of Österberg’s argument, as I 
read it (Österberg 1977:227ff, 252f, 259f, 266f, English summary:282) 
where the lack of fit between the actual disparity of resources and the 
state’s inadequate attempt to catch this disparity in a rigid matrix of 
binary tax rates, becomes an independent dynamic factor interacting 
with the more commonly discussed demographic and property rights-
related tendencies151. For the 18th and 19th centuries, and in particular 
for the period of fast demographic growth around 1750-1850, an 
increasing inequality among the peasantry has been demonstrated in 
a number of local studies (cf the compilation in Söderberg 1987).  
                                                   
149The distinction between ‘whole-’ and ‘half-peasants’ appears already in the Land 
Law, but as a consequence of Gustav Vasa’s tax reforms, it was universally 
applied to the registered holdings (Dovring 1951. 
150 Even more glaring examples can be found, eg the torp (quarter-homestead) 
Botorp in Grava was in 1600 assessed for a harvest twice the size of (Norra) 
Hershög, which was a ‘full farm’ in the fiscal sense, but kept less than a quarter 
(21%) of the livestock found on the ‘quarter-farm’ Botorp. (cf the property 
taxation in VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and the cadaster in VrmH 1601:10:3 fol 
25v-29). Accordingly, this ‘croft’ (under ecclesiastical tenure) not only paid a rent 
lower than the tax levied on Hershög, but was also more lightly burdened by 
extraordinary taxations - except property taxes. 
151  A discussion of tax-related dynamics in terms of Schumpeter’s Crisis of the Tax-
state, was initiated by Birgitta Odén (1967), who also argued that rising taxes 
should lead to a sharper social differentiation - without, however, specifying the 
mechanisms through which this effect would have been produced. Folke 
Dovring’s earlier analysis of Gustav Vasa’s tax reforms (cf the English summary in 
Dovring 1951:422-6), emphasized the individualization of taxes, which is an 
indispensable precondition for the different dynamics discussed by Odén, 
Österberg and Herlitz (below). 
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The most influential of these studies are Herlitz 1974 and Winberg 
1975152, both of which demonstrate developments widening the gap 
between freeholders and tenants on exempt land, in addition to the 
long-term trend transforming the peasantry into ‘a class of farmer 
proprietors (hemmansägare)’ on the one hand, and a landless 
proletariate on the other. In Herlitz’ study rising tax-land value was 
interpreted as reflecting improvements made possible by a stagnating 
tax burden allowing the retention and reinvestment of an agricultural 
surplus, and the improving quality of peasant property rights making 
this a rational option153. In Winberg’s case a more restrictive birth rate 
among freeholders ensured that the growing agrarian proletariate was 
primarily recruited from the tenantry on noble land. This tendency 
was reinforced by the reorganization of manorial agriculture towards 
consolidated farms employing wage workers, usually154 in the form of 
a semi-dependent truck-system wage-labour force (statare). Winberg 
1990 provides the best concise synthesis of these findings, also 
incorporating corroborative evidence from Gadd 1983 (peasant 
productivity) and Bäck 1984 (peasant demands for enclosure).  
A weak point in this ‘peasants into proprietors’ theory is its heavy 
reliance on evidence from one single province – that of Skaraborg155. 
Endeavouring to summarize a number of different local studies, 
Söderberg 1987 discerns two periods: 1720-1800, and 1810-1850. 
Excepting a study of development in Stockholm – reasonably subject 
to different dynamics than the countryside – all of them indicate an 
increasing divergence for the latter period. For the earlier one, the 
evidence is contradictory: Herlitz’ increasing inequality in Skaraborg 
links up to Winberg’s and Martinius’ findings for phase 2, while 
Isacson 1979156 suggests contrasting tendencies for the two periods, 
                                                   
152  Here cited from the 1977 edition.. 
153 To the extent that Revera 1984 is right in suspecting a parallel stagnation of 
noble rent pressure – very  difficult to square with her own description of 
growing status expenses – this would shift the explanatory burden more heavily 
onto the institutional component in Herlitz’ model. 
154 Particularly in Eastern and Southern Sweden. The relative importance of the 
‘peasant road’ and the commercial manor system within the development of 
modern Sweden is still awaiting a full assessment. 
155 The standard evidence on early peasant inequality, on the other hand, relies 
heavily on Värmland (Österberg 1977) while that on farm sizes is primarily based 
on data pertaining to Uppland (Ågren 1964, Dahlbäck 1977), and the effects of 
conscription on sources from Västerbotten (Lindegren 1980).  
156 Martinius 1977 also studied an area in Skaraborg. Isacson discusses the 
development in By parish in Bergslagen (the ‘mining law’ region in central 
Sweden). 
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proposing an introductory phase of homogenization, followed by a 
reversal in phase 2.  
Homogenization or polarization? 
In order to test Odén’s and Österberg’s hypothesis, Janken Myrdal 
and Johan Söderberg compared the property taxations of 1571 and 
1599 for a sample of twelve parishes in the provinces of Uppland, 
Sörmland, Östergötland and Småland (1991:175-202). The results were 
interpreted as showing no marked tendency in either direction. In 
most of the parishes (7 or 8) the keeping of livestock expanded, but 
this was compatible with growing inequality (3 parishes) as well as 
with diminishing (2).  
As I felt dissatisfied with a conclusion neglecting to discriminate 
between landowning freeholders and tenants, I decided to select two 
of their contrasting examples for closer scrutiny. As I also wanted to 
be able to carry the comparison further up to 1713-5, the best choices 
appeared to be the Upland parish of Danmark, and the Småland 
parish of Gladhammar157. In order to make a more differentiated study 
of the contrasting development, I had to begin with a reconstruction 
of the original comparison. Myrdal/Söderberg (henceforth M/S) 
measured the amount of livestock kept by each nominatus by 
converting the various animals into ‘cattle equivalents’ 
(nötkreatursenheter, Ne) in conformity with the conventional usage 
among Swedish cultural geographers158, but as the accounting for 
young cattle appeared to be insufficiently uniform in their sources, 
they decided to discount heifers, steers and calves, as well as those 
animals which did not figure in both of the taxations - young pigs, 
lambs and kids159 (1991:176). They also attempted to limit the 
investigation to the agricultural population strictu sensu, by excluding 
nominati who possessed no draught animals. 
                                                   
157 Danmark is one of the wealthiest parishes in the central parts of Uppland 
(Myrdal-Söderberg 1991:182-4), a part of Sweden which has been seen as the 
heartland of peasant-magnate opposition to royal centralization during the middle 
ages (Lönnroth 1959), and whose peasantry later customarily played a leading 
role in the Peasant Estate (Olsson 1926). Gladhammar was the home parish of 
Per Olsson, a renowned Speaker of the Peasant Estate during the Caroline 
period. Accordingly, these two parishes should also be important from the 
viewpoint of peasant political representation, another aspect I am studying. 
158 Cf note 148 above. 
159 Who were not included in 1571. 
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Some standardized procedure for delimiting the investigated group 
does appear necessary, though160, but for my own investigation I 
prefer to use Lars-Olof Larsson’s criterion (Larsson1983:44): a 
nominatus assessed as holding any amount of seed grain and/or 
livestock corresponding to 3 Ke161 or more, is presumed to be an at 
least de facto landed peasant.  
When reconstructing the original comparison, I discovered that a 
considerable number of stock-owning nominati which I could not 
identify as non-peasants162 would be excluded from the list by the 
draught-animal criterion. At the same time, cavalrymen assessed for 
no other property than their horse would have to be included, as a 
horse was by definition considered a draught animal and thus an 
indicator of husbandry. When I revised the figures including all of the 
nominati, or just those possessing stock corresponding to at least 3 
Ke, the contrasting development disappeared altogether. I also 
examined the consequences of varying the unit of measurement: 
                                                   
160 Different tax rolls specify the landless parishioners to a widely varying extent. 
Accordingly this source material cannot tell us much concerning the rural 
proletariate. 
161 Lennart Andersson Palm 1993 reports this criterion to be effective for eliminating 
landless nominati. (Although he cites the limit as 3 Ne units, which is a 
somewhat more restrictive norm) 
162  On some of the homesteads not a single draught-animal possessor was 
registered, although the assessment of cattle and seed grain makes it clear that 
the farm was engaged in agricultural activity. The M/S criterion thus excludes not 
only a person owning five cows but no other animals, like Matz Ionß i Lundha 
(Danmark 1571), but also someone like Peter i Hendelöp (Gladhammar 1571), 
richer than five sixths of the peasants in that parish. 
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Charts 1-4. The parishes of Danmark and Gladhammar 1571-1599. 
Sources: ÄL 1571, UpH 1599:9K, SmH 1599:12. 
I have not succeeded to completely duplicate Myrdal-Söderberg’s 
results163 – represented by the white reference line in the chart – but 
at least my version (grey line) shows the same tendencies, and the 
same contrast, although in a slightly weaker form. Including young 
cattle (deducted by M/S as the delimitation criteria of the two 
taxations did not seem to have been consistent164) does not affect 
these tendencies much, except that the homogenization in Danmark 
becomes more pronounced.  
Substituting the 17th century Ke scale gives a similar and even 
stronger effect, but if we instead measure variation in the livestock 
tax enacted at each occasion, also the figures from Gladhammar show 
a certain (but weaker) homogenization, even when we employ 
                                                   
163 Johan Söderberg has kindly provided me with a copy of his excerpts, and it 
seems as though the major sources of the deviation are differing interpretations 
of indistinct figures and of the vaguely specified attributions of children’s 
property in the rolls. In either case, the influence on the final figures is limited 
and only really discernible for Gladhammar 1599. 
164 Excluding young cattle solves this problem only if the inconsistency is due to to 
a different demarcation between young cattle (taxed) and calves (tax-free). If it 
is due to a different demarcation between heifers and cows, and/or steers and 
bulls/oxen, all of which were taxed, although at different rates, the proposed 
solution might even aggravate the inconsistency instead of dissolving it. (If cattle 
counted as cows within one of the taxations would be counted as heifers in 
another, and therefore be underevaluated, then removing heifers from the 
comparison would increase the discrepancy.)    
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Myrdal-Söderberg’s draught-animal delimitation. That is to say: there 
is no increasing inequality discernible between the two dates 
according to the tax assessment for livestock property in 
Gladhammar. On the contrary, inequality subsides, though not to 
nearly the same extent as in the parish of Danmark.  
Indications of a sharpening inequality thus only appear after 
reinterpreting the figures through weighting systems designed to 
make these taxation figures more compatible. This indicates that the 
source of the apparent contrast may lie in the manipulation of the tax 
assessment figures as well as in the delimitational criteria discussed 
earlier.  
When we vary the delimitation of the investigated population, but 
stick to Myrdal-Söderberg’s measurement unit (Ne excluding young 
cattle), we find that increasing inequality only appears under the M/S 
criterion of draught-animal ownership. 
And, finally: if we use the entire population (excepting the parson, 
who is obviously irrelevant to the study of peasant stratification) no 
choice of unit can prevent the conclusion that both of the parishes 
experience a homogenization – not a polarization. It thus appears 
likely that the contrasting developments observed by Myrdal-
Söderberg are a statistical illusion. 
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 If we use the entire livestock assessment as our unit of 
measurement no delimitation would produce the contrast observed 
by M/S. If we apply this to a population delimited through Larsson’s 3 
Ke criterion we find that the contrast between shrinking and growing 
differences of wealth will be replaced by a difference in degree: 
between a stronger and a weaker homogenizing tendency. This 
method of comparison is the one I advocate, and in the rest of this 
section I will extend it to 1640165, and, through correlating indices 
based on cattleholding in 1571 and 1713 (cf Appendix), almost to the 
close of the Swedish Imperial Age. 
How should we interpret these results? My original intention was to 
examine Myrdal-Söderberg’s contrasting developments searching for 
clues as to the causes of divergence – whether it was due to a 
contrast between: 
1. changes within the entire groups,  
2. changes within a certain segment (the richest, the poorest, 
or among the middle peasantry166), or to  
3. contrasting developments on land of different nature, 
 and then to follow up these clues in the further development up to 
1624, 1640 and 1714. The extension of the investigated period will 
still be a worthwhile project, but to decompose an illusory effect is 
                                                   
165 The last year for which full livestock taxation lists exist. 
166  The rise and subsequent decline of the middle peasantry is an important theme 
in European early modern history (Le Roy Ladurie, Robisheaux 1994, 1998). 
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not. As the supposedly lower degree of inequality for Gladhammar in 
1571 was measured over a much more narrow selection of the 
assessed households than in 1599167, the apparent rise in the 
coefficient of variation would seem to indicate changes in the pattern 
of horse- and ox-keeping168, but not in any way a rising inequality - 
rather the opposite, although the tendency is much weaker than for 
the parish of Danmark. 
If the homogenizing tendency is the general pattern, Österberg’s 
argument appears even more decisively refuted – for this period, that 
is169. This is probably because my period of investigation is so late 
that the figures already reflect the success of counteracting policies 
invented to secure the tax base. These are exemplified within 
Österberg’s description of how the state attempts to capture the 
hidden surplus through property taxes, poll taxes etc around the turn 
of the 17th century170. Her extensive lists of extraordinary taxes 
exacted during the last four decades of the 16th century (Österberg 
1977:237-247) reflect the earlier stages of a long struggle to mitigate 
the counterproductive effect of the rigid land tax system: too little tax 
from those who were able to afford it, and too much trouble and 
expenses wasted on attempting to collect it from those who were not 
(266n7) 
In this respect the contrast between Danmark and Gladhammar is 
hardly crucial enough to focus my investigation on. To find out how 
general the homogenizing tendency is, further examples have to be 
brought into the picture. Also: if Österberg’s hypothesis is no longer 
central to the argument, other aspects of stratification - than its 
compression or amplification - deserve equal attention. A good place 
to start an investigation of the stratification per se, should be where it 
first caught attention – let us have a look at the taxation cited in 
Österberg’s study. 
                                                   
167 64% as against 89% for the later year. 
168 The average number of horses and fully grown oxen per nominatus are almost 
constant between the two assessments (2,1-2,4  and  1,5-1,6) while the average 
household in 1599 in addition possesses 2 young oxen and 1 bull, which are 
totally absent in 1571. This suggests a higher involvement with ox-trade, in 
1599, while farmers in 1571 must have borrowed or rented draught animals – or 
had entered into companionship with draught animal owners (as bolagsmän). 
169 Further below I will show indications that it does apply to the period without 
property taxes between 1641and 1713. 
170 See Österberg 1977:266n7, where she also cites Larsson 1972 to the same 
effect. 
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Rich and poor peasants 
Among the five parishes examined by Österberg, Grava presented 
the most extreme case of inequality, and will therefore be selected for 
closer scrutiny: 
Table 4. Property tax of 1599: dispersion of assessed property in 5 Värmland 
parishes (Österberg 1977). 
 Segerstad Grums Grava Tingvalla Hammarö SUM 
penningar 
(pennies) 
number of 
households 
number of 
households 
number of 
households 
number of 
households 
number of 
households 
number of 
households 
1-200 5 10 5 7 1 28 
201-400 6 19 19 11 8 63 
401-600 5 14 10 3 10 42 
601-800 3 8 8 1 4 24 
801-1000 3 10 8 1 2 24 
1001-1200  3 4 1 1 9 
1201-1400  4 6 1  11 
1401-1600 1  1  1 3 
1601-1800   2 2  4 
1801-2000  1 1   2 
2001-   2   2 
Source: Österberg 1977:table 66. 
Österberg also compared different categories of peasants: 
Grouping the material according to land nature distinguishing tax 
and crown land from exempt land (krono homesteads are too few to 
constitute a separate category except in Hammarö, where on the other 
hand there is no skatte) yields certain interesting results. The average 
is in every parish higher for the skatte and krono units, than for the 
frälse households, and the difference is in many cases considerable. In 
addition, the dispersion among the values is often greater within the 
skatte group. What can be said, in particular for a couple of these 
parishes, is that the frälse units have clustered more closely around a 
lower accounted wealth than other units. (Österberg1977:256; my 
translation) 
Alongside Kurt Ågren’s demonstration that hemman (cadastral 
homesteads) on tax land were on an average larger than those on 
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land of different natures (1964:49,53f)171, Österberg’s results have 
helped to confirm the picture of tax peasants as an upper stratum of 
the peasantry, not only during the late 18th and 19th centuries, but 
from the very beginning of the modern era172. However, this 
viewpoint rests on questionable foundations. Ågren’s calculations 
compare only the formal cadastral units of different nature, while the 
relevant unit of comparison should be the peasant household. Many 
hemman units comprised more than one household, and the 
homonymity between hemman in the literal sense of an actual 
homestead, and in the sense of a cadastral unit of account is one of 
the perennial sources of confusion within Swedish agrarian history (cf 
Herlitz 1974 ch.V, Larsson 1983:14ff, Gadd forthcoming).  
As tax land was in freehold and thus inheritable, it seems quite 
likely that a higher rate of subdivision could offset or more than offset 
the difference in cadastral unit size. Myrdal (1987:83-89, 93) discusses 
the extent of hidden subdivision indicated by the property taxations, 
and calculates an average rate of subdivision of 19% in 1571 and 32% 
in 1599/1601. Regrettably he does not discuss differences between 
land of different nature. Larsson 1983:50f demonstrates that in 1627 
the subdivision was much more frequent among the freeholders of 
Kinnevald hundred, than among the tenants. Herlitz 1974:190f shows 
that the average rate of subdivision was, in the early 18th century, 
slightly higher on tax and crown land than on frälsebonde holdings, 
and that this divergence increased. On the other hand, he also 
demonstrates (220ff) that during the period 1750-1769, the actual 
units of cultivation were larger on tax-cum-crown land than on 
exempt land holdings. This might be said to strengthen Ågren’s case, 
but as a stronger position of tax peasants would be the effect of the 
dynamics analyzed by Herlitz it is in no way certain that it is also a 
starting point. The convergence of tax and crown peasants is likewise 
a product of the development rather than a precondition. 
                                                   
171  Ågren’s results, referring to parts of mid-17th century Uppland, have been 
confirmed for the 16th by Dahlbäck 1977:268f, using similar methods and 
covering roughly the same region. Ferm 1987:210f extends the comparison to 
other parts of central Sweden finding divergences on the same scale or even 
larger. 
172 Behre et al 1985:126ff, Larsson 1985:70. NB that Larsson’s own survey, which he 
cites in addition to Österberg’s, does not support her conclusion.[1983:82]. Yet 
he claims that tax peasants usually were more well off than other peasants. 
Samuelsson 1993:177. Also cf Dahlgren in Roberts (ed)1973:106 and Nilsson 
1990:23f, 50f 
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The property tax rolls allow us the best approximation to 
independent households available173, and thus a comparison between 
the assessed households should afford us a more reliable measure of 
relative affluence. This is what Österberg endeavoured to do, but 
unfortunately she neglected to make corrections for the lower tax rate 
on frälse land. This means that the wealth of frälse households has 
been underestimated by 50 percent, and likewise the span of 
variation. In order to get a more adequate picture of the distribution 
of wealth I have made charts dividing the nominati into five 
categories: skatte, kyrko (tenants of the parish church), kloster (tenants 
on former monastic land), arv och eget174, and frälse. I also 
discriminate between households of different cadastral magnitude: 
‘full’ or ‘half’ homesteads, and crofts or settlements assessed as 1/3 or 
1/4 hemman (fiscal homestead units). Farms accommodating more 
than one household I have subdivided into fractions of the cadastral 
assessment for the entire farm175.   
Chart 5: The parish of Grava in 1600: total tax  
 
Sources: Compiled from VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. 
                                                   
173 Cf the discussion in Larsson 1972. 
174 Royal – or, as in this case, ducal – patrimonial domain land. In Grava only one 
single homestead belonged to this category (eventually to be subsumed under 
the title of krono). 
175 Two households sharing a farm assessed as a ‘half-size’ homestead are thus 
treated as two quarter-size homesteads etc. 
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Chart 6 shows the distribution of wealth by standardized tax 
assessment in penningar; i e corrected for the frälse reduction, so that 
the figures become compatible for comparisons of wealth – in 
contrast to Österberg’s table 66 (reprinted as table 3 above176.  
Chart 6: The parish of Grava in 1600: livestock index 
 
Sources: Compiled from VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. 
Chart 4 shows the value of livestock only, measured by comparison 
with the national average from 1571177. These are the kinds of figures 
I will use in interregional comparisons and over time. Chart 5 shows 
the assessed harvest in barrels of grain, reasonably giving a better 
estimate of farm size, than the conventionalized ‘mark-land’ value 
assessment categories employed in Ågren’s comparison178.  
                                                   
176 I have checked the assessed wealth against the tax rates and property rolls to 
make sure that the tax reduction really did correspond to a twice as high ratio 
between tax and property for the tenants on exempt land in this parish. 
177 Index(ÄL1571)= 100 (see Appendix, page 121ff). 
178 Markland was a conventionalized land assessment measure of uncertain origin, 
presumably signifying a quantity of land yielding a rent of 1 mark. As land was 
not regularly  reevaluated these measures can be used for comparisons only with 
serious reservations (Dovring 1947). 
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Chart 7: Grava 1600: harvest size. 
 
Sources: Compiled from VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. 
In this parish, at least, tax peasants by no means held larger farms 
than tenants: their harvests average 5,2 barrels over a range from 3 to 
10, while tenants of the parish church average 5,6 barrels, those on 
noble land 9,6 and monastic tenants 15179! Is the divergence from 
Ågren’s results just due to the different method of calculation, or does 
it also reflect a difference between regional patterns of landholding180? 
It cannot be entirely due to a higher degree of subdivision, for if we 
merge all the tax land households of Grava into full cadastral 
homestead units (hela hemman), their composite harvests would still 
not exceed 8,5 on an average. We will have to return to that 
question. 
                                                   
179  Crofts and settlements are excluded. 
180  In Danmark 1640 tax land holdings on an average appear to be larger than all 
other categories except those under ‘academy tenure’ (paying rent to the 
university). If we look at the 10 largest farms instead, 3 are skatte (2 of those 
skattefrälse, including the second largest farm, while the third one is held on tax-
free conditions by the constable), 5 are frälse, and the remaining 2, including the 
largest one, are on academy land. It is thus not evident, that the higher average 
size necessarily meant that tax peasants dominated the large-farmer stratum. 
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Who were the rich peasants – a second look 
These charts present a picture quite different from Österberg’s181. 
Not only do the frälsebönder (peasants on tax-exempt or ‘noble’ land) 
appear to be as rich or richer than the skattebönder (freeholders on 
tax land) but the disaggregation of the combined skatte and krono 
category also reveals a hidden elite - the tenants on former monastic 
land182. If this pattern is not altogether exceptional183, it suggests that 
the history of peasant stratification in Sweden may be more 
discontinuous than we have thought, featuring different and maybe 
competing elites. The rich tenants on monastic and noble land may 
have been post-medieval residues, some kind of reeves or sub-
vassals, perhaps stemming from lapsed gentry184 a service category, 
while the richer among the skattebönder might already have been 
those most successful at navigating the perennial tidal movements of 
morcellement and reassemblement – a category based on inheritance 
                                                   
181  These findings I first presented at a conference at the Gustavus Adolphus 
Academy in Stockholm 1999. Only considerably later did it come to my attention 
that Klingnéus 1997 already had pointed out Österberg’s tax rate mistake. He 
did not, however, observe the other misleading factor in her wealth analysis: that 
also the Crown peasants whose property assessments she merges with that of 
the tax peasants, are more wealthy than the freeholding skattebönder. The 
peasant category which she declares to be the richest on the strength of her 
survey is thus – at least within the wealthiest and most unequal of her sample 
parishes – the poorest!  
182 The standardization of the different ecclesiastical, royal and regnal categories 
under the amalgamated title of krono, proceeded at a very slow pace, and the 
distinction between prebendal, parochial and monastic tenants was upheld in land 
registers for a long time. 
183  In the ÄL1571 roll for Norra Lundby  in the province of Skaraborg, 11 out of the 
33 nominati  were tenants of the local monastery. As some of the poorest 
peasants also belonged to this group, their average property was quite modest, 
but among the five wealthiest households in the parish, four held on cloister 
land. Number one was a frälsebonde, but if we count only livestock, two 
monastic tenants top the list. In the jointly assessed parishes of Hånger and 
Mårby in the same province, there was only a single monastic tenant, but he was 
the wealthiest one. 
184 Cf Dahlerup’s (1969) discussion of the Danish case in terms of a ‘fall of the 
gentry’. Samuelsson 1993:193f recounts an example of decline from gentleman 
to frälsebonde – presumably as a tenant of relatives rich enough to uphold 
privileged status. Also cf Almquist (SoH 1967:182) and Munktell 1982:72,129. 
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and thus a form of ownership whatever the juridical definitions 
attached185.  
As the prebendary tenures were secularized into a wage system for 
purposes of state, other holdings converging under the title of krono 
tended to go the same way, partly as an alternative186 to service 
tenures, partly as a parallel. Forssell 1869:174ff recounts the beginning 
of this process, where earlier canonical prebends are assigned for 
scriveners, bailiffs etc. In an appendix (op cit, app 3:VI) he has 
registered all the prebends he could identify, their number of tenants 
and the rents due as well as their destinies after the reformation: 
confiscation, revocation to the family of the original donor, or being 
granted in fee (Tables J.I-J.7). The last-mentioned cases were 
apparently of the same wage-assignment character as mentioned 
above, as the grantees do not seem to be aristocratic feudatories, but 
rather administrators, tradesmen, specialized craftsmen (a 
pearlstitcher, a bookbinder), and school-masters. 
Did the privileged position of the former monastic tenants survive 
in some way, or were they submerged into the lower peasantry, as 
other categories rose? The varying fortunes of individuals and families 
would be difficult to trace, at least before the 18th century, but 
comparing the development for identified homesteads between the 
different taxations may be a feasible alternative which should yield 
some clues as to the relative fortunes of the different categories.  
The special position occupied by monastic tenants in Grava may be 
a local peculiarity, but the important point is that it goes totally 
against the traditional presuppositions. Crown peasants – among 
whom monastic tenants were eventually to be included – are 
                                                   
185  The system of subdivision and reconstruction of homesteads from generation to 
generation studied in Dalecarlian villages by Sporrong and Wennersten (1995) 
has certain features which would appear to be peculiar to this region. Mutatis 
mutandis it should be possible to identify other local patterns of strategic 
planning necessary to maintain peasant property over generations. Winberg 
1977:53 pointed out that different customs of inheritance were still practically 
unknown, and excepting Dalecarlia, this observation would still appear valid. 
186 Cf Odén 1955 on förläning, beställning, and anvisning. The development of a 
specific Swedish system of assigning revenues from indidual homesteads as 
wages is stressed by Nilsson 1989:147ff. The post-reduction indelningsverk or 
‘allotment system’ was the final outcome, eventually affecting the majority of 
krono tenures. 
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generally treated as an adjunct to the freeholding tax peasants187, but 
this example seems to point in the opposite direction: instead of 
enjoying the benefit of Crown protection to a similar but lower extent 
than the skattebönder, these peasants might rather be enjoying the 
benefits of stewardship to a similar but higher extent than the 
frälsebönder – or might have been in a better position to combine 
different kinds of advantages. The existence of wealthy peasants also 
among the frälsebönder has occasionally been noted188, but has hardly 
led to any debate. Lindkvist’s discussion (1979) of inequality among 
tenants of the nobility during the 14th century advances the 
hypothesis that the difference between rich and poor tenants may be 
a remnant of an earlier manorial organization, where certain more 
substantial holdings were occupied by a bryte or villicus 189(steward).  
It is also conceivable that the monastic tenants were the heirs of 
peasants who during the Middle Ages had sold or donated their own 
land to religious institutions in order to protect themselves, in which 
case favourable tenure conditions might have been part of the 
bargain. If the klosterbönder of Grava came from such a background, 
their personal wealth would testify to the efficiency of the strategy. 
However, as Rosén points out (1950) Queen Margaret’s inquiry or 
räfst was much more interested in retrieving land given to parish 
churches, usually by peasants, than in the donations to monasteries, 
where the donors were primarily gentry and aristocracy, whose land 
was already ‘lost to the crown’ anyway.  
So maybe the wealthy monastic peasants came from a gentry 
background, and had sought protection both for the land they lived 
from and from the wars they did not want to fight any longer (or 
could not afford to take part in)? Examples of Dahlerup’s ‘fall of the 
gentry’, perhaps – his study in the hardening conditions for lower 
gentry at the end of the Middle Ages pointed out that many 
impoverished gentrymen had found a living as reeves for churches or 
                                                   
187 Especially for later periods; cf Herlitz’ (1974) and Winberg’s (1977:42,158) 
assumptions that their results for tax peasants also apply, albeit in a weaker form, 
for Crown peasants. Winberg’s argument explicitly refers to the near universality 
of freehold purchase during his period (and in his area of investigation). In 
Herlitz’ case his property rights-based argument is tentatively extended to crown 
peasants enjoying stadgad åborätt (hereditary tenure); neither of these 
arguments would apply during the Imperial age, though. 
188 Forssell 1872-83. Larsson 1983:82 reports that in 1627, the majority of the very 
wealthy (>21Ke) peasants in the hundred of Kinnevald (Småland) were tenants, 
and that the richest by far (52 Ke), was a frälsebonde.  
189 Also cf the example discussed in Dovring 1951:398f. The discussion of 
bosgårdar in Helmfrid 1962 gives further references.  
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monasteries, but that the opportunities for this type of employment 
were becoming scarce (Dahlerup 1969). For a gentryman who had 
some land to donate, however, the conversion to farming under 
church protection might have been rather advantageous after all.  
DEVELOPMENT OF PEASANT WEALTH OVER TIME 
What happened to the rich peasants of Grava? 
If we compare the wealthiest households from 1600 with those in 
1622 and later, we may get some clues as to how permanent the 
stratification was. Moving on from the property taxation of 1600 to 
the livestock tax rolls for 1622, we find that out of the seven richest 
households from the earlier occasion (the top decile - none of them 
on tax land), most of them had split into two or more190. Out of the 
resulting 10 households only one still belonged to the top decile in 
1622191 two homesteads out of 94 shared position nr 9, one or two in 
1640.  
Among the 17 households within the top decile of the peasant192 
households of 1714, only two derived from the original seven. If we 
trace the origin of the other 15 in the top decile, we find that the 
richest farm derived from a parochial homestead – (Western) Tolerud 
- which had split into three already by 1600. The other two sub-
homesteads also appeared in the top decile of 1714 (rank 5-16), while 
they in 1600 had occupied the places of 27, 33 and 48. If we look at 
chart 9, we can see that the original top layer of wealthy households, 
mainly composed of ‘full’ cadastral homesteads, has been fragmented 
by 1622 and 1640.  
In this parish, at least, that homeostatic self-adjustment seems to 
have been in effect, whereby more economically successful farms 
tend to accommodate a larger number of people and eventually split 
                                                   
190 Nr 6 Almar had been turned into a vicarage. 
191  Just barely, as two homesteads shared position nr 9 out of 94. One of these 
was derived from the homestead of Rud, divided between two homesteads. In 
1600, the undivided farm had been by far the richest one in the parish, but iin 
1640 the two resulting farms - which had by then been bought into freehold by 
the tenants from 1622 - were down to the 3rd and 4th deciles. In 1714 the 
original homestead accomodated 11 households, among which the 3 wealthiest 
belonged to the third decile or the bottom layer of the second one.  
192  Nr 5 (according to livestock tax) from 1600 had by then been turned into a 
manor, and nr 6 had - as mentioned above - become a vicarage. 
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up into smaller – and relatively poorer – units193. The new stratum of 
rich peasants in 1714 consisted primarily of tax peasants, 13 of them 
compared to the 3 crown peasant households comprising W. Tolerud 
and the single exempt farm: S. Grava, which was the only ‘full’ 
homestead among the top decile.  
Chart 8: Top decile from Grava 1600: further development 
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Sources: VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. BL 1622, 1640. Ksl 1714. 
Households identified with the help of OVL, Rosenberg and cadasters for relevant years. 
What about Österberg’s hypothesis that ‘underassessed’ homesteads 
might have been able to retain a larger portion of its agricultural 
surplus and would thus have been better equipped to invest and 
improve? If we measure wealth relative to the cadastral homestead 
                                                   
193 Winberg 1975 and Martinius 1977 argue the relevance of these mechanisms in 
the Swedish context. They are a commonplace in discussions of the French 
peasantry (many examples in Aston-Philpin 1985). 
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size, hemmanstal, or as it is later designated, mantal, we find that 
two ‘quarter-size’ homesteads or torp194 (crofts) stand out as 
proportionally much more affluent than the number 1195 homestead of 
Rudh: Botorp (on cloister land) and Klingerud (on ducal domain 
land). Botorp is assessed for a harvest which only the wealthier half 
of the ‘full farms’ can surpass, and its livestock is worth 43% more 
than the median full farm. Klingerud’s harvest is equal to Botorp’s 
and its livestock value is 6% above the median full farm. Both of 
these farms are thus obvious cases of ‘underassessment’. Still, in a 
period of more or less constant property taxes - designed to tap that 
real-value surplus whose existence the crude system of cadastral 
assessment couldn’t capture – we might suspect that Österberg’s 
dynamics could have lost their effect196. 
If we also include apparently subdivided homesteads197 in the 
comparison, three out of four households on the tax-land homestead 
of (Southern) Skived, two out of four on the parochial farm of 
(Western) Tolerud, and one out of the three on Kätterud (skatte), also 
surpass the top decile in wealth per cadastral unit. 
The further development of these farms (see Chart 9) is not easy to 
pinpoint, as it is not quite evident which one of the subfarms 
correspond to which at each later date, but the five households at or 
below index 100 should be disregarded, as they do not appear to be 
under-assessed. They probably appear also in the following taxations, 
though, and are therefore included for the sake of consistency. The 
chart suggests a general downward trend during the years of annual 
livestock taxations, while the period 1640-1714 has witnessed a 
considerable expansion for several of these198, most remarkably for 
the only remaining199 crown homestead (originally parochial), W. 
                                                   
194 A term usually translated ‘croft’, but in early cadasters a common label for any 
farm ‘smaller’ (in economic substance) than the ‘whole’ or ‘half’ homesteads of 
peasants counted as full members of the community. 
195 Ranked according to wealth. 
196 The very fact of such disproportionate wealth having been accumulated in ‘small’ 
homesteads seems to indicate that they had been in effect during the 16th 
century, when most taxes were exacted in proportion to cadastral size. 
197 De facto separate farms which are not listed as independent homesteads in the 
cadastral registers. The same mechanisms should apply to these, as they 
reasonably must have divided the tax burden between themselves, and thus 
might be ‘under-assessed’ in exactly the same way as independent cadastral 
units. 
198 The argument that the downturn could be due to decreasing efficiency in the 
registration of livestock is discussed in the Appendix.  
199  Kätterud and S. Skived were originally tax land homesteads, while Botorp and 
Klingerud were bought into freehold between 1622 and 1640 (OVL). 
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Tolerud. If we merge property figures for each homestead, however, 
the development of S. Skived becomes even more spectacular. 
Chart 9. “Under-assessed” homesteads 1600 and their further development. 
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Sources: VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. BL 1622, 1640. Ksl 1714. 
Households identified with the help of OVL, Rosenberg and cadasters for relevant years. 
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Thus it seems as though the period without property taxation, 1641-
1713, might give some support to the Österberg hypothesis. The 
expansive effect, though, seems to have propelled the tax land 
homesteads into that dominant position which her survey had 
assumed to be the point of departure. It is quite possible that the 
political struggle for secure property rights around the mid-17th 
century in alliance with burghers and clergy marked the beginning of 
the rise of the market-oriented tax land peasant200, and that an 
important step in this direction was the abolition of the unpopular 
livestock tax.  
. 
Chart 10: Homesteads in Grava 1600-1714. Taxed property  
(linked livestock-based indexes, see Appendix) 
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 Sources: VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. BL 1622, 1640. Ksl 1714. 
Households identified with the help of OVL, Rosenberg and cadasters for relevant years. 
                                                   
200  As studied by Herlitz (1974), Gadd (1983) and Winberg (1975, 1990) during the 
18th-19th century. 
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If we look at the whole series of 1600-1622-1640-1714 for Grava, 
(above, chart 11) we can see that despite an increasing rate of 
subdivision, ‘small’ farms become surprisingly prosperous towards the 
end of the period, especially the homesteads on tax land. This kind 
of property structure may have offered especially favourable 
conditions for an early example of the ‘rise of the freeholder’. 
If we look at the development over time of aggregate and 
individual (average) property in livestock in Grava, (below, chart 12) 
we can see that the total value is almost constant for the first forty 
years, while the average declines. I e, during this first period the 
number of households declines, while total wealth appears to be 
more or less constant. During the second period, the aggregate 
wealth of the parish more than doubles, although average wealth 
rises to a level equal to or even higher than in 1600. 
Chart 11: Property in Grava: aggregate and average value 1600-1714 (linked 
livestock-based indexes, see Appendix) 
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Sources: VrmH 1600:10:3 fol 68-77 and 1601:10:3 fol 25v-29. BL 1622, 1640. Ksl 1714. 
Households identified with the help of OVL, Rosenberg and cadasters for relevant years. 
As to the question of ‘homogenization or differentiation’, chart 12 
above suggests a decreasing economic inequality during the first 
period, (1600-1640) mainly due to the fragmentation of larger farms, 
followed by a widening gap between rich and poor peasants during 
the period of economic expansion, where, as we have already noted, 
tax land households have been the most dynamic (apart from the 
Crown farms at W. Tolerud). A Lorenz curve chart confirms this 
impression, also suggesting a return to the level of inequality 
prevalent in 1600. However, as these diagrams are constructed from 
107 
livestock tax figures, except for the 1714 taxation, which measures 
total wealth related to livestock through an index, the relevance of 
which may be questionable outside the region on which it is based, I 
also construct a second Lorenz curve, comparing the total tax values 
of 1600 and 1714201. 
Chart 12-13: Lorenz curves Grava 1600-1714 (livestock index) 
GRAVA 1600-1714 (livestock index)
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The second curve chart (#13, below) shows that the total-wealth 
inequality of 1600 had been even greater than the livestock-value 
inequality and than the total-wealth inequality of 1714. However, 
measured by the property share of the top two deciles, inequality of 
total wealth was almost identical at these two occasions.  
The difference lies in the lower part of the curve, where the 
taxpayers of 1714 appear to possess a greater portion of the parish’s 
aggregate wealth than at 1600 (a similar effect is even more 
noticeable in the first curve chart, where the bottom decile of 1714 
seems to the most affluent among the four cases, while the top 50% 
have the proportionally lowest share). 
This is certainly due to the more restrictive delimitation I have had 
to employ for the contribution figures: anyone assessed at only 1 kast 
(=owning property not worth more than 10 dsm) has to be excluded 
as a suspected obesutten (landless), as this figure is the conventional 
                                                   
201 In both of these cases the ambition was to tax total wealth, even if the methods 
differed, but the degree and profile of  the dispersion of wealth should be 
comparable. 
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minimum level for everyone that isn’t explicitly defined as destitute. 
Hired hands and maids are thus routinely assessed at 1 kast, which 
makes it impossible to discriminate between landless lodgers and de 
facto peasants farming a parcel of the cadastral homestead.  
 
The further development in Gladhammar 
The tenures in Gladhammar exhibit a bewildering multiplicity. 
Apart from the usual tenures of skatte, frälse and krono, there are 
customary relicts and in-between categories. Skäriebönder on islets 
are a parallel to other customary tenures in forest-land areas which 
usually have had favourable conditions to encourage settlement. Like 
other customary tenures they have been subsumed under krono. 
Sämjebönder is a contested category which sometimes has been 
counted as skatte, and at other times krono. (see above page 76).  
Out of the 57 frälse units in 1571 only one has changed its nature 
in its entirety202: Åldersbäck, which had been the homestead of Nils i 
Allersback, the 3rd richest frälsebonde 203 has become a subdivided 
krono homestead together comprising 3/4 mantal. None of the two 
tenants are assessed for much property (30 and 40 dsm), but one of 
them is assigned (presumably as a salary) to Mayor Hans de Rees, the 
                                                   
202 Disregarding those where a part of the homestead has been detached and 
turned into krono. 
203 The 6th richest peasant in the whole parish – the richest tax peasant was number 
7. 
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second richest landowner in the parish (see below, table 4) which 
suggests that the economic potential of the homestead may have 
been appropriated by the allotment holder (indelningshavare). 
Chart 14: Property of households in Gladhammar 1571-1714  (linked livestock-
based indexes – see Appendix) 
 
 
sk= skattebönder (freeholders on tax land) 
slb= skattelandbor (tenants on tax land) 
säm=sämjebönder (‘agreement tenants’) 
skär= skäriebönder (‘skerry peasants’) 
br&fplb= brukslandbor & förpantningslandbor foundry tenants and tenants on land 
held 
as collateral. 
dec= dekanatsbönder(deanery peasants) 
aoe= arv och eget (royal or ducal domain) 
lg= ladugårdsbönder (demesne tenants) 
tp= torp (crofts)  
 
Sources: ÄL 1571, SmH 1599:12, BL Småland 16:1 (1624), BL Kalmar län 1640, Ksl 
Kalmar län 1714:36. Land nature identified from headings, comments and tax-rates in 
the rolls and from cadasters for relevant years. 
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The six arv och eget homesteads (or ‘His Royal Majesty’s peasants’, 
as they are called in this roll) have dispersed into different natures. 
Gellerzkulla, which had been the 3rd richest farm in the parish in 
1571, is now a krono homestead housing an Alderman, who may be 
living there himself204, while Långauik, number 5, and Yxnauik appear 
to have become the two most substantial frälse homesteads, as the 
tenants on each farm have a combined assessed property worth 140 
dsm, though they also manage to pay a high rent: 30 dsm. On 
another frälse homestead, Giärdzöö, the only tenant is worth 150 dsm 
by himself, but he only has to pay a rent of 15 dsm205. In the earliest 
property taxation 143 years earlier, Laße in Jersiöö (also a 
frälsebonde) had at an index of 25 been one of the poorest peasants 
in the parish: one cow and two young cattle only two years of age206, 
four sheep and copperware with a total weight of two pounds. This 
excludes him from being counted among the landed peasantry 
according to both of the rival delimination criteria discussed earlier. 
Among the customary tenants of 1640, the 5 sämjebönder had 
earlier been counted as skatte, except Johan i Torsfall (1599), who 
was krono. One of the others, Pär i Wigelsbo, had lost his tax right by 
1624, presumably due to unpaid taxes. These two are still in the 
Crown sector by 1714, while the other three are skatte. Obviously 
sämjebönder were considered a form of skatte in Gladhammar during 
this period. 
The skäriebönder, on the other hand, are all counted as skatte in 
1714, but as krono in 1571-1624, except the homestead of Horn, 
which is frälse for some time from 1599207. In this case the nature of 
                                                   
204 No tenant is listed, just a farm-hand and a maid. The alderman is assessed at 70 
dsm, which seems rather modest, especially as it might include 20 for the 
servants. Probably he has property in the town as well. 
205 The only higher amount of rent specified in the roll, is paid by the oskattlagda 
torpare (crofters who have not been assessed as taxable – for regular taxes, that 
is – in the cadaster) under the manor belonging to Captain Beniamin Magnus 
Cronobourg (see below). They are estimated to yield a rent of 60 dsm together. 
As they are not specified, we do not know how many of them there are. There 
are 34 crofters in the roll discounting horsemen, craftsmen, parish ringer and 
destitute, but many of these would belong to other manors.  
206 The 1571 taxation rolls specify young cattle from one to four years of age at 
different assessment rates; only at five are they counted as cows or oxen.  
207 Probably in 1624 where noble domain estate is usually excepted. Perhaps also in 
1640 where it is listed as noble domain estate, although it pays full tax rates like 
skatte or krono. 
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their tenure has been reinterpreted in a way favourable to the tenants, 
which appears to be quite unusual208. 
The four homesteads under the deanery (dekanatsbönder) in 1599 
and 1640, are counted as frälse in 1571, but as krono in 1624. In 1714 
three of these have become skatte and one frälse209.  
Chart 19: Peasant households in Gladhammar 1714. Assessed property. 
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 Source: Ksl Kalmar län 1714:36. 
In Gladhammar by 1714, an upper echelon of peasants assessed for 
a personal property worth at least 100 dsm (roughly corresponding to 
an index of 275) have clearly detached themselves from the majority 
clustering around an average of Index(JHM1713)=100 closely 
                                                   
208 Cf the discussions of customary tenures in Almquist 1964 and Hafström 1970. 
The sämjebönder example lends support to the analysis of Bergfalk 1832:17-20 
as against those of Almquist and Hafström. 
209 This is probably just a delayed effect of the church reduction, where the 
occasional preservation of a prebendal-style tenure has made the land 
expendable for state purposes and thus possible to sell. 
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corresponding to that of 1571210. Within the area 100 + 45 (or 20-50 
dsm), more than 80% of the farms can be found. There is also a more 
thinly scattered intermediate group in the area 60-80, loosely grouped 
around Index(JHM1713)=190. In this parish, the wealthiest peasant 
stratum is clearly dominated by peasants on exempt land, 9 out of 16, 
including the richest one. Three are crown peasants, and among the 
five on tax land, at least three are tenants and not 
freeholders/owners. In general, the concentration of ownership in 
Gladhammar has become very pronounced by 1714. 
 
Table 5: Persons of standing owning land in Gladhammar 1714 
Persons of standing owning land  homesteads value 
in Gladhammar 1714 frälse skatte 
capitalized 
rent 
assess 
ment sum 
Bruukz Patron Hans Andersson 18 8 629 86 715 
Borgmäßter Hr Hans De Rees 10 2 432 100 532 
Wälb: H: Capitain B Ma Cronobourg  6 1 311 6 317 
Öfw högw Hr grefwe C J Lewenhaupt  1  56  56 
Baron och Landzhöfd: H: Claes Bonde  1  56  56 
Häradzhöfdingen H: Abraham Bauman  1  30 30 
Brp Christopher Bauman 1  25  25 
Leutnanten Hr Herman De Rees  1  20 20 
Häradzhöfdingen Jonas Lindbohm  1  20 20 
Source: Ksl Kalmar län 1714:36.  
Out of the 86 cadastral homesteads (not counting the crofts) the 
three largest landowners – a foundry owner, a mayor and an army 
captain – together control at least 40. Out of the 37 tax homesteads 
they own 11, or 46% of the assessed values of tax rights, and out of 
the 39 exempt homesteads, they own 34, or 86% of the capitalized 
rent value. In fact, only three other owners of noble land appear in 
the rolls – another foundry owner, the provincial governor and a 
colonel. 
The latter two – a baron and a count belonging to ancient lineages 
– would have been the only legitimate owners of exempt land in the 
parish (with the possible exception of the captain). Among the tax 
homesteads, three more were owned by titled gentlemen: a lieutenant 
and two hundred-court judges, leaving the 24 remaining tax peasants 
                                                   
210 Index (ÄL1571)=100; the livestock held by the two reference-farm averages are 
almost equivalent if we assess them according to the BL 1640 tax rates. (See 
Appendix).  
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in possession of 37% of the freehold value. One consequence of this, 
is that out of the more than 40 peasants on skatte land, around 40% 
were subtenants, not freeholders. 
This shows that already at this date frälse land – just like skatte – 
has become a commodity which is bought and sold on the market, 
and that the ‘Estate’ definition is becoming more and more 
meaningless; you can’t tell from the nature of the land who the owner 
or the occupier is, and not from the owner what kind of land he 
would possess. The only remaining constraint from the Estate order, 
is the prohibition against peasants buying frälse land. Yet even 
peasants begin to acquire exempt land during the later part of this 
century, even if they have to do it by proxy or acquire it as collateral 
(Carlsson), and in the very appropriate year of 1789 the last 
restrictions fall211.  
Another interesting aspect of the assessment – or rather of this 
contribution in general – is the way the future development is 
anticipated in the property sum: the two totally different kinds of 
landowning (cf Herlitz 1974, chaper IV) generate very different kinds 
of revenue, which are reduced to a common denominator and 
summed up in a monetary evaluation abstracting from all class and 
Estate aspects212. The market is becoming the implicit point of 
reference for price-setting even for absolutist taxation commissions. 
Measuring the development of peasant wealth over time in 
Gladhammar is made difficult by the many homesteads unnacounted 
for in some of the taxations – especially in 1624. Therefore I have 
complemented the curves showing all the farms with three different 
samples designed to be more internally consistent: 
 
A. homesteads included all of the years   
B. homesteads included each year except in 1624 
C. those included at least in 1599, 1640 and 1714 
 
The figures for sample A indicate that the dip in aggregate wealth 
in 1624 is due to the large number of farms which are not listed for 
this year. These are in the main demesne farms on noble land 
                                                   
211 To be more precise: almost the last; ypperligt frälse – manor demesne – which is 
completely tax-exempt, will remain out of bounds for another 20 years.. 
212 An even more explicit example is Madame Christina Springers(?) at Nåntuna in 
the parish of Danmark, who is assessed at 37 dsm for real estate: 17 for the tax-
land right (skatterätten) and 20 for the exempt-land rent (frälseräntan). Ksl 
1713: Danmark. This homestead was 5/8 skatte and 3/8 frälse, and in this case 
exempt-land share was thus assessed at almost the double the value of the tax-
land portion. 
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(ladugårdsgods). As a consequence they are also excluded from 
sample A, which accounts for the contrasting behaviour of the 
average (sample A) curve in 1599; the farms on fully privileged 
noble land account for the bulk of the rise in 1599 (the sample A 
aggregate is also practically constant from 1571 to 1599). 
Chart 15:  Livestock in Gladhammar: aggregate and average value 1571-1714 (both 
measured by linked livestock-based indexes, see Appendix) 
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Sources: ÄL 1571, SmH 1599:12, BL Småland 16:1 (1624), BL Kalmar län 1640, Ksl Kalmar 
län 1714:36. Farms identified from entries in the rolls and in cadasters for relevant years. 
As can be seen from chart 15, there was on the whole probably a 
fairly steady increase in average as well as aggregate wealth even if 
the growth during 1599-1640 may have been very modest213. In the 
parish of Danmark, on the other hand, (below, chart 16) there was a 
sharp rise from 1571 to 1599, and an equally sharp decline between 
1599 and 1624. The last period witnesses an obvious growth in both 
of the parishes, as was also the case in Grava.  
                                                   
213  A rise up to 1624 and a decline from 1624 to 1640 is also quite possible, but 
the apparent decline of sample A in 1624 is contradicted by the evidence from 
samples B and C. 
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Chart 16:  Livestock and wealth in Danmark: aggregate and average value 1600-
1714  Both measured by linked livestock-based indexes (Appendix) 
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Sources: ÄL 1571, UpH 1599:9K, BL Uppland 3:10 (1624), BL Uppsala län 1640, Ksl Uppland 
1713. Land nature identified from headings, comments and tax-rates in the rolls and from 
cadasters for relevant years. 
The further development in Danmark 
The general rise, decline and rise pattern is clearly visible also in 
the chart of assessed households in the parish of Danmark over the 
whole period (chart 18, below). An interesting aspect here is that the 
strong growth during the final period, 1640-1713, is not primarily due 
to the tax land peasants, but to the remarkable recovery among the 
crown sector – originally largely cathedral tenants, who had been 
heavily depressed during the period 1599-1624-1640. 
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Chart 17: Households in Danmark 1571-1714. Assessed property. Measured by 
linked livestock-based indexes (see Appendix) 
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Sources: ÄL 1571, UpH 1599:9K, BL Uppland 3:10 (1624), BL Uppsala län 1640, Ksl Uppland 
1713. Farms and nature identified from DMS, from headings, comments and tax-rates in the 
rolls and from cadasters for relevant years. 
 
The category ’enf’ in the chart for 1624 signifies enfeoffed 
homesteads – in general from ecclesiastical tenures, but also four or 
five examples of skattefrälse. To this category I have also added 
‘military homesteads’ (‘mil’), nominati identified as soldiers, horsemen 
or officers. These are examples of the ‘earlier allotment system’ (det 
tidigare indelningsverket) where homesteads were given or allotted 
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to214 military personnel as a system of remuneration. The important 
role for crown sector peasants in the military system is probably the 
main reason behind their depression during the war period, but also 
behind their preservation as viable peasant homesteads. Their 
recovery after the Westphalian peace may be a sign that the tax and 
rent pressure had forced them to improve their husbandry which 
would have led to a fast growth as soon as the constant tapping of 
their surplus abated. 
Chart 18: Average property for different tenures. Danmark 1640-1713. linked 
livestock-based indexes (see Appendix) 
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214 Meaning that their tax or rent was reserved for the upkeep of the soldier etc. As 
the military nominati are in many cases themselves registered as occupants, 
these seem to have been given the homesteads in custody or as donations. In 
other cases, occupants have been given reduced dues in exchange for military 
service, but in this particular roll, all the military nominati pay the full tax. There 
are also some who are registered on homesteads which already appear to be 
fully occupied by farmers. In such cases they are probably paid by receiving rent 
from the occupants, as in the allotment system proper introduced by Charles XI 
from 1682 onwards (cf Ågren 1973, 1989). 
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Comparison and conclusions 
Thus there is no general pattern among the three parishes studied 
here, except for the rising aggregate wealth as well as average wealth 
during the period 1640-1714215. That the patterns of differential 
development for the various tenures diverge even during this rise, 
suggests that this was a period of general economic growth, the fruits 
of which could be plucked by different groups depending on the 
property rights structure of the area: freeholding tax peasants as in 
Grava, crown peasants as in Danmark or frälsebönder as in 
Gladhammar. 
Chart 19: Aggregate wealth in the parishes of Danmark, Gladhammar, and Grava 
1571-1713/4 (linked livestock-based indexes,(Appendix) 
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215  The rise between 1571 and 1599/1600 observed in both Danmark and Grava 
may very possibly have had a parallel also in Grava, but unfortunately no records 
from the Ransom for Älvsborg (1571) are extant for this part of the country. 
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Chart 20: Average wealth in Danmark, Gladhammar , and Grava 1571-1713/4  
(linked livestock-based indexes, see Appendix) 
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Neither of these cases gives any support for the conventional 
notion that the later economic and political dominance of 
skattebönder within the Swedish peasantry is a direct and unbroken 
heritage from the Middle Ages, let alone from the Viking Age, as a 
nationalist myth would have it. The myth of the freeholding 
odalbonde with an unbroken tradition of citizenship based on 
private ownership of land has to be revised so that we can reassert the 
historical role of Sweden’s peasantry without romanticizing 
ownership. 
The medieval and early modern Swedish peasant was a full 
member of the community whether he owned his plot or held it from 
a Lord, the church or the Crown. If he held enough land he enjoyed 
full juridical capability including the right of attendance at the 
hundred moot and the possibility of serving as a juryman, whatever 
the nature of the land he held (Claesson 1987, Bjarne Larsson 1994). 
120 
The peasantry did not become an Estate216 until the representation of 
the cities and the hundreds at 16th century Diets became reinterpreted 
as a representation of two social categories that were eventually 
formalized into corporate bodies (Estates): burghers and peasants. 
During the 17th century, the Nobility argued that they represented 
their own tenants, who should therefore not be included in the Estate 
of peasants, but not until in 1720 was this viewpoint shared by the 
spokesmen for the Peasant Estate. By this time a new kind of 
skattebonde had emerged, whose views of property had been shaped 
by the struggle for tax-land property rights in alliance with Burghers 
and Clergy, and who was well disposed to take advantage of the 
economic opportunities that arose when the burden of constant 
warfare was lifted through the fall of the Swedish Empire. 
 
 
                                                   
216 Unless you insist that the Estate concept is a natural classification that can be 
applied – like class analysis – whether people define themselves in these terms 
or not. I wouldn’t agree; as Tom Söderberg put it: ‘Classes are based on 
observation of reality. Estates are institutions.’  
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APPENDIX:  
Livestock-based indices 
In order to gauge the diachronic development reflected in the 
various property tax assessment I have constructed two indices: 
I: Index(ÄL1571) 
The first index relates all of the taxations to a ‘reference farm’  
derived from the national average in 1571. Hans Forssell’s statistical 
summary of this taxation (1872 and 1883) remains the only 
nationwide treatment of Swedish Imperial Age data, and after some 
vacillation I have decided that the lack of precision imposed by his 
condensation of the categories is a smaller problem than the regional 
bias inevitably inherent in any other available solution. I have 
therefore based my index on the average amount of livestock owned 
by the 53 342 households for which the rolls are preserved (I have 
taken the figures from Myrdal-Söderberg 1991:80 as they have 
complemented Forssell’s figures with a number of parish rolls 
rediscovered after his survey). 
 
oxen cows young cattle goats sheep swine horses 
fully 
grown young  4years 3years 2years 1year    stallions mares 
0,4 0,4 3,9 0,5 0,5 0,9 0,9 1,4 5,1 2,5 0,8 0,8 
 
The assessed value for this livestock – 80,37 marks – I equate to 
Index(ÄL1571)=100. To relate this index to the taxations of 
1599/1600, 1622/24 and 1640, I calculate the taxation value of the 
same amount of livestock according to the tax-rates of these 
respective years, and put each of these evaluations equal to 100. 
 
II: Index(JHM1713) 
 
To relate this index to the value sums in Ksl 1713/1714 is more 
complicated, as it is in general not possible to separate the value of 
the livestock from the rest of the taxable property assessed. As I have 
only found three parishes with separately recorded livestock within 
the Ksl rolls, I use the inventories from these 106 assessed 
households as the basis for a second reference index. As the closest 
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earlier year, 1640, should be the most important date of comparison 
for the Ksl figures, I will use the tax rates of that year to correlate the 
indices.  
 
 
 horses oxen cows young cattle goats sheep swine TAX 
 stall. mares foals   steers heif. old young old young old young öre 
1713 0,5 1,2 0,3 0,8 3,8 0,5 3,3 0,8 0,54 3,5 1,8 1 1 46,29 
1571 0,8 0,8  0,4 3,9 1,4 1,4 1,4   5,1  2,5  46,27 
 
As can be seen in this table, the two reference stocks are virtually 
equivalent according to the rates of the roughly midway taxation year 
of 1640. I therefore link the two indexes, which yields a conversion 
factor of Index 27,46 per assessment unit (‘kast’, corresponding to 10 
dsm217) within the contribution of 1713. Of course constructing an 
index from such a narrow base entails a high degree of uncertainty, 
but as the reference parishes are relatively poor and exhibit no sign 
of growth compared to 1571, the compound index relating the two 
almost equivalent reference farms of 1571 and 1713 will hardly inflate 
the 1713/14 figures.   
It is, however, important to remember that the linking of the 
indices represents a two-step comparison. In chart 17 the average 
Danmark farm of 1713 is rated 217, while the average for 1640 only 
reached 156. This would mean a 39% increase in taxable wealth if the 
figures had been fully commensurable; in this case, however, they 
represent the facts that  
1. the 1640 average farm in Danmark owns livestock worth 
156% of the livestock of the 1713 reference farm in Jäla-
Hånger-Mårby (or of the national-average farm of 1571), 
and 
2. that the average 1713 Danmark farm owns taxable movable 
property worth 217% of the same reference farm’s total 
taxable property.  
Although this is not equivalent to a 39% increase in wealth, 
comparing the figures will still reasonably tell us a lot about relative 
wealth. As to the question of total property, it is quite unlikely that 
the relatively poorer average farm of 1640 would have possessed a 
                                                   
217 dsm= daler silvermynt, the contemporaneous Swedish monetary unit; the 
possible complications arising from the mutable relation between this silver-
standard  currency  – which was at this point primarily a unit of account – and 
the everyday copper-standard currency of daler kopparmynt, should not affect 
the present calculations as all taxable property was assessed in dsm. 
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higher proportion of non-livestock property than the relatively richer 
average farm of 1713. The 20 years of continuous property taxation 
should also reasonably have tended to deplete monetary reserves and 
thus to increase the relative weight of the livestock component. The 
39% should on these accounts be taken to be a minimum figure.  
How about the objection that the collective inquisitive assessment 
method of 1713 might account for the higher taxation results? Should 
the BL figures be suspected of heavily underrating the movable 
property? The participation of the parish priest, has usually been 
considered a reasonable safeguard against under-taxation, even the 
more so since the six-man parish jury or vestry (sexmän) also had to 
assist, and put their identification marks (bomärken) on the rolls as a 
guarantee (Larsson1972).  
To interpret the generally decreasing livestock assessments of 1620-
1640 as primarily due to a learning process, whereby methods of tax 
evasion were refined from year to year, would be to underestimate 
the degree of local supervision possible in the Swedish early-modern 
society. The parson and the vestrymen were also capable of learning, 
and other rational explanations for decreasing returns have to be 
taken into account.  An important reason for introducing property 
taxes was to capture the hidden surplus of under-assessed farms. As 
my investigation of Österberg’s rising inequality hypothesis (see the 
discussion after chart 10 above) suggests that her proposed 
mechanism did have effect during periods without property taxes, the 
combined effects of continuous warfare and of an equalizing tax 
system should provide sufficient explanation for the decreasing 
returns. Of course this downturn may have been aggravated by 
refined tax evasion, but as the 1713 figures are also quite higher than 
those from 1624, the subsequent upswing could hardly be illusory. 
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CHAPTER III 
SWEDISH STATE-BUILDING AS A PROCESS OF 
PARALLELL CENTRALIZATION. THE MEDIEVAL 
BACKGROUND 
POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
A question of terminology 
How shall we describe the kind of society that was transformed by 
the modernization process, whether incremental or revolutionary? 
‘Feudalism’ was one of the first labels to be affixed to the ‘system’ of 
pre-revolutionary Europe, and in the Marxist tradition codified as 
‘historical materialism’, the ‘Feudal Mode of Production’(FMP) is 
understood to be the stage preceding capitalism218. Many historians 
are opposed to the use of ‘feudalism’ to describe a whole family of 
societies, and argue that either (1) it should be confined to certain 
European societies during a certain period, (2) that it should only be 
used to describe certain social relationships, characterized by fief and 
vassalage, or even (3) that it has created so much confusion that we 
are better off without it. E A R Brown’s argument for the third 
alternative has received formidable backing from Susan Reynolds’ 
Fiefs and Vassals (1994), which, however, concentrates its 
deconstructive fire on ‘feudalism’ in the sense of alternative 2 
(scorching some of the arguments for alternative 1 in the process).  
Reynolds is careful, though, to make reservations for ‘feudalism in 
its Marxist sense, which involves not only relations between nobles 
                                                   
218 The details of how this is supposed to have occurred - and to what extent the 
actual development has conformed to the axiomatic model of societal 
development sketched in the famous introduction to ‘A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy’ - have kept generations of Marxist, anti-Marxist, 
neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist historians busy over the years. I will try to avoid 
this kind of debate as far as possible as I do not think that the analysis of 
capitalism should serve as a model for how to analyze earlier forms of society - 
the danger of teleological bias when discussing the emergence of the modern 
world is great enough as it is. 
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and peasants but consideration of the whole economic structure of 
society’, a ‘broader subject’ which she seems to consider more 
important, although ‘impeded by its inheritance from the narrower 
one of the idea that fiefs and vassalage were central and defining 
institutions of medieval European society.’ (p 3, also cf 15). Marc 
Bloch’s concept of ‘feudal society’ was also broader and more 
synthetic than that of the legal-historic formalism Reynolds sets out to 
dismantle, and although his ideas are criticized in a few places it 
would seem that his holistic anthropological approach - and by 
extension that of Georges Duby, who also appears to escape really 
fatal injuries – should deserve a more respectful treatment. Bloch’s 
wider concept of liens de dependence would even seem to gain the 
more in value as a characterizing feature the more we devaluate the 
importance of ‘vassalage’ and ‘fiefs’ in the supposedly ‘strict sense’ – 
an especially important aspect in the analysis of ‘atypical’ cases like 
Sweden219.  
An ambiguous term for an ambiguous concept 
There is still a need for a general term encompassing the types of 
societies that dominated Europe before the transformations of 
modernity, the type of societies the miracles ‘happened to’. ‘Ancien 
Régime’, ‘Alteuropa’ (Brunner),  or ‘old order’ (Blum), have been 
employed as alternative labels, but the advantage with ‘feudal society’ 
is that the usage of the word in this sense is familiar and well-
established, however irritating it may be for those who prefer 
unambiguous terms.  
What we need here, though, is a term for an inescapably 
ambiguous concept, and to create a new, and more ‘precise’ term, 
would be to pretend to an accuracy we have not yet achieved, or, 
worse, a conformity which never existed. As a heuristic concept, we 
are quite simply stuck with ‘feudalism’ until we have found a better 
explanation of what it really was that happened to exactly what kind 
of group of European societies at exactly which points of the whole 
process. There is a practical need of some kind of generalizing label 
                                                   
219 Aaron Gurevich has carried the anthropological aspect of Bloch’s work further, 
and incorporated it into his very original reconceptualization of ‘feudalism in the 
Marxist sense’, which is not mentioned anywhere by Reynolds. This is probably 
because his fundamental 1970 work on the origin of European feudalism has not 
been translated into any major Western European language except the Italian 
(Gurevic:Le origini del feudalesimo. Bari 1983. A Swedish translation was 
published in 1979.) Gurevich has paid special attention to the Scandinavian 
countries, especially Norway and Iceland (Gurevitj ###). 
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broad and flexible enough. ‘Feudalism’ in the widest usage of the 
term would be even far too broad, though, as when it is used in the 
vague general sense of landlordism and oppression of peasants.  
The European state-system  
As my present purpose is to formulate a general framework for the 
discussion of the Triple Miracle, and of Sweden’s role within it, loose 
enough to accommodate all the different perspectives I discerned in 
Sweden and the European Miracles, I will start out from the only 
point of virtual consensus in the entire debate:  
Europe never consolidated into an empire, but developed into a 
system of interacting but independent and competing societies, which 
accounts for the higher dynamic potential, compared to other regions.  
This argument, which can be traced to Otto Hintze, is envisioned as 
a fundamental European advantage not only by Anderson (1974), 
Wallerstein (1974) and Tilly (1975) - as Skocpol observed in 1977 - 
but has received an even heavier emphasis in Jones 1981, Holton 
1985, Hall 1985, Mann 1986, and Tilly 1991. 
State-system dynamics: different approaches 
The state-system argument has been advanced from quite different 
directions of approach, each version carrying its own implications 
and anchored in different analytical perspectives  
Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) emphasis on the ‘Failure of 
Empire’, and on the dynamic consequences ensuing when the scale 
of economic reproduction moved up to a level beyond the spatial 
grasp of political power.  
Perry Anderson’s descriptive220 (1974) definition of European 
feudalism, stressing its composite, polystructural, and variable 
character, and rooting its dynamics not only in the struggle over the 
                                                   
220  He also offers an interpretation of Marx’ own implicit definition of feudalism, 
distilled from comparative discussions of Russia in Marx’ correspondence. I find 
this part of Anderson’s analysis very much beside the point - why assume that 
Marx possessed a valid implicit definition, when the current state of research 
could not have furnished him with an adequate empirical basis for it? - and 
probably only designed to disconcert dogmatic Marxists. 
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agricultural surplus221, but also in the struggles for control over land 
and people, between lords and between countries. His emphasis on 
the build-up of coercive power as a double imperative: to extract 
economic surplus from the peasantry and to defend the lord’s 
position against other lords, gives his model an internal cohesion 
despite the diversity and grounds the state-system dynamics in 
‘feudal’ microfoundations (the nexus between surplus exaction and 
military duties). 
The argument of Charles Tilly and his associates (1975) that the 
‘formation process’ of modern European states was driven by the 
growing demand of fiscal and administrative power in order to 
survive the state of endemic competitive warfare in early modern 
Europe 
Reinhard Bendix’ (1978) concept of ‘reference societies’ (12f, 292) 
expressing the concern of state elites observing the superior 
performance of a rival state and seeking ways to emulate the factors 
perceived to have caused this superiority, provides a more 
generalized parallel to Gerschenkron’s concept of the (economic) 
dynamics of ‘catching up’.   
Eric Jones’ (1981) description of the European states system as ‘a 
portfolio of competing and colluding polities whose spirit of 
competition was adapted to diffusing best practices’ (115) and his 
claim that although ‘the self-propulsion of market forces explains 
much’, the rise of the nation-state was required to establish ‘stable 
conditions’ for the diffusion of progress222(149), provides a capsule 
synthesis of much of the earlier state-system debate. 
John Hall’s (1985) notion that the common ideological system of 
christianity provided the crucial link holding the state-system together 
is hardly novel, but his consistent formulaton of that argument offers 
a perspective for integrating ideology and identity formation into 
                                                   
221  As argued by the British Marxist historians (from Dobb to Hilton) against the 
exogenous viewpoints of Pirenne and Sweezy (Hilton(ed)###, Kaye###). One of 
Wallerstein’s points of departure is his attempt to endogenize the role of long-
distance commerce through moving up to a wider object of analysis: the entire 
system instead of a single polity. In this way he can argue a ‘purely economic’ 
dynamic without having to recourse to exogenous explanations. Anderson 
instead endeavours to endogenize political struggles and institutions into the 
economy through arguing that ‘extra-economic coercion’ was the most essential 
means of economic competition in pre-capitalist societies.  
222  Although he formulates it within a context emphasizing another argument: 
favourable natural conditions, crucially including a wide span of ecological 
variation over an area compact and traversable enough to permit constant 
interaction. 
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general social development without overrating the power of mind 
over matter (‘organizational materialism’). 
Michael Mann’s (1986) generalization of the state-system 
explanation into a model of ‘multi-power actor civilizations’, arguing 
an analogous dynamic for the Sumerian and Hellenic city-state 
systems, develops the concept into a general principle for historical 
dynamics. He uses a neo-Weberian model of four separate ‘sources of 
social power’ for the important purpose of minimizing reductionist 
explanations, but when he postulates from the beginning that the 
‘four sources’ are independently constructed, but interact 
‘promiscuously’, he is left without tools to analyze the ‘separation of 
the economic from the political’ (Cf Wood) characteristic of modern 
society. 
Charles Tilly’s revised theory (1991) focusing on the interaction 
between ‘accumulation of coercion’ driving the process of state-
building, and ‘accumulation of capital’ resulting in the growth of cities 
and city networks. The crucial dynamic element in his revised theory 
is the growth of the ‘nation-state’, or, as he now prefers to call it: the 
‘consolidated state’, combining the military advantage of the first 
process with the economic advantage of the second, thus following a 
trajectory of ‘capitalized coercion’.        
Feudalism as dynamic polystructurality 
As I have argued earlier (Emilsson 1996), Anderson’s denotation of 
‘feudalism’ is less to be understood as a set of societal structures than 
as a set of development paths, ‘trajectories’. 
As Anderson’s explanation of European uniqueness is:  
1. closely tied to his analysis of feudalism and its dynamics,  
2. wide enough to accommodate all of my three miracles,  
3. congruent with the neo-Hintzean argument about the 
European advantage which appears to be the only point of 
near consensus in the entire debate223,  
4. possible to rephrase in broadly institutional terms,  
5. broad enough to accommodate insights from most of the 
other approaches listed, 
I will take it as my point of departure. As implied by point 4, I will 
adopt an un-dogmatic institutionalist viewpoint, somewhere in the 
border country between the old and new institutionalisms, availing 
myself of Douglass North’s concepts while trying to stay clear of his 
anachronistic neo-classicism.  
                                                   
223 As Skocpol noted in (1977). 
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Anderson’s explanation of the dynamic advantage of European 
feudalism may be loosely interpreted thus: The feudal synthesis is 
envisioned as a fusion of the complex institutional heritage of the 
ancient world, transmitted in different variants by the cities, the 
Church and the Empire, with the forms of community and collective 
jurisdiction of Teutonic tribal society, thereby creating a 
‘polystructural’ society endowing Europe with a uniquely wide 
repertory of alternative institutional models (Cf the quote from Jones 
above). This made institutional innovation possible in several ways: 
• Where different institutional structures were able to co-exist within 
the same political unit, further societal development could follow 
different possible tracks: royal or imperial proto-state, ‘feudal’ chains 
of devolved authority, the manorial system, village communities, city 
networks, monastic orders, parishes224 and other ecclesiastical 
institutions etc. 
• A political unit with a more adequate institutional structure could 
conquer others, or be imitated by them, or attract mobile elements 
such as merchants and money-changers, knights or mercenaries,  
clerics or other intellectuals. 
• If necessary, new institutional arrangements could also be created 
through analogy225, or through ‘resurrection’ of defunct models (the 
Renaissance!) 
SWEDISH REVOLUTIONS? 
The ‘Engelbrekt rebellion’ 
Trying to fit the discussion of revolutionary or incremental change 
into the context of European transformation as described above226, I 
was led to search for revolutionary situations in Sweden. In such a 
discussion, we can hardly avoid going all the way back to the 
Engelbrekt rebellion in the 1430s, as this has been variously 
interpreted as a national revolution, as a struggle giving birth to 
Sweden’s parliamentary institutions (cf the quingentenary celebration 
                                                   
224 In Sweden, the community of the parish was often more important than that of 
the village. 
225  As when secular institutions may have been modelled on ecclesiastical ones. 
Marongiu (1968) makes this point about curias, and Lindkvist (1997:228) and 
Padoa-Schioppa 1997:359 about juridical institutions. 
226 An aspect of the ‘European miracles’ on which I am not yet prepared to offer a 
general analysis. The discussion in my paper on ‘institutional revolutions’ contains 
a preliminary survey of the discourse. 
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in 1935, manifested through an eighteen-volume history of the 
Swedish Riksdag)  or as an ‘early-bourgeois revolution’ along the 
lines of Engels’ view of the German Peasant War (Nyström). None of 
these analyses finds much support today, though, as the still 
dominant paradigm in Swedish historiography was founded on a 
severe deconstruction of national mythology, a spectre which later 
importers of alternative paradigms have been understandably 
reluctant to revive. 
I will argue that this rebellion is only the first phase of a longer and 
more complex revolution, ending with the final deposition of king 
Eric of Pomerania. If we evaluate this revolution and its effects 
without revolutionist or nationalist preconceptions, it appears to have 
effected an important reduction of taxes227, and although it did not 
repeal the Union of Kalmar, its immediate result was to put 
sovereignty in the hand of the magnate council for several years, 
during which time these aristocrats had to assume responsibility for 
state finances228. 
Two separate economic bases  
I suggest that we should interpret this as a ‘formative moment’229 
constraining future development through the particular institutional 
solution chosen: in effect a double economic base separating the tax 
base of the ‘crown’ (proto-state) from the economic base of the 
‘ruling class’ – i e that social and economic class from which the 
dominant political leadership drew its support and membership. This 
institutional transformation – a ‘revolution from above’ insofar as it 
was imposed by the ruling Council, but dependent upon bottom-up 
support to the extent that legitimacy for the taxation system was 
                                                   
227 The heaviest tax was, eventually, reduced by a third (Dovring 1951:147-8, 
Schück 1987b). 
228 Gabriella Bjarne Larsson 1994. Also cf Lönnroth 1940:191 about the ‘double 
interests’ of fiefholders during the period of ‘council rule’: As landowners, it must 
have been in their interest to limit the demands on the peasantry; as tax-
collectors, to support these demands. He does not draw any conclusions about 
the consequences for their politics, but the compromise between class interest 
and reason of state typical of the later Swedish nobility (Englund speaks about a 
‘historic compromise’ between Crown and nobility) has a solid material foundation 
in this dilemma. 
229 cf Rothstein###; the ‘tracklaying moments’ discussed by Mann are another way 
to express basically  the same idea. I prefer Rothstein’s less heavy-handed 
expression, and interpret it in terms of path dependence: when a choice 
between possible alternatives in retrospect proves to have constrained the 
options available further on, this is a case of path dependence, and the initial 
choice is revealed to have been a formative moment. 
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based upon wartime requirements – establishes the conditions for the 
specific Swedish version of social division among the peasantry, and 
thus carries far-reaching sociostructural implications as well, affecting 
the peculiar set of class-specific property rights as well as the 
conditions of political representation, including, specifically, the 
choice-set of political alliances. 
The ‘freezing’ of the land nature distribution is not a consequence 
of the rebellion as such; it had been achieved already through the 
räfst (inquiry into alienated Crown estates) of Queen Margaret (Cf 
Rosén 1950), the result of a com-promise between the Queen and the 
group of magnates who had offered her the Crown. Through 
accepting her authority to resume Crown goods they got the chance 
to influence the realization and conditions of this reduction230 in their 
capacity of experienced judges231. 
The formative moment I discern in the aftermath of the rebellion, is 
thus not the first emergence of this ‘frozen distribution’ – it is that the 
aristocracy controlling the state at this moment accepted the two-
sector model and took measures to preserve the balance. This 
compromise between short-term individual and long-term collective 
interests provided the foundation for the kind of ‘collective kingship’ 
exercised by oligarchic assemblies at recurring moments in the further 
development. 
From this point onwards, the roughly fixed-proportion division 
between: 
• a ‘public sector’ providing the material basis for the proto-
state through fixed land taxes and  
• a ‘private’ seigneurial sector providing the material basis for 
the ruling class through more or less contractual rents232,  
seems to have led to something like a ‘two-sided Bauernschutz 
policy’ or a ‘competition in protection’. Instead of engaging in a 
                                                   
230 As such resumptions are called in Sweden. This was neither the first – King 
Magnus Eriksson had also attempted to do something similar (Ranehök 1975:127) 
– nor the most extensive, as Gustavus Vasa’s reduction of Church lands and 
Charles XI’s ‘Great Reduction’ of the 1680’s both transformed the entire society 
on a scale thitherto unheard of; still, it was thorough, uncompromising and 
efficient., and it permanently changed the prospective conditions under which 
land was held. It was formative.  
231 And evidently they were able to influence it much less than what they had 
expected, having to pass judgment on each others’ shady land purchases 
together with gentry co-judges and bishops, with the Queen present to back up 
her henchmen at strategic moments (Rosén 1950:211f, 242-6). 
232 The importance of this ‘freezing of the distribution of rights over land and 
peasants between the Crown, the Church, and the nobility’ is pointed out in 
Herlitz: 1982:265f. 
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destructive struggle between rent and tax233, the Crown and the lords 
had to protect the respective advantages of ‘their own’ peasants, as 
the two sectors were in open or latent competition for cultivators. If 
the land/labour-ratio would have fallen low enough, the situation 
should have changed, but the limits of potentially arable land seem 
never to have been reached during the periods I discuss.  
This factor of course must have strengthened the peasants’ position, 
as the opposite landowner strategy: to unite in order to squeeze the 
peasants harder (the so-called Eastern model) would require 
unanimity not only within the aristocracy (and the Church!) but also 
between the King and the landed nobility. As the rest of the Swedish 
Middle Ages was to be spent in an even more polycentric struggle for 
state power, it would prove very difficult to achieve such unity. Still, 
it did materialize, eventually, but in new and unforeseen ways, and 
by then the imprint of the two-sector model was no longer possible 
to erase. 
                                                   
233 As has generally been taken to be a factor inhibiting agricultural development in 
France (Brenner debate, many entries; cf Aston-Philpin 1985). 
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No homogeneity 
The situation was further complicated by the heterogeneity of both 
sectors. At this point the ‘sectors’ are even hard to discern, but the 
consequences of the aristocratic strategy: to assume responsibilty for 
long-term state-building instead of just using the king-less situation as 
an opportunity for quick profits, had already laid the foundation of  
this ’double base’.  
This may seem like a very idealized picture, but we must not forget 
that the aristocracy were under severe pressure both from above and 
below. The upheavals of the past three or four years were 
tremendous. First they had lost the prospect of castle-fiefs to foreign 
vassals and upstarts; then their remaining foothold in the juridical 
system was challenged through the King’s refutation of their authority 
and through the actions of peasants and miners seeking redress on 
their own. In order to maintain a privileged position ideologically 
justified by their supposed role as protectors of the commonalty, they 
had to enter into active competition on the ‘protection market’.  
The ‘state sector’ comprised freeholders on their own234 land but 
also tenants on the royal domain (Uppsala öd), which originally 
consisted of a network of royal manors (husabyar) designed to 
support the itinerant king during his circuit of the courts and moots. 
Another category, which grew in step with land reclamation, was the 
customary peasants, whose status seems to have varied a lot. In the 
tax-exempt sector we find not only the tenants of the lords, but also a 
diffuse semi-gentry of personally exempt horsemen below the rank of 
properly armigerous gentlemen235, and a bewildering multiplicity of 
ecclesiastical holdings. The competition for cultivators was not 
restricted to tenants, as many peasants farmed mixed holdings – 
combining freeholds with crown or exempt land - and subtenancy 
seems to have been widespread.236 
                                                   
234  To what extent we can talk of individual ownership, and to what the land 
should rather be seen as accruing to the family (or even, in some respects, to 
the community), is unclear, and may be impossible to determine. An earlier 
general belief in a ‘lineage society’ (ättesamhälle) as the point of origin, has been 
strongly attacked, and went out of fashion (Winberg, Gaunt, Sjöholm). 
235 Some of them put a simple identification sign, a bomärke, resembling a merchant-
mark, such as those used by peasants to sign themselves, on their escutcheon, 
like Herman Berman, an army officer of obviously German extraction who served 
as one of the sub-commanders in Engelbrekt’s army (SBL). 
236 Dovring 1951:393-4, Bjarne Larsson 1994:134-138, 154-55, 186. 
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 As in other countries, the legislative system was struggling to 
clarify and simplify this mess, but the particular balance of forces in 
Sweden led towards a clarification and solidification of this two-sector 
model. That is: a division according to surplus exactor, rather than a 
homogenization or a division along other fault lines, such as 
freeholders vs tenants or customary vs contractual. This meant that 
those two dimensions remained unresolved, while the division 
between land owing rent (or tax) to the Crown, and that owing rent 
to a landlord (noble, spiritual, or institutional), and between the 
cultivators of each sector, was sharply regulated, and their distribution 
fixed.  
The internal proportion between secular and spiritual frälsejord237 
was also at issue in the regulations and re-regulations of land 
distribution, and the clashes betwen different interests were obviously 
more complex here than in other areas of conflict resolution. Though 
a general Land Law and a general Town Law became the enduring 
legacies of the period under Magnus Eriksson where the balance of 
power238 between the King and the college of lawspeakers still hadn’t 
shattered, a compromise between the regional Church laws proved 
impossible to achieve.  
Conditions for pious donations were at times contested, but I 
considert it misleading to view this as a struggle between parties on 
the one hand ‘friendly’ towards the Church and positive to free 
testamentary rights, and on the other hand ‘hostile’ to the Church and 
vindicating the birthright of relatives239. As access to Church resources 
from different family networks competing for offices and benefices 
would vary over time, so, it seems, could their attitudes and 
solidarities, and their tendency to condone or to contest.  
It is deeply unsatisfactory to have to accept the oversimplication of 
treating all frälse land as one single category, as in the two-sector 
                                                   
237 I e land tax-exempt through ‘noble’ privilege (horseman’s service) or through 
ecclesiastical privilege.  
238 A balance between – on the one hand – his ambition to reform and strengthen 
royal power and – on the other – the entrenched positions of the magnate 
collective from his regency, who had seemingly overcome the internal divisions 
from the civil war. The balance was to topple in a few years’ time, when a new 
civil war broke out in 1356. 
239 Rosén considers this an important line of division, and counts not only the 
Marshal Tyrgils Knutsson, but also St Bridget’s father, the lawspeaker Birger 
Petersson, among those ‘hostile’ to the Church. As he was the nephew of an 
archbishop and a cousin of an influential archdean, with whom he collaborated in 
his legislative work, I suspect that the label is misleading, and that he was merely 
opposing the rival aristocratic faction at that time controlling important economic 
resources in the name of the Uppsala chapter.  
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argument – the variation and complexity of ecclesiastical tenures 
makes it a gross enough simplication to lump them together into the 
composite title of krono, let alone to conflate them with noble-owned 
land. Still, a sort of convergence did result from the increasing 
importance of the fiscal sector: during Queen Margaret’s räfst (see 
page  131 and note 230) the transition of tax-land into parish church 
land was seeked out and reverted to a much higher extent than were 
monastic and cathedral holdings (Rosén 1950:195) – those were 
generally noble donations and presented no material incentives to the 
state as they would have remained tax-free in either case. From the 
state’s point of view the sector division was crucial. 
Swedish state formation: a two-sided centralization 
The origin of this dual structure can thus be found in the balance 
of forces between crown/proto-state and aristocracy, and in the 
specific trajectory of double or parallel centralization characteristic of 
the Swedish state-formation process. The tug-of-war between two 
competing versions of political centralization: one monarchic240, proto-
absolutist, and one oligarchic, aristocratic, have shaped the Swedish 
state in a quite different mould than would have the allegedly more 
‘typical’ conflicts between absolutist centralization and ‘feudal’ 
decentralization241.  
In modern Swedish historiography, a constant tension between 
absolutism and constitutionalism has for a long time been viewed as 
the underlying formative long-term conflict running through almost 
the entire history of Sweden. This interpretation has replaced an 
earlier conception of a formative conflict between:  
(1) a nationalism based upon an alliance between king and people, 
and  
(2) a self-serving, always potentially traitorous aristocracy 
(especially during the Scandinavian Union).  
In my view, the ‘modern’ interpretation is just as fundamentally 
idealist in its conception, as was the older tradition. Political principle 
may appear to be a more ‘realistic’ factor than nationalist sentiment, 
                                                   
240 At times there was even a tripartite struggle between two monarchic alternatives 
and one oligarchic, as in the struggles between Karl Knutsson, Christian I and the 
council faction led by archbishop Johannes Benedicti, allying themselves to one 
or the other of the royal pretenders, or attempting to stand on their own under 
Johannes’ regency. 
241 In this respect, compare Anderson’s concept of parallel centralization (England as 
compared to standard pattern of Western European absolutism), but also Bendix’ 
comparison between English and Japanese state formation (see below page 140). 
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but although a ‘constitutional state’ would be the best long-term 
safeguard for aristocratic privilege and political impact there is no 
reason to postulate that political ideology must have been the motive 
force. There were always at least potentially three contending political 
positions within the Swedish power struggles during the Age of 
Union:  
1. An oligarchic magnate faction arguing their case along the 
lines of regimen politicum242, whether they take this stand 
from an ideological conviction or out of pure self-interest. 
Such a coalition might be expected to prove unstable, 
because of constant inter-magnate rivalry and fluctuating 
personal alliances. Yet it would hardly lead to subdivision, 
as the conflict with the other two configurations would 
leave no room for overt infighting. Oppositional groups 
within this faction would therefore have to enter into 
tactical alliances with one of the other categories. 
2. Personal adherents of the Union monarch. There is no need 
to presuppose that such a standpoint had to be based upon 
a principled advocacy of the Union as such, but to the 
extent that it was, we may have to subdivide this faction. 
What would hold this group together was reasonably the 
‘feudal’ bonds tying their careers to the suzerain. Open 
conflict within the group is therefore unlikely, as dissidents 
would move into one of the other positions. 
3. Contenders for a local Swedish principate, and their 
followers. There might be more than one at a time, 
although in that case tactical alliances would tend to blur 
the picture, whether the desired objective was some kind of 
absolutism, something more resembling a military 
dictatorship, or maybe a theocracy. 
A material interest in a stable union was represented by aristocratic 
families owning land in more than one country. The Axelsson 
brothers (Thott) are the classic example, which also shows the 
difficulties involved in sticking to long-term interests – in their actual 
politics they had to enter into various shorter-term alliances which in 
the long run hardly furthered the security of their scattered estates. 
Whatever the material or principled foundations of pro-union 
sentiments, it was only through bonds of allegiance that it could hold 
together, and only a monarch capable of inspiring loyalty and of 
constructing stabilizing institutions on the union level, would have 
stood a chance to succeed. As we can see from the marriage 
                                                   
242 Medieval constitutional theories such as those emphasized in Lönnroth 1934, also 
cf references to analogous discourses in Runeby 1964 and Koenigsberger 1974. 
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networks charted by Enemark (2001) – Krummedige, Gyllenstierne 
and others – Scandinavian intermarriage in the long run proved more 
disruptive243 than integrative. An aristocratic union with a purely 
nominal royal apex might have worked, but as the Swedish case 
shows, there was usually enmity enough even in the King’s absence. 
Position 1 was in reality only held together by the threats from the 
outside, and once the threat from below had started to interact with 
position 3, the personal bonds of feudal loyalty proved too weak and 
interchangeable, and the class solidarity of position 1 too easily 
shattered by the individual career prospects offered by the other two. 
The forces of cohesion and disintegration within the narrow 
magnate stratum did not operate in a vacuum. The economic forces 
of Baltic trade intersected with the internal aristocratic power 
competition in ways we can only glimpse, while the advantage of 
number within military competition was being re-invented. The future 
would belong to those who could take advantage of these 
developments. 
Remaining ambiguities 
The solidification of the ‘two-sector model’ left some important 
definitional questions unresolved. Where non-congruent dichotomies 
intersected, ambiguous areas were left open for contestation: 
1. The difference between tax and rent within the state 
sector became conceptually blurred. If tax was a civic 
duty, the status of the tenantry on noble land became 
highly uncertain. If it was a burden on the land, then 
freehold could only be interpreted as an inheritable 
tenure244. 
2. The difference between customary and contractual 
holdings never became a crucial aspect of land tenure in 
the (contractual) exempt sector, but within the state 
sector this was an important issue, though subordinate to 
the distinction between tax and crown land. 
Not until another balance of class forces emerges in the mid-17th 
century does this line of division become dominant, and the Estate of 
Peasants begins to become transformed into an instrument for the 
defence of private property (through the alliance with burghers and 
clergy). Charles XI, through reorganizing the state by structurally tying 
                                                   
243 Alliances with families in other countries repeatedly lead to divided interests 
alienating different branches of these noble families from each other. 
244  Which was also claimed by some aristocratic jurists of the 17th-18th centuries (cf 
Almqvist 1929, Wirsell 1968). 
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up state sector land to state office, saves the crown peasants from 
virtual extinction, but as their role in the system becomes all but 
indistinguishable from that of the freeholders, these categories tend to 
be assimilated to each other.  
Whether this will ultimately mean that freehold will become no 
more than a form of hereditary possession, or that both types of land 
will become commodified – and that thus the customary crown land 
will eventually be sold away – is not finally resolved until in the late 
18th century (in 1789, as a matter of fact). As I will argue in closer 
detail elsewhere, the preserved political representation of crown 
tenants together with extraneous245 interest in freehold property rights 
led to the latter solution.  
The question of Royal ownership 
One of the possible solutions to the ambiguities concerning 
freeholds, would have been a full adoption of the feudal ideology of 
nulle terre sans seigneur, defining tax land as held from the king. No 
king before Gustavus Vasa had achieved a position strong enough to 
carry through such a proposal. However, not even Gustavus dared to 
make a full-scale attack on peasant property rights. The institution of 
skattevrak (‘tax eviction’), whereby three years of default on taxes led 
to loss of freehold through conversion to crown tenure, and the 
principle that withholding taxes due was defined as larceny from the 
crown, served to undermine the allodial status of tax land, though. At 
least three possible reasons that this process was not carried further 
during Gustavus’ reign may be discerned:  
1. Wariness of peasant rebellions. Several risings, citing taxes, bad 
coinage and confiscation of church property among their 
grievances, occurred during Gustavus’ reign, and especially 
after the dangerous Dacke rebellion, breaking out a couple of 
years after the devaluation of tax land property rights, the King 
seems to have become more cautious.  
2. The ambiguities arising from the presence of several types of 
royal domain. In addition to the traditional regnal domain of 
Uppsala öd, Gustavus had collected a huge ‘patrimonial domain’ 
as his private property (arv och eget). As land belonging to the 
church became ‘nationalized’, the bulk of it was kept apart as 
land available for purposes of state, without (yet) being 
                                                   
245 Burghers, clergymen, and ofrälse ståndspersoner (‘non-noble persons of standing’ 
or ‘Commoner gentlemen’). 
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integrated with the old crown domain246. If the tax land sector 
had been fully converted into yet another variant of state 
domain, freehold pretensions might have spilled over into other 
tenures as well. It may also be, that the safeguarding of his 
personal domain became a more important concern – he may 
not have felt fully secure about retaining the crown for his 
dynasty. 
3. The individualization of taxes and the piecemeal revision of tax 
titles – resurrecting any forgotten dues, always taking the 
highest levels as a model – was carried out under the legalistic 
guise of a restoration of the Crowns rightful property (Dovring 
1951:175-187). 
The Land Law’s prohibition against diminishing the property of the 
crown was interpreted as an irremissable responsibility to exact all 
established duties and impositions in full measure. This was also 
interpreted as a necessary act of justice: any claims which had fallen 
into desuetude left an unfair burden on those subject to demands still 
in effect. This exploitation of the possibilities of legal formalism in the 
name of immemorial custom was quite successful and might have 
been undermined if a foreign novelty such as the concept of higher-
level state ownership had been pressed harder. 
Oligarchic centralism 
Perry Anderson has described Sweden as an ‘underdetermined’ 
absolutism, where the absolute state was ‘facultative’ for the nobility, 
which could ‘convert backwards and forwards to it without undue 
emotion or discomfort’. This interpretation of the ‘pendulum swing247’ 
between absolutism and oligarchy misses a most crucial point: That 
this ‘oscillation’ in no way signifies a swing between centralization 
and decentralization, but on the contrary constitutes a parallel to what 
Anderson describes as a fundamental trait in the English 
development: a ‘concurrent centralization of royal power and 
aristocratic representation’ (Anderson 1974b:114). The fact that in 
Sweden aristocratic regencies repeatedly have had to shoulder 
responsibility for state survival, has forced them to ‘rise above’ their 
                                                   
246  Cf Forssell 1869-75, Dovring 1951 and Larsson 1985. The integration of church 
holdings into crown land seems to have proceeded gradually; not until the turn 
of the 18th century do the cadasters cease to distinguish between ecclesiastical 
tenures and crown tenure. 
247 The notion is borrowed from Roberts, who is Anderson’s principal source for 
Swedish history (with Claude Nordmann and Eli F. Heckscher). 
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immediate class interests248 and search for workable compromises 
between short term self-interest and long term viability249.  
Reinhard Bendix’ description of English development is in many 
ways similar, and also offers parallells to the Swedish case.  
 The period from Magna Carta (1215) to the end of the fifteenth 
century may be described as an uneven seesaw between baronial 
interests as represented in parliament and the authority and power of 
the English kings. This ”balanced” development in England contrasts 
with the repeated rise of local authority in Japan and its lasting 
suppression in Russia. 
His further discussion of the contrasts between English and 
Japanese development emphasizes two aspects. One is 
an early appearance of a quasi-parliamentary institution, a collective 
forum in which notables of the realm assembled to counsel the king 
and eventually to oppose him. [which] provided the English 
aristocracy with a national forum  
and the other results from the dynastic and feudal entanglements with 
the French monarchy, creating  
political ties with the Continent [that] involved the whole country in 
the national defense, especially since France made periodic attempts 
to get a foothold in Scotland. (Bendix 1978:195) 
These arguments strengthen the parallell with Sweden, where (I) 
corresponds to the role of the Council, and later of the whole gamut 
of proto-parliamentary meetings described in Schück 1987a, finally 
resulting in the four-Estate Riksdag, and (II) to an even broader 
alliance of aristocracy and commonalty creating a foundation for 
Swedish nation-building through their joint opposition to the German 
princes wearing the Danish crown250. 
 Heckscher’s opinion that Sweden had never been feudal (1952:36f) 
was based on the apparent absence of regional aristocratic 
                                                   
248 Against this, it might be argued that incomes from state office form as immediate 
an interest. However, the nobility as a class is defined by the common privilege 
of tax exempt landholding, while office incomes are contingent and define an 
economic interest common to those nobles and commoners who are holding 
remunerated offices. 
249 The absolutist coups in 1680 (Charles XI) and 1772/1789 (Gustavus III) were 
the results - direct or indirect - of aristocratic failure to work out tenable 
compromises.  
250 A parallel might even be drawn between the in-between positions of the 
marginal neighbours Scotland and Norway. 
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separatism, on the fact that leading Swedish magnates from at least 
the time of Bo Jonsson (Grip) strove for dominance on the national 
level rather than for regional supremacy. This may be an exaggeration 
– we have far too sparse evidence to evaluate the ambitions of 
medieval lords in general, but although it seems fairly obvious that a 
‘feudalized’ regional power should have been the most realistic goal 
for some of the magnates, the really important thing is that a large 
enough fraction of them converged on striving for oligarchic power 
on a sub-monarchic regional level - the level of Sweden – and that in 
centralizing power onto this level in order to resist Mecklenburger, 
Pomeranian and Oldenburger proto-absolutism, they paved the way 
for a local Swedish absolutism. Although some of the magnate 
families survived into the modern era and continued to hold a 
dominant position in the council, the Vasa dynasty251 restructured the 
elements of Swedish society into a modern monarchy ‘feudalizing’ the 
knights and squires of an old-fashioned tax-exempt warrior class into 
better conformity with the pattern of other European aristocracies. To 
a certain extent we might call this a delayed ‘feudalization’, but it is 
important to realize that it did not signify an anachronous 
introduction of a hitherto unknown system. Western European feudal 
society had served as a model for institutional arrangements and 
social ambitions all through the Swedish Middle Ages, in particular 
imported via the Catholic church.  
An integrative feudalism  
A very important genetic contrast between the Swedish version of 
feudalism and the ‘classic’ Western European one, is that while the 
original post-Carolingian societé féodale developed out of the 
disintegration of a dissolving monarchic state power, in Sweden the 
import of feudal customs and relationships served as a tool for 
integration, for constructing a royal power centre in a country where 
regional autonomy had been the original point of departure for the 
state-building project, not the result of an early state’s failure and 
                                                   
251  Itself emerging from among these magnate families, counting a High Steward of 
the Realm and, somewhat later, a Regent bishop, among their ancestry.  
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disintegration252. Thus the 16th century ‘feudalization’ of Swedish 
society (Nilsson 1947, 1990) might be viewed as a ‘final touch’ or 
complementation of feudal society, filling out lacunae in that 
‘polystructural’ repertoire of institutional variety which is the essential 
characteristic of feudal society in Perry Anderson’s sense: that 
particular dynamic form of society constituting the ‘European 
Advantage’. 
In what way might these borrowings be said to represent a 
dynamic element? The delayed introduction of inheritable fiefs – the 
duchies (re)introduced by Gustavus Vasa, counties by Eric XIV, and 
baronies by John III – may have helped to reorient Swedish 
noblemen from the short-term exploitation of temporary office 
(service fiefs) to more long-range concerns with utilization of private 
property rights; a central economic argument of Axel Oxenstierna’s 
was that land under private (read noble) ownership would be taken 
better care of. In general the formation of a European-style nobility 
also served to introduce a competitive element: an embarrassed 
consciousness of cultural and economic backwardness which spurred 
the aristocracy as well as the Crown into efforts to ‘catch up’ (Revera 
1988). The closure of the nobility (which was always more of a threat 
than a fact – except at the very moment of its reconstitution as a 
noble Estate) also sharpened the consciousness of conflicting interests 
among the non-noble Estates. 
THE SWEDISH TRAJECTORY: WHERE TO BEGIN? 
Nations before nationalism? 
My discussion of Swedish history has so far taken its object of 
analysis for granted, but at what point in history does the specific 
state-building trajectory I try to analyze begin? When does Sweden 
become Sweden? Most of the lively present-day discussion of nations 
and nationalism is concerned with the constructed character of 
‘modern’ (post-Enlightenment) nationalism. Almost all of the current 
definitions and generalizations concerning these concepts are 
                                                   
252 England before the Norman conquest may have been a parallel case. Anderson 
1974a:164 discusses the ‘delayed’ German feudalism which was ‘constructed 
against monarchical integration of the country, by contrast with England where 
the feudal  social hierarchy was itself installed by the Norman monarchy, or 
France, where it preceded the emergence of the monarchy and was thereafter 
slowly reoriented round it in the process of concentric centralization.’ In such a 
comparative context, Sweden would appear most strongly contrasted to 
Germany, its closest source of import for feudal customs.    
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concerned with nationalism in the 19th century sense253. The early 
modern or even late medieval ‘nations before nationalism’ have 
received much less theoretical attention. One of the few students of 
nationalism, who have attempted to account for this phenomenon, is 
Anthony D Smith. He defines two main routes along which nations 
‘are created254’: 
• the ‘lateral route’ in which an ‘aristocratic ethnie’ forms the 
‘dominant ethnic core’ around which ‘these states were built 
up’ - England, France and Spain are  the classic cases and 
‘inevitably became models of the nation, the apparently 
successful format of population unit, for everyone else.’. 
Only a ‘relatively homogenous ethnic core’ possessing  a 
‘sense of ancestry and identity’ can expand this feeling of 
community through ‘bureaucratic incorporation’ of the 
subjects. 
• the route taken by ‘vertical’ or ‘demotic ethnies’ is ‘only 
indirectly affected by the state and its administration’. These 
communities are united through a common religious 
organization, which in many respects could be considered a 
nation:  
Arabs and Jews, for example, had common names, myths of 
descent, memories and religious cultures, as well as attachments to an 
original homeland, and a persisting, if subdivided, sense of ethnic 
solidarity. Did not this suffice for nationhood? All that seemed to be 
necessary was to attain independence and a state for the community.  
In other cases the  
attempts by older political formations to take over some of the 
features of the Western ‘‘rational state’’ … upset the old 
accomodations of these empires to their constituent ethnies’ 
These definitions try to reconcile uncomfortably contradictory 
arguments. Although Smith recognizes the constructed character of 
English, French, and Spanish nationalities, and their role as ‘model 
nations’, sparking off even more obvious constructions within rival 
political units, he persists in postulating a nationalist identity – if only 
for the ‘core’ elite – as a precondition for the pioneering modern 
states and not as an instrument or a consequence of the state-building 
process.  
                                                   
253 Benedict Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm ##, Gellner##. 
254 Anthony D. Smith: ‘The Origins of Nations’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 12/3(1989), 
349-56. Extract 22 (p147-154) in Hutchinson-Smith (eds): Nationalism. 
(Oxford:OUP) 1994 
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The concept of ethnie allows him to camouflage this essentialist 
proposition through phrasing it in more relative terms, but it is a 
concept which does not in any way resolve the fundamental 
ambiguity of the word ‘nation’. Ethnie as well as ‘nation’ is an 
allegedly objective term covering a subjective notion.  
We are not here talking about actual descent, much less about 
‘race’, but about the sense of ancestry and identity that people 
possess. 
It might be useful for making a clearer distinction between the 
subjective identification span established by the modern model state, 
and the identification span of the collective actors establishing these 
states – but only if this presumed collective actor corresponds to an 
objective reality. If the formation of a state-building elite is prior to 
the development of a subjective group identity involving the notion 
of common descent, then Smith’s concept only serves to muddle the 
case, and to bestow an aura of authenticity upon politically 
constituted descent myths.  
Even in a case where the common myth of descent has been 
formulated before the state-building elite had emerged, the important 
question is whether the shared identity constituted the group which 
then went on to build a modern state, or if an elite constituted by 
state-building activities assumed a ready-made identity only when 
they felt the need for it. Myths of descent may be formulated for 
other purposes than political group formation, e g for literary 
purposes (Geoffrey of Monmouth?) or as an exercise in learned 
pedantry, or it might originally have served the more limited purpose 
of establishing an exalted extraction for a private individual or a 
dynasty. 
The arguments concerning the second route intensify the density of 
contradictions: Although the ‘demotic ethnie’ is more similar to the 
modern notion of a nation than is the ‘lateral ethnie’, in that it already 
possesses that sense of community which has to be artificially 
extended to state-level in the latter case, it can only become a nation 
through imitating the type of state created by the lateral ethnies. A 
nation-state teleology is thus implicit in the entire model. 
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National fetishism and the role of chance in history 
To escape circular argumentation, we have to go back to the time 
before the triumph of the nation-state format, and look at other 
aspects of state-building than ‘national identity’. After all, the 
construction of national identities has been the primary object of 
historical scholarship until quite recently255, and thus the underlying 
assumptions of nationalism appear in every conceivable context. 
From the perspective of medieval history, Susan Reynolds cautions us 
against nation-centered teleology: 
‘A more fundamental distortion arises from the fact that belief in the 
objective reality of nations inevitably draws attention from itself: since 
the nation exists, belief in it is seen not as a political theory but as a 
mere recognition of fact. The history of nationalism becomes less a 
part of the history of political thought than of historical geography, 
while the starting-point of political development becomes the nation, 
with its national character or national characteristics. This pre-existing 
nation is then seen as moving through the attainment of ‘national 
consciousness’ to find its own rightful boundaries in the nation-state. 
Perhaps, however, it might be easier to assess the values and 
solidarities of the past if we considered whether the process may not 
sometimes have worked the other way round, with units which are 
perceived as nations as the products of history rather than its primary 
building-blocks’  
(Susan Reynolds: Kingdoms and Communities, 1984 :.253) 
                                                   
255  And to a large extent reassessments of earlier nationalist historiography may be 
seen as part of a de-nationalization of political discourse. The nation-state 
paradigm is obviously impracticable as a model for world politics, and thus the 
formation of international scientific discourses of global history has required a 
considerable deconstruction of natiocentric concepts. 
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This kind of ‘national fetishism’256 can only be evaded through an 
acceptance of historical accident, which goes against the grain of our 
scientific ambitions. Even if we realize that other historical outcomes 
must have been possible, we almost instinctively try to explain why 
those things that really happened actually had to happen. The more 
successful we are – and hindsight always makes explanatory success 
an attainable goal – the more inexorably pre-destined the past 
appears. The outcomes of wars can always be made to seem 
consequent, but, given the important role of sovereigns in history, 
dynastic accident (see below) remains an irreducible element of pure 
chance, ensuring that perfect teleologies in history have to be 
spurious, however logically consistent they are made to appear. More 
generally, the combination of different populations with different 
natural resources also remains an example of original hazard, 
weighting the possible futures of a region in respects where it would 
be ridiculous to attempt logical explanations257. Still, only by 
attempting explanation can we try to gauge the extent of historical 
cause-and-effect.  
Informal constraints and the multi-generational 
build-up of royal power 
In addition to formal rules, ”informal constraints” are also 
considered to be institutions by North and other institutionalists. In 
the widest sense, any human habitual behaviour can be considered 
an institution. This is a clearly unsatisfactory practice, making way for 
ad-hocery and slippery definitions. A reasonable demarcation would 
be to require that a behavioural pattern should be common and 
ingrained enough to enter into rational calculations of whatever 
responses will be provoked by different lines of action, before we 
count it as an institution. Such a usage would conform to the general 
notion of what an “institutionalized” behaviour pattern signifies, or of 
what we mean when we talk about “unwritten rules”. 
The informal aspects of a system of political rule will therefore 
include those patterns of political decisions and actions requiring 
political power, that a rational subject258 will take into consideration in 
                                                   
256 By analogy with Marx’ concept of ‘commodity fetishism’, I use the word 
‘fetishism’ to describe the human tendency to endow a man-made concept - in 
this case the nation - with a ‘supernatural’ reality, reasoning as if it were capable 
of  independent action. 
257  For instance, the frequent coincidence of petrol and Islam. 
258  In both of the relevant senses. 
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calculating the impact of alternative courses of action. For instance, if 
both the acting subject and the role-models in the preceding 
generation, whose experience have been transmitted to him/her, have 
had to reckon with a strong, virtually unrestrained royal executive 
power as a fact of life necessary to take into account as a perennial 
constant of insecurity, then the effectual power of the sovereign will 
be much closer to the asymptote of full royal absolutism, than if such 
power has been claimed hesitatingly, intermittently and with varying 
success.  
This means that a multi-generational continuous build-up of royal 
power will create a much stronger de facto power, than what may be 
inferred from formal institutional rules, which might or might not be 
taken at face value by the parties involved. Of course this argument 
should be almost embarrassingly self-evident, but formulating it in he 
terms of institutionalized predictability of behaviour might make it 
easier to avoid losing sight of the obvious while discussing systems of 
political rule within an institutional framework. 
This is corroborated by Koenigsberger’s observation that the 
chances of an adult, male, undisputed succession was always less 
than 50% within Europe during the early modern period, and that the 
suite of four successive generations of rulers being able to carry on a 
continuous policy of central-power building in Brandenburg-Prussia 
goes a long way towards explaining the competitive advantage in the 
forging and wielding of state power that the Hohenzollern rulers 
enjoyed over rival German princes. 
The Swedish case: contestation as the norm 
After the period of rival dynasties before Earl Birger’s regentship 
(1250-66), and before the stabilisation of modern constitutional 
monarchy during Oscar I (1844-59) only a handful of Swedish kings 
have completed their reigns without experiencing serious 
contestation. 
I discount the transitional reigns of  
1. Ulrika Eleonora (1719-20), who accepted a massive 
devaluation of royal power in order to access the throne in 
competition with her elder sister, and who one year later 
accepted even more severe limitations in order to transfer 
the crown to her husband Frederick of Hesse (1720-51)  
and  
2. Charles XIII (1809-18), who succeeded his deposed nephew 
Gustavus IV Adolphus, thereby accepting the legitimacy of 
a constitutionalist coup, and, eventually, also accepting the 
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choice of a French revolutionary general259 for his own 
successor, and confirming it through adopting him. 
The relevant (uncontested) cases will then be: 
• Margaret (1389-1412); once she had accessed the throne 
through vanquishing Albrecht of Mecklenburg. 
• Christopher of Bavaria (1441-1448); once he had accessed 
the throne as a replacement for his deposed uncle Eric of 
Pomerania. 
• John III (1568-92); once he had accessed through deposing 
his brother Eric XIV. 
and possibly also the three Caroline kings of the Palatine dynasty:  
• Charles X Gustavus (1654-60); who, however, accessed the 
throne only through Queen Christina’s skilful manipulation 
of the opposition, and whose testamentarial dispositions 
were immediately contested and changed after his death. 
(Wittrock 1908). 
• Charles XI (1660-97); although he had to restore strong 
monarchic rule after the oligarchic reaction that had taken 
place during his regency, and complete this change of 
regime through an absolutist coup. 
• Charles XII (1697-1718); unless his apparent death in battle 
was actually regicide by the opposition, as has often been 
suspected. 
The only examples – still withinthe same period – of a sovereign 
being able to leave the throne to an undisputed, adult, male heir , 
were: 
• Margaret (to Eric of Pomerania in 1412)260 
• Gustavus Vasa (to Eric XIV in 1560) 
• Charles XI (to Charles XII in 1697) 
• Adolphus Frederick (to Gustavus III in 1771) 
• Gustavus III (to Gustavus IV Adolphus in 1792) 
Four among these rulers died in full command of their powers, thus 
leaving a foundation of accumulated royal power for the new King to 
keep building on. The exception is Adolphus Frederick, who had no 
                                                   
259 Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, later king under the name Charles XIV John. 
260 I include Eric, despite some hesitation, as he was elected and crowned already 
during Margaretas reign. However, it would seem surprising if no objections had 
been voiced before his election. According to one interpretation of the complex 
problem of reconciling two contradictory documents from the Union negations in 
1388, the inadequate number of seals on one of the documents is a sign that 
these negations were never fully concluded due to inability to reach an 
agreement. At least the conditions of his succession thus seem to have been 
disputed, and even if we count him among the undisputed accessions, his reign 
was finally contested and overthrown by an extremely wide coalition of 
disenchanted subjects (cf the entire second part of this chapter. 
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power to bestow. After an aborted royalist coup he lost what vestiges 
of royal power he had ever possessed, and was replaced – by a name 
stamp – even in his sole remaining function as a signature writer on 
governmental decrees. Eric of Pomerania, Eric XIV and Gustavus IV 
Adolphus all failed to hold on to their heritage, maybe partly through 
exhibiting a hubris unpalatable to Swedish political culture. This 
leaves the succession from Charles XI to Charles XII in 1697 as the 
only Swedish parallell to the four-generation accumulation of princely 
power which Koenigsberger cites as a crucial factor in the 
comparative success of Hohenzollern statebuilding.  
Of course, Charles XII’s death in battle cut short his possibility of 
fulfilling his singularly autocratic reorganization, ‘flattening’ the 
inequality span of Swedish society through the subjection of even the 
highest social strata to the will of the sovereign (Karlsson 1994, 
Lindegren 1992), and instead the ‘pendulum swung back’ to the 
aristocratic side of the parallell state-building process. The Caroline 
strangulation of the aristocratic council had removed the self-evident 
collective oligarchic leadership that had been ready to take over in 
each of the earlier swings:  
• Bo Jonsson’s junta of castle-fief speculators and monastery 
investors during the 1370’s and 80’s 
• the four-regent college of Christopher’s reign (1441-48) 
• the ‘Aristocratic Republic’ (Schück 1984) of the later 15th 
century,  
• the neo-constitutionalist council of Sparre and Bielke261  
• Axel Oxenstierna’s reorganized Central Committee of the 
new Europeanized nobility (making a critically weaker 
second appearance during Charles XI’s minority, bereft of 
its leader) 
In the absence of a clear focus of pre-defined power, and in a 
situation where the balance between the nobility’s interests as 
landholders (seigneurie fonciére) and as holders of delegated public 
                                                   
261 The least successful example, as they were out-manipulated by Duke Charles, 
the later Charles IX. 
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authority (what corresponded to the medieval seigneurie banale262) 
had to be drawn up anew263, the Diet could become the arena for a 
new form of power struggle, centering on persuasion and 
negotiation. The first experiments with parliamentary rule were ready 
to begin. 
The nation-state as a problem - Tilly’s model 
The self-evidentness of the ‘triumph of the nation-state format’ 
alluded to above, has been most thoroughly called in question by 
Charles Tilly: 
Empires, city-states, federations of cities, networks of landlords, 
churches, religious orders, leagues of pirates, warrior bands, and 
many other forms of governance prevailed in some parts of Europe at 
various times over the last thousand years. Most of them qualified as 
states of one kind or another: they were organizations that controlled 
the principal concentrated means of coercion within delimited 
territories, and exercised priority in some respects over all other 
organizations acting within the territories. But only late and slowly did 
the national state become the predominant form. Hence the critical 
double question: What accounts for the great variation over time and 
space in the kinds of states that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990, 
and why did European states eventually converge on different variants 
of the national state? Why were the directions of change so similar 
and the paths so different? 
(Tilly 1992:5) 
                                                   
262 Which, I will argue, was in Sweden split into two further dimensions: the fiscal-
military and the adjudicatory. The third dimension of feudal power, seigneurie 
domestique, or patriarchal power, had in Sweden also become subdivided, but in 
a very different manner. Not into separate vertical power chains, but into 
separate horizontal levels: on the one hand centralized into the hand of the King 
as the super-patriarch, the Master of the national household, and on the other 
hand devoluted down into the individual household cells of the system, where 
the husbonde, the master of the family household, wielded a patriarchal authority 
over his wife, children and domestic servants. Through this stake in patriarchal 
power, the four-chamber Diet could integrate the peasantry into the political 
system. The position of peasants of noble-owned land remained contested, 
though, and not until the Estate got the prospect of a share in national power 
before their eyes in the early stages of the Age of Freedom did its leadership, 
by now clearly dominated by tax-peasants, drop the ambition to represent also 
the frälsebönder and leave them to be ‘represented by their masters’ (which the 
Nobility had claimed to do all along, endorsed by generations of historians). 
263 It was, as I have argued, the aristocratic failure in balancing these interests, and 
thus to solve the contradiction between their short-term individual and long-term 
collective interests, that left them powerless to solve the fiscal crisis of the state, 
and which made a return to absolutism – and this time in a sense more absolute 
than ever – inevitable. 
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Tilly’s answer is based on grouping statebuilding trajectories into 
three categories:  
1. The ‘capital-intensive’ road requires a certain concentration 
on towns, trade and mobile wealth. ‘Cheap, slim states’ that 
tap the flows of monetary transaction to buy coercive and 
administrative competence when needed, are typical of this 
variant (Venice and the United Provinces are the favoured 
examples).  
2. ‘Coercion-intensive’ states have to squeeze the statebuilding 
resources from the reluctant population (basically their 
peasantry), and therefore need a stronger permanent 
coercive apparatus. 
3. The states in the category of ‘capitalized coercion’, treading 
an unspecified middle way, develop the format of the 
‘nation-state’ (or ‘consolidated state’ as Tilly now prefers to 
call it) and set the standard for military efficiency which 
other states have to measure up against, thereby making 
other states – insofar as they survive the competition – 
converge with this path. England, France and Spain are the 
original examples264, exactly as in A D Smith’s typology of 
nation-building. Tilly’s perspective is quite different, though, 
as he seems to view nation-building as a secondary feature. 
As Sweden would also fit the bill both as a nation-state 
pioneer and as one of the innovators of military 
organization, a closer look at the emergence of a Swedish 
state should help to clarify Tilly’s central category, as well 
as Smith’s early-nation pattern.  
                                                   
264 Together with Brandenburg-Prussia after the incorporation of the Rhineland. This, 
however, occurs a bit too late to motivate a place among the pioneers. 
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Another model grouping together the same examples can be found 
in Perry Anderson’s taxonomy of European absolutist trajectories, 
within which England, France and Spain appear as the prime 
instances of the Western European version, where city growth and 
peasant liberation necessitate a centralization of lordly power up to 
state level. Here Sweden is put into an intermediate position, as the 
weakness of the cities conforms better to the Eastern pattern, where 
stagnating cities and subject peasantries provide no internal 
compulsion for a stronger centralism, but where the level of 
international military competition eventually forces the states to 
centralize or perish (Poland!). Sweden is given the key role of 
transmitting the ‘Western’ military pressure onto the Eastern states. 
Nations and languages as historical constructs 
There is no way back from the realization that nationalities are 
historically constructed (as argued in different ways by Hobsbawm, 
Benedict Anderson, Gellner, Reynolds and many others), although it 
is very difficult to draw the full implications of this. Once constructed, 
through a slow piecemeal process, nationalities are no longer 
optional, and reconstructing them in different shapes has proved to 
be no less complex a process (cf Eastern Europe after 1918 and 
1989!).  
Even if a common ‘ethnic identity’ cannot be fashioned out of any 
material – mutually unintelligible idioms and/or sharply contrasting 
physiognomical traits (complexion, hair, eyes, tallness) may at least 
act as brakes to the development of a mythical consanguinity265 – 
nationalities are constructed to fit politically constituted communities, 
not (primordially) the other way around. It was the political ambitions 
toward a united German nation (of course inspired by historical 
precedents as well as by the desire to emulate successful geopolitical 
adversaries) that made the German language a criterion for the 
desirable scale of political delimitation, not the co-linguality per se 
that created a national bond inevitably leading to such political 
ambitions – why, otherwise, was this nationalism not in stronger 
evidence earlier? Even the pioneering English nation-state was 
originally constructed through exogenous military conquest, and the 
creation of a common language through the fusion of Anglo-Saxon 
and Norman French idioms was obviously the product rather than a 
                                                   
265  Still the power of self-delusion in questions of ‘racial’ similarity should not be 
underestimated. Cf the famous cartoon describing the Nazi racial ideal: ‘An Aryan 
is tall [illustrated with Goebbels], slim [Goering], and blond [Hitler!].’ 
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premiss of political unity. The later denotation span expansion into 
British nationhood required yet a further level of ‘suspension of 
disbelief’ in order to be envisioned as a primordial fact.  
Scandinavian evidence: redefinable dialects 
In few other cases the political construction of linguistic identity is 
as obvious as in Scandinavia. A continuum of closely related 
dialects266 came to be disjoined according to political boundaries and 
the dialects were eventually reconceptualized as vulgar versions of 
the three separate languages of different political administrations267, 
even the more so after the codification of written vernaculars. The 
most conclusive example within this development is the reaffiliation 
of the dialects spoken in those provinces conquered by Sweden in 
1658-60. The originally Danish dialects now known as skånska, 
halländska, and blekingska became reoriented towards the Swedish 
written language, and eventually turned into Swedish dialects, as did 
the Norwegian dialects jämtska and bohuslänska. I certainly would 
not claim that these examples prove that linguistic identification 
always follows national affiliation, but they should serve as sufficient 
counterproof to any naïve assertion that the reverse can be taken for 
granted: that ‘linguistic identity’ leads to the formation of nationalist 
sentiment.  
Another argument against the primacy of linguistic identification is, 
that within Finland, which was just one of several provinces making 
up the larger political unit of Sweden, Finnish-speaking peasants 
seem not to have been considered less Swedish than others. When, in 
the sovereign Riksdag of the 18th century Age of Liberty, the Finnish 
peasant deputies demanded an interpreter, this motion was turned 
town by the thrifty Peasant Estate, which argued that their bi-lingual 
colleagues could serve as interpreters. This was mainly268 discussed as 
a purely economic question, though, and there seems to have been 
                                                   
266  The Scandinavian dialects of the Viking period are usually treated as a single 
language, fornnordiska (‘Old Norse’), and the present-day tongues are still so 
mutually intelligible that comparative linguists sometimes refuse to recognize 
them as separate languages.  
267 This is a very schematic simplification ignoring the further complications 
eventually leading to the formation of two competing Norwegian languages. The 
formation and shifting delimitation of the Swedish language is complex enough to 
carry my point. 
268 The question of security was also important – an outsider brought in as an 
interpreter might jeopardize the confidential atmosphere of open internal 
discussion. 
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no hint that a member of the Swedish Diet ought to have been able 
to speak Swedish269. 
Against this background I also insist that the particular case of 
Swedish history has to be reconceptualized from a fully constructivist 
standpoint: ‘Sweden’ should not be reified into an actor in northern 
European medieval history, but neither should it be conceived to be a 
given arena. It is rather the product of a number of subplots 
converging on the same part of the stage, thereby constituting it as a 
separate scene for a separate play. 
Sweden: the prehistory of modern statebuilding 
I do not mean to deny the obvious fact that the words Sverige 
(Sweden) and svensk/a/ (Swede, Swedish) had existed long before 
the dissociation of Sweden from the Scandinavian Union of Kalmar - 
my argument is that they did not acquire the connotation of a special 
bond overriding other loyalties until quite late in the course of that 
process. The loose federation of largely autonomous provinces with 
separate law codes, held together by an electoral monarchy which 
seems to have alternated between the dominant magnate families 
from the leading provinces, began to be more firmly united under a 
dynasty combining the semi-hereditary claims of two earlier royal 
families. The kings of the Bjälbo dynasty (1250-1363/80)270 attempted 
to pre-empt the still electoral monarchy through devices such as 
homage of designated heirs, or several instances of fealty required in 
charters for castle fiefs. Under king Magnus Eriksson the provincial 
law codes were replaced by a ‘Land Law’ valid for the entire 
kingdom. Obviously consolidation of a territorial state was already in 
process by this time, although it’s by no means evident that the scale 
of aggregation had reached its limits.  
Magnus Eriksson also inherited the Norwegian crown, and acquired 
the province of Scania from Denmark, which might eventually have 
led to integration on a still wider territorial scale. However, a phase of 
                                                   
269  In the other end of the social spectrum we can find, within the House of 
Knights, noblemen with a poor knowledge of Swedish addressing the chamber in 
German or French. 
270 Often called the Folkung dynasty through an early historiographical misunder-
standing. As the true Folkungs were a party opposed and vanquished by this 
dynasty (cf Lönnroth 1949), the name is now seldom in use except in popular 
accounts, and - for reasons of easier reference - within the genealogical 
literature. The matter is further complicated by evidence that the leaders of the 
‘true Folkungs’ belonged to a wider ‘clan’ of related families, which also included 
the Bjälbo dynasty (Carlsson 1953). 
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dynastic fragmentation and infighting returned271, when Norway was 
assigned to his younger son, Håkan, while the elder, Eric, was to 
inherit Sweden. This left space for partisan politics among an 
aristocracy divided between oligarchic ambitions and support for 
monarchic centralization. Not content to wait, Eric rebelled against his 
father, backed by one of the magnate factions, and a protracted 
struggle ensued, where after Eric’s death, his brother Håkan for a 
while took over the role as alternative pretender, until an invasion 
from Mecklenburg under his brother-in-law Albrecht reunited him 
with his father. Elements from the magnate faction supporting 
Albrecht eventually, after his victory,  started to co-operate with some 
of their former opponents in a scheme of regnal reconstruction.  
The Mecklenburger invasion had led to an even greater financial 
disaster than king Magnus’ regime, and large parts of the realm were 
now held as securities by the creditors of the crown – most of them 
German noblemen272. Bo Jonsson’s extraordinary accumulation of 
reclaimed mortgage fiefs (pantlän) was largely financed through 
raising new loans from ecclesiastical institutions using the already 
reclaimed fiefs as securities (Engström 1935, Sällström 1951, Fritz 
1972, 1973). I will return to the question of this fund of land and 
castles, and to the trust created by Bo Jonsson’s testamentarial 
dispositions in order to administrate it. 
THE REBELLION AGAINST KING ERIC 1434-1440 AND 
THE DELIMITATION OF SWEDEN 
The geographical convergence of power struggles 
Without advocating a return to hero-worship and chauvinist 
romanticism273 I will argue that the nation-building significance given 
to the so-called Engelbrekt rebellion (1434-35) in older Swedish 
historiography has to be taken more seriously – though rather in the 
sense of geographical delimitaton and innovative construction of 
                                                   
271  As it had during each of the two preceding generations of this dynasty. 
272 The most extensive mortgage fiefs were held by king Albrecht’s father, duke 
Albrecht of Mecklenburg. 
273 The most important difference between my perspective and that of traditional 
Swedish historiography, is the diametrical opposition between our causalities: 
where Geijer and his followers believed that the common national identity 
brought the different classes together in creating a common state, I see the 
‘common national identity’ and its geographic delimitation as the resultant of 
converging struggles.  
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nationality, than in the traditional Romanticist concept of an 
‘awakening of a national spirit’ that is supposed to have laid dormant 
within some Platonic World of Ideas.  
Popular resistance in the Swedish part of the Union monarchy had 
tended to be regional274. Magnate power struggle, on the contrary, 
seems to have wavered between a panscandinavian275 and an all-
Sweden scale, but during the multiple rebellion against king Eric, 
popular insurgency and magnate resistance converged onto that level 
of geographic aggregation which would from now on become a 
potential nation-building project, where the possibility of popular 
mobilization had become of central importance for the strategies of 
every contestant for power. Already during the Bjälbo dynasty (see 
above, page 154 and note 270) a proto-national consolidation 
appearing to be the first phase of this project had taken place. We 
should, however, be wary of too easily identifying the collection of a 
patrimonial power base with a national project just because the one 
sometimes developed into the other (cf Reynolds 1984:253). Capetian 
power accumulation was hardly predestined to crystallize into a 
French nation, and if Håkon Magnusson of Norway had lived long 
enough, the union between his own Norwegian kingdom, his father’s 
Swedish kingdom, and the Danish kingdom of his father-in-law might 
have occurred under his own kingship and eventually consolidated 
into a distinctly Nordic variety of a patrimonial union, instead of a 
sub-imperial Germanizing federation. If his son Olof had survived, a 
similar scenario may have been possible, although his mother’s 
regency would have stamped it with a stronger Danish emphasis - as 
happened in the actual case. Although this inevitably implies 
continental entanglements, a surviving Scandinavian dynasty might 
have handled communal self-administration less ineptly than the 
succession of Imperial vassals following the rule of Queen Margaret. 
This assertion should not be taken to imply that this rebellion 
determined the final outcome of the contest between different 
competing state-building projects. It only means that the practical 
conditions for pursuing the kind of strategy which would eventually 
                                                   
274 As – after the Swedish secession from the Union – peasant rebellions would 
continue to be, up until the last disturbances of the early 19th century. 
275 Also including those cross-boundary regional interests emphasized by Lönnroth 
(1934, 1940, 1959). It is furthermore quite possible that some of the Swedish 
magnates at times may have had ambitions on a wider Baltic scale, and that the 
intermarriage between certain Swedish and German aristocratic families may have 
reflected such ambitions.    
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prove victorious in the 16th century, were constructed during the 
revolution against King Eric276.   
Peasant rebellions, private warfare or class 
alliances? 
The two most recent studies of Swedish ‘peasant rebellions’ 
(Harrison 1997, Reinholdsson 1998) make sharply contrasting 
interpretations of these events. Both of them point out that in general, 
these uprisings also included other social groups than peasants, and 
that they were usually led by frälsemän (gentry), in many cases even 
by aristocratic magnates. Reinholdsson therefore considers them to be 
feuds, rather than rebellions, i e examples of ‘private warfare’ or 
formal revocations of political allegiance, where the peasants took 
part as followers in keeping with their reciprocal relationship with 
their immediate overlords277. Harrison, on the other hand, sees them 
as in some cases genuine peasant rebellions and in others as class 
alliances278 (primarily the later rebellions).  
In the second half of the 15th century, the peasant following of 
Johannes Benedicti, the archbishop and leader of the party striving 
for oligarchic rule in Sweden under a nominal and suitably distant 
union monarch, might have been largely composed of peasants on 
ecclesiastical holdings – the fabrica of the cathedral of Uppsala was 
one of the most important landowners in the province of Uppland279 – 
as well as peasants on the manors belonging to his family 
(Oxenstierna). It is quite possible that these categories in some way 
                                                   
276  I will try to avoid the standard expression Engelbrektsupproret (the Engelbrekt 
rebellion) as I understand this to be no more than a component (albeit a key 
one) of a longer revolution.  
277 This would entail a view of Swedish peasants as subject to seigneurie banale, as 
he appears to consider tax-peasants as owing fealty to their häradshövding 
(‘hundred sheriff’) or to other holders of office-fiefs. In any case he makes no 
distinction between tenants and freeholders, and seems to consider them all to 
owe some sort of allegiance to a lord. His only argument for this appears to be a 
conviction that general European patterns must have prevailed also in Sweden. 
278  ‘Class alliances’ also imply a totally different view of lord/peasant cooperation. 
Where Reinholdsson considers a peasant to have interests normally congruent 
with those of his lord, Harrison’s view is that common interest is the exception 
and must be due to external factors. 
279  Cf DMS, Dahlbäck 1977; its tenants were known as ‘S:t Erik’s peasants’ after the 
Swedish saint-king, whose short reign in the 12th century had acquired the 
legendary status of a Golden Age without taxes and oppression, and whose cult 
had been encouraged by St Bridget and by Swedish insurgents during the Union 
struggles (cf Engelbrekt’s letter to bishop Thomas in HSH VIII:3, where he 
invoked ‘the help of God and Saint Erik’). 
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‘owed allegiance’ to Johannes, and were thus committed to support 
him in a feud, if that is how this struggle should be interpreted. In the 
uprising of 1463, when a peasant army was massacred when trying to 
liberate him from prison, the peasants might just as well have wanted 
to support him, becaused he had waived a contested tax while acting 
as king Christiern’s sub-commander in 1457 (the reason for his 
imprisonment). It is also quite likely that protest against the tax was 
their primary objective also in 1463.  
The leaders of this rising are said to have been peasants, and the 
most prominent one, Johan Lindorm, came from Västergötland, which 
appears to speak against the ‘feudal’ interpretation. His name does 
not sound like a peasant’s name, though, and Lönnroth identifies him 
with a merchant who appears as a purchaser of rent butter in the 
vicinity of present-day Gothenburg (1959:212n63) 280. 
In the case of an aristocrat seeking individual supremacy, like Sten 
Sture (the older), it would prima facie appear even more likely that 
his peasant armies could have been personally committed to himself 
or to his confederates, and no doubt several examples of such 
followers should be possible to identify. The chief objection to such 
an interpretation is that it would make his distinctive style of 
propaganda seem totally misdirected. If the peasants just followed 
their ‘overlords’, then his populist agitation on marketplaces (Staf 
1935, Lönnroth 1959, Schück 1987a) all over the country would have 
been a wasted effort and a quite unnecessary innovation. 
The Engelbrekt debates 
The most decisive argument against Reinholdsson’s thesis, is that he 
completely fails to account for the greatest and most widely disputed 
of these rebellions: the ‘Engelbrekt rebellion’ of 1432-36. The 
immediate object of the original risings in 1432-33 was to get rid of a 
particularly detested bailiff - Jens (Jösse) Eriksen in Västerås - but 
from 1434281 onwards it escalated into a full-scale rebellion involving 
all social classes. Disentangling all the overlapping grievances and 
struggles, the competing leaderships and shifting alliances of this 
rebellion is so difficult and rests upon so fragile sources, that it has 
remained one of the classic perennial points of contention within 
                                                   
280 His activities as a merchant and the system of regular contacts between bailiffs 
and merchants necessary to convert taxes in kind into liquid assets are described 
in ib 1940:229. 
281  Cf Carlsson 1932  for the initial phase.  
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Swedish historiography. It fairly obvious, though, that Reinholdsson’s 
feud model solves none of the problems of this rising.  
The crucial question of the earlier debate was, in Jerker Rosén’s 
concise summary:  
 ‘if it was Engelbrekt who determined the development in Sweden 
during the years 1434-36 and, supported by the peasants, united the 
nation for his own purposes, or if it was the Council aristocracy who 
used the peasant rebellion to put an end to the absolutist tendencies 
of Eric of Pomerania.’ (Rosén 1966:88; my translation) 
In the renewed discussion arising since the 550th anniversary of the 
rebellion – this would at least include Larsson 1984ab, 1997, Schück 
1985, 1987b, 1994, Bøgh 1985, Myrdal 1995, Harrison 1997 and 
Reinholdsson 1998 – yet another aspect has become even more 
central: to what extent did the peasants fight for their own interests, 
and to what extent were they just mobilized to fight for those of their 
lords? This is a question of wider and more general significance as the 
entire late medieval to early modern period of continuous power 
struggle leading up to the construction of a separate Swedish ‘nation-
state’, was permeated with peasant unrest, and of course the whole 
question of peasant participation in the political system of early 
modern Sweden hinges on how peasant struggle is interpreted. To 
Reinholdsson, the later formation of a peasant Estate in the Swedish 
Diet is an effect of the decline of reciprocal relations between 
peasants and lords: When the state was no longer organized through 
chains of patriarchal protection, it had to find another model for 
integrating the peasantry. Thus his salutary wariness of romanticizing 
peasant rebellions makes him slide periculously close to a romantic 
view of feudal paternalism.  
In his surprisingly scant references to what must surely be the 
touchstone of his interpretation, Reinholdsson simply states that 
although it has always been known that Engelbrekt belonged to the 
gentry, and that the leaders of rebellions very seldom have been 
peasants, the full consequences of this have not been drawn: to see 
these events as involving different classes. Then he goes on to 
investigate the forms, ethics, metaphoric language and practice of 
feuds and other conflicts involving individuals from different classes. 
Large parts of his arguments seem reasonable, although at times a bit 
trite, and he identifies mechanisms and conventions which certainly 
must have played important parts in the late medieval power 
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struggles282, but no analysis is offered for the peasant rebellion 
which seems to have triggered the whole process. However 
illuminating his discussion of feuds may be, its inadequacy is revealed 
as soon as its applied to Engelbrekt’s followers. Does Reinholdsson 
think that just because Engelbrekt bore a coat of arms and owed 
horseman’s service283 in return for the privilege of tax-exemption, his 
relation to his followers must have been that of a lord demanding 
fealty from his vassals, and not that of an elected spokesman or 
campaign leader?  
Although several other factors have been brought into the 
discussion, we have no information contradicting the unanimous 
assertion made by all narrative sources that the rebellion started with 
peasant complaints against an unusually oppressive bailiff284. In this 
particular part of Sweden, almost all peasants were freeholders, and 
many of them were miners as well. Reinholdsson (1998:198-208) may 
very possibly be right about nobleman/tenant relations involving 
something resembling vassalage, but if there has existed some kind of 
rudimentary Swedish seigneurie banale – which has so far evaded 
discovery – binding also freeholders in fealty to the häradshövding 
(‘hundred sheriff’)285 or to the holder of an office-fief, then Dalecarlia 
– together with Norrland – must have been the least likely place to 
find it. 
                                                   
282 The really illuminating part of his study is the analysis of how a change of 
allegiance under compulsion would be viewed as lagitimate (not dishonourable). 
283  ‘Knight’s service’ would be a misleading term in the Swedish context, as riddare 
(knight) remained a title of high distinction as no higher noble titles were 
introduced before Erik XIV. The ancient Nordic title of Jarl (Earl) was used as 
denoting an Office of the Realm rather than a noble rank, and the only example 
of a hertig (Duke) outside the royal family - Bengt Algotsson - was either an the 
sole example abortive attempt to introduce higher feudal ranks, or just simply a 
German translation of the office of Earl (in latin almost always rendered as Dux). 
The only other medieval examples of higher noble titles in Sweden were of 
foreign origin: Greve (Count) Hans von Eberstein and Jarl Erengisle Sunesson, 
who, though himself a Swede, inherited his title from his Norwegian father-in-law, 
the Earl of Orkney. 
284  As I will argue, what triggered the conflict was probably rather the combination 
of a more than average oppressive bailiff with a local population singularly 
unaccustomed to endure oppression. 
285  This seems highly unlikely, as the hundred would in most cases contain several 
forms of tenure, and thus tenants on noble land - being also eligible to the 
hundred court jury - would be subject to divided loyalties. Such conflicts of 
interest should have left some kind of traces, at the very least. That a 
häradshövding might use his personal prestige and connections to canvass 
support for his side is self-evident.  
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The lack of manors in these regions would have made the 
emergence of a paternal seigneurial protection highly unlikely. In 
addition, the system of regular hundred moots chaired by the 
häradshövding assisted by a twelve-man jury did not apply to these 
provinces. In Dalecarlia, which was defined as a single hundred, the 
basic unit of jurisdiction (and self-administration) was the parish, and 
the hundred sheriff286  held itinerant courts. In the provinces of 
Norrland, the situation was similar, with several underlagmän 
holding itinerant courts on behalf of the lagman of Uppland 
(Almquist 1954:12f,160f). 
That the author of the Engelbrektskrönika hardly mentions the 
Dalecarlians after the original attack on the castle of Borganäs287 is no 
proof that the whole rebellion was just a concern for the nobility 
from then onwards. In that case a leader of such a (relatively) humble 
origin as Engelbrekt could not have become a succesful rival of the 
highest aristocracy. Only if he really was a successful commander of 
peasant levies strong enough to match royal armies is his career at all 
conceivable: going directly from the role of spokesman for local 
grievances to the post of Captain of the Realm (rikshövitsman)288.  
This conclusion is confirmed if we move on to the next large 
conflict: the Puke feud, which can also throw doubt on the 
conclusion Reinholdsson makes from military tactics. The military 
argument that highly mobile campaigns must have relied on 
horsemen and thus on gentry, rather than on peasant foot-soldiers, 
certainly deserves careful consideration. However, the obvious 
advantage of superior mobility which allowed Karl Knutsson to 
rapidly quench Puke’s support in those central Swedish provinces 
where he could have counted on ‘feudal’ support – i e, in just those 
areas where the estates of Erik Puke’s family were concentrated – 
shows that the rebel armies must have been decidedly less mobile 
                                                   
286 Or, normally, his deputy, as the sheriffalty of Dalecarlia was customarily a 
honorary benefice bestowed on non-resident magnates. (LOS) 
287 1998:84s. That Reinholdsson – quoting Herman Schück – considers the author to 
be ‘a mouthpiece for those among the frälse who had made the rising against 
king Eric their business’ (loc cit; cf Schück 1994:55; my translation), should of 
course disqualify this chronicle as a source for assessing the peasants’ 
contribution to the struggle.  
288  A title for which there seems to have been no precedent since Mathias 
Kettilmundsson in 1319 (Gillingstam in SBL 25:246). Mathias, however, was a 
prominent aristocrat, as were all the known holders of the more standardized 
High Offices of the Realm. ( E g the office of High Steward, to which Mathias was 
shortly promoted. Although Bjarne Beckman’s 1953 study at times tends to 
depict him as an almost rustic upstart, his mother’s family is at the same time 
identified as an illegitimate sideline of the royal dynasty(7-10)).  
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and thus based on a peasant foot to a greater extent than on mounted 
troops. That Puke’s Dalecarlian and Norrlander supporters, when they 
finally arrived, seem to have overturned the threatening defeat, shows 
that even large armies could move over considerable distances when 
necessary. In the cases of Dalecarlia and Norrland (and parts of 
Uppland) many of the peasants may also have been mounted, as the 
horse supplants the ox as a draught animal in these provinces 
(Myrdal-Söderberg 1991).   
The evidence from the Puke feud 
Although this conflict started out as a formal feud between two (or 
three289) leading aristocrats, Puke’s eventual success (until he was 
killed, reputedly through breach of safe-conduct) was above all due 
to the support of the non-feudal provinces of Dalecarlia and 
Norrland, which is a strong counterargument against Reinholdsson’s 
thesis – in fact I would argue that this support shows that the ‘Puke 
feud’ in actual fact was just a second phase of the general rebellion 
(see below). 
Harrison 1997:53 claims that ‘a majority of the tax-peasants in 
Rekarne, Närke and Västmanland’ immediately joined up with Puke, 
but does not identify a separate source for this statement290. Probably 
it is based on Larsson 1984:222, claiming that the majority of the 
peasants in Rekarne, Närke, Västmanland, Dalecarlia, Southern 
Norrland, and many parts of Uppland, ‘without much doubt’ joined 
up with him.  
These areas Larsson identifies as dominated by ‘free-holding, tax-
paying peasants’. In four of these provinces, however – all except 
Dalecarlia and Norrland – there was also a considerable element of 
exempt land, owned by gentry, magnates and religious institutions. In 
those areas the estates of Erik Puke’s family were mainly situated291, 
and to the extent that his support was built on seigneurial authority, 
                                                   
289  Judging from Puke’s letter as quoted by Karl Knutsson and Christiern Nilsson 
(Vasa), he simultaneously broke an agreement with Bengt Stensson (Natt och 
Dag). Whether the agreement he revoked was a settlement of their earlier feud, 
during which Puke had burnt (but apparently not destroyed) a castle belonging 
to Bengt Stensson, or a settlement of the murder case, is impossible to conclude. 
290 As he only supplies an exhaustive consolidated bibliography of sources and 
literature for each rebellion, it is difficult to trace the origin of separate 
statements.  
291 Particularly in Rekarne, where the percentage of tax-peasants in 1560 - the 
earliest year from which we have any figures - was less than 30% according to 
Forssell 1869:26f 
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we should expect to find his following there. However, Karl 
Knutsson’s rapid campaign through this region succeeded to stamp 
out rebellion efficiently, burning peasant leaders at the stake to strike 
terror into their comrades. The non-feudal provinces of Dalecarlia and 
Norrland seem to have provided a following capable of succesfully 
resisting the Marshal’s troops, though292. 
The peasants from these areas can hardly have supported him out 
of a sense of obligation, unless it was the moral obligation to support 
a leader who had supported their demands. Although the feud was 
probably motivated by Erik Puke’s personal ambitions293 and thus 
reasonably a calculated wager on his popularity as Engelbrekt’s 
brother-in-arms, the very fact that a leading nobleman got his decisive 
support from provinces where he held no land, makes a simpler 
explanation seem more likely: That the settlement putting an end to 
the first rebellion in 1436 (after Engelbrekt had been murdered) 
satisfied the aristocratic opposition294, and (for the moment) the 
personal ambitions of Karl Knutsson, but neither the peasant 
opposition, nor the personal ambitions of Erik Puke. Such 
convergences will from this point onwards become commonplace in 
the history of medieval Sweden. 
The problem with foreign bailiffs, which was a grievance common 
to the magnates and the peasantry, appears to have been solved, but 
the other principal demand of the peasants: abolishment of 
extraordinary taxes,  had not been met. It is also quite evident that a 
satisfactory solution of the first problem for the peasants must have 
meant something more than just paying the same taxes to a Swedish 
bailiff. Xenophobia would rather have been the result of the negative 
experience of foreign bailiffs than a cause of the resentment they 
roused. It has often been assumed that these bailiffs would have 
brought with them another political culture including a harsher and 
more contemptuous treatment of peasants as a matter of course, but 
the very lack of a shared political culture may have been enough.  
The traditional political culture of negotiated rule mediated through 
regional assemblies and hundred moots, must have been impossible 
                                                   
292 Cf Harrison’s comparative analysis of the contrasting accounts in Ericus Olai and 
the Karlskrönika. (Harrison, 1997:31-40, 52-55, 98), concluding that Puke’s army 
was never really vanquished by Karl Knutsson 
293  Dissatisfaction with his share of the spoils in terms of fiefs and castles is cited 
as his primary motivation in the Karlskrönika. 
294  Likewise the clerical opposition and probably also the burghers, as the treaty 
had been closed with the cooperation of Hanseatic diplomats, and thus should be 
able to guarantee the return of peaceful conditions for trade. 
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to handle or even understand, for castellans and bailiffs who knew 
nothing of local custom, and sometimes not even the language! (As in 
the case of Giovanni Franco, a Venetian295 mercenary driven out of 
the Castle of Borganäs by the first Dalecarlian levy). If Swedish bailiffs 
took over the castles and collected the (reduced) taxes, this might 
have been seen as legitimate, as long as the aids tax was necessary 
for the defence against king Eric, but when, after the peace treaty, 
these bailiffs started to collected the full aids tax for king Eric, whose 
Baltic warfare was decidedly unpopular (especially with the miners, it 
has been argued), then the gains from the rebellion must have 
seemed to evaporate. 
That Puke in this situation, with thwarted ambitions, isolated 
among his equals and reasonably in grave danger himself after the 
murder of Engelbrekt and the execution of Broder Svensson296 
decided to raise the peasantry against the council, is hardly 
surprising, but, as Larsson observes, this gave the new rising a more 
threatening social profile: Peasants against lords, not a broad class 
coalition against the oppressive rule of strangers and the danger of 
royal autocracy (Larsson 1997:235. Cf Harrison 1997:53). That Puke 
was not defeated in combat but through deceit (breach of safe-
conduct) shows that his support was far wider than what could in 
any way be explained through some kind of ‘fealty’ from his 
subordinates – in that case the rest of the Council should have been 
                                                   
295 Or rather Croatian, according to a recent article by Ibler and Fritz (2004). These 
interesting new findings in no way detracts from his usefulness as an extreme 
example, rather the opposite. 
296  Broder Svensson (bull’s head), a former privateer and a subcommander of 
Engelbrekt’s during the campaign in Halland, had – like Erik Puke – become 
dissatisfied with the distribution of castle-fiefs and raged against Karl Knutsson, 
making violent accusations. He was immediately beheaded. The chronicle reports 
that Puke barely escaped his fate. KK, Kumlien 1933:81; Larsson 1984b argues 
that there are no grounds for interpreting Broder’s execution as a purge of 
Engelbrekt’s associates. However, it fits quite neatly into Karl Knutsson’s 
strategy of eliminating rivals one by one and even if Broder Svensson may have 
been more of a soldier of fortune than a champion of the people, he was one of 
the new councillors who had come to the fore through the rebellion. As no-one 
else among the newer councillors had been knighted, he may have been 
considered a particularly dangerous rival whether or not he enjoyed any popular 
support. Another possible rival whose death Karl Knutsson was accused of 
having caused (Kumlien 1937:196f with n32) was Peder Ulfsson (Roos), the rebel 
leader in Värmland, who, like Puke, seems to have been an independent  levy-
raiser and rebel army commander. He belonged to an illegitimate sideline of the 
old royal Norwegian dynasty, and was the father-in-law of Amund Sigurdsson 
Bolt, the aristocratic leader of a Norwegian peasant rising in 1436 (Kumlien 
1937:93 n92). 
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able to raise a devastatingly superior force by the same means, and 
thus the ‘feud’ aspect of this rising cannot explain its military success.  
Although we do not know the reasons for the peasants’ support297, 
the very fact that peasant unrest and local risings continued, should 
be proof enough that they had reasons of their own to rebel, and that 
these had not disappeared. The peasants who dragged Jens Eriksen 
out of his sanctuary in the Abbey of Vadstena298, formally sentenced 
him to death, and executed him, could not have had personal 
grievances to avenge, as Jens had been a bailiff in Jämtland and in 
Västmanland-Dalecarlia, not in Östergötland. They must have seized 
upon him as a representative or symbol of what they had been 
fighting against, which also indicates that they did not feel vindicated 
or bound by the treaty. For the peasantry it was not enough to have 
the strangers replaced by Swedish bailiffs, as is clearly demonstrated 
by the risings in Dalecarlia and Värmland in 1437, where in both 
cases a new, Swedish, vice-bailiff holding the castle on Karl 
Knutsson’s behalf, was killed by the peasants.  
The example of the Puke feud makes it all but impossible to 
maintain that the peasants only lent a transient support to the noble 
opposition against king Eric, but played no active part of their own. 
From the point of view of the peasantry, the entire rebellion must 
have been one more or less continuous struggle. In fact, it is difficult 
to see any reason whatsoever for treating the ‘Puke feud’ as a new 
and separate conflict. As the truces and treaties between king Eric 
and the different councils or makeshift alliances negotiating in the 
name of his Swedish subjects never had much permanence, I prefer 
to view it as ‘one’ revolution, in the same way as we speak of ‘the 
                                                   
297 The extremely partial Karlskrönika claims that Erik Puke had frightened them 
with tales of Karl Knutsson’s terrifying treatment of peasants who dare to make 
complaints: He ‘lets their mouths to the ears cut up’  and finally ‘break them on 
wheels, and burn and hang’ or ‘scourge them and tie them without a cause, and 
let them freeze to death’ (my translation).  
298  The account in the diary of Vadstena Abbey, confirms the depiction of this 
event in King Karl’s chronicle. That no häradshövding is reported to have taken 
part in the trial, hardly justifies Reinholdsson’s interpretation of this act as only an 
‘imitation’ of the forms of legal procedure. A hundred jury was capable of making 
judgment under the direction of a sheriff’s substitute, and the tradition of 
awarding the senior member of the jury the title of ‘hundred judge’ may very 
well have a medieval origin. In the only monography on medieval hundred courts 
Claesson (1987:116) does not consider this incident to have been a legally 
correct verdict, but perhaps a sort of ‘court-martial’. His argument does not even 
discuss the absence of a häradshövding, though, and is based upon the 
provision that crimes should be prosecuted in the hundred where they have 
been committed, and upon the probable absence of witnesses.  
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French revolution’ in one term, although it contained widely varying 
phases.  
The murder of Engelbrekt 
Underlying all this turmoil is reasonably also the murder of 
Engelbrekt. Some historians tell us sternly, that Ericus Olai’s assertion 
that Karl Knutsson had protected the murderer is of too late a date to 
deserve any credence, and that it probably is a misunderstanding 
because the murder was a purely private affair299. According to 
established source-critical practice, one single (independent) source is 
not enough to establish a historical fact, and in this case the three 
decades elapsed between the deed and the allegation must surely 
further weaken the argument for complicity. Still, I have only seen 
conjectures offered as proof of the conventional assertion, and as 
these conjectures are made by historians who are more than ten times 
further removed from the occasion, compared to Ericus Olai, I am not 
quite certain why they feel entitled to make such strong assertions. I 
cannot see how the weakness of a source can prove the truth of the 
opposite viewpoint, and there are also other indications that people 
at the time might have suspected Karl Knutsson’s guilt, certainly even 
more so after the deceitful capture and execution of Erik Puke300.  
The ‘private conflict’ interpretation seems to be derived from 
Karlskrönikan, where a stereotype fable of the ‘faithless servant’ 
mould is recounted, depicting the murderer as a former retainer of 
Engelbrekt’s. Magnus Bengtsson, however, belonged to the very 
highest aristocracy. His father, one or two of his uncles, and his 
granduncle sat in the council - which he also entered himself during 
the rebellion - and his grandfather Sten Bosson (Natt och Dag) had 
not only been a member of the ten-man board of executors of the 
will of Bo Jonsson (Grip), the High Steward of Sweden and the lord 
                                                   
299 Larsson 1984:203, 211 and more explicitly in 1997:230ff. Christensen 1980:232, 
Harrison 1997:52. Rosén 1966a (Engelbrekt och unionen DSH 3:83) considers 
the murder to be ‘the final act of a lengthy personal quarrel … No political 
motives can be traced.’(my translation). He cites Karl Knutsson’s protection of 
the murderer as a fact, though, which also Lönnroth does (1934:130), although 
the latter considers the ‘political difference’ between Karl Knutsson and 
Engelbrekt to be grounded in ‘pure competition for power’.  
300  The survival - albeit in a garbled Danish version - of a political ballad recounting 
a fairy tale-like story of treachery and murder, where the villain is called Karl 
Knutsson, and his victim Erik Stygeson or Pukeson who ‘listens to the peasants’ 
complaints’, and ’will against the power fight’, suggests that a suspicious attitude 
against Karl Knutsson was not limited to clerics like Ericus Olai (Grundtvig, 
Hildeman). 
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of the most extensive estate ever controlled by a Swede beneath the 
throne (Schück 1976:199ff; the testament is printed in Rosman 
1923:.356ff.), but after the dissolution of the group he became the 
sole executor of the estate (SRP2483,2583. Cf Schück 1976:195,210). 
That the young aristocrat Magnus would have entered into the service 
of a humble esquire such as Engelbrekt – and had done so in the 
very beginning of the rebellion, before Engelbrekt had attained the 
position of Captain of the Realm, or even member of the Council – 
would have been very remarkable. Whether we accept the 
reconstruction of a separate Engelbrektskrönika as a precursor and/or 
starting-point for the Karlskrönika (Schück 1994 is the latest and most 
elaborate version of this interpretation), or consider the portion of the 
Karlskrönika dealing with Engelbrekt to be an integral part of Karl 
Knutsson’s propagandist chronicle301, it is clear that even if Karl 
Knutsson had had a reason to protect the murderer, this motive 
would have disappeared long before the chronicle came into 
circulation, as Magnus Bengtsson’s uncle Nils Stensson was appointed 
Marshal of the Realm by king Eric in 1439, replacing the deposed Karl 
Knutsson (SSFS 13:2 s205f). After this date the family of Natt och Dag 
were – for a period – leaders of the royal counter-revolution, and 
thus the murder could be turned into a propagandist asset instead of 
a liability. The chronicle now depicted Karl Knutsson as the successor 
of Engelbrekt and its savage denigration of Erik Puke served to bury 
the memory of another political configuration of which we know 
nothing except that it served Karl Knutsson’s interests to depict it as 
grossly demagogical, with an ingratiating attitude towards the 
peasantry.   
Of course Erik Puke must have been a most formidable rival as he 
was not only  
(1) Engelbrekt’s brother in arms (cf Reinholdsson’s evidence for 
a formally declared brotherhood-in-arms between Erik and 
Engelbrekt) and  
(2) the successful commander of a separate rebel army (in 
contrast to Karl Knutsson, who had only played a minor role 
in the least successful subdivision of Engelbrekt’s army) but 
also  
(3) the son of Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik), the foremost 
lawspeaker and thus the highest-ranking secular official of 
                                                   
301 Lönnroth 1934; reformulated in response to Schück in Lönnroth 1996, making 
some concessions as to the political role of Engelbrekt, but using Schück’s own 
evidence to restate the conviction that Karl Knutsson’s propaganda is the 
context within which the entire Engelbrektskrönika has to be understood. 
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Sweden, who had played a key role in the insurrection (see 
below), and  
(4) the son-in-law of Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta), whom I 
consider to be the central personality within what may have 
remained of Bo Jonsson’s followers among the old Swedish 
aristocracy (see below). 
In any case the murder, given the circumstances, could in no way 
be described as a private affair. Under a state of civil war with 
constantly shifting alliances, a member of one of the leading power 
groups cannot kill the leader of another constellation out of purely 
personal reasons - all personal relations between people in that kind 
of a position are political, as the forming and breaking of alliances 
constitute politics in an age of politics based on personal ties. Of 
course it is also quite possible that Karl Knutsson at that moment 
would have preferred a living Engelbrekt - there is no need to see the 
powerful clan of Natt och Dag as puppets for anyone else302.  
The most common explanation for the quarrel between Engelbrekt 
and Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag), refers to Erik Puke’s attack on 
and capture of the castle of Täljehus (at that moment held by Bengt’s 
wife), reputedly in response to Bengt Stensson’s plundering of a 
Lübeck ship, thus violating the promise of free and unimpeded trade 
for Hanseatic vessels issued by the rebel council. If this really is the 
source also of Engelbrekt’s conflict with Bengt Stensson303, seems 
doubtful - the chronicle mentions the conflict before describing the 
piracy issue. A conflict concerning authority over the province of 
Närke would seem rather more likely - Herr Bengt had for a quarter 
of a century been its lawspeaker, when Engelbrekt took over the 
coterminous (Fritz 1973:40) castellany of Örebro through buying off 
King Eric’s bailiff.  
Though Bengt Stensson had been prominently, if ambiguously, 
involved with the magnate opposition from the very beginning, he 
had neither been entrusted with a castellany, as were his two 
colleagues Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik), Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta), 
and his own uncle bishop Knut; nor with a regional captaincy, as 
were Nils Erengisleson and another lawspeaker, Knut Jonsson (Tre 
Rosor)304. At the same time, fiscal and military authority in his home 
                                                   
302  If they were, King Eric might be a more likely suspect, as subsequent events 
would indicate. 
303  If Puke’s attack had been the cause of the conflict, it seems very strange that it 
is always explicitly mentioned as a conflict between Bengt Stensson (with his 
son) and Engelbrekt.  
304  Bengt Stensson’s own younger brother Nils became captain of Småland, though.. 
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province was assumed by the upstart Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson, or 
by his less distinguished deputy and brother, Nils Engelbrektsson. 
This must have appeared as a mortal insult to Sir Bengt, and 
according to the chronicle, Magnus Bengtsson attempted to seize the 
castle of Örebro after the murder, but failed, provoking in response a 
spontaneous peasant attack on his father’s castle, Göksholm, which, 
however, also failed. 
During the rebellion, the council was expanded into 36 members305, 
including the rebel leaders Engelbrekt and Erik Puke. Only five 
magnate families were represented by more than one member. The 
later so dominant family of Oxenstierna was represented by two 
brothers: Bengt and Nils Jönsson, future regents and leaders-to-be of 
the ‘constitutionalist’ faction. In three cases an already well-
established senior councillor had been joined by his son: Erik Puke 
had joined his father Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) - lagman 
(‘lawspeaker’) of Uppland, which made him the judicial head of the 
most prestigious province, and, in a situation where the offices of 
High Steward and Marshal of the Realm were left vacant, the foremost 
secular member of the Council; Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta), 
lawspeaker of Södermanland and Engelbrekt’s subcommander for the 
neighbouring province of Östergötland, had been joined by his son 
Erengisle Nilsson, and Gottskalk Bengtsson - of an ancient and 
prestigious sideline of the family whose senior branch had become 
the recently defunct royal dynasty - by his son Bengt Gottskalksson.  
The fifth family counted no less than five members: ‘the oldest 
noble family of purely Swedish origin’ (SBL), which much later came 
to be known as Natt och Dag (‘Night and Day’). It included the 
venerable bishop Knut of Linköping, three of his nephews: Bengt, Bo 
and Nils Stensson, and Bengt’s young son Magnus. This numeral 
preponderance has, as far as I have been able to ascertain, never 
been given any attention, perhaps because the bias of the narrative 
sources is weighted towards two rival protagonists: Engelbrekt, the 
gentleman miner who appears as a leader from the very beginning of 
the rebellion, and who is transmuted into a sanctified nation-hero a 
few years after his death; Karl Knutsson, the ruthlessly ambitious 
marshal, who brings the struggle against king Eric to an end, crushing 
peasant rebellions and killing his rivals on the way, but still fails to 
secure the crown and loses out to Christopher of Bavaria, only to 
return as a king several years later, losing and regaining the crown 
twice more.  
                                                   
305  Carlsson 1936.  
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Against both of them, the arch-antagonist Eric of Pomerania, a rex 
iniustus of the clearest water. This triple focus has turned all other 
actors into a priori minor characters whose actions are determined by 
the triangular power constellation, and above all: it threatens to turn a 
story of large-scale collective resistance into a chamber play about 
clashing personalities306. Other actors and configurations must have 
been of comparable importance without getting as much attention 
from the chroniclers, as is borne out by the simple fact that none of 
these three or four (counting Erik Puke) protagonists emerged 
victorious from the struggle.     
The revolution against King Eric as a composite 
conflict 
The struggle between king Eric and his Swedish subjects consisted 
of three or four interlocking conflicts:  
(1) encouraged by their involvement with the conciliar 
movement, the Swedish church demanded the freedom to 
appoint their own leaders307, and got into a head-on clash 
with Eric’s conviction that appointing bishops - and 
particularly archbishops - should be a royal prerogative.  
(2) The peasants were reacting against the heavy extraordinary 
taxation, and against those mostly foreign bailiffs and 
castellans, through whom Eric imposed those taxes.  
(3) The magnates also turned against his system of rule, as Eric’s 
enfeoffment policy had deprived them of important sources 
of income and influence.  
(4) It is also possible that Eric’s war against Lübeck and the 
resulting blockades and privateering made the mercantile 
classes - Stockholm burghers, Dalecarlian mineowners and 
possibly also borderland producers of surplus food - turn 
                                                   
306  This tendency is only reinforced if we complement the mini-cast through 
adducing the tempestuous temper of Erik Puke, the Hotspur of Swedish 
medieval history. The resemblance to a Shakespearean chronicle-play is of course 
already present in the rhymed chronicle of King Karl, which remains our only 
source for large parts of the story. 
307  Control over the enfeoffment of church land also became an important issue, no 
doubt strongly intertwined with the interests of the nobility, as Bo Jonsson’s 
strategy had been to pawn land to ecclesiastical  institutions, not only in order to 
raise money for further land purchases, but also to put the land out of royal 
grasp (Sällström). It is noteworthy that two bishops were included in the ten-man 
‘aristocratic junta’ appointed trustees of his estate. Maybe more remarkably, they 
lacked the aristocratic background and large private estates common among 
Swedish medieval bishops, but were - by Swedish standards - exceptionally 
highly educated and versed in jurisprudence. 
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against him. This argument, first broached by Henrik 
Schück, was given a decisive role in the analyses of 
Lönnroth308, and received an even heavier emphasis by 
Nyström, while Larsson argues that the truce of 1432 
between king Eric and the Hanse, should have removed this 
factor. Boëthius states in his study of the copper mining 
district, that he can find no clear evidence of crisis in the 
mining districts, but he still concludes that disturbances to 
the trade must have been serious enough to contribute to 
the general discontent.  
Stockholm and the Hanse system  
Stockholm should not only be identified as a part of Sweden. At the 
same time it was, as a city, involved in the city alliance system of 
interlocking networks, whereof what we usually refer to as the 
Hanse309 is only the most visible subsystem. Although not explicitly 
affiliated to any of the Hanses, Stockholm had a kind of partial 
exterritoriality for its German citizens, who had a separate mayor and 
were entitled to nominate half of the town council (Ahnlund 1929). In 
Swedish history, ‘the Hanse’ is usually talked about as if it was a state, 
thus conflating the city of Lübeck as a political power with the much 
more wide-ranging but also more diffuse economic power of the 
Wendish Hanse as such, or even of the Hanse system as a whole. In 
this way the struggle between Scandinavian sovereigns (whether 
Union monarchs or ‘national’) and ‘the Hanse’ is viewed as a struggle 
of power in a political sense, and thus a kind of ‘national’ struggle.  
However, it is more to the point to view it as a question of rival 
forms of state-building. To the extent that their struggle represents a 
                                                   
308 In Carlsson 1941 the importance of the endangered trade argument is also 
strongly argued - he puts a heavy emphasis on Engelbrekt’s entrepreneurial 
‘vitae genus’ - but the overall context of his interpretation is still determined by 
the ‘nationalist’ motive.  The strong reaction against Lönnroth’s ‘materialist’ 
explanation seems a bit surprising, as the trade argument was in no way novel. 
Evidently the complete absence of nationalist sentiment and hero-worship made 
the commonplace pocketbook argument appear so stark as to give an impression 
of sacrilege.  
309  The Hanses started out as enclaves of German merchants in cities like Bruges 
and London, but developed into a form of guild-like alliance between largely 
independent cities, who were granted their liberties as privileges from a princely 
power in the vicinity; the most well-known example is the Wendish Hanse 
dominated by Lübeck, although there was also for instance a Prussian Hanse 
centering on Danzig. Visby and Bergen were Hanse cities although they also 
were considered parts of the countries in which they were situated. A larger 
pan-Hanseatic confederation was formed in Cologne, and Hanse Diets were 
occasionally attended even by such cities as Stockholm. 
172 
territorial ‘nation-state’ model trying to assert itself against the ‘guild-
like’, federative, city league model (which is capable of coexistence 
with other, looser, state forms, such as empires or polystructural 
‘composite states’), it is in some sense really a national struggle, but 
not in the sense of ‘national defense’ so much as of a nation being 
constructed through the exclusion of elements defined as ‘foreign’ – 
not a struggle between nations, but a struggle between nation-state 
building projects and other forms of political aggregation.  
We might consider the entire Scandinavian Union project – or at 
least Eric’s version of it – as an attempt to build a consolidated state 
through the path of ‘capitalized coercion’ in Tilly’s sense:  
a combination of  
• coercive tax-raising: the imposition of new extraordinary 
taxes through a system of castellans and bailiffs separated 
from an aristocracy which had combined landowning 
power over multilocal conglomerate estates with 
administrative and judicial power as regional magistrates on 
the hundred or province levels310.  
and 
• capital accumulation through intercepting the monetary 
flows of trade networks. The Sound tolls – which were in 
fact introduced by Eric of Pomerania – are of course the 
most important source of such revenue. 
ARISTOCRATIC DISCONTENT. A BACKGROUND 
Who were ‘the Council’? 
It is important not to overestimate Karl Knutsson’s role in the 
rebellion, especially not in the initial stages. Even apart from the bias 
of the principal narrative source, written in order to glorify his career, 
there is the teleological danger of bias from hindsight: both of these 
biases serve to identify him as the leader of the aristocracy. Yet we 
know that he did not belong to the original rebels and did not play 
an important role until the King appointed him Marshal of the Realm, 
obviously counting on receiving his support in exchange. Even at the 
end of the rebellion, when his authority should have been at its peak 
after having ensured the military victory and eliminated all his serious 
rivals, the Council avoided accepting him as king, turning instead to 
Christopher of Bavaria. If the Council took control over the 
                                                   
310 Though, as I show in Chapter 4, their different forms of power were normally 
not exercised over the same territories. 
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insurrection from 1435, from 1434 or (surreptitiously) from an even 
earlier date, they acted as a ‘confederation’ (Lagerroth, Lönnroth) to 
further their own collective interests, not on behalf of a rival 
pretender. But: who were these councillors - what factions and 
coalitions can be discerned?  
It is by no means certain that we can count on the existence of a 
permanent Council during the reigns of Margaret and Eric 
(Christensen 1980, Schück 1985), and if the Councils convoked by 
these rulers when they were needed for one purpose or another did 
not have any independent existence – or even any consistent 
membership – between these occasions, then the very act of 
assembling as a Council without a royal summons was seditious. The 
famous letter of revocation from a meeting in Vadstena 1434 - where 
the signatories withdrew their obedience from king Eric specifying 
the complaints which should justify such a step, while at the same 
time pleading that they were acting under duress311 – has been 
rejected as a Council meeting by Lars Olof Larsson, who considers it 
to be a ‘meeting for those provinces that still were left untouched by 
the rebellion’ (1984; 1997:194ff).  
Schück 1985 argued, against this interpretation, that Council 
meetings usually did not muster all regular members, and that they 
were frequently expanded through the presence of additional ‘Men of 
the Realm’, outside the ranks of councillors proper. His own 
admonition against the belief in permanent Councils weakens the 
contrast between the two positions, though. If the revocation was 
issued by a makeshift council, then the really important question is if 
the signatories constituted some kind of leadership of the rising, or if 
they just were late-comers hastening to jump onto a rebellion already 
in full swing. In neither case they would have constituted a Council 
legitimate in the eyes of the King – at most a self-proclaimed Council 
like the one convened in Arboga in January 1435, although the 
                                                   
311  The signatories explicitly state that they revoke their obedience because they 
have been forced to do so by Engelbrekt. On the other hand they at the same 
time assert that the king’s behaviour  justifies the rebellion. Most historians 
consider this no more than a device to protect their own backs (e g Larsson 
1997:196). Reinholdsson’s discussion of how a change of sides due to coercion 
was considered legitimate (1998::247-53), seems to make this episode less 
confusing. Whether we believe that they were actually physically intimidated (as 
Schück and Reinholdsson do) or that the threat was a fictional pretext (Lönnroth 
and many historians after him), the argument will become much simpler, if we do 
not have to explain how the conversion could outlast the threat. If a forced 
conversion is not dishonourable, then the most honourable way to go on is to 
stick to the new loyalties; if a fictional threat is used as a pretext, on the other 
hand, then to remain converted won’t give the game away.  
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signatories of the meeting in Vadstena 1434 did not style themselves a 
Council.  
In both versions, this becomes a partly planned, partly improvised 
meeting with councillors and other ‘men of the realm’; to that extent 
representative, yet with no formal authority; taking sides in the 
conflict with the king and listing grievances against him, but still 
shrinking from taking full responsibility for their stand. On the whole 
this sounds like a tentative attempt to find a way to make a formal 
withdrawal without having any evident pattern to follow, and thus as 
a step in the ongoing construction of formal politics. 
To identify the exponents of the many different sub-struggles 
involved in the rebellion against king Eric is hardly possible, given 
the nature of our sources. Still, it should be possible to advance some 
tentative assumptions through observing which names that appear in 
which contexts, and through relating these to earlier and later events. 
If the political standpoints of the rebellious council were ‘the same 
constitutional program’ that was overrun by Queen Margaret in 1397 
(as claimed by Lönnroth 1934:103) we could begin by looking for 
points of continuity with the constitutionalist lobby of the Union 
negotiation.  
Constitutionalists or oligarchs?  
The testamentarii of Bo Jonsson (Grip) 
Lönnroth finds such a continuity in the political ideology 
formulated within the ecclesiastical opposition against Eric, containing 
more and more explicit invocations of elective kingship and rule 
according to the Land Law312. This struggle for libertas ecclesiae owed 
a lot ideologically to the conciliar movement in which some of the 
protagonists had been deeply involved, and there is no doubt that 
this ideological example helped to reinforce the constitutionalist 
position within secular politics as well. Still we should be wary of 
identifying every anti-absolutist stance as a symptom of constitutional 
ideology – a self-serving preference for oligarchic rule without any 
strong ideological conviction would hardly be possible to distinguish 
from a principled stand. 
The specific constitutional program formulated in the ‘unification 
document’ of Kalmar 1397 – now by most historians considered a 
                                                   
312  ‘The heirs of the 14th century constitutionalists took the lead in the 
rebellion’(1934:111) 
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defeated proposal which was overrun by Queen Margaret313 – may 
have been forgotten on the Swedish side, as argued by Christensen, 
but the politics of oligarchic opposition to a centralizing monarchy 
cannot have been. The narrow group of signatories was basically a 
residual of the 10- or 18 (Counting also the deputy members.) -
member ‘aristocratic junta’ formed in order to administrate the estate 
of Bo Jonsson (Grip), which had made the Union possible through 
offering the crown to Queen Margaret in 1388314. This group was 
formed around a tightly knit nucleus of intermarrying aristocrats315, 
buying, selling, exchanging, donating and enfeoffing land among 
themselves, to ecclesiastical institutions (prebends, monasteries etc - 
especially at Vadstena Abbey), or to their clients. In addition to the 
eight (regular) secular members, who counted three sometime 
Marshals of the Realm, and six lawspeakers (though not more than 
four holding office at the same time time), two bishops were 
included: Nicolaus Hermanni of Linköping and Tord Gunnari of 
Strängnäs. In addition to their impeccable spiritual credentials – 
Nicolaus was well on his way to become a saint, and Tord Gunnari 
                                                   
313 The complex debate concerning the validity and apparent incompatibility of the 
two documents dating from the Kalmar meeting: the ‘document of unification’ 
and ‘letter of coronation’, has been running since Paludan-Müller critical analysis 
of the source material in 1840. Christensen provides a lucid overview of the 
debate (1980:131-171) and settles for a reasonable compromise: the unification 
document was saved by Queen Margaret as a document of how far the magnates 
were prepared to go in the direction of a permanent union, and on what 
conditions. As she was not prepared to accept these, she postponed the long-
term negotiations, and was for the moment satisfied with having gotten king Eric 
acknowledged with much wider powers granted for the duration of his reign. 
(Although she formally surrendered the throne to him at his coronation she 
appears to have remained in full de facto control for the rest of her life.) 
314 Most of the Swedish castles were held as securities by Bo Jonsson’s estate, and 
by pledging to hold them to Margaret, the college of executors could endow her 
with the formal suzerainty over most of the country. If she – and her new 
adherents – had not been able to muster the requisite military power to make 
good her claims, this formal manoeuvre would have been of no avail, of course. 
315 They may have been motivated by an ideology formulated by St Bridget – a 
‘Birgittine party’ according to Engstöm’s expression, though for my purposes it’s 
enough to describe them as an oligarchic faction, with or without a theory to 
justify their position. The saint’s family and estates were deeply implicated, 
though, as her son, her brother’s son-in-law and three grandnephews were 
members of the board, as were two of her most faithful clerical supporters. 
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has been described as ‘no doubt the most erudite Swede of his time’ 
– they were also experts in canon law316.  
This board of executors was formally dissolved in 1390, when one 
among them, Sten Bosson (Natt och Dag), took over the 
responsibility for the residual estate, although Rosman considers the 
former members of the college to have been regarded as a ‘higher 
instance’ in doubtful cases (1923:292). That the group still held 
together as at least an informal lobby is shown by the fact that all of 
the seven Swedish signatories to the ‘unification letter’, except the 
archbishop Henricus Caroli317 were regular or deputy members of the 
original college.  
Already in the letter of allegiance to Queen Margaret from 1388, 
two new substitutes had been included in the group explicitly 
defining themselves as Bo Jonsson’s testamentarii. This shows clearly 
that the instructions in the will had been followed, stipulating that 
members who ‘decease, go abroad on pilgrimage or in other 
business, or become enemies of the realm, or do not want to take on 
this commission fully and faithfully’ (Rosman 1923:358, my 
translation) were to be replaced through choosing worthy substitutes 
‘among native men’. At that point the group was still an officially 
functioning body, though. The liquidation of the trust when Sten 
Bosson (Natt och Dag) took over full responsibility for the remainder 
of the estate318 in 1390, may have reflected a breach in the group, as 
argued by Sällström 1951:60.319.  
                                                   
316  Nicolaus had studied at the University of Paris, where Karl Ulfsson, one of the 
leading secular executors, had also spent some years. Tord Gunnari had studied 
canon law for five years at the University of Prague, where he had also taught 
for four years, and become a canon at the All Saints’ Chapel at the Castle of 
Prague (Collmar 1977:51-8).  
317 He might, however, be considered as a reasonable substitute for the two original 
bishops. He was also deeply involved in the further landholding machinations of 
the executors as a purchaser of pantlän (mortgage fiefs) and a major beneficiary 
of land donations, parallelling the earlier roles of Nicolaus Hermanni and Tord 
Gunnari in helping to put land outside the reach of royal resumption. 
318 Most of the pantlän, which constituted the most important part of the estate, 
had by then already been returned to the crown. Carlsson 1941:40f considers 
that the Queen accomplished the liquidation of the trust taking care not to 
alienate the individual executors. 
319 He considered Sten Bosson and Ulf Jonsson to have become the ‘henchmen’ of 
Queen Margaret. 
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Table 6: The executorial college created by Bo Jonsson’s testament.  
     relation to signatory of 
 name dead family office St 
Bridget 
BJG alleg
letter 
unif. 
letter 
1 Nicolaus Hermanni  1391  
bishop of Linkpg fr 
1375 
children’s 
teacher 
  ( † ) 
2 Thordo Gunnari 1401  
bishop of Strgns fr 
1378 
    
3 Karl Ulvs-son of Tofta 1407 Tofta 
cas Sth 1364, lsp Upl 
1359-07 Msl 1364-71 
nephew-
in-law 
  X 
3b 
dep 
his son Knut 
Karlsson 1389 Tofta lsp Sdm 1380-6(9?) 
grand-
nephew 
  ( † ) 
4 Birger Ulvsson 1391 Ulvåsa 
lsp Thd 1381-2, Nrk 
82-4 
son  1 ( † ) 
4b 
dep 
Algot 
Magnusson 1426 
Sture 
(II) 
cas in Vgl 1388, Norrl 
1405-26 
  (sep) X 
5 Erik Kettils-son Puke 1396 Puke 
Msl, cas in Värml 
1363-96 
  (sep) ( † ) 
5b 
dep 
his nep. Kettil 
Jonsson  
last m 
1386 
Malsta hh1380-5   
md 2nd 
cousin 
 ( †?) 
6 Sten Bengtsson 1408 Bielke 
Msl 1376 Q's Cpt 
1390 lsp Öl 1406-8 
grand-
nephew 
 2 X 
6b 
dep 
his brother 
Ture 
Bengtsson 
1414 Bielke 
v lsp 1378 Vsm, cas 
in Nrl 1406-14, lsp 
Upl 1409-14 
grand-
nephew 
 7 X 
7 Erengisle Nilsson 1406 
Ham-
mersta 
cas in Finl 1380-1402 
lsp Sdm 1390-1406 
  3 X 
7b 
dep 
his br-in-law 
Tord Bonde 1417 Bonde 
cas in Finl 1378-1417 
lsp Vsm 1394-1417  
  11  
8 Ulv Jonsson last m 
1393 
Aspe-
näs 
cas in Dal 1370-78, 
lsp Ögl 1389-91 
cousin's 
son 
mother´s 
cousin 
4 ( †?) 
8b 
dep Magnus Kase 1407 Kase cas in Finl. 1385-90  
son of 
cousin 
  
9 Sten Bosson 1410 
/11 
Natt & 
Dag 
cas in Finl 1368-9, in 
Srm 1388-93, Cpt Nrl 
1395, Kdh1385-1409 
cousin's 
grandson 
cousin 6  
9b 
dep 
his brother 
Knut Bosson  1436 
Natt & 
Dag 
precentor at Lkpg, 
bishop fr1391 
cousin's 
grandson 
cousin 9 X 
10 Karl  Magnusson 1421 Örnfot   
2nd 
cousin 
10  
10b 
dep 
his br-in-law 
Arvid Bengtss  
1401 
/02 
Oxen-
stierna 
hh 1390-1401Tjurbo   8  
(11) 
co 
Sten 
Stensson 1431 Bielke lsp Vsm 1374-86 
grandson
-in-law 
 5  
(12) 
co 
Gregers 
Bengtsson  
Aspe-
näs 
                   
2nd 
cousin 
12  
(13) 
co? 
Henricus 
Caroli (?)    
archbishop of 
Uppsala 
   X 
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cas= castellan, co= co-opted member, cpt= captain, dep= deputy member, hh= härads-
hövding (hundred sheriff), kdh= konungsdomhavande (judge on behalf of the King), lsp= 
lawspeaker,  msl= marshal, Q’s cpt= Queen’s captain, sep= separate letter 
On the other hand the entire college had cooperated to put her on 
the throne, as many of them had once helped to put Albrecht there 
before her320, and several of them had accepted responsible posts in 
the service of either monarch. Loyalty to one master or another was 
not the most typical trait of these people321, rather an ability to use 
their allegiance as a negotiable asset, and what united them was not 
any of the specific adherences they had entered into, but the 
common effort to safeguard their space for political manoeuvre. This 
may of course be regarded as a struggle for freedom, but in such a 
context liberty itself is a very exclusive privilege. Thus I have to insist 
that ‘oligarchic’ is a less misleading label than ‘constitutionalist’.  
The ‘unification letter lobby’ 
Although the material foundation for the college had disappeared, 
the members had after all been united by the common task of using 
its resources to serve a political goal. As a lobby or party, they – or a 
faction of them – would continue, openly or clandestinely. When the 
‘unification letter’ was brought into the negotiations with King Eric in 
Kalmar 1436, and the Swedish delegation argued:  
‘Item have our forefathers and parents in the three realms bound 
themselves together thus – and we in the same way – that each shall 
help the others to enjoy law and justice and in no way to diminish or 
violate them’,322  
then the reference to ‘forefathers and parents’ was not just a figure 
of speech. Only one of the Swedish delegates – Nils Erengisleson 
(Hammersta) – was literally the son of a signatory to the unification 
letter, but then only one more son of a signatory of that letter was 
                                                   
320  Or, earlier, conspired to pitch Erik Magnusson against his father Magnus and 
brother Håkan, and then Håkan against Magnus (Engström, Sällström, Andersson). 
321  With the possible exception of Erik Kettilsson Puke. His loyalty to the old 
dynasty may of course have had something to do with his seemingly semi-
independent stewardship over Värmland, and with his probable marital 
connection to the royal house (see Chapter 4). 
322  ST 75, p167. My translation. 
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alive at that point323. Nils Jönsson was not a descendant of Karl 
Ulfsson, only his cousin’s son, but when his father died, Karl Ulfsson 
had been appointed his guardian, and two of his uncles had signed 
the original declaration of allegiance to Queen Margaret, together 
with the husbands of his two aunts. Knut Karlsson’s father had also 
signed the letter of allegiance and belonged to the executorial 
college, as had the father of one of the witnesses, Karl Bonde324. The 
High Steward Christiern Nilsson (Vasa) was a grandnephew of Erik 
Kettilsson Puke, which leaves Magnus Gren as the only delegate 
without closer family ties to the testamentarii325. The last survivor of 
the executorial college and the unification letter lobby, Bishop Knut 
of Linköping, had died just a few months before these negotiations, 
but up to that point he had been an important participant during the 
entire course of the Swedish insurrection326. A closer examination of 
the continuity between Bo Jonsson’s trust and the magnate element in 
the revolt against king Eric seems to be called for.  
                                                   
323  He was Gustav Algotsson (Sture), who took part in the midsummer council in 
Stockholm, which Kumlien 1933:73 presumes to be convened in order to appoint 
delegates for the Kalmar negotiations. That he was not among those appointed 
may have to do with the fact that Karl Knutsson, who also took part in this 
meeting, wasn’t either - Gustav was the marshal’s brother-in-law. Kumlien’s claim 
that this meeting was dominated by the ‘union-friendly elements’ seems weakly 
underpinned. Nils Gustavsson and Erik Puke took part, in addition to Karl, 
Gustav, and archbishop Olaus – certainly no friend of king Eric’s. Christiern 
Nilsson (Vasa) and bishop Magnus of Åbo were the only other representatives 
mentioned (73n23; cf BSH 2:110), and even if Hans Kröpelin and the Mayor of 
Wismar (one of the mediators in the conflict) had accompanied them to 
Stockholm, as Kumlien suggests, the notion that the last-mentioned four, 
together with ‘other Finnish lords’, had succeeded to ‘momentarily put Karl 
Knutsson’s party out of play’ seems contrived. The tension between Erik Puke 
and Karl Knutsson, however, may have weakened the insurgent side.  
324  Among the other witnesses, one was the son-in-law of the executor Magnus 
Kase (and the nephew-in-law of another), another one was next-of-kind to Kase 
(apart from his daughters) and belonged to the legatees of Bo Jonsson’s will, and 
yet another one was a nephew-in-law of Gregers Bengtsson who had signed the 
letter of allegiance as a co-opted member of the testamentarii. 
325 His uncle Ivar Nilsson (by saltire) was one of the 21 noblemen endorsing Birger 
Ulfsson’s and Sten Bengtsson’s agreement with Margareta in May 1388 (6 of 
them belonged to the executorial college. Ivar’s close connection to the 
testamentarii is evidenced by his appearance as an executor in the testament of 
Karl Ulfsson together with three other members of the college; it is quite 
possible that he may have been a co-opted member of the board. His father was 
a cousin of Karl Ulfsson, and his wife a daughter of Tord Bonde. He also became 
Ulf Jonsson’s successor as the lawspeaker of Östergötland. 
326  Christensen’s attempt to make him into a co-leader – with Engelbrekt – of a 
supposed hard-liner faction among the insurgents, is unconvincing, though. As 
Schück points out in his review (1982), documentary evidence for depicting him 
as ‘the implacable leader of the prelates’  simply does not exist. 
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Trust or council? 
Although the crucial role of the testamentarii has been generally 
acknowledged, Swedish historians have tended to subsume this body 
under the Council327, and treat its operations as actions by the Council 
as such, or by a ‘party’ (‘constitutional’, ‘Birgittine’, ‘national’ or 
whatever) within the Council. However, a Council as a permanent 
corporation with an existence independent of the King calling his 
advisors, is by this period probably just a teleological mirage. In 1435 
a large group dominated by councillors and their relatives constitute 
themselves as a council. This is a revolutionary act: another form of 
politics.  
Bo Jonsson through his land transactions and his testament had 
created a totally different kind of an institution: a privatization of 
political power through setting up a ‘trust’ controlling a large portion 
of what should have been ‘the state’. This was only an ephemeral 
phenomenon, a transient tool for political change and not an 
alternative form of state-building. (Would it even be possible to 
envision a private state?) The estate trust was created in order to 
enforce a political solution, but it was not in its power to dictate its 
content. Law and order had to be re-established, but for all their 
juridical competence, the college could not do it on their own. The 
‘pyramid-shape’ of a hierarchical society demanded an apex tying 
everything together (cf Anderson 1974a), and what the trust could 
achieve was to bargain for the best conditions attainable. It is 
probably at this point that the path of ‘parallel centralization’ begins. 
The aristocratic-oligarchic-constitutionalist faction has centralized 
power privately and offers it back to the state in return for a 
guaranteed participation328.  
                                                   
327  A ‘Council committee’ according to Schück 1976:200n13.  On p 212 he states 
(in my translation): ‘The executorial college had formed an inner circle of the 
Council, and had probably continued to act as such since their commission had 
been concluded.’ NB that there is nothing ‘constitutional’ about the way this 
committe had originated! 
328 [Later comment: Today I am inclined to trace its pedigree further back in time, 
reasonably to the council during King Magnus Eriksson’s minority – a compromise 
between the rival sets of councillors from the preceding Civil War.] 
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Magnate politics 
Within the group of actors usually lumped together as ‘the Council’, 
we may search for political factions:  
• A ‘Birgittine party’ is Engström’s label for the nucleus of the 
oligarchic party setting up Håkan Magnusson against his 
father, banished after the reconciliation of the monarchs, 
and after this involved in the Mecklenburger invasion. His 
analysis is quite strained, though, arguing that the defence 
of the integrity of the realm (that is: the retention of Scania) 
had become the defining characteristic of Birgittine politics.  
• Patrons of the Vadstena Abbey would reasonably be 
susceptible to Birgittine-style denunciations of tyrants, and 
the overlap with Engström’s ‘party’ is considerable. Some of 
the magnates investing in prebendary stalls in the Abbey 
church might have had a purely business or patronly329 
interest in the foundation, though. This type of self-interest 
would reasonably tend to converge with the Abbey’s, in any 
case. Many of the leading figures from the insurrection had 
close connections to the Abbey, but it might be rash to 
conclude that it was a centre of resistance: after all, Jens 
Eriksen was also a patron and obtained sanctuary there 
during the rebellion, even if his protection ultimately 
proved insufficient.  
• Defenders of libertas ecclesiae we would in principle be 
more likely to find within the cathedral chapters than 
among the bishops, most of whom owed their sees to royal 
patronage. Archbishop Olaus Laurentii, however, had a 
strong personal interest in this aspect, and his successor 
Nicolaus Ragvaldi, although originally considered King 
Eric’s man, seems to have adopted the conciliar viewpoint 
during his extended embassy to the Church Council of 
Basle. Some of the magnates within he archdiocese had 
sided openly with the chapter through testifying to the 
traditional freedom of archiepiscopal elections (Lönnroth 
1934).  
• The internecine struggles between different pretenders of 
the Bjälbo dynasty had each time subdivided the oligarchic 
elite in somewhat different ways, partly – but not 
                                                   
329 As the founder family usually reserved patronage rights for themselves, land 
donated to a prebendary foundation could be put under ecclesiastical protection 
while still remaining an asset in building feudal authority. Certain economic 
revenues and services, e g fines or (hospitality) could also be reserved by the 
founder, leaving only the customary rent to the beneficiary (Norborg 1958:97ff). 
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exclusively – because new men coming to the fore as royal 
aides tended to be assimilated into the higher aristocracy. 
Still, there was a continuous tradition of opposition dating 
back to the Folkung risings of the 13th Century, but as the 
opposition to Royal power started to take the form of 
collective oligarchic state-building, this tradition becomes 
redefined in contrasting ways330.  
The several occasions on which different magnates found 
themselves on opposite sides may have caused a lasting resentment 
or suspiciousness in some of them, but to describe them in terms of 
earlier partisanship is questionable, although loyalties forged during 
one period of strife might well survive longer among partisans on a 
more humble level331, where it might not be necessary to take a 
personal stand in each spectacular changes of alignment.  
The final coalition dedicated to limit Albrecht’s power crystallized 
into the college of testamentarii comprising leading members from 
both sides of the earlier struggles332. What they had in common was 
above all the necessity to safeguard a scope for independent politics 
on a magnate level. To this extent they can be viewed as exponents 
of a regimen politicum, although we might conceive of two or three 
potential variants of magnate opposition, depending on where the 
focus of oppositional power was located:  
• A more highly centralized version based on the functional 
subdivision of executive power through the High Offices of 
                                                   
330 Knut Jonsson, the son of the executed Folkung rebel leader Johan Filipsson, first 
sides with King Birger against his brothers the Dukes: Erik and Valdemar, but 
later joins the former Dukes’ men in forging a new aristocratic state power 
during Magnus Eriksson’s minority, and becomes (as High Steward) the leader of 
this configuration. The name folkungar has later been mistakenly applied to that 
royal dynasty which the true Folkungs opposed (see next note and Lönnroth 
1959). 
331 The designation folkungapartiet, is often used to cover adherents of the 
misnamed “Folkung” (Bjälbo) dynasty versus Albrecht of Mecklenburg, but as the 
period of civil warfare had commenced with an interdynastic strife compounded 
with anti-absolutist insurrection we should be wary of using a term that imply 
adherence to the disrupted dynasty as such. Their may be some substance in 
Bengt Hildebrand’s discernment of a pro-“Folkung” tradition among the gentry 
network in the hundred of Rekarne, which he identified in his study of a 
medieval inheritance process and its consequences (1934), but in that case we 
would need some indications as to what political standpoints the term should 
cover. Maybe a wider-based gentry oligarchism with a stronger sympathy for an 
executive royal power to balance the aristocracy, but as fully committed to 
legalism as the aristocrats? 
332 E g did the group include the highest military commander from each side, king 
Albrecht’s marshal as well as king Magnus’.  
183 
the Realm333. Through the occasional office of Regent(s) it 
may shade imperceptibly over into a dictatorship and a 
more or less open rivalry for the Crown.  
• An only slightly wider but more federal, legalistic version 
based on the office of lagman (‘Lawspeaker’334). In effect, 
this office was usually more or less hereditary, or alternating 
between a few magnate families335. Although the Land Law 
only stipulated that the Lawspeaker had to be the son of a 
bonde (peasant), the word here appears to be used in the 
original sense of ‘resident’ or ‘settled’, reasonably signifying 
that he had to be a native of the province336 and domiciled 
there. If this is the right interpretation of the provision, it 
was quickly attenuated though. In no way, however, should 
we imagine that it signifies a representation of the 
underprivileged: the early lawspeakers constituted the very 
cream of the old magnate stratum, frequently related to or 
intermarrying with the royal or ducal houses of Scandinavia. 
The lagmän were of equal rank although Uppland was the 
most prestigious lagsaga337, and its lawspeaker was primus 
inter pares.  
• We might also consider the possibility of a third version, 
based on the castles and the territories, län (‘fiefs’), 
subordinate to them. The län system is usually considered 
to have been non-feudal, as they were generally not 
inheritable, but tjänstelän – ‘service-fiefs’ – where the 
castellans (slottsherrar) or bailiffs (fogdar) held the castles at 
                                                   
333 Primarily the High Steward (drots) and the Marshal (marsk). Other titles appear 
more occasionally, like Chancellor, Major Domus, Treasurer or Camerarius, 
Justitiarius and Captain of the Realm (rikshövitsman).  
334 Literally ‘law-man’, but in Latin rendered as legifer – ‘law-bearer’. From the 
beginning each of the nine lagmän more or less embodied the law of his 
jurisdictional district, lagsaga, which up to 1350-1389 each had its own respective 
law code. The word lagsaga indicated the territory within which ‘law was spoken’ 
by the lagman; i e his office was to know and pronounce the meaning of the law 
within his province. 
335 Engström 1935:109. See chapter 4 for a more nuanced assessment of hereditary 
lawspeakerships. 
336 The lagsagor more or less corresponded with the old landskap (provinces). 
Almquist (1954:8f) assumes that bonde in this case signified that the lawspeaker 
could not be a lösker karl (vagrant) or the son of a thrall or a freedman. A 
safeguard against such occurrences would seem a bit unwarranted, though. 
337 Not only were the archiepiscopal see of Uppsala and the 8reputedly) traditional 
scene for the election of and homage to the King of Sweden - the meadow of 
Mora - located in Uppland; it was also an amalgamation of three earlier lagsagor : 
Tiundaland, Attundaland, and Fjärdrundaland, and became even further expanded 
when the four northernmost provinces were subsumed under Uppland (Almquist 
1954:12f).  
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the will of the king or regent(s). As the län besides being 
instruments of administration, of tax-collection and of 
military control, were also used as a wage-system, yet 
another variant soon arose: pantlän (mortgage fiefs), which 
were entrusted to creditors as securities for the money 
owed. These were inheritable, in contrast to other ‘fiefs’, 
and thus constituted a form of privatized political power. 
Bo Jonsson’s accumulation of land largely consisted of 
pantlän.  
Queen Margaret and king Eric used the castellanies as service-fiefs, 
attempting to channel the administration of the entire Union into a 
single hierarchical system. While Queen Margaret appears to have 
preferred to move the fief-holders around, Erik appointed long-term 
castellans, and seems to have appointed bailiffs without local ties as 
an alternative safeguard against ‘feudal fragmentation’. The whole 
point of either system was to prevent feudal fragmentation and the 
formation of a sense of collective power, a possible opposition taking 
shape among the highest level of the top-down military 
administration.  
Thus the councillors – all of them private landowners and providers 
of armed contingents – were given no real role in the administration, 
no share in the resources of the Crown, and were thus relegated to 
the role of supplying counsel and consent only – ‘yes-men’ to turn 
King Eric’s phrase the opposite way338. If their demand to be 
enfeoffed with castellanies had been met, a still broader, 
decentralized but strictly hierarchical top-down version of an 
oligarchy may have developed yet another variant of constitutional 
opposition, which would have led to something much more alike 
what we usually think of as feudal conflicts.  
Without a basis in the top-down local administration hierarchy, and 
without the material foundation of ‘privatized state power’ which the 
former testamentarian trust had to give up to Queen Margaret in 
order to get rid of the Mecklenburgers; without any share in the 
centralized executive power, only two sources of political power and 
possible collective opposition remained: the jurisdictional system and 
the church. The jurisdictional system was constructed bottom-up, in 
contrast to the fiscal-military administration. Below the level of the 
nine lawspeakers there were more than 120 häradshövdingar 
(‘hundred sheriffs’) of gentry or magnate extraction, each supported 
by the twelve-man permanant jury of the hundred, staffed by peasant 
                                                   
338  According to the Karlskrönika he declared that he refused to be made the ‘yes-
lord’ of the Council. 
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notables. An opposition basing itself upon the jurisdictional 
administration would be collegial and capable of mustering broadly 
based popular support – just like the ecclesiastic organization. In both 
cases, designation by royal favour might lead to divided loyalties. 
However, one of Erik’s chief weaknesses appears to have been an 
inadequate ability to inspire and retain loyalty among his followers.  
The bishops, writing to the council in Basle, referred to the Council 
as ‘electores et proceres…,’ evidently referring to the lawspeakers’ role 
as an electoral college, like the electors of the Empire or the 
cardinals. Sällström 1951:18 argues that the testamentarii in their 
capacity as lawspeakers possessed a legitimate authority to depose 
and replace a King breaking his oath, according to the kungabalk 
(King’s Code) in the Land Law339. However, although most of the 
members of the executorial college were lawspeakers or other high 
judges, only three or four were actually lawspeakers at the moment 
they pledged their allegiance to Queen Margaret340. 
Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) – an upstart magnate  
How come Nils Gustavsson supported the rebellion? Although he 
was the lawspeaker of Uppland, and thus formally the highest secular 
member of the Council, his family by no means appears to have 
belonged to the higher echelons of the magnate class. All of the 
earlier lawspeakers of Uppland had come from highly aristocratic 
families. Nils Gustavsson’s closest connection to the higher aristocracy 
was through his maternal grandmother, through whom he was a 
cousin of Erik Kettilsson Puke – the Marshal of king Magnus, his son 
Håkan and then of Queen Margaret – who was also a member of the 
testamentarii. It is quite possible that this rather tenuous connection 
had provided enough backing; that his son Erik Puke, who was to 
win fame as Engelbrekt’s brother-at-arms, was named in honor of his 
                                                   
339  Cf Engström 1935:82.  
340 At most five, if we count Sten Stensson (Bielke) as a co-opted member, which 
would have given them a narrow majority. Of course this would not make the 
change of allegiance ‘constitutional’ – a formally legitimate election would have 
required a congregation of delegates from all of the nine lagsagor, each 
delegation headed by a lawspeaker. Actually only seven of them commanded an 
independent vote, as Öland and Värmland were on such occasions included in 
the delegations of their mother lagsagor; only those coterminous with dioceses 
possessed the authority of kingmaking. 
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illustrious relative may suggest a closer personal relationship341 
(maybe as a godfather?), but it may just as well reflect the eagerness 
to overstate claims to distinction typical of a parvenu.  
The Statute of Alsnö had created a new gentry class which must 
have been far wider than the old magnate stratum, and many ‘new 
men’ seem to have been given a chance for advancement during the 
civil wars of the preceding period. Nils Gustavsson appears as a 
knight already in 1400, several years before his first known judiciary 
assignment. Therefore it seems likely that he first rose to prominence 
through military achievements, although he primarily seems to have 
been an administrator – he was one of the very few native Swedes 
endowed with fiefs by king Eric, including most of Northern Sweden, 
while his duties at assizes were often performed by deputy judges. 
Even if the older Erik Puke may have acted as a sponsor for his 
cousin, Nils’ career took off a bit too late – Erik Kettilsson died in 
1396 – to have been due to nepotism alone.  
Nils’ two closest predecessors as lawspeakers of Uppland had both 
been members of the college of executors of Bo Jonsson’s estate: Karl 
Ulfsson av Tofta – considered to have been the most illustrious 
representative of the Swedish aristocracy during the 14th century – 
and Ture Bengtsson (Bielke), who at his death in 1414 had been 
described as the foremost member of the Council in the obituary note 
recorded in the Diary of Vadstena Abbey. The three known 
lawspeakers before these had been closely related to the ancient 
                                                   
341 This kind of ‘double namesakeship’ where a young man is named after a 
prominent relative - usually, though, a maternal grandfather - and given both his 
first name and his surname, would certainly have occurred even more often if 
surnames had been in general use. As it is we can still point to the cases of Bo 
Djure, Hans Kröpelin, Fjellar Pik, Sven Sture, Ragvald Puke and Nils Guse. (Nils 
[Nilsson] Guse, the younger, is better known under the alternative designation of 
Guse Nilsson). Sten Sture the younger might be seen as a somewhat parallel case 
although he – like Erik Puke! - was not closely related to the older regent of the 
same name, and besides he already had a claim to the same surname through his 
grandfather. The political motivation for the namesakeship is obvious in his case, 
though. 
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lineage of the Earls of Sweden342 traditionally but erroneously 
designated the Folkung dynasty. St Bridget’s father Birger, whose wife 
belonged to the ‘lawspeaker branch’ of this dynasty, Bridget’s brother 
Israel and Magnus Gregersson, illegitimate great great grandson of 
Earl Birger, the founder of the royal branch. Karl Ulfsson was also 
descended from a sideline of the Folkungs through his grandmother, 
and his marriage to a daughter of Israel Birgersson tied him even 
closer into the highest aristocracy. Ture Bengtsson’s maternal 
grandmother was St Bridget’s sister, and thus all of the earlier 
lawspeakers were in some way related to the first lawspeaker of 
Uppland, as well as to the Earls and the Kings.  
In this company Nils Gustavsson’s ancestry seems decidedly minor 
league, and with the following lawspeakers we return to the highest 
aristocracy: Ture Stensson (Bielke) who is the grandson of Karl 
Ulfsson as well as of Ture Bengtsson; then Bengt Jönsson 
(Oxenstierna) whose family is just rising to real prominence343, but 
whose grandmothers were both daughters of lawspeakers belonging 
to the ancient lineages (Aspenäs and Sparre av Tofta; the latter – Karl 
                                                   
342 Earl or Jarl was in early Medieval Sweden an Office of the Realm rather than a 
noble rank. Though not directly inheritable it seems to have been in practice 
confined to one single family or clan, intermarrying with the two alternating 
Swedish royal houses as well as with Danish and Norwegian royalty. The Earls 
tended to take over de facto rule, much like the holders of the office of major 
domus in the Frankish realm, and, like these, they eventually assumed royal title 
for their dynasty. The last of the Earls of Sweden (the only later Jarl known in 
Sweden, Erengisle Suneson, got his title through marrying the daughter of the 
last Norwegian Earl of Orkney), Birger Jarl, ruled Sweden as a regent for his 
under-age son, king Valdemar. The non-royal sidelines of the Bjälbo dynasty 
(traditionally called the Folkung dynasty, although this seems to have been a 
party name used by the oppositon against royal centralization Cf Lönnroth 1959) 
came to form some of the most prestigious early aristocratic lineages of Sweden. 
One branch descended from Earl Birger’s elder brother Bengt, bishop Bengt of 
Linköping, became lawspeakers of Östergötland, and another from his illegitimate 
son Gregers Birgersson. Other branches descend from Earl Knut’s daughter 
Cecilia (the so-called Aspenäs lineage), from Earl Karl the Deaf’s grandson Ulf 
(the family known as ‘Ulv’ –¨ Wolf – from their coat of arms, showing a wolf 
regardant), or his granddaughter Ingeborg (ancestress of the family Sparre av 
Tofta).  
343 The emphasis Hans Gillingstam puts on Bengt’s title of Upplandslagman as 
marking a new level of prominence for his family, puts Nils Gustafsson’s career 
into its proper perspective. Bengt Jönsson’s father, uncle and paternal 
grandfather had been knights, his uncle, uncle-in-law and both of his 
grandfathers councillors. His uncle had been a member of Bo Jonsson’s 
testamentarii, together with his two uncle-in-laws, his half-uncle had been co-
opted into the trust and taken part in their offering the Swedish crown to 
Margareta, and the most illustrious member of that circle – Karl Ulfsson of Tofta – 
had become the guardian  of Bengt and his brother Nils when their father died. 
Even from such a position the lawspeakership marked a very significant advance. 
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Ulfsson’s uncle – was a High Steward as well). If we instead compare 
Nils Gustavsson to his contemporaneous colleagues from the other 
lagsagor, we find that Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta) of 
Södermanland and Karl (Tordsson) Bonde of Västmanland are both 
second generation344 lawspeakers with illustrious pedigrees; on a 
similar level we find Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag) of Närke, whose 
great grandfather was a second generation lawspeaker, and who 
belonged to a most exalted lineage. All of these three were also sons 
of Bo Jonsson’s testamentarii.  
Arvid Svan of Tiohärad, Björn Nilsson (Vinge) of Värmland, Olof 
Ragvaldsson (Lindö lineage) of Östergötland, and possibly also Knut 
Jonsson (Tre Rosor) of Västergötland, may at a first glance seem more 
comparable to Nils Gustavsson - relatively ‘new’ men rising from local 
gentry families to magnate status345. Although Arvid Svan’s career may 
have started more or less from scratch, that of Nils Gustafsson must 
be reckoned yet more spectacular: it endowed him with the highest 
secular rank available at a time when the High Offices of the Realm 
had fallen into desuetude. During the conflict over the 
                                                   
344 Linton’s contention that Nils’ father Erengisle Nilsson was a third generation 
lawspeaker, is erroneous (his grandson, Erengisle Nilsson the younger, was). He 
also misrepresents Erengisle’s family as belonging to the house of ‘Natt och Dag’ 
(Cf n345 below) instead of ‘Hammersta lineage’, which is the correct modern 
usage. This confusion is probably due to the clumsy expression ‘Natt och Dag på 
längden’ (‘Night and Day by pale’) used by early-modern genealogists to 
describe their blazon, resembling a vertical transposition of that of Natt och Dag, 
but of different tints.  
345 Maybe this reflects an attempt by King Eric to undermine the positions of the 
traditional aristocracy, or maybe it’s just a sign of increasing social mobility. Knut 
Jonsson’s background is probably underrated here. According to the old and 
often unreliable rolls of lawspeakers in Stiernman (SGH), his grandfather had also 
been a lawspeaker of Västergötland, but in the modern standard handbooks, 
Almquist1954 and 1955, the older Knut Jonsson is not mentioned. Almquist, 
however, does not list any other lawspeaker for the years reported by 
Stiernman, and as Knut Jonsson the older had married the daughter of an earlier 
lagman (SK 103f) – a common background for new entrants – Stiernman might 
have been right after all. Even if he wasn’t, the younger Knut Jonsson’s third 
generation descent from the distinguished aristocrat Bengt Hafridsson puts his 
social backround on a distinctly higher level than Nils Gustafsson’s. Arvid Svan 
appears to have been of a much more humble origin. From the entry in SK 298 it 
does not even appear obvious that his father had been a gentleman; in 
Härenstam 1946:316 his father-in-law is identified as a local gentryman appearing 
as a co-judge with lawspeaker and bishop in a Royal inquiry court /räfsteting/ in 
1414). Olof Ragvaldsson had succeeded his father Ragvald Filipsson as 
häradshövding in Siende before he became lagman in Östergötland, and his 
grandfather had been a knight (ÄSF64). Through his mother he was related to 
the aristocratic lineage of Aspenäs, which would put him on the same level as 
Knut Jonsson.  
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archiepiscopate of Uppsala, it is doubtful whether any Swede can be 
said to have outranked him, although all bishops were routinely listed 
first in Council documents. In the absence of a functioning 
archbishop, his only serious rival would have been Bishop Knut 
Bosson of Linköping, whose seniority, aristocratic birth346 and position 
as visitator of Vadstena Abbey augmented the traditional distinction of 
his see.  
That Engelbrekt so soon obtained the support of Nils Gustavsson 
and his son Erik Puke has been interpreted as a sign that he from the 
beginning must have had contacts ‘among the highest aristocracy’ (EL 
in Sc1995; cf BH 1935, GC in SBL). In the light of the comparison 
above, we may view such assertions from a different angle: 
Engelbrekt’s spectacular career from a mixed miner-burgher-
gentryman background to the Captaincy of the Realm, is rivalled and 
foreshadowed by that of Nils Gustavsson.  
Felicitous marital connections may have helped him on his way, 
but may also be symptoms of his rise rather than causes. His first 
marriage347 had strengthened his connections with the testamentarial 
league through marrying a niece of its least distinguished member 
(Magnus Kase). His sister’s marriage, which may have occurred 
earlier, provided him with a link to the lawspeaker dynasties: She 
married a cousin of Magnus Gregersson, belonging to the same 
(illegitimate) sideline of the royal house (ÄSF45). 
Nils’ son Erik Puke348, ambitiously christened after the Marshal of 
King Magnus, King Håkan and Queen Margaret, took a further step 
into the inner circles of aristocratic power through marrying the 
                                                   
346 Brilioth 1925:193 observes that his admission fee to the University of Prague 
equalled that of a Count of Mansfeld registered the same year. His family, later 
known as Natt och Dag (‘Night and Day’ – from their blazon: per fess or and 
azure), is considered ‘the oldest noble house of purely Swedish extraction’ (SBL).  
347 His second, (Gillingstam 1952:64f, n349) or maybe third (Hildebrand 1935:76) 
marriage was to a niece of the lawspeaker Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag) from 
Närke. She was thus a cousin of Engelbrekt’s murderer-to-be Magnus Bengtsson. 
348  The protracted controversy regarding Erik Puke’s identity – whether the rebel 
leader was really Nils Gustafsson’s son, or identical with another aristocrat, Erik 
Pedersson Puke – seems to have been closed by the thorough investigation in 
Hildebrand 1934:53-9 (but cf Olofsson 1962 who appears unconvinced). 
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daughter of Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta), lawspeaker of 
Södermanland – the home province of Nils Gustavsson349. 
Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta) – a link to the past 
Nils Erengisleson of Hammersta was one of the central members of 
the council and the son of Herr Erengisle Nilsson the older, who had 
been a member of Bo Jonsson’s testamentarii, one of the magnates 
who pledged the Swedish crown to Queen Margaret in 1388, and one 
of the signatories of the unification letter at Kalmar in 1397. Nils had 
himself attended the Union negotiations, and when his father died in 
1406, Nils soon succeeded him as lawspeaker of Södermanland and 
as a judge in the Royal Inquiry Court for the same province, passing 
verdicts on ‘illegal’ enfeoffments and donations from king Albrecht’s 
reign, together with his uncle Sten Bengtsson (also a member of the 
executorial college and a signatory of the unification letter). Through 
his mother Margareta Bengtsdotter – a sister of two of the signatories 
– he was also related to St Bridget, who was her grandaunt, and after 
the death of his first wife350 he married the granddaughter of Bo 
Jonsson. 
As I have mentioned above, the Swedish delegates to the 
negotiations with king Eric had appealed to the contents of the 
unification letter, and among those who could rightly refer to this as 
the work of their ‘forefathers and parents’, Nils Erengisleson was the 
foremost. His father and his two uncles had all signed the letter351.   
Despite this massive aristocratic background, Nils Erengisleson 
seemed to have belonged (Fritz 1973:56f) – with Algot Magnusson 
                                                   
349 That he became lawspeaker in Uppland while his manor was located in 
Södermanland reinforces the impression that he was put there for administrative 
purposes, perhaps primarily because the whole of Norrland (the northern parts of 
Sweden) sorted under the lagsaga of Uppland. This appointment would thus have 
been an early example of the late medieval appointment of out-of-province 
magnates as lawspeakers, described in LDS p9 as a practice through which the 
Crown attempted to circumvent the local nomination procedure. Maybe king 
Eric’s behaviour at the appointment of High Steward and Marshal according to the 
Karlskrönika gives us a clue to how this was achieved. When the Council 
presented three nominees to the Stewardship, he rejected the candidates and in 
his turn presented three nominees of more mature age for the council to choose 
among. Using similar turntable tactics against the lawspeaker nomination boards 
may have yielded the desired effect.  
350  The mother of Erik Puke’s wife Birgitta. Her descent was equally distinguished: 
she was a sixth generation descendant of Earl Birger. 
351  His first father-in-law Magnus Håkansson was one of the 21 signatories to the 
letter endorsing the offer of the Crown to Margareta, sealing the document as 
number four, in advance of four of the executors.   
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(Sture II352 – water lily leaves), Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) and Bengt 
Stensson (Natt och Dag) – to the group of trade-oriented 
administrators essential to Erik’s economic and administrative policy 
(Lönnroth 1934, 1940; Fritz 1972, 1973). According to recent findings 
cited by Rahmquist (1996), he may have been the first man to exploit 
the later so famous mining district around Dannemora (the original 
source of ‘Oreground iron’). This of course strengthens the economic 
interpretation of the ‘Engelbrekt rebellion’, as one of the key 
aristocratic allies of the rebel leader may have shared his trading 
interests. On the other hand the economic motive might no longer 
depend upon widespread trade disturbances in the Dalecarlian 
mining districts; it could have been a private, factional motive uniting 
the rebel leaders rather than a general motive underlying the popular 
insurrection353. 
Another councillor who seems to have been closely connected to 
Nils Erengisleson’s circle, was Gotskalk Bengtsson, belonging to an 
ancient sideline of the Earls of Sweden, known from their blazon as 
Ulv or ‘tillbakaseende ulv’ (wolf regardant). His father Bengt Filipsson 
had died in 1383 (LHS), and had therefore not been involved in the 
testamentarial dispositions of Bo Jonsson, although he seems to have 
been one of the High Steward’s closest associates; according to 
Engström, ‘one of the most decided and influential spokesmen of the 
Birgittine party ... appearing time and again in close co-operation 
with Bo Jonsson’354. His third wife was Cecilia Ulfsdotter, a daughter 
of St Bridget, and although Gotskalk had been born in the second 
marriage, he must have become fatherless so early as to have been 
brought up by his step-mother, and thus also as a nephew of Birger 
Ulfsson, one of the leaders of Bo Jonsson’s testamentarii355. Gotskalk 
appears together with Nils Erengisleson as a signatory of the 
coronation letter in 1397, and as one of the witnesses testifying to the 
traditional freedom of archiepiscopal elections in 1432. He also signs 
                                                   
352 SMV 451 – carrying three water-lily leaves in their escutcheon, in contrast to the 
lineage Sture I (SMV 340 - a ram’s head). 
353 In this case, it might weaken Larsson’s argument (1984:131f and later) against 
the trade-motive interpretation, as private interests could have been threatened 
by Eric’s trade policies even in the absence of a general slump.  
354 Engström 1935:60 (my translation). Cf also 1935:32, 52-55, 60, 63f, 117, and 
219. 
355 Gotskalk’s mother-in-law Katarina Glysingsdotter was the sister of Birger’s wife 
and also the widow of his brother Karl Ulfsson av Ulvåsa. Another connection 
between the families went through Gottskalk’s grandmother Gödelin von Kyren, 
whose cousin had married St Bridget’s daughter Katarina, who was also 
considered a saint.  
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the second withdrawal of allegiance letter from Arboga jan 11, 1436356, 
and appears in the ‘Engelbrekt Chronicle’ as one of the negotiators 
with the castellan of Stockholm. 
THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION 
The outbreak of the rebellion 
How are we to interpret the origin of the rebellion? Even if there 
are signs that Engelbrekt at least would have been acquainted357 with 
Nils Gustavsson’s family through his own (or his brother’s) 
landholding in the hundred of Västerrekarne, it is by no means 
necessary to assume a premeditated insurrection plan to explain the 
course of events. That Engelbrekt acted as spokesman for the 
Dalecarlians in their complaints against Jens Eriksen; that the lack of 
redress made the plaintiffs march on the castle; that the King referred 
the matter to the Council; that they judged in favour of the litigants 
and replaced Jens Eriksen with Count Hans von Eberstein358; that the 
King refused to countenance the shift of castellans, and that this 
rekindled the rebellion, is by no means such an implausible chain of 
events that we have to introduce supplementary hypotheses. The 
chronicle refers to a rumour that king Eric planned to send them an 
even worse bailiff in place of Jens Eriksen, as sparking off the second 
rising.  
This certainly sounds contrived, but we do not have to speculate as 
to what kinds of rumours might have been circulating, and why - the 
king’s refusal to accept the verdict would appear to be a good 
enough motive to resume the struggle, and also as so humiliating a 
treatment of his Councillors, especially the lawspeakers, that their 
support of the rising seems quite consistent. That Melchior Görtz 
surrenders the castellany and that Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) takes 
                                                   
356 Carlsson 1934:22; also cf Kumlien 1933:51, although the list of names there is 
incomplete; moreover he assumes without motivation that ‘maybe also 
Engelbrekt and Erik Puke’ took part.  
357  Sealing the same documents of land transactions, however, only confirms a 
business connection which may be completely ephemeral. That Engelbrekt’s seal 
appears on the same document as Erik Puke’s brother’s is no evidence that their 
brotherhood-in-arms antedated the insurrection - Engelbrekt had once sealed a 
document together with Jens Eriksen as well. 
358  Who appointed Melchior Görtz to hold the castle as his subcaptain. That the 
Council chose a non-Swedish, loyal follower of King Eric as Jens Eriksen’s 
replacement, shows that they took pains to evade any impression of oppositional 
behaviour, and tried to minimize the political implications of the verdict. 
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over seems perfectly logical. Görtz commands the castle only on 
behalf of Count Hans, who has been appointed through a verdict by 
a court led by the foremost lawspeaker, Nils Gustavsson. According 
to the chronicle, Görtz makes no resistance, but defers his surrender 
until the evening, when Nils Gustavsson and other ‘good men’ 
appear, rallied there by Engelbrekt. Engelbrekt’s leading role in the 
seizure of the castle thus seems a bit undermotivated. Maybe he 
personally forced the course of events, as the chronicle depicts the 
situation, or maybe the offended judge just chose to uphold his own 
verdict, thus legitimizing the insurrectious levy by his appearance.  
That Nils took over outside the bounds of his own lagsaga, rather 
than the regional lawspeaker, Karl (Tordsson) Bonde, may be an 
argument in favour of Engelbrekt’s leading role at this moment. 
Conversely, it might indicate that the authoritative leadership rested 
with Sir Nils. Other alternatives are that Karl Bonde did not want or 
dare to take this stand in defiance of the King, or that he was absent. 
Karl appears as captain of Raseborg in Finland on at least one 
occasion in 1412 (SD 1567; cf Fritz 1973:139f ), a post which he seems 
to have inherited from his father Tord Bonde, as well as his 
lawspeakership, and which he later resumed if he had not upheld it 
all along (FMU 336 for 1439; Gillingstam 1952:221). It is thus possible 
that he had had further undertakings colliding with his post as 
lagman in Västmanland and Dalecarlia. His relation to the King may 
also have been better than that of most of the councillors. In this 
aspect he would have resembled his uncle Christiern Nilsson (Vasa), 
to whom he was closely allied. Both of them were also sons-in-law of 
powerful Danish councillors. An indication that king Eric counted him 
as a loyal follower, is that the King in 1435 send him to Kastelholm to 
replace Erik Puke, who refused to accept his dismissal and threw 
Bonde in the tower (Gillingstam 1952:212; FMU 2180).  
It is of course impossible to guess, whether Karl Bonde was 
bypassed as castellan of Västerås because he was considered 
untrustworthy, or if he sided with the King because he felt offended. 
Yet another possible interpretation is that the case may have been 
conceived to lie under the collective jurisdiction of the lawspeakers 
and/or the councillors, as konungsdomhavande (judging on behalf of 
the King), and that upholding the verdict thus became a matter for 
the ‘national’ (regnal) level rather than the regional. It is also possible 
that all of these explanations apply, or some of them.  
Most important, however, must be the convergence of interests 
between Engelbrekt and Nils at this point of the rebellion; we should 
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not underestimate the capacity for independent action from either of 
them. 
Table 7: The ‘Engelbrekt rebellion’ first campaign. 
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Table 8: Engelbrekt rebellion, second campaign. 
 
 
The peasants  
What of the peasants’ role? During the first Dalecarlian rising they 
choose Engelbrekt to be their captain, and march on the castle of 
Västerås, threatening to burn it down; then the Council replaces Jens 
Eriksen, and the levy dissolves. 
During the second local rising, which is the one we have discussed 
above, and which sparked off the full rebellion, the peasants burn 
down the castle of Borganäs and make their way to Köping where 
the castellan flees to his principal castle of Stegeborg. Only at this 
point is Engelbrekt mentioned again, where he ‘risks his life for the 
realm’ and attacks the castle of Köping, burning it down. This sounds 
like a more or less spontaneous rising meeting with an initial success 
that attracts the earlier captain to return to the side of the peasants. 
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That an attack burning down a castle deserted by its commander 
should be described as mortally dangerous seems exaggerated. A 
more reasonable interpretation of this phrase, is that through taking 
command of the attack, Engelbrekt stakes his life on the success of 
the rebellion. This is the point of no return, and that it is done for the 
sake of ‘the realm’ implies a wider perspective than just demanding 
redress of the original grievances359. Through extending the attack to 
other castellans, the peasants had defied royal authority altogether. 
Did they enter upon this attack spontaneously, or was Engelbrekt 
(with or without predeterminate backing) the driving force in the 
extension, as historians have habitually assumed (Carlsson 
1941:259f.)? 
The first burned castle 
Nothing in the chronicle intimates that Engelbrekt took part in the 
burning of the first castle, Borganäs. The Venetian commander 
Giovanni Franco’s retreat to his main stronghold of Stegeborg is 
explicitly credited to the peasants’ marching into Västmanland, 
threatening his fortress at Köping. Engelbrekt is after this mentioned 
as a potential threat:  
‘he [Franco] meant to build [fortify] it [Stegeborg] so 
that, Engelbrekt would it never get’.  
This may be formulated in hindsight, or it may indicate that 
Engelbrekt’s involvement followed immediately upon the arrival of 
the peasants. A third alternative is that Engelbrekt’s participation was 
implied by mentioning the peasants, as they had chosen him to be 
their captain during the earlier march to Västerås.  It is of course 
possible to assume this, but throughout the remainder of the 
chronicle, Engelbrekt is mentioned as the acting subject whenever he 
is present. As the norm seems to be to imply the peasants when 
mentioning their leader, and as the peasants are mentioned so rarely 
that this appears to be confined to cases when they are acting 
without an ‘official’ leader, I can only conclude that Engelbrekt did 
not take part in the burning of Borganäs, and joined up with the 
peasants at the siege of Köping or probably on the road there – his 
presumed domicile in Engelsberg (Larsson 1984:122) lay more than 
halfway on the road towards Köping. There is no reason to assume 
                                                   
359 If this is Engelbrekt’s original perspective, or if it is ascribed to him in retrospect 
by the chronicle, is one of the insoluble controversies surrounding the rebellion. 
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that the chronicle understates Engelbrekt’s role, at least not until Karl 
Knutsson starts to appear as his rival. 
When Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) takes charge of the castle of 
Västerås in the subsequent episode this appears as an effort to restore 
legitimate authority, and Engelbrekt’s taking command of the levy as 
an effort to provide a spontaneous rising with leadership and 
direction. Both of these men had high ambitions, and Nils’ son Erik 
Puke maybe even higher360. The next section of the chronicle shows 
him organizing risings in Norrland and Finland, according to the text 
following a summons from Engelbrekt, who offered him the 
command over all of Norrland. However, as acting castellan of 
Korsholm (on his father’s behalf) he already commanded the 
northernmost parts of Norrland. His subordinate role in relation to 
Engelbrekt has no real foundation outside the chronicle, and as he is 
to become Karl Knutsson’s most dangerous rival after Engelbrekt’s 
death, his independent position as a rebel leader beside Engelbrekt361 
is consistently underplayed in the text.   
The bishops 
The conflict over the archbishopric of Uppsala had left the Swedish 
bishops humiliated whether or not they sympathized with Olaus 
Laurentii’s hard line in the struggle for canonical election rights. A 
few aristocratic sympathizers had openly supported the chapter, but 
though the King’s autocratic handling of the matter had caused 
resentment, open challenge had been silenced. The case against Jens 
Eriksen, though, had escalated into a full-scale denunciation of the 
Swedish jurisdictional system from the king. Already deprived of a 
share in executive power through the vacancy of the High Offices of 
the Realm, and largely disconnected from the fiscal/military 
administration, the Swedish council aristocracy were faced with the 
threat of being pushed back to merely local or regional prominence – 
a sort of ‘feudal fragmentation’ not of royal power, but of the 
collective oligarchic power accumulated by the Swedish aristocracy 
during more than a century of struggles between rival contenders for 
                                                   
360  The later section of Karlskrönikan usually referred to as the ‘marshal chronicle’ 
(Marskkrönikan) accuses him of royal ambitions. As the main objective of that 
section is to justify Karl Knutsson’s gradual elimination of his rivals it is of course 
not to be trusted; that Puke had no intention to stand back to Karl Knutsson 
seems obvious though.  
361 Eric of Pomerania tends to single them out and lump them together as 
‘Engelbrekt and Erik Puke’ which shows that Engelbrekt is the most important 
enemy, but also that Puke is an enemy on a comparable level. 
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the crown. The only higher-level positions of public power still under 
magnate control were the lawspeakerships, in general only 
possessing a regional authority, but collectively upholding the 
important function of electing the King.  
Eric’s arguments in the archiepiscopal struggle showed that he 
considered himself to be hereditary king of Sweden, and his 
appointment policy for castellans/bailiffs showed that he was 
determined to circumvent electional procedure through binding the 
castellans in fealty to himself and to his designated successor. As long 
as this ‘overlord in expectancy’ was the apparently quite popular 
queen Philippa362, this may not have seemed too dangerous, but 
already long before her death in 1430 Eric started to insert his cousin 
Duke Bogislaus of Pomerania, who had no Scandinavian ancestry 
whatsoever, into this oath of ‘second or third instance fealty’ (cf 
Christensen 1980:181-7). As control over the castle-fiefs had been the 
device through which Bo Jonsson and his testamentarii undercut the 
sovereignty of king Albrekt and transferred it to Queen Margaret, the 
danger must have been quite apparent at least to men like bishop 
Knut, the only surviving member of the testamentarii, and Nils 
Erengisleson (Hammersta), Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag), Laurens 
Ulvson (Aspenäs), Sture Algotsson (Sture II)363, Karl (Tordsson) 
Bonde, and Knut Karlsson (Örnfot), the oldest and most high-ranking 
among the sons of the others. Of course this group cannot be 
expected to have inherited their fathers’ alliance, as its material 
foundation - the collection of castle securities - had disappeared. It’s 
quite reasonable to expect, though, that something of the traditions 
and experience of strategic political manoeuvring and of the tactical 
methods developed through a century of political strife had been 
transmitted to this generation.  
                                                   
362 The sister of King Henry V of England, Philippa’s extensive dower was located 
entirely in Sweden, which brought her into closer contact with the Swedish 
council, especially on the numerous occasions when she acted as Regent in the 
absence of her husband. Her chancellor was the future bishop Thomas of 
Strängnäs (Schück in RBR). 
363 Also known as Anund Sture. He died before the rising, but his brother Gustav 
Algotsson took part in the revolutionary council of 1435, and played a more 
prominent role in the following conflicts. Gustavs son Sten Sture (the older) 
eventually became a regent, ruling Sweden for the unprecedented duration of 27 
consecutive years. (Magnus Eriksson’s reign of over 40 years appears to be 
much longer, but the time from his majority to his son’s first rebellion is at most 
25 years). 
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The role of the Lawspeakers 
When the councillors, and the most prominent lawspeakers among 
them, found themselves in the position of a court of appeal when the 
King referred the case of Jens Eriksen to them, they acted with great 
circumspection; still the King refused to sanction their verdict. To 
accept this affront would have been to yield from the only positions 
of independent power remaining to them – as interpreters of the 
Swedish Land Law, which was binding also to the King. If we believe 
their own statement in the negotiations with king Eric in Kalmar 1436, 
they had done their utmost to make him resume the responsibility 
and judge the case himself364. The only alternative left open to them, 
short of rebellion, would have been to revoke their own verdict and 
abandon any pretense to mediate between the king and his 
oppositional subjects. During this crisis of authority, the peasants 
burn down the castle of Borganäs.  
Did the councillors opt for rebellion already at this point, only after 
Engelbrekt had assumed leadership of a full-scale rebellion against 
the foreign bailiffs, or only after Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) had made 
his choice between his two incompatible roles: as the most high-
ranking among king Eric’s Swedish fiefholders, and as the foremost 
representative of the Swedish jurisdictional system? In any case Nils 
Gustavsson’s open defiance of his liege lord marked a decisive step 
in the rising, as it provided the rebellion with legitimacy. Were the 
other lawspeakers behind him in taking this step, or did they only 
join later? At least one lawspeaker can with high probability be 
assumed to have taken part in this decision.  
Nils Erengisleson’s role 
He was Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta), the lawspeaker of 
Södermanland, where the peasants from Rekarne had already 
attacked Gripsholm (which was burned down by its fleeing captain), 
and who was entrusted the captaincy of the first castle surrendered to 
Engelbrekt after Västerås365. Nils Erengisleson was, as I have argued, 
together with bishop Knut Bosson (Natt och Dag) the most important 
link to the group of magnates who had offered the throne to Queen 
Margaret, and who had attempted, without (full) success to wrest 
binding declarations from her concerning the union. He was also 
                                                   
364  See the quote below, page 201. 
365  Which, as I argue, would have been surrendered to Nils Gustavsson rather than 
to Engelbrekt. 
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connected to Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) through the marriage of his 
daughter Birgitta to Erik Puke, and through their common residence 
in the province of Södermanland.  
He was also one of the guests at Nils Gustavsson’s third(?) 
wedding366. Herman Schück (1994) has argued that the conspicuous 
attention paid to Nils Gustavsson, Erik Puke and Nils Erengisleson in 
the Engelbrekt Chronicle, and also to the Stockholm castellan Hans 
Kröpelin, is due to the fact that the presumed author, the Council’s 
scrivener Johan Fredebern, owned an estate in Södermanland as well 
as a house in Stockholm, where he and Hans Kröpelin were both 
members of the Guild of Saint Gertrude. A simpler explanation might 
be that the three Södermanland residents really did play such 
important roles in the rebellion, that the attention is justified.  
Erik Puke’s prominence in the rising is unquestionable, and so is 
Nils Gustavsson’s – at least as the first magnate to openly side with 
the rebels. If my interpretation of the surrender of Västerås Castle is 
correct, he should have deserved even more attention, and the same 
thing goes for Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta), who has put his seal 
under a greater number of important documents from this 
insurrection, than has any other participant, except perhaps bishop 
Thomas. That Kröpelin, although an adversary, is treated with such 
an evident sympathy may owe more to Fredebern’s personal contacts. 
Kröpelin’s importance, as a constant mediator in the conflict, is borne 
out by the documents as well.  
I would find it harder to motivate why the unsuccessful attempt to 
storm the castle of Stegeborg is described in such detail, paying 
meticulous attention to every gentleman involved in the attempt. Here 
the ‘public relations’ aspect of the chronicle seems much more in 
evidence – everone is entitled to his own fifteen minutes of fame. 
Alternatively, Karl Knutsson (Bonde) – who appears for the first time 
in this episode – played such a modest role in the attack, that 
everyone who was higher in command had to be fitted in as well. 
The second Darlecarlian rising 
The cause of the rekindled rebellion remains obscure. Jens (Jösse) 
Eriksen had already been replaced by Count Hans von Eberstein – or 
rather by the Count’s vice-bailiff Melchior Görtz – although a referral 
from Hanseatic witnesses present at the treaty of Kalmar in 1436 
quotes the Swedish councillors as reminding king Eric of his refusal 
                                                   
366 Hildebrand 1935:76; according to Gillingstam 1952:64f, n349 it was probably his 
second wedding. 
201 
to heed their plea to come to Sweden and judge between Jens 
Eriksen and the Dalecarlians367. It appears as though King Eric had 
refused to confirm the replacement. The Engelbrekt Chronicle reports 
that the peasants had been prepared to burn down the castle in 
1433(?) and that only when the Council had removed Jens were they 
appeased. (EK 54)  
A possible interpretation: According to the chronicle, the peasants’ 
complaints to the King were left unheeded (EK 49 claims that Eric just 
sent the letters of grievances to the bailiffs, and that they responded 
by punishing the peasants for their complaints), and when they chose 
Engelbrekt as their spokesman and sent him to complain in person to 
the King, the case was referred to the Council (50-2). Their verdict 
went against Jens Eriksen, but the king refused to confirm it (52-3), 
and then the peasants rose. In the Hanseatic referral the councillors 
said that they had written to the King and implored him to remove 
Jens ‘lest that things would come to worse’, which the King had 
refused, and ‘when the commonalty and Engelbrekt’, who had won 
the suit, concluded that justice could not take its course because of 
the King’s veto, they stormed and won the castle of Borganäs and 
went on towards Västerås.  
Then councillors of Sweden came to Copenhagen where also Jens 
Eriksen was present, and they fell down on their knees and asked the 
King, that he for the sake of the death, that God has suffered, should 
come into the country and hear, who was to blame, and avert the ruin 
of the realm and himself; what he said to that, he should himself 
remember.368    
Unfortunately, we never get to hear the King’s answer, but it must 
have been negative. In general, only the Danish historians seem have 
devoted any serious attention to this problem. Erslev draws the fairly 
obvious conclusion that the Council must have replaced Jens Eriksen 
before seeking authorization by the King369. If that is so, the King 
must certainly have been offended by this slight to his authority, and 
would have connected it with the clerical refusal to accept his right to 
                                                   
367 HR I 606 §5 (in Low German); the passage in question is translated into Danish 
in Erslev 477fn6, and into Swedish by Carlsson 1932:245. 
368  Loc cit; my translation, based on the three versions cited above. 
369 Erslev 1901:478 n6; that Christensen 1980:206f does not take this into account, 
leaves his hypothesis open to the criticism posed by Bøgh 1985:137 n15. 
Neither Carlsson, Kumlien, or Lönnroth seems to have bothered about clarifying 
this point (cf, however, Wichman 1937 and Gillingstam 1952. Larsson 1984:129ff 
deeper into the problem, but slides over into a general discussion of underlying 
causes without focusing the conflict of authority). 
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appoint bishops. In the latter case he did not hesitate to force his 
way, and it is hardly likely that he would have been more tolerant 
about giving way to peasant rebels. Thus the rapid endorsement of 
Engelbrekt’s rebellion from leading councillors seems to have been 
prepared by the King’s refusal to let them handle matters he himself 
had referred to them in the way they themselves found best, and the 
renewed rising supposedly caused by a rumour that Eric meant to 
send the Dalecarlians an even worse bailiff sounds less contrived. 
According to the chronicle, the peasants expected Jens Eriksen to be 
punished, and when this did not happen, a rumour that Eric was 
going to send them an even worse bailiff made the peasants rise 
anew370. (EK p54)  
As Lars-Olof Larsson points out (1984:131), this does not have the 
ring of a convincing explanation, unless the rumour had been planted 
by determined propagandists. However, it was clear that the first 
rising had been made ineffectual, if the King did not sanction the 
removal of Jens Eriksen. From the King’s point of view, he would 
have to make a new replacement; Count Hans was a fellow 
Pomeranian, and probably as loyal371 a representative as he could 
wish for, but to let him remain in command would be to accept the 
verdict of the council, which he apparently had denounced. 
Reinstating Jens Eriksen would have been the obvious way to rebuff a 
council which to him must have appeared as too spineless when 
facing open sedition.  
However, Jens had evidently not been successful enough in 
keeping control over this unruly region. If king Eric planned to 
appoint a new bailiff he would have to find someone capable of 
putting an end to insurrections and resuming effective collection of 
taxes. From the peasant point of view, such a bailiff would indeed be 
even worse than Jens Eriksen. If the peasants had been informed of 
                                                   
370  Roughly translated (I have tried to retain as much as possible of the wording 
and the simplicity of the rhyme): 
The peasants in Dala waited tidings to know 
that justice would over Juss Eriksson go 
When they did learn for true  
that the King this did not do  
they feared, as was them said  
that the king in his full mind had 
them a worse bailiff to get 
thus they would again out set 
371  Efficiency may be another matter: the second march on Västerås was caused by 
Jens Eriksen’s renewed attempts to collect the tax. That the same reason is not 
cited for the third rising, shows that Hans - or his subcaptain Melchior Görtz, 
who, through his Swedish mother, may have had relatives among the rebels (Cf 
Hildebrand in SBL) - had avoided confrontation on this point. 
203 
the King’s reaction to the Council’s verdict, it should have been clear 
to them that the rising had failed, and that the King was prepared to 
enforce his will. If they were not prepared to recant and acquiesce, 
the normal fate of rebellious medieval peasants would probably be 
theirs, and rumours of king Eric’s massacre of  the inhabitants of the 
Holsatian island of Femern had certainly reached them372. Engelbrekt, 
who had identified himself with their cause, would also have had 
reasons to worry, and the lawspeakers would lose authority in the 
eyes of their communities as well as in the King’s. In this case it 
might be more prudent to attack than to await, as the apparently 
effortless capture of Västerås Castle confirms.  
As to the atrocities attributed to Jens Eriksen, they are usually taken 
to be conventional stereotypes – smoking peasants in chimneys, 
harnessing pregnant women before haycarts – and a general opinion 
is that he was probably no worse (or not much worse) than most 
other bailiffs (Lönnroth 1934:83, Rosén 1964:285, Larsson 1984:116f). 
Judging from the more general grievances of the rebels as well as 
from the chronicle’s depiction of early stages of the rebellion, the 
collection of taxes was the most sensitive point. As that was a primary 
function of the bailiffs, this is hardly surprising.  
The difference between tolerable, bad, and atrocious bailiffs in this 
respect can hardly be due to the level of taxation – new and heavy 
duties necessitated by Eric’s war efforts were imposed everywhere – 
but rather to the methods of exaction, in particular the handling of 
arrears, distraint practices, and the treatment of defaulters. If 
resistance to the new impositions was stronger in Dalecarlia, which 
would seem quite likely373, the methods used to quench resistance 
might also be harsher. Neither should we imagine that reported 
atrocities always have to be rhetorical exaggerations. As later sections 
of the Karlskrönika make clear, even its glorified protagonist Karl 
Knutsson had no qualms about burning rebellious peasants at the 
stake when they were no longer fighting on the same side.  
                                                   
372 The Diary of Vadstena Abbey reports that he had killed ‘all males, around 6000, 
but abducted the women and children’. The Engelbrektskrönika (Jansson (ed) 
1994:34f) also paints a vivid portrait of the atrocities committed in Femern as a 
preliminary to the mounting tension between Erik and his Swedish subjects. As 
the Femern attack seems to have been provoked by insolence against the King 
(Erslev 1901:57ff), the Swedes should have had good reasons to worry. 
373 Given (1) the higher degree of social homogeneity among the peasantry, (2) the 
fact that the local elite, the mining works owners, were – in contrast to the 
gentry – not insulated against the effects of taxation, and (3) a jurisdictional 
structure based on the primary community of the parish, instead of on the 
secondary hundred level, as in the central and southern regions. 
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The widespread support for the rebellion implies a more general 
dissatisfaction than can be explained by the actions of an oppressive 
bailiff; obviously the new taxes were taken to be oppressive per se. 
The King’s freedom to tax was strictly circumscribed by the Land Law, 
and when popular rebellion against the taxes was endorsed by 
councillors, lawspeakers, clerics and hundred sheriffs through 
identifying all their grievances as having the same cause: the King’s 
refusal to rule by the law, then the principle of taxation by consent 
was de facto recognized also by the aristocratic leadership. When the 
settlement with King Eric was concluded in 1436, and new, Swedish 
bailiffs resumed full collection of the impopular taxes, bailiffs and 
other officials were killed by the peasants in Dalecarlia, Värmland and 
other places. Whatever connection these events had with the Puke 
feud, the upshot was that after crushing peasant resistance, the statute 
of 1437 issued by the Council had to confirm the 33% tax reduction 
made by Engelbrekt374. The multiplicity of political factions, and the 
shifting alliances and ruptures during the following period, ensured 
that at most times, someone would find a reason to play the ‘peasant 
card’, thus keeping the memory of tax rebellion and the notion of a 
sharp distinction between justified and unjust taxes alive375.   
The ‘Revolutionary Council’ 
The ‘Revolutionary Council’ of 1435 was convened at the end of 
the first revolutionary campaign, and comprised 33 secular members 
– almost three times the number specified in the Land Law – in 
addition to the three insurgent bishops. Although it appears as though 
there had been a certain influx of gentrymen of more modest 
extraction, who presumably had qualified themselves through taking 
part in the rising376 – besides Engelbrekt himself Johan Karlsson 
(Färla), Bengt Uddsson (Vinstorpa) and perhaps Birger Trolle – most 
                                                   
374 We do not know, whether Engelbrekt’s reduction had been universally applied, 
or indeed how extensively any tax collection had been in operation during the 
rebellion. That the greater part of the new tax seems to have been accepted (at 
least in Uppland, from where we have the information about the reduction), is 
certainly because it was used to finance the rebellion.  
375 The Land Law made a difference between laga skatt (literally: ‘lawful tax’) which 
was customary and immutable, and extraordinary taxation, which was only 
permitted at carefully specified occasions: war, coronations, royal marriages etc. 
376 Otte Ulfsson and Arvid Svan were also of quite modest extraction, but had been 
made councillors by king Eric, presumably as part of a strategy to devalue the 
aristocratic status of the council. Broder Svensson and Gustav Laurensson, two 
relatives of Queen Margaret’s  favourite Abraham Brodersen – executed by king 
Eric for rape during a military campaign – might count as  in-between cases. 
205 
of the new members belonged to the established conciliar aristocracy. 
In addition to electing Engelbrekt Captain of the Realm, six regional 
captains were appointed377. Among these captains, only one – Knut 
Jonsson (Tre Rosor) - seems to have lacked any apparent relation to 
the legacy of Bo Jonsson.  
Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta) was made captain of Östergötland – 
where he already held the surrendered castle of Ringstadaholm. 
Bishop Sigge Uddsson of Skara shared the responsibility for 
Västergötland – belonging to his own diocese – with Knut Jonsson, 
the lawspeaker of the same province. Nils Stensson (Natt och Dag) 
was to take care of Småland, excepting the sub-province Tjust which 
was entrusted to Bo Knutsson (Grip), and Knut Karlsson (Örnfot) 
became captain of Södermanland, which was Nils Erengisleson’s 
lawspeakership. Three of these men were sons of Bo Jonsson Grip’s 
executors, one was his grandson378, and bishop Sigge was a legatee of 
the testament, a cousin of one of the executors, and the grandson of 
Bo Jonsson’s cousin. He had also been active in the efforts to get 
bishop Nicolaus Hermanni – the predecessor of bishop Knut Bosson 
(Natt och Dag), and one of the leaders of the testamentarii – 
canonized. 
This council has earlier been celebrated as the first Swedish 
Riksdag, and considerable ingenuity has been spent on attempts to 
salvage this reputation, but at the time of the quingentenary 
celebration in 1935, marked by a monumental history of the Swedish 
Diet379, this notion was refuted not only by Erik Lönnroth, one of the 
leading exponents of the Weibull school, noted for their severely 
source-critical deconstructions of patriotic mythology, but also by 
                                                   
377 Apparently by the Council – into which Engelbrekt had now been admitted – 
and not by Engelbrekt alone, as is often taken for granted. (Kumlien 1933:32f 
says only that they ‘were chosen’, without trying to specify how. A few 
sentences later, however, he embarks on a discussion why Engelbrekt had 
passed over Karl Knutsson, and speculates over whether this might imply 
political differences of opinion already at this point.)  The chronicle explicitly says 
that ‘in each shire they a captain make’ (EK 85), right after the passage where 
‘they’ have chosen Engelbrekt because he ‘was manly and wise’ (my 
translations). 
378 The earlier tension between the executors and Bo Jonsson’s descendants seems 
to have abated by this time; Bo Jonsson’s widow Margareta Dume had married 
Bengt Niclisson (lion’s face), whose heir Guse Nilsson was supported by several 
descendants of the executors - as well as by Bo Knutsson - in his efforts to 
regain the castle of Stäkeholm, of which he had been deprived by King Eric.  
379 The eighteen volumes written by prominent historians were published in 1931-
1938 under the editorship of Nils Edén, history professor and former prime 
minister. 
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Gottfrid Carlsson, the most meticulous representative of nationalist 
historiography. 
Though no one today would stick to the proto-Diet interpretation, 
the 36-member council is a very interesting convocation in its own 
right – a redefinition of political representation in sharp contradiction 
to regimen regale, and a manifestation of a quite broad alliance. It 
should be worthwhile taking a closer look at its membership. 
Table 9: The revolutionary council of 1435. 
 
 councillors/ new 
councillors 
lineage official 
titles 
 
IN 
 
IO 
Revoluti-
onary titles 
relations to executors* 
and to Bo Jonsson 
1 Bp Knut Bosson Natt & Dag 
bishop 
Linkpg 103 34 
cast (Stege-
borg) 
executor (9b), brother 9, 
cousin 
2 Bp Sigge Uddsson Vinstorpa  
bishop 
Skara 3 0 
co-subcpt 
(Vgl) 
csn's grson, legatee 
3 Bp Tomas Simonsson bish. Strg 0 0   
4 H Nils Gustavsson Rossvik  knight, 
lsp(Upl) 
9 0 cast 
(Västerås) 
csn-son 5, nep-inl 8b 
5 H Gottskalk Bengtsson wolf regdt knight 159 31  step-nep 4 
6 H Nils Erengislesson Hammersta  knight, 
lsp(Sd) 
138 43 cast (Rsth), 
subcpt(Ögl) 
son 7, grson-in-law 
7 H Bengt Stensson Natt & Dag knight, 
lsp(Nrk) 
100 16  son 9, cousin's son 
8 H Bo Stensson Natt & Dag knight 100 16  son 9, cousin's son 
9 H Laurens Ulvson Aspenäs  knight 156 50  son 8, son-inl 6, 2nd csn 
10 H Gustav Algotsson Sture II knight 128 16  son 4b,son-inl 10b 
11 H Broder Svensson bull's head knight 0 0   
12 Nils Jönsson Oxenstierna  108 40  ward 3,nep 10b,11,nep-
inl 8b,10, son of 2nd csn 
13 Karl Ormsson ram's head  38 3  
son-inl 12, grnep-inl 8, 
grson-inl 7 
14 Knut Jonsson Tre Rosor lsp(Vgl) 50 22 
co-subcpt 
(Vgl) 
 
15 Bengt Uddson Vinstorpa   3 0  csn's grson, legatee 
16 Henrik Snakenborg Snakenborg  63 19  csn-son 4 
17 Karl Knutsson Bonde  119 34  grson 3, 7b stepgrson 6b 
18 Bo Knutsson Grip  34 28 subc (Tjust) grson-inl 12, grson 
19 Magnus Gren Gren  44 13   
20 Nils Stensson Natt & Dag  100 16 
subcpt 
(Smål*) 
son 9, csn's son 
21 Arvid Svan Svan lsp(Thd) 0 0   
22 Gregers Magnusson Eka   66 22  son-inl 8b, nep-inl 10b 
23 Matts Ödgislesson fleur-de-lys  38 18  
son-inl 12, grnep-inl 8, 
grson-inl 7 
24 Bengt Gottskalksson wolf regdt  138 13   
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25 Bengt Jönsson Oxenstierna  108 40  ward 3,nep 10b,11,nep-
inl 8b,10, son of 2nd csn 
26 Knut Karlsson eagle's foot  63 13 subcpt (Sd) son 10 
27 Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson  0 0  cpt of the realm 
28 Erik Puke Rossvik   53 25 cpt (Norrl), 
cast (Korsh) 
grnep 8b, grson-inl 7 
29 Johan Karlsson Färla  0 0   
30 Måns Bengtsson Natt & Dag  141 28  grson 9, csn's grson 
31 Erengisle Nilsson Hammersta   138 56  grson 7 
32 Karl Gädda Gädda  38 0  cson 7 
33 Birger Trolle d y!* Trolle  13 0   
34 Olof Ragvaldsson Lindö  lsp(Ögl) 56 9  nep 12 
35 Otte Ulvsson bear paws  0 0  grson-inl 7 
36 Gustav Laurensson Änga   25 0   
  AVERAGE:  57 16 
* excepting 
Tjust 
* executors numbered 
according to table 6 
As can be seen from the list, the majority of this council belonged to well-established aristocratic families.  
Index IN is an attempt to quantify 'noble rank' , so that someone whose (male) ancestor for the preceding 
four generations have been knights or councillors will get an index of 100. As many of them may have been 
both, these can compensate for untitled ancestors, and it is also possible to reach an index of more than  
100. If this is to be interpreted as 'nobility' in the full sense 39 % of the revolutionary councillors qualified,   
though I am fairly certain this is too restrictive, and by no means the only relevant criterion. Index IO is far  
more exclusive. For symmetry, it is constructed in the same way, although no one could be expected to  
have ancestors all holding offices of lawspeakers or higher (High Steward, Marshal, camerarius, bishop) 
 
Engelbrekt’s followers – peasants or gentry? 
Schück 1994:101f claims that the peasants only play an important 
role in the Dalecarlian section, and  that in the later levies, those 
summoned by Engelbrekt are primarily the gentry: 
But these warlike Dalecarlian peasants appear to have done their 
part when Borganäs has been burned, and Köping taken ... In their 
place ‘Westmen all’ step in. But here it’s in the first place a matter for 
‘freeborn men’, i e gentrymen headed by Sir Nils Gustavsson from 
Rekarne. When they in Västerås answer Engelbrekt’s appeal to rally to 
the service of the realm, they talk about themselves as ‘we’, [but] 
about the ‘peasants’ in the third person: they know how these have 
been mistreated. (my translation) 
However, the Västerås episode clearly outlines two consecutive 
summons. First (p55) Engelbrekt summons ‘Westmen all’, asks if they 
want to help to drive out the ‘unmild foreign bailiffs’, and promises to 
help to rid them of their suffering (thus he cannot be addressing just 
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the gentry); after this ‘all of them’ joined up with him. Then he sends 
letters to ‘freeborn’ men, presenting an ultimatum threatening the ‘life 
and estates’ of whomever that would not meet up at Västerås. It’s 
thus quite obvious that raising the peasantry was still a primary 
concern. That the peasants are not further emphasized in this passage 
is self-evident: they were not needed (except maybe as a background 
threat) in the taking of this castle, as the bailiff turned it over 
voluntarily to Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) by whose authority he had 
held it! As the peasants must have been needed for something, it is 
reasonable to presume that the levy followed Engelbrekt to Uppsala, 
where – as Schück himself has to concede – the ‘concerns of the tax-
peasants’ are emphasized.  
When Schück goes on to argue that ‘This pattern can be followed 
throughout the chronicle’, he cannot yet be said to have established 
any pattern at all. Even if we disregard the first, peasant levy at 
Västerås, his own account has presented three levies: The ‘poor 
peasants [who] in Dalecarlia live’, ‘freeborn men’ at Västerås, and ‘all 
Uplanders’, who ‘are given a more popular image’. Only the second 
case conforms – and this only partly, as we have seen – to his 
‘pattern’. Is it instead confirmed by his further account? 
‘Eastgothians all’ are called to Söderköping, but the three ‘skaror’ 
(‘bands’) who set out from there appear to be gentry retinues. ‘All 
Westgothians’ summoned to Axvall, turn up ‘with armour and strong 
weapons’, thus not the ‘folk-weapons’ of the law. 
Among the three subdivisions of the army raised at Söderköping, 
the first one was obviously dominated by higher gentry. The leader, 
Guse Nilsson, was the heir of Bengt Niclisson (lion’s face), who had 
married Bo Jonsson’s widow, and who had held the castle of 
Stegeholm as a pantlän. King Eric had removed him from the castle 
and given him the town of Söderköping as compensation, but both 
Bengt and Guse had been in constant conflict with king Eric’s 
castellan, trying to retrieve the castle (Fritz1973:99, SBL). The 
completely unsuccessful attack on Stegeholm is one of the most 
detailed passages in the chronicle, probably in order to fit in the 
names of the five380 prominent young noblemen subcommanding the 
enterprise. Obviously this was the right place to be for career-minded 
                                                   
380  Six subcommanders are mentioned, but one of them - (Claus) Gramsow - is 
otherwise more or less unknown (but cf Gillingstam 1949:23). He was to take 
the Western bridge, while Guse took the Eastern and the young noblemen 
stumbled over each other to attack by floats from the other directions. Karl 
Knutsson is mentioned in the second place among these. 
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gentlemen, as four of them entered the council after the campaign381, 
two became regional captains and the other two (eventually) 
regents382.  
There is no reason to assume that Herman Berman, a lower-
gentry383 officer commanding the second army, attracted such an 
illustrious following for his efficient campaign burning down three 
castles in a row; only peasants are mentioned here, and in two of the 
cases they set fire to the castle while its captain is still negotiating. 
Why Schück takes for granted that Berman’s troop would look like 
Guse’s I cannot make out – obviously the objectives of these two 
subcampaigns were quite different and involved divergent military 
methods.  
The third ‘band’, led by Engelbrekt himself, was only used to 
provide a backing in his negotiations with the captain of Örebro 
castle – who gave it up for a ransom of 1000 marks – before it was 
reinforced by the levy at Axvall. The ‘armour and strong weapons’ of 
that levy is no evidence against peasant participation. The statute of 
Strängnäs a couple of years later expressly forbids peasants to bring 
crossbows, armour or swords to moots, boroughs or feasts (Bjarne 
Larsson 1994). Obviously peasants had not always been content with 
sticking to the ‘folk-weapons’ Schück refers to.  
The original ‘band’ following Engelbrekt from Söderköping to 
Örebro might have been a reinforced version of his personal 
entourage; a ‘gentry retinue’ (frälsefölje) would still hardly appear to 
be a proper designation for it, unless we accept Reinholdsson’s 
postulate that as Engelbrekt was a gentryman, his followers must 
have been those who owed him fealty. 
Schück’s observation that the account of the second campaign 
leaves no place384 at all for peasants seems more to the point, though, 
                                                   
381  Bo Stensson, the oldest among them, and already knighted, had been a 
councillor for four years. 
382  One of the two regents even became a king (Karl Knutsson); Magnus Gren 
became one of the four regents who were to rule Sweden while king 
Christopher of Bavaria was abroad. 
383  His escutcheon carried a bomärke - a simple symbol resembling a merchant’s 
mark, used by peasants to sign themselves where a nobleman would use a 
signet. The compromise version of a seal bearing a bomärke is typical of the 
very lowest gentry, according to Löfquist 1935 (SBL: Berman, KLMN: Bomärke). 
384  Yet it appears to me that some factual difference must be intended when the 
chronicle describes a summons of  ‘all Southmen’ to Nyköping, but one of 
‘knights, squires and burghers’ to Söderköping (116, 118); pace Schück 1994:102, 
the second case is not also described as a summons of ‘Eastgothians all’ - this 
phrase he must have transferred from the summons in the first campaign (p68), 
right before the partition of the army. 
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except that the contrast becomes even stronger when we have to 
revise his picture of the first campaign. When Engelbrekt’s followers 
at Ronneby are called hovmän, however, this word is hardly used in 
its present-day sense of ‘courtiers’, but rather in the same sense as 
during the 16th century: ‘horsemen’, who at least at that time could be 
peasants as well as gentlemen385. Obviously his followers in this 
passage is a quite small, mounted group probably dominated by 
gentrymen and their retainers, as almost all of those who are 
mentioned seem to belong to these categories. However, Engelbrekt 
would reasonably also have had a personal entourage at least 
matching those of his subcommanders.  
We have no way of telling whether this was composed of mining 
district associates (Cf S J Boethius 1916, B Boethius 1965, Lönnroth 
1934), burgher troops, his relatives among the gentry or semi-gentry 
of Västmanland, Rekarne and Uppland, or peasant soldiers risen in 
his service (cf the patents of gentility issued by a group of councillors 
including Engelbrekt in SMR 278-282). Johan Andersson and Kädel 
are mentioned as Engelbrekt’s retainers in EK 130, but we know 
nothing about them, except that bishop Thomas complains about a 
confiscation of pork made by the former on Engelbrekt’s behalf. That 
Kädel is mentioned without a patronymic suggests that he was not a 
gentleman. (The use of patronymics did not become common among 
the peasantry until later.) 
Engelbrekt’s earlier levies during this campaign have been left to 
hold the sieges, and the attempt to raise the burghers of Kalmar had 
failed (EK 118f). When he summons a new levy of Westgothians and 
Smallanders to fight against the Scanians, though, I see no reason to 
presuppose that peasants were not intended to take part. Raising 
peasants was obviously one of Engelbrekt’s key advantages (besides 
his efficiency as a negotiator), and the unusually long notice for this 
levy386 suggests that he wanted to allow time for bringing a foot down 
to the border.  
The Revolution against king Eric: causes and effects 
My interpretation of the revolution against king Eric offers a simple 
solution to the linking of peasant protest and magnate opposition. We 
do not have to ask ourselves whether it was the leader of the 
                                                   
385  Hovman  may be interpreted as ‘court-man’, but also as ‘hoof-man’. 
386  He had sent messages already from Söderköping, according to EK 123. As this 
is in sharp contrast to the otherwise hectic tempo of the second campaign, it 
should carry some kind of significance.  
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peasants – Engelbrekt – who forced the aristocracy to support the 
rebellion, or whether it was the dissatisfied councillors who took 
advantage of the opportunity offered by the peasant rising (or who 
provoked it themselves). If a heavy and legally objectionable taxation 
was the principal underlying grievance, it is no wonder that the 
strongest opposition arose just at the place where the contrast 
between a bailiff determined to apply whatever amount of pressure 
required to extract the taxes, and a peasantry unaccustomed to 
endure oppression, was at its sharpest. When the lawspeakers did 
their duty and resolved that conflict, they were rebuffed by the king. 
At this point both peasants and lawspeakers had closely connected 
reasons to protest, and as soon as the peasants arose, the spokesmen 
for each group took fast and concerted action.  
The alliance between Engelbrekt, Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik), and 
Nils Erengisleson (Hammersta) also represents a convergence of trade 
interests quite compatible with Lönnroth’s analysis even if 
disturbances to the trade may be unlikely to have triggered the 
outbreak of rebellion. The outbreak should have come earlier in that 
case as Larsson argues from the timing of the rising in a way that 
mirrors Lönnroth’s own dismissal of the taxation as the ignition spark 
(Larsson 1984:131f). 
What is the legacy of the revolution? 
• The alliance between the Dalecarlian peasants, led by Engelbrekt, 
and the Swedish judiciary leadership, led by Nils Gustavsson 
(Rossvik), served to legitimize the insurrection, and as a 
consequence: 
• the aristocratic leadership had to recognize – at least implicitly – 
that the principle of taxation by consent also applied to the 
peasantry, which left them no alternative to a policy of negotiated 
rule.  
• The ‘two-sector model’ where tax land and rent land have 
separate and complementary functions, became institutionalized 
as a compromise between the conflicting self-interests of the fief-
holding aristocrats (ensuring collective reproduction through 
exaction of taxes as well as individual reproduction through 
exaction of rents). 
• To stabilize this solution the ‘frozen proportion’ between tax land 
and rent land (Herlitz 1982) resulting from Queen Margaret’s 
inquiry, is accepted as a permanent condition and coordinated 
with the corresponding division of the peasantry into two 
separate sectors (Bjarne Larsson 1994:141-7, 153-5), resulting from 
an earlier compromise between Queen and council. 
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• A revised regulation of land sales and taxation serves to fulfil this 
separation, eliminate mixed categories and limit social mobility, in 
order to preserve the tax base as well as the rent base. 
• The construction and consolidation of a state apparatus on the 
level of Sweden (rather than on the level of the Union) becomes 
a mutual concern of oligarchic factions and contenders for a local 
Swedish principate. This is a continuation of the process of 
‘parallel centralization’, which from the one side strives to 
construct a strong state as a bulwark against royal arbitrariness, 
while from another side a stronger state is required as a 
foundation of power for a new monarchy capable of keeping the 
nobility under control. 
• The legalistic foundation of the compromise uniting the coalition 
of insurgents makes a geographical delimitation corresponding to 
the Land Law of 1347-52 the most feasible political project. A new 
edition of the Land Law is produced in order to consolidate this, 
as a condition for Christopher’s accession, and to update the 
compromise between Crown and aristocracy387. 
• A proto-nationalist propaganda formalizing and legitimizing this 
delimitation through constructing a notion of ‘Swedishness’ (rather 
than regional or Scandinavian identities) develops (bishop 
Thomas, Nicolaus Ragvaldi, the Chronicle of Karl Knutsson). 
There is no reason to take for granted that all this predetermined 
the victory of the future Swedish ‘nation-state’ which under Gustav 
Vasa’s reign successfully defeats other state-building formats (the 
‘sub-Empire’ model of the Kalmar Union, the regionalism of the old 
landskap communities, the city-league model which at least 
Stockholm and Visby had been affiliated to, the parallel ecumenical 
community of Catholic Christendom388 etc.)  
This would be a return to the teleological fallacy of essentialist 
nationalism. However, the factors that were to make this particular 
project a viable contender in the struggle between different state-
building strategies have their point of origin in this revolution, and to 
this limited but very important extent, it was a crucial step in the 
                                                   
387 ‘[T]he changes might be interpreted as favouring the aristocracy’ (Lindkvist 
1997:214f). 
388 ‘For European states the Church was not only an institutional model which lent 
itself to imitation, but also a formidable rival power with which to reckon in the 
long journey towards sovereignty over territory, supremacy over subjects, and 
control of the law.’ (Padoa-Schioppa 1997:361) Even if a church-state has not 
been an obvious political alternative in Sweden, independent Bishoprics similar to 
Mainz or Salzburg would not have been unthinkable, and Archbishops like 
Johannes Benedicti and Gustav Trolle were obvious contenders for ultimate 
temporal authority as well.      
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development of Sweden as a separate state with certain idiosyncratic 
features:  
• an institutional balance of power between King and 
aristocracy, 
• which balance depended on and was reproduced by an 
institutional division of agricultural surplus, of the land that 
yielded it, and of the peasants that tilled this land. 
• a constitutional heritage that was not – pace Lagerroth, 
Lönnroth, and Roberts – a purely aristocratic affair: regents, 
aristocrats, clerics and peasants all held strong views on 
such matters. 
• Closely tied to this is a strong tradition of negotiated rule, 
which, during the Imperial Age, is institutionalized into the 
four-Estate Diet, where a more or less permanent 
negotiation for the means of warfare (men and money) 
takes place in two directions: between the Crown and the 
Nobility and –  which is the real innovation – between the 
Crown and the Peasantry. 
• Also: a monarchy with a strong heritage of popular 
agitation, militia-levying and sale of protection (cf Glete 
2002), which may have been the precondition for the 
former point389. 
                                                   
389 This is the intuitive first instance explanation, although negotiation with the 
peasantry may have been even more necessary for a collective oligarchic 
leadership lacking the charisma of royal authority. Even if that was the case, the 
alternatives would converge, as members of the oligarchy with the requisite 
persuasive abilities would get the upper hand in the competition for regentship – 
most visibly in the case of Sten Sture the younger. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LAWSPEAKERS AND ARISTOCRACY IN MEDIEVAL 
SWEDEN 
The purpose of this text is mainly to provide a firmer background for 
the discussions in the other essays through analyzing the background 
and social position of the medieval lawspeakers, and their role in the 
state-building process. In order to do this, the vaguely defined 
medieval aristocracy also has to be investigated 390.  
The essay also contains further discussion of theoretical concepts 
and attempts to situate a couple of contributions from classic Swedish 
historiography into  contemporary European discussions. Lönnroth’s 
analysis of Swedish power struggles is reconceptualized into a 
distinction which I use to differentiate my version of Mann’s typology 
of social power and to modify Tilly’s distinction between contrasting 
state-building trajectories. 
The analysis of Swedish feudalism is also carried further through 
putting Lagerroth’s discussion of the separate-ness of judiciary 
authority into the context of Duby’s subdivision of seigneurial power. 
The bulk of the text, however, is concerned with an investigation of 
the known medieval lawspeakers from the early examples in the 13th 
century through four contrasting periods of state formation up to the 
Engelbrekt rebellion discussed in Chapter 3. 
                                                   
390 Genealogical information is always in the first place taken from ÄSF, the most 
reliable and detailed compilation of the medieval evidence; where necessary, it 
has been supplemented by SBL and SMV. Other sources or conflicting 
interpretations are cited in the text.  
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The formation of a nobility 
In Swedish frälsa means to ‘save’, ‘liberate’ or ‘deliver’. Old 
Swedish frälse signified ‘liberation’, exemption from taxation, and was 
used in two senses:  
• the privilege of tax-exemption, which appertained to the 
land (at least in the later Middle Ages) as well as to the 
holder and  
• those groups or classes enjoying this privilege.  
During the Middle Ages, there were two kinds of frälse (in both 
senses): 
• andligt frälse – ‘spiritual tax exemption’, also signifying the 
clergy enjoying it 
• världsligt frälse – ‘temporal tax exemption’ in exchange for 
horseman’s service. Also signifying the totality of the social 
groups enjoying it. 
As the spiritual frälse was abolished during the reformation, frälse 
land (land under tax-exempt tenure) came to signify ‘noble’ land, and 
we therefore usually reserve the term frälse for the secular category, 
even when we speak about medieval conditions. This is also because 
we have no other term covering the entire medieval gentry-cum-
aristocracy. The word adel, nobility, is a German loan-word entering 
the Swedish language in the 16th century, and it did not acquire a 
precise definition until the Swedish nobility was constituted as a 
closed corporation – an Estate (stånd) – through the formation of 
Riddarhuset (the ‘House of Knights’ - also one of the chambers of the 
Swedish Diet) in 1626.  
The tax-exemption privilege is usually believed to have been 
introduced through the Statute of Alsnö, enacted by King Magnus 
Barnlock around 1280, but there may already have existed some kind 
of a consuetudinal tax exemption, in which case the statute just 
served to regulate this privilege and to establish the Crown’s 
prerogative to rule on such issues. The purpose may have been to 
extend it to the new mounted warrior caste, but quite as possibly to 
restrict and control a privilege which had earlier been self-assumed. 
There has been an extensive discussion of this statute (cf Bjurling 
1952, Andrae 1960, Sjöholm 1988, Bjarne Larsson 1994, Lindkvist-
Sjöberg 2003:47f) but whichever interpretation we choose to believe, 
a broad frälse category appears to have been firmly established well 
before the Land Law of 1350-52. 
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To speak about the medieval (temporal) frälse as an Estate391 is 
misleading. A focus on their common privilege of tax-exemption 
obscures the wide contrasts within this group, ranging from magnates 
on a level competing with royalty, to well-off peasants acquiring 
exemption from taxes through putting up a horseman. Neither is 
there any form of collective representation which might have ensured 
cohesion between the different levels: 
• The riksråd (council of the realm) develops from a royal 
entourage into a quasi-governmental body representing the realm 
vis-à-vis the King, but not the social category of frälsemän as 
such392. 
• During hovdagar and other occasions when the council is 
expanded with additional members of kungens män, or rikets 
män (“the King’s men393”, or “men of the realm”) they assemble as 
vassals, not as gentrymen/aristocrats; i e in virtue of their personal 
bonds to the King, and not on strength of the privilege they have 
in common. 
• When the nobility in the strict sense (the adel) was formally 
constituted as an Estate of the Realm in the earlier part of the 17th 
century, up to 2/3 of the families belonging to the medieval frälse 
may have lost their privileged status394. 15-!6th century proto-
parliamentary gatherings appear to have been transitional ad hoc 
assemblies, but under Gustavus Vasa a noble representation 
functionally separated from the Council was taking shape. Until 
this process had developed far enough, cohesion among the 
entire frälse category would have been more vertical than 
horizontal – the upward-looking loyalty of liens de dependence 
rather than the solidarity of acknowledged common interests – 
except at the very highest level: the narrow elite that sometimes 
defined themselves as Men of the Realm rather than of the King. 
                                                   
391   Usually, it is taken for granted that the frälse privilege automatically constituted 
an Estate. 
392   In practice they of course normally acted in the interest of their own social 
group – i e the aristocratic magnate stratum, rather than the broad gentry. 
393  ”Men” in this context is a technical term, as in hommage or Mannschaft (cf 
Löfquist 1935,1936, Jägerstad 1948, Schück 1985). 
394   As Roberts estimates (1958:57), but this is a compromise between quite 
divergent sources. Samuelson 1993 evades the issue of quantifying the cut, as 
his study breaks off in 1600. 
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The role of the lawspeakers 
The conventional view was for a long time that before the import 
of centralized kingship in the general European sense, a sort of 
peasant republic akin to the romantic image of Teutonic 
Urgemeinschaft had held sway in the länder (‘lands’ or ‘shires’; 
usually translated ‘provinces’) that were to be united into Sweden. 
The interpretation of the role of the lawspeakers395 has been central 
to the development of such viewpoints. In the Land Law of ca 1350, 
they on the one hand appear as electors (cf Sällström 1951, Losman 
1970) of the King, and as representatives and spokesmen of their 
Provinces, but on the other hand it is prescribed that the Lawspeaker 
be the son of a bonde – to us a word signifying “peasant”396. Thus, 
this provision has helped to shape the conception of early Swedish 
society as a sort of primitive tribal democracy397, where the peasants 
elected spokesmen among themselves, who interpreted the law of the 
region and in turn elected the king. However, what we know about 
the lawspeaker institution before the Land Law is limited to quasi-
mythical accounts found in Snorri Sturluson’s Heimskringla, and in 
one or two of the provincial lawcodes – prehistories tracing the 
institution back to heathen times. 
If we discount all legendary evidence and stick to the strictly 
contemporaneous documentary evidence398, then Eskil of 
Västergötland is – apart from the completely unknown lawspeaker 
                                                   
395  In Swedish lagman, literally: lawman, and in latin legifer, ‘law-carrier’. The 
district of a lagman was designated lagsaga, the area where he fulfilled his office 
of ‘speaking the law’. In Icelandic or Old Norse the corresponding title was 
logsagumann ´the man who speaks the law’. I prefer the translation lawspeaker, 
following Schück’s usage in the English version of the official history of the 
Swedish Parliament: The Swedish Riksdag (Schück 1984a). 
396  This provision is already present within the oldest regional lawcode, 
Västgötalagen, (VGL) where it appears only one paragraph below a similar 
provision concerning the election of bishops. 
397  During the Swedish ‘Age of Freedom’ in the 18th century, the foundations of 
noble privilege were questioned by ‘enlightened’ commoners, and the idea that 
noble and tax-peasant landownership had a common source in the odal – 
envisioned as the peasant-citizens inalienable right to the land of one’s 
forefathers – was promulgated by historians and by political ideologists 
(Nordencrantz, Kepplerus) who argued that the nobility had unjustifiably divorced 
themselves from the commonalty (Hallberg 2003:191-198). 
398  As Almquist also does in his standard treatise on the judicial subdivision of 
Sweden (LDS). 
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Nicolaus  – the first person explicitly mentioned as a lawspeaker399. 
He is usually identified as the probable author of Västgötalagen, the 
oldest one among the provincial law codes, and because of his 
acquaintance with Snorri Sturluson he has been cited as the possible 
source for the account in Heimskringla (Lönnroth 1959). Eskil has 
often been made out to typify the traditional picture of the 
lawspeaker as a powerful spokesman for the regional community, 
like Snorri’s apocryphal Torgny, who allegedly dared to threaten the 
King with summary execution if he went to war against the people’s 
will.  
Eskil, however, was a person very far from the kind of regional 
peasant magnate that would have been required in order to confirm 
the traditional lawspeaker image. He was not even a native of the 
region whose law he was said to have formulated but of the rival 
province of Östergötland. Far from being ‘the son of a peasant’, he 
was the nephew of Earl Birger Brosa, a grandson-in-law of the saint-
king Eric, the stepfather of a pretender to the Norwegian throne and 
an elder brother of two bishops400 as well as of Earl Birger 
Magnusson, the chief architect of the unified Swedish monarchy and 
the founder of its royal dynasty. If we would want to formulate an 
alternative picture of the lawspeakers as agents of monarchic state-
building and centralization in close cooperation with the church, we 
could have found no more ideal a candidate401. 
So, where can we find better evidence for the traditional view? 
From where does it originate? Two of the lawcodes claim to be based 
on traditions dating back to a lawspeaker from heathen times: 
Västgötalagen, the reputed work of Eskil, and Upplandslagen, written 
                                                   
399  In Söderwall’s dictionary of Medieval Swedish (OSM), the word Laghman is not 
cited from any text written before 1285 (VGL), although the compound word 
Lagmanskyld is found in a Latin text from 1270.  
400  It has also been suggested (Gallén) that his unknown mother (he seems to 
have been too old to have been a full brother of Earl Birger) may have been a 
granddaughter of the famous archbishop Eskil of Lund – the primas of the whole 
Scandinavian church province, and one of the main combattants during the period 
when archbishops were the kings’ rivals for the ultimate power (Skyum-Nielsen). 
This obviously refers to a time before the enforcement of clerical celibacy; he 
was also the father-in-law of two powerful Danish Jarlar , one of whom may 
have been the grandfather of Eskil lagman. 
401 Of course his distinguished background has often been pointed out, but in 
general it is cited as an exception to what is presumed to be the normal pattern. 
My argument is that the ‘normal pattern’ did not exist, as far as we know. Not 
many of the later lawspeakers can match the precedent of Eskil, but the most 
outstanding aristocratic magnates of their times tended to be lawspeakers: Birger 
Petersson (Finsta), Svantepolk Knutsson, Ulf Abjörnsson (Tofta), Knut Jonsson 
(Aspenäs), Nils Turesson (Bielke), Bo Jonsson (Grip), Karl Ulfsson (Tofta) etc. 
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for the newly amalgamated province of Uppland by a commission 
under the leadership of Birger Petersson, the lawspeaker of the most 
prestigious among the three earlier provinces (Tiundaland) and one 
of the richest landowners in Sweden, belonging to a family intimately 
connected to the archiepiscopal see of Uppsala402 and married to a 
great granddaughter of bishop Bengt of Linköping, who was a 
brother of Eskil lagman and Earl Birger. (Birger Petersson was also 
the father of the future Saint Bridget.) 
Two lists of lawspeakers are extant, connecting the heathen 
lawspeakers Lumber (Västergötland) and Wiger Spá (Uppland) to the 
time they laws were actually written, but what is pure myth and what 
might be history? The list from Uppland is of very obscure 
provenance, and incorporates Torgny and his descendants. It might 
very well be based on an extended version of Snorri’s account, 
modelled to match the earlier Västergötland list, and to give the 
politically ambitious new central province a glorious enough 
background. It is thus quite possible that Eskil could have been the 
ultimate inspiration for all information about the earlier role of 
lawspeakers, which in any case seems to belong to the category of 
normative fable rather than that of factual history. The exalted role 
attributed to Swedish lawspeakers may also have been a projection 
from Snorri’s own experience as a lawspeaker of Iceland, in which 
case the creation and promulgation of the lawspeaker myth might 
have been a joint venture in aristocratic political propaganda. That 
Eskil had a keen sense of the value of myths is evidenced by his title 
in a charter from 1224: legifer visigothorum – explicitly identifying his 
own constituency (the västgötar) with the illustrious Visigoths, the 
conquerors of Rome. As far as I can ascertain, he is the first Swede403 
known to have consciously exploited this mythical identification – 
more than two centuries before Nicolaus Ragvaldi’s famous speech in 
                                                   
402 He was a nephew of the archbishop, and the cousin of the archdean, who also 
took part in the lawcode commission. His first wife had been the daughter of a 
crusading knight (member of the Teutonic knights) and the niece of a nunnery 
founder of saintly reputation, St Ingrid of Skänninge, whose career Birger’s 
daughter was to repeat and eclipse - she eventually became famous as St 
Bridget. Not only was she the daughter of one lawspeaker and the wife of 
another, as is usually pointed out. She was also the mother of two lawspeakers 
and the grandmother of one, the sister of another, the daughter-in-law of yet 
another, and granddaughter (daughter’s daughter), niece, aunt-in-law or 
grandmother-in-law to four more, and a grandaunt of at least three. 
403 That the identification of Sweden as the home of the Visigoths occurs much 
earlier in a papal letter was pointed out to me by Thomas Lindkvist. That no one 
seems to have exploited this notion for his own aggrandizement before Eskil still 
suggests an unusual talent for propaganda. 
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Basel, and three centuries before Johannes Magnus’ Swedish history, 
whose list of apocryphal early Gothic kings has furnished Swedish 
Kings from Eric XIV onwards with absurdly high ordinal numbers.  
Of course there is no reason to take for granted that Eskil invented 
what I will call the ‘lawspeaker myth’. The Torgny logmaðr story is a 
moral fable which Snorri uses for his own purposes and which he 
may have invented himself or borrowed from somewhere else. To the 
extent that Eskil may have supplied him with background 
information, there is no reason to suppose anything but propaganda, 
though, and the traditional lawspeaker image is a myth, as I will 
show below. First, however, we have to consider the only putative 
evidence for a lawspeaker before Eskil – the elusive Nicolaus. 
Nicolaus legifer of Finnethia, Werãdia and Niwdhwngia 
Nicolaus received a royal letter (SD I:71) protecting the fishing 
privilege of the monastery of Nydala against encroachments404.  
Nicolaus was addressed together with “all the inhabitants of 
Finnveden, Värend and Njudung”, and should therefore have been 
the lawspeaker of an area exactly corresponding to the later province 
of Tiohärad, although this amalgamated region is not in evidence 
until some 70 years later (Larsson 1964:22). That the first known 
example of a lawspeaker should belong to one of the most marginal 
provinces instead of one of the politically dominant regions appears a 
bit surprising, especially as there is no evidence that magnates from 
this area have taken part in realm-level politics before 1280 (Larsson 
1964:26).  There seems to have been no doubts voiced about the 
authenticity of this particular charter, though, even if the monks of 
Nydala have been suspected of forging other documents405. In the 
comments to his edition of the Nydala charters, Gejrot attempts to 
play down the forgery allegations, but in so doing he also 
demonstrates the wide range of both suspicious scholars and 
questioned documents. 
                                                   
404 Fishing rights seem to have been very important in early medieval Sweden – at 
least a sizeable proportion of the earliest diplomas concern conflicts over 
fisheries – valuable real estate that was often bequeathed, enfeoffed, or sold. 
The explanation is certainly that the monasteries had great need of fish for their 
fasting periods (including every Friday), and that when they were donated 
fishing rights this tended to collide with established custom in the 
neighbourhood. 
405 A royal letter concerning barley dues purported to derive from 1248 is generally 
acknowledged to be a forgery (DS 364),  cf Härenstam 1946:246ff. Likewise DS 
389 (ibid :234). 
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It has often been maintained that many of the Nydala documents 
are to be regarded as whole or partial forgeries. As a general rule, it is 
important to remember that the medieval views on the authenticity of 
documents were probably not as strict as our modern demands; for 
instance, the facts that parts of a document can be ‘forged’ or taken 
from  another act does not necessarily prove that the contents of the 
charter should be rejected. (Gejrot  1994:37) 
As Nyd. 2 (the letter to Nicolaus) only survives in the form of an 
entry in the monastery’s copybook406, it seems fair to suspect that the 
intitulation is the part of the document which has the weakest 
documentary relevance, and that both the ‘correct’ specification of the 
province and the formal addressing of a lawspeaker might have been 
modelled upon later charters. 
Of course it is in no way inconceivable that the early lawspeakers 
might have been spokesmen for local communities407 rather than 
representatives of regnal centralization, and that the ‘later’ 
lawspeakers described below belong to a phase of royal 
reconfiguration of the lawspeaker institution. My point is that the 
documentary evidence gives us no reason to make this kind of 
assumptions. We have no reason to believe that there existed any 
lawspeaker of an ‘earlier’ type. If Nicolaus existed, the king obviously 
expected him to back up the King’s own judgment on the fishery 
conflict, so, even if we accepted the intitulation as a faithful copy of a 
genuine 12th century document, that would not oblige us to believe 
the traditional lawspeaker image. 
Onwards to the documented cases of early lawspeakers. 
The first known lawspeakers 
If we consider the list of documented lawspeakers from Eskil to 
Birger Petersson, almost all of those whose ancestry or family-in-law 
we know anything about (some 20-21 out of 26) are in some way 
related to the royal and ducal dynasties. Twelve to fourteen are 
related to Earl Birger himself: one brother, one grandson, one 
nephew and three grandnephews, three or four nephews-in-law, one 
or two grandnephews-in-law and two great grandnephews-in-law. 
Five more bear similar relationships to earlier Earls, and one may 
have been the natural son of a Norwegian Earl. Among the remaining 
                                                   
406 Written between 1506 and 1508 according to Gejrot. 
407  Though, as Lindkvist points out (1997), the size of their districts were a bit too 
large to be conceived as functional communities. 
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six, one (Folke of Västergötland), carries a lion in his coat of arms, 
suggesting a close relationship to the royal house408. 
 
Table 10: The 26 first lawspeakers 
 Name Blazon Province Relations to royal dynasty etc 
1 
1217-1227  
Eskil  
Magnusson 
lion 
Väster-
götland 
Elder brother of Earl Birger, married to Kristina 
Nilsdotter, granddaughter of King St. Eric of 
Sweden and widow of Håkon Galen, Earl of 
Norway 
2 1224  Näskonung ? (unknown) unknown. 
409 
3 1230  Gustaf 
man with sword 
and cloak410 
Väster-
götland 
married to Hafrid Sigtryggsdotter Boberg, niece 
of Earl Birger and of 1 
4 1231  Germund ? 
Attunda-
land* 
family unknown 
5 1231  
Laurents 
? Tiunda-
land* 
Married to a daughter of Earl Philip of Norway, 
who was a son of the Swedish Earl Birger Brosa 
6 1240  Folke 
lion and fleur-de-
lys 
Väster-
götland 
Family unknown. The lion suggests a close 
relationship to the royal dynasty. 
7 
1244  
Laurents  
Petersson 
bend and greek 
cross 
Öster-
götland 
Son of Katarina Eriksdotter, the daughter of king 
Erik Eriksson, the last king of St. Erik's lineage. 
411  
8 
1247-63  
Magnus  
Bengtsson 
lion 
Öster-
götland 
Son of Earl Birger's brother Bengt, Bishop of 
Linköping. 
9 1251-53  Peter Näf lion 
Väster-
götland 
May have been married to the widow of his 
predecessor 3. The lion in his blazon suggests 
a close relationship to royal dyn. 
10 
1266-8  
Karl 
Ingeborgason 
per pale, lion and 
bendy  
Värend 
Married to Ulfhild Sigtryggsdotter Boberg, niece 
of Earl Birger. Metronymic suggests relationship 
with a more illustrious family. 
                                                   
408 Cf Liljeholm. By the same token, Peter Näf and through him his son-in-law Algot 
Brynolfsson have been presumed to be related to the royal dynasty, even if 
Peter’s marriage to Earl Birger’s niece would turn out to be a false conjecture, as 
Gillingstam suspects (ÄSF). The fleur-de-lys, also featured in Folke’s blazon, was 
the emblem of Earl Birger Brosa, whose son Earl Folke was the eponymous 
leader of the aristocratic folkung party. 
409 A possible connection with the family of 21 is suggested by the exceedingly 
rare name. 
410 Almqvist only describes the damaged seal as ‘man with cloak’, but I think the 
drawing in SSM clearly shows the point of a sword resting vertically against the 
ground before the cloaked man. It does not resemble a heraldic blazon, but 
might perhaps be interpreted as a kind of ‘office seal’, analogous to the bishop’s 
and dean’s seals found in SSM series 2. These picture saints, angels, or men in 
sacred attire. In a similar vein Gustaf’s seal might be intended to represent a 
judge wielding the ‘sword of justice’. 
411 Laurents Petersson abducted and married Benedicta, the daughter of Sune Folke-
son (son of Earl Folke) and Helena Sverkersdotter, last surviving member of King 
Sverker's lineage. This meant that he – like Earl Birger – combined hereditary 
connections to both of the royal dynasties and the ducal dynasty. His exile in 
Norway indicates that he failed to make good his potential claim to the throne. 
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11 1268  Höldo winged pheon Värmland 
Possibly an illegitimate son of the Norvegian 
Earl Håkon Folkvidsson412. 
12 
1269-94  
Bengt 
Magnusson 
lion 
Öster-
götland 
Son of 8 and a grand-nephew of Earl Birger.  
13 
1270-88  
Algot 
Brynolfsson 
griffin's head 
Väster-
götland 
Son-in-law of 9. Possibly a descendant of the 
pre-1217 lawspeaker dynasty in Vgl, unless 
they are purely mythical413. 
14 
1272-79 
 Filip 
Törnesson 
antlers Närke 
Possibly the son of an earlier lawspeaker of 
uncertain proven-ance (Thyrner). Married to a 
granddaughter of Earl Folke.  
15 1273-85 Folke Karlsson 
per pale, lion and 
bendy 
Värend Son of 10. Grandnephew of Earl Birger. 
16 
1279-88  
Knut  
Matsson 
lion and fess Närke 
Son-in-law of Ulf Karlsson (wolf regardant), who 
was a prominent councillor and a grandson of 
Earl Charles the Deaf. 
17 
1285  
Israel 
Andersson  
duck 
Tiunda-
land*  
Son-in-law of 3 . 
18 
1285 
Karl 
Haraldsson 
? Värmland Married to a granddaughter of Earl Folke. 
19 1285-6  Björn Näf ferules 
Söder-
manland 
Son-in-law of 3:s daughter, who was also Earl 
Birger's grandniece and a step-daughter of 17. 
20 1286-96 Håkan ? Attunda-
land* 
Family unknown. 
21 1286-99  Nils Sigridsson  
per pale azure 
and or ( “Night 
and Day” ) 
Värend 
Parents and wife unknown, but metronymic 
suggests relationship with a more illustrious 
family. Unspecified relative ('cognatus') of 15. 
22 
(1288)-91  
Anund 
Haraldsson 
winged fleur-de-
lys 
Söder-
manland 
Son-in-law of Elof: a brother of 1, and a half-
brother of Earl Birger. 
23 
(1288)-1305  
Magnus 
Gregersson 
bendy 
Väst-
manland 
Grandson (illegitimate) of Earl Birger. 
                                                   
412 In that case a half-brother of the Norwegian pretender Knut Kristineson, a step-
son of 1. Höldo's blazon, on the other hand, is identical with that of Earl Charles 
the Deaf. 
413 They are also said to be related to the royal dynasty – see below. 
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24 
(1288?) 1294-
1305  
Bengt 
Hafridsson 
lion 
Väster-
götland 
Son of 3 or (less likely) 9. Grandnephew of Earl 
Birger. 
25 1291-5  Tyrner Jonsson cock’s foot? Värmland Family unknown
414.  
26 
1293-1316, 
1319-27 
Birger 
Petersson 
two wings 
Tiunda-
land*, 
Uppland 
Son-in-law of 12, cousin of 17. 
*  Attundaland and Tiundaland – together with Fjärdhundraland – were in 1296 
amalgamated into a composite province: Uppland, which, as the seat of the archsee as 
well as of the capital, was obviously intended to become the leading province. 
 
The frequent examples of lawspeakers marrying into the 
ducal/royal dynasties (more than half the cases) suggest a method of 
tying up local notables. A few cases (2-21, 14-25, 13) hint – 
inconclusively – at the possible existence of local continuity 
independent of the central power. Some may be a sort of emissaries 
from the royal house (1, 8, 12, 23 and maybe some of the in-laws), 
unless their lawspeakerships are rather to be viewed as some kind of 
fiefs for junior branches. Those who are tied to the non-royal 
branches of the old ducal dynasty415 (7, 14, 16, 18) may also be 
interpreted as holding power bases alternative to the central state, but 
it might just as well reflect attempts to give them a share in the 
central power. The presence of several members from these families 
within the earliest royal councils – sometimes before they appear as 
lawspeakers (18, 21, 22) – gives a distinct impression of successful 
integration. 
Upstarts and Uradel 
Hans Gillingstam has argued (1952:23,52, ÄSF 2:51) that indigenous 
names like Abjörn and Sighsten are evidence of a lower social 
background, as the aristocracy had quickly adopted names of foreign 
provenance. Beckman 1953:346 objected that accepting this criterion 
would lead to an unreasonably large number of upstarts in the early 
14th century. Gillingstam retorted that this is exactly what we should 
expect, following the establishment of tax-exemption for horseman’s 
service around 1280. This is no doubt on the mark, but Beckman’s 
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second objection might be worthy of more serious consideration, 
notwithstanding: 
He argued that an old and distinguished family might stick to a 
more archaic name pattern without letting themselves be affected by 
recent fashions. Even if almost all of Beckman’s counterexamples are 
from families who are not in evidence before 1280416, we only have to 
consider the names prevalent within the few really aristocratic 
families we know from the earlier period – those who freely 
intermarried with royal and ducal families – to realize that he has a 
point. Ancient Nordic names like Finvid, Sigtrygg and Holmger not 
only appear among the witnesses in the first few royal charters, but 
also recur within the very highest aristocracy, such as the families of 
Ama and Boberg and the lineages named after the manors of Aspenäs 
and Rumby.  
Sigurd Rahmquist has made the observation that the arms of the 
earliest aristocracy carry fanciful arrangements with fabled beasts, 
angels and flowers, while the upstarts carry simple shields with 
cardinal charges417. This makes sense, if it represents an influx of 
mounted warriors, to whom the necessity of being able to distinguish 
blazons in the battlefield would be a stark reality: shields divided into 
contrasting tints like Natt och Dag (per pale) or Hammersta (per fess) 
as well as those carrying a chevron (Sparre), fess (Bielke) or bend 
make sense within this context. If Rahmqvist is right, all of Beckman’s 
examples would be off the mark. Better support for Beckman’s 
argument can be found in this list, containing examples of ancient 
Scandinavian names within a number of the most exalted among the 
early armigerous lineages: 
                                                                                                                      
414 Raneke suggests (SMV362u) that his seal may have been misinterpreted, and 
that he carries antlers like 14. His unusual name supports this notion. 
415 ‘Folkungar’ has become the conventional designation of the royal dynasty, 
although the name originally signified groups opposing the new royal dynasty. 
To make matters even more complicated, most of the leaders of this opposition 
belonged to other branches of the same house or clan, which appeared to have 
more or less monopolized the office of Jarl (‘Earl’, but rendered in latin as dux. I 
use the Anglo-Saxon equivalent as a translation, but write ‘ducal’ when I need a 
corresponding adjective. This does sound contradictory, but any alternative I can 
think of would be even more misleading. 
416  Sparre av Tofta (the names mentioned above), Arvid Gustavsson (Sparre av Vik) 
and Ture Kättilsson (Bielke) and Rörik Birgersson: the exception; a grandson of 
Earl Folke (ÄSF 185). 
417 This analysis, presented in a  public lecture, has not yet been published, but is 
cited by Dick Harrison 2002a. (Personal communication from Rahmqvist) 
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Lineage blazon first 
ap-
pear-
ance 
Nordic names 
percentage, 
first 6 armi-
gerous gene-
rations(<1381) 
Relation 
to ducal / 
royal 
dynasty 
offices & 
titles 
Marital 
relations 
(and sons of 
female 
members) 
 
1 Algotsson 
lineage 
ÄSF 1ff 
SMV407 
griffin’s 
head 
1260 
Algot, 
Bryniolf, Karl, 
Folke, Rörik   
50%  (male 
64%) 
consangui
-nity (un-
specified) 
2lawsp 
bishop 
(saint), 
3canons 
chancellor 
lawsp, 
2lawsp-drs 
marshal’s dr, 
Earl Folke´s 
granddr 
 
2 Ama 
ÄSF107ff 
SMV157 
per bend 
embattled 
grady 
1248 Folke, Ulf, 
Holmger, 
55% (male 
86%) 
sideline of 
elder 
ducal 
branch  
lawsp, 
camerarius, 
2 canons 
E. Birger’s 
granddr, 
lawsp-sister, 
3lawsp-sons 
 
3 
Aspenäs 
ÄSF 8ff 
SMV414 
lion-eagle 1272 Birger, Knut, 
Ulf, Ingegärd  
52% 
female 
sideline of 
elder 
ducal 
branch 
H Steward 
3lawsp, 
2leaders of 
aristocratic 
rebellion 
3 lawsp & an 
ex-prince 
 
4 Bengt 
Hafridson 
lineage 
ÄSF115ff 
SMV283 
lion 1286 
(1230
?) 
Algot, 
Bryniolf, 
Knut, 
Ramfrid, 
Folke  63% 
 
through 
#5 
lawsp, duke, 
marshal, 
abbess 
2 lawsp:s    
2H Stewards 
/one Norw/ , 
St Bridget´s 
daughter  
 
5 Boberg  
ÄSF 22-5 
SMV650 
fleur-de-
lys betw. 
antlers 
1219 Sigtrygg, 
Hafrid, Ulfhild  
55% 
female 
sideline of 
royal 
branch 
bishop  4 lawsp 
 
6 Fånö 
ÄSF50ff         
SMV416 
lion-eagle 1274 
Tjelve, Karl, 
Folke, 
Torsten    
63% 
through 
#3 
canon, 
leader of 
aristocratic 
rebellion 
Earl Knut’s 
granddr, Earl 
Folke’s 
granddr, 
Teutonic 
Knight 
 
7 Vingad lilja 
SMV670   
winged 
fleur-de-
lys 
1240 Anund, 
Harald, Helga  
78% 
through 
#14 
lawsp Earl Birger’s 
niece, lawsp, 
High Steward 
 
8 Lejonbalk 
ÄSF163ff 
SMV855 
per pale, 
lion and 
bendy 
1263 Karl, 
Ingeborg, 
Folke, 
Holmger, Ulf, 
Ragvald 69% 
through 
#5 
2 lawsp, 
canon 
Earl Birger’s 
niece, 
Marshal’s  gr-
dr, Norv. 
baron’s dr 
 
9 Stallare   
ÄSF2:78ff 
(SMV759) 
7-point 
mullet per 
bend 
1274 
Ragne, 
Anund, 
Finvid, 
Näskonung  
85% 
 Stabularius, 
marshal, 
dep.lawsp 
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10 Rumby  
ÄSF183ff 
SMV231 
bend 
checky 
1276 
Finvid, 
Jedvard, 
Ingegärd  
50% 
Possible 
relation to 
older royal 
dyn (Erics) 
archbp, 
canon, 
member of 
law comm. 
rebel leader  
2 lawsp, 2 
lawsp-
children 
 
11 Rörik 
Birgersson 
lineage 
ÄSF185ff 
SMV46 
bend 1250 Rörik, Birger, 
Holmger, 
Anund         
74% 
female 
sideline of 
elder 
ducal 
branch 
canon Earl’s dr,   
Ex-King’s 
grdson, 
2lawsp-drs 
 
12 Ulv        
ÄSF296ff 
SMV329 
wolf regar-
dant 
1252 
Ulf, Holmger 
40%  
     
German/Baltic:
15% 
sideline of 
younger 
ducal 
branch 
lawsp, 
steward, 
justiciar 
3 lawsp, 
marshal, St. 
Bridget’s 
daughter 
 
13 
Tyrgils 
Knutsson  
lineage 
ÄSF88ff 
SMV746 
lion 1283 Tyrgils, Knut, 
Gustav, 
Ragvald  
60% 
through 
#5 
marshal, 
lawsp 
Sw. princess 
(?), 
Germ.count’s 
daughter, Sw. 
duke, Norv . 
baron 
 
14 
 
Vingad pil 
SMV696 
winged 
arrow 
1253 
Elof, 
Sigmund, 
Sune, Helga 
39% 
sideline of 
royal 
branch 
 
 
5 lawsp,  
High Steward 
 
15 
 
 
Örnsparre  
 
ÄSF2 
SMV859 
per pale 
half-eagle 
& 
chevronny 
1269 
Ingevald, 
Thorsten, 
Guttorm, 
Olof, (Sune) 
50% 
 
 
2 lawsp, 
Sthlm 
castellan(?)   
 
Earl Birger’s 
illeg.grand-dr,  
archbp’s 
sister   dean-
chancellor 
 
To look at the other side: which families would appear not to have 
been upstarts according to Gillingstam’s criterion? The examples he 
would probably have had in mind, are the magnate families most 
intimately connected to the archsee: And, Ängel and the Finsta 
lineage, where general Christian European names such as Andreas, 
Petrus, Bengt (Benedictus), Magnus, Johan, Jakob and Israel are 
prevalent418. However, even among their family members we find 
                                                   
418 Finsta 65% general Christian names. Laurents Petersson’s family 88%. 
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ancient Scandinavian names like Birger419 and Erland. Another very 
early aristocratic family that would fit Gillingstam’s pattern is the 
family of the lawspeaker Laurents Petersson, grandson of king Erik 
Eriksson and abductor and first husband of Benedicta Sunesdotter, 
granddaughter of King Sverker and Earl Folke. Laurents’ father and 
great grandfather were both named Petrus/Peter, and his grandfather 
Laurents. Still, these examples are by no means more frequent or 
more exalted420 than those of the earlier list, and the shift in namestyle 
is more obviously explained by the heavy ecclesiastical influence, 
which would favour saintly names421. 
A lawspeaker dynasty? – the Algotssöner in Västergötland 
The only example that might give some credence to the traditional 
image of regional lawspeaker dynasties422 is the Algotssöner dynasty in 
Västergötland. Although we have no contemporary documents 
verifying the existence of the alleged early lawspeakers of this 
lineage, the story acquires some credibility from the fact that two 
historical lawspeakers appear to belong to their family. The legend 
recounts four successive generations of lawspeakers belonging to this 
dynasty, as predecessors of Eskil lagman. If this is true, Eskil (who, 
along with the Algotssöner’s reputed ancestor Karle of Edzvära, is the 
hero of the legend) becomes an interpolated exception before the 
descendants of these presumed peasant leaders resume power. 
However, there are at least 53 years of such interruptions, and when 
Algot Bryniolfsson attains the lawspeakership around 1270, he 
probably does so by virtue of being the son-in-law of his closest 
                                                   
419 Birger Petersson, the lawspeaker, was named after (and also adopted the blazon 
of) his maternal grandfather Birger Skänkare, (SBL: Birger Petersson) who 
according to his sobriquet would have been holding one of the highest offices 
within the hird or royal entourage (corresponding to the office of butler in the 
royal English household), and would in his turn presumably have been named 
after Earl Birger (or his uncle Earl Birger Brosa) – maybe as a godson, if not 
through kinship (among the early examples of the name in the archives, all but 
one are closely related to the ducal/royal dynasty. (SMP: ‘Birger’). Also cf Conradi 
Matsson 1998:109f. 
420 With the possible exception of Laurents Petersson. 
421 The royal branches of the dynasty continued to favour the prestigious ducal 
name of Birger together with the ancient Swedish royal name Erik and the 
Danish and Norwegian royal names of Valdemar and Håkan. The quasi-Christian 
name of Magnus is derived from Carolus Magnus (Charlemagne). 
422  Other examples of quasi-inheritable lawspeakerhood are either compatible with 
the royal centralization thesis (the ‘lawspeaker branch’ of the royal dynasty and 
their later in-laws in Östergötland) or late-medieval developments (the Vinge 
dynasty in Värmland). 
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known predecessor, Peter Näf, rather than as a scion of an ancient 
dynasty. He is succeeded by Peter’s possible son or stepson Bengt 
Hafridsson, a grandnephew of Earl Birger’s, and when Algot’s 
grandson 56 years later becomes a lawspeaker, after three or four 
additional relatives of the royal house, he surely owes this position to 
his relation to Bengt, Peter and – through Bengt’s mother Hafrid423 – 
to Earl Birger, rather than to his alleged descent from a legendary line 
of proto-lawspeakers 424. Of course such a pedigree might have been 
an advantage in gaining entrance into the higher aristocracy, and 
acquiring the possibility of forming such advantageous liaisons, but is 
this an argument for believing the story or for suspecting one of the 
Algotssöner of having fabricated it? Documents from the canonization 
process for Brynolf Algotsson contain allusions to his noble descent 
and relation to the royal house425, but do not confirm any particulars 
of the lawspeaker legend. 
The lawspeaker – native son or royal servant? 
My survey has confirmed that those early lawspeakers which are 
known to us were descended from the very highest aristocracy. How 
are we then to interpret the provision ‘bondes son’ , occurring not 
only in the mid-14th century Land Law, but already in the oldest 
preserved provincial code, that of Västergötland426? Almquist presumes 
that as the word bonde originally signifies ‘settled’ or maybe ‘landed’, 
the paragraph only means that the lawspeaker may not be the son of 
a ‘lösker karl’ (vagrant), and he suggests that servants of the king 
might also have been excluded.  
I find it hard to understand how the later conjecture might be 
deduced from the wording of the passage, and anyway my survey 
points into quite the opposite direction. The necessity of ruling 
against vagrants occupying the highest office of the Shire seems a bit 
unwarranted – especially in the light of what we now know about the 
                                                   
423  Metronymics generally signify that the mother’s descent is more illustrious then 
the father’s. 
424  Of central importance is also his own  marriage to a granddaughter of 
Svantepolk Knutsson, signalling the end of a feud starting with his uncle’s 
abduction of Svantepolk’s daughter, which plunged the whole family into 
disgrace, and cost Algot his office. 
425 We do not know in what way, but if it is true, the Algotssöner would become an 
even less convincing counter-argument against a top-down interpretation of 
lawspeakerhood. 
426 In the Västergötland code, the paragraph on lawspeakers is preceded by a 
section about the election of bishop. Also the bishop is supposed to be ‘bondes 
son’. 
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early lawspeakers’ normal social background – so we have to take a 
closer look at the very word bonde. As the Västergötland law code is 
the earliest text in medieval Swedish which we possess, we are 
forced into etymological conjecture.  
Literally, bonde is the present participle of bo – ‘to live’ in the 
localized sense, as in ‘living in Västergötland’. A possible 
interpretation might then be ‘inhabitant’ or ‘native’, which would 
make sense as a provision, although it had been broken already 
through the example of Eskil, and would therefore reasonably have 
been introduced later on. It would also conform to the pattern of 
provisions for the subordinate office of häradshövding (‘hundred 
sheriff’). Häradshövdingar were required to be domiciled within the 
hundred427, while lawspeakers may even have had to be born within 
their constituencies, if my interpretation is correct. We might also 
consider the possibility that the word bonde originally may have had 
higher social connotations than within later Swedish usage. Sawyer 
and Sawyer (1993) point out the fact that one of the oldest Swedish 
noble families is called Bonde, which at least would appear to show 
that the word should not have had any demeaning connotations428. If 
the traditional picture of a more or less egalitarian society of freeman 
farmer-citizens could be shown to hold water, there would of course 
be nothing to explain, but there are too many reasons to doubt it (cf 
Dovring 1953, Sjöholm 1988, Rahmqvist 1996, Berg 2003). 
Let us move forward in time! The first few subsequent lawspeakers 
in each province seem to conform pretty well to the pattern observed 
above, and as long as their pedigrees are in general insufficiently 
known, it is not possible to move on to a more detailed analysis of 
their social background and to scrutinize their ancestors with respect 
to different status markers. First, however, a theoretical context. 
                                                   
427 A provision which seems to have been broken with increasing frequency 
towards the end of the Middle Ages (Almquist in LDS).  
428 On the other hand, there are several examples of not very flattering nick-names 
transformed into family names, like Krumme (crooked), Galen (mad), Krognos 
(hook-nose), Gylta (sow), and Puke (goblin). 
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STATEBUILDING PROCESSES AND SOURCES OF 
SOCIAL POWER 
The context within which the lawspeaker institution develops429, is 
a state-building process, driven by an emergent royal power in close 
cooperation with the church.  
I will discuss this process utilizing Michael Mann’s concept of 
political power as constructed from three different sources of power, 
which he, modifying Weber, identifies as economic, military430, and 
ideological power. The notion of ‘ideological power’ seems to me far 
too diffuse, and, indeed ideological in itself, why I choose to 
substitute the concept of ‘normative power’431. In order to centralize 
(political) power, the king needs to achieve control over physical 
force and find ways to mobilize economic resources. Both of these 
objectives require a normative underpinning – partly provided by the 
church – but there is also an independent necessity for norm-building 
in order to form societal units. Normative power generally has to fall 
back on sanctions – economic (fines) or physical (violence) – but the 
strongest sanction during this time was social exclusion: to outlaw the 
offender. Adjudication, the process of solving internal conflicts, is 
one of the most fundamental building techniques used in constructing 
human societies, and here there is space for a purely normative 
                                                   
429 I refrain from speculation as to what extent it might be built upon a previously 
existing regional power structure, based on a spokesman function and/or lineage 
status. There is no reason to postulate that political power must have been 
constructed on a uniform pattern covering all the different regions. 
430 The standard Weberian trichotomy is economy, politics and ideology, but as 
Weber interpreted political power as ultimately based on military resources, Mann 
argues that political power is not one of the fundamental sources, but a 
composite form of power constructed from all of the three basic ones (Mann 
1986, 1988). 
431 Borrowed from a differently modified version of neo-Weberian sociology – Poggi 
1978. 
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technique: persuasion432. There is a case to made for persuasive 
power as one of the fundamental sources, but for the moment I will 
only use it as a subdivision or subaspect of normative power. 
 The role of the lawspeakers within the statebuilding project must 
have been to tie the processes of adjudication into the state structure, 
as a source of state power which will make normation possible on 
the realm-level. A very important step here is the creation of a 
widened form of social exclusion, biltoghet, which outlawed the 
offender not only within his home region, but over the whole realm. 
The provincial law codes known to us are all part of this process, as 
Nyström 1974b and Sjöholm 1988 have argued in different ways, but 
also reflect the underlying power struggles at stake in the social 
compromises involved in constructing the state. Violent revolts and 
intermittent civil war were characteristic of this period, and indeed of 
most parts of the medieval history of Sweden, but it is not easy to 
define the ‘parties’ involved. The Folkung risings during the state-
formation period have been interpreted as a magnate reaction against 
centralization of power, possibly in alliance with independent 
peasants reacting against the introduction of taxation (Lönnroth 1959). 
Some of the leaders of these rebellions belonged to families later 
providing lawspeakers to the Swedish state. Is this a symptom of 
resistance to centralization or a sign that the Crown eventually 
succeeded to integrate its opponents? 
Even after Earl Birger’s dynasty had succeeded to unite the claims 
of the earlier competing dynasties and to vanquish the successive 
rebellions, power struggles between different royal pretenders – 
                                                   
432 Basically, this is the ability to convince. It is based on the communicative ability 
of humans. A chief or ‘big man’ (Sahlins) may reach dominance through an ability 
to persuade including elements of the other power sources (his inexpendability 
as a generous provider of goods and/or his ability to physically intimidate). The 
Swedish rebel leader Engelbrekt, whom I have discussed above (Chapter 3), 
obviously was a very efficient persuader: not only was he good at mobilizing 
peasant levies – most of his successful captures of royal castles during the 
rebellion were the results of negotiations with the commanders. He successfully 
negotiated 6-9 surrenders, using a skilful combination of threats and offers 
(including, in two cases, large amounts of cash), while there is only one case of 
taking a castle by attack and one burnt-down among the castles attacked under 
his own command. Where he didn’t succeed, he negotiated truces (8 cases – 
none of the other commanders did) or organised sieges, which he left for 
subcommanders to maintain (7 cases). His original function as a spokesman for 
the disgruntled commonalty within the fief of Västerås, also shows that he was a 
man of words to at least as high an extent as a man of action. Evidently he 
combined both of these characteristics efficiently, and the element of physical 
persuasion attributed to him at the so-called council meeting at Arboga 1434 (see 
Chapter 3) may thus be more than a pretext. 
233 
brothers against brothers, sons against fathers, cousins against 
cousins, became the new mode of internal strife. Can we always find 
a rationale for the different standpoints in these struggles? For or 
against a strong state, for or against a strong church, for an alliance 
with Norway or one with Denmark, for union or nation, for royal 
authority or constitutional principle? 
Or is power struggle just endemic in a redistributive society based 
on the extraction of peasant surplus by a class of professional 
warriors? And ideological motivation just a part of the propaganda 
legitimizing the breaks of oaths and truces433? 
There are obviously a lot of underlying conflicts of interest during 
these stormy centuries, and as long as we remember that they are 
largely filtered through the taking of sides in acute conflicts by 
professional powerstrugglers who may find it in their interest to 
change sides at any moment, I still think that it is possible to find 
rational explanations for these conflicts. 
Erik Lönnroth – between idealism and materialism 
Erik Lönnroth has put forward two widely divergent perspectives 
on the lines of division during the medieval Swedish power struggles. 
One is fundamentally idealist: the conflict between royal proto-
absolutism (regimen regale) and constitutionalism (regimen 
politicum). The other one is thoroughly materialist434: the tension 
between economic power based on the exploitation of peasant 
production and economic power based on participation in the 
circulation process.  
I consider both of these lines of division very important (and their 
intersections!), but I disagree with the idealist interpretation of the 
first one. As I have argued elsewhere, I consider it a specific Swedish 
(and to some extent probably also an English435) trait, that the 
alternatives in the power struggle between monarch and nobility 
were not royal centralization versus noble (‘feudal’) decentralization, 
but monarchic or oligarchic control over a power centre, a state, 
which both sides helped to construct and which neither was prepared 
to dismantle. 
                                                   
433 A rain-coat to put on when you need it, as the young Queen Christina said 
about religion in a discussion with the Marshal Jakob de la Gardie. 
434 And, maybe for that very reason, not as explicitly articulated. The clearest 
formulation can be found in Lönnroth 1940, in the chapter about the Sture 
administration. 
435 The analyses in Anderson 1974b and Bendix 1978, suggest this. See page 139. 
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Lönnroth’s second line of division I would connect to Tilly’s 
discussion of coercion-intensive and capital-intensive state-building. 
His argument is that where there are sufficient monetary flows 
possible to tap, a ‘cheap, slim state’ can be constructed, without the 
need of a too oppressive state apparatus, but where this option is not 
at hand, the only alternative is to squeeze the necessary resources out 
of the peasant masses. Then oppression will be the fundamental 
characteristic of the resulting state. The twin processes of military 
competition, necessitating an ‘accumulation of means of coercion’, 
and of economic competition driving the accumulation of capital, 
make the successful states converge on a mixed strategy (where it is 
feasible) setting the standard for successful state-building and the 
requirements for state survival. Thus the ‘consolidated state’436 is born 
and the wide spectrum of state-forms found in late medieval Europe 
is reduced to variations on the same theme. 
Tilly considers early modern Sweden to be an example of coercion-
intensive statebuilding, although its role in the development of inter-
state rivalry would fit better along with the mixed-strategy pioneers 
(England, France and Spain). The lack of expansive cities is the main 
stumbling-stone, but if we consider Lönnroth’s scheme, it might be 
possible to make a broader definition. The socio-political alliance 
behind the ‘Sture faction’ dominating Sweden’s medieval power 
struggles after 1471 was, according to Lönnroth, based on the mutual 
trade-centered interests of city burghers, mining peasants (and mining 
gentry), and cattle-trade oriented landowners in the border regions, 
while their adversaries’ alliance was based on the common interests 
of grain-producing peasants and landlords in the central Swedish 
provinces. Lönnroth’s categoric interpretations of the medieval power 
struggles has been largely abandoned, but if we see his purpose as 
making analytical distinctions, and constructing ideal-type models 
rather than as reconstructing the implicit political programmes for 
defined and cohesive interest groups437, I think that they still merit 
serious consideration. His analysis of the economic failure of the 
Mecklenburger invasion argues that the undeveloped Swedish 
economy simply was not productive enough to support a continental-
style knightly army, and that the solution of the Sture administration438 
was to compensate for the low level of economic exchange through a 
                                                   
436 Earlier he talked of nation-states, but he now considers that term to create more 
confusion than it solves. 
437  Which is a view implicit in much of the criticism, but even if Lönnroth’s elegant 
rhetoric sometimes gives such an impression, his analysis is far from simplistic. 
438 Later to be further developed by Gustavus Vasa. 
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version of ‘administrated trade’, where local specialization was 
encouraged through complementary forms of in-kind tax exaction, 
and where the surplus product was realized through carrying the 
different goods to locations where they were in higher demand. In 
this way the level of division of labour and specialized production 
was boosted through the regime’s intervention, and, reasonably, this 
should have raised productivity according to normal Smithian 
expectations. 
In my modified Weber-Poggi-Mann model, power based upon 
control over economic resources may in this way be subdivided into 
control over production and control over circulation439. That might 
serve as a common foundation for Lönnroth’s and Tilly’s distinctions, 
which could both exemplify the possible scope of material interests, 
and the possibility of alliances – however fleeting and transitory the 
allegiance of different actors to such potential convergences of 
interests. 
The peculiarities of Swedish feudalism –  
Lagerroth’s view 
Lagerroth 1947:150-3 discusses Swedish länsväsende in relation to 
European feudalism (explicitly referring to Bloch). Lagerroth points 
out, that the Swedish mansförhållande as reflected in e g the Statute 
of Alsnö, corresponds to the general European vassalage, but that the 
expression 'Men of the Realm' which with increasing frequency 
replaces 'the King's Men', leads to a change of emphasis: the notion 
of serving the country becomes more important than the personal 
service relation to the King. Neither does the union between benefice 
and vassalage apply to Sweden, Lagerroth argues, and besides, the 
Swedish benefices, like the Norwegian, are just to be seen as grants 
of incomes, not of offices, as the Swedish fiefholder  exercised his 
authority in the King's name, and the immediate relationship between 
King and subject did not disappear. Moreover, one public function, 
judgement, was always reserved from the fiefholder. 
Another ‘exceptional’ characteristic, he argues, is the absence of a 
peculiar feudal institution: 
It should hardly be necessary to mention, that it would never have 
occurred to anyone, that the Swedish medieval nobility should give up 
                                                   
439 Circulation here encompasses the whole phenomenon of ‘feudal realization’ as 
well as precocious versions of capitalist realization. 
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their allodial land to receive it back as fiefs from the King. (Lagerroth 
1947:152; my translation)  
Here we can stop to ask: how often did this ‘occur’ to anyone, 
anywhere? Reynolds (1994) points out that the English don't even 
have a word for this phenomenon – the fief de reprise (393) – and the 
only example she cites in the part about England in Fiefs and Vassals 
concerns King John’s surrender of his kingdom to Pope Innocent III. 
This suggests that Innocent may have thought of England as what 
Italian historians call a feudo oblato ... In the letter in which he 
condemned Magna Charta the pope said that the king had received 
England and Ireland back in feudum and referred to the rebels as 
vassali conspiring against their lord and milites conspiring against their 
king. (Reynolds 1994a:390) 
An almost identical idea had entered the mind of at least one 
Swedish king some 60 years later:  
At the end of the same year Valdemar has invoked protection from 
the Holy See against insurgents and pretenders. This appears from the 
Pope’s order of January 9th, 1275, to the Archbishop and the Bishop 
of Linköping to give the King the requested protection. Valdemar had 
even gone so far as to formally acknowledge the Pope as his liege 
lord. (Yrwing 1952:32; my translation) 
Analogous strategies also seem to have been invented by Swedish 
peasants in the mid-14th century, or at least by the King and his men, 
to whom it ‘occurred’ that peasants might commend their allodial 
land to aristocrats through feigned land sales, and thus evade 
taxation. Swedish historians usually interpret this as a simple tax-
dodge collusion, and seem to expect that peasants and gentlemen 
divided the profit more or less equally. This betrays a certain 
blindness to the realities of uneven power – to put oneself under 
someone else's protection is to put oneself at the mercy of the 
protector, even if the danger one seeks protection against is 
something as commonplace as high taxes; at that time, however, 
there were also other and maybe even more threatening dangers than 
taxes, despite the impending onset of agrarian crisis – the only 
peaceful period in medieval Sweden exceeding 20 years was also 
drawing to an end, and the recurrent civil wars were soon to return 
for the best part of the remaining century. In such a situation, 
protection by the Church might seem less dangerous than by the 
competing lords – no wonder that Queen Margaret's inquiry into 
alienated tax-land struck much  harder against the parish churches 
than against cathedrals and monasteries (Rosén 1950). 
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The figure of thought behind the fief de reprise was not so abstruse 
as it came to seem when it was inferred in hindsight by historians – 
or sought after in vain as an indicator of ‘true’ feudal development:  
It would be a misconception to suppose that all fiefs were in fact 
created by a grant made by a lord to the vassal. Paradoxical as it may 
seem, many actually originated in a gift by the vassal to the lord; for 
the man who sought protection had frequently to pay for the 
privilege. The powerful individual who forced his weaker neighbour 
to submit to him was apt to require the surrender of his property as 
well as his person. (Bloch 1961:171) 
That it seldom occurred to Swedish aristocrats440 to give away their 
own land to receive it back, might have been because they usually 
had other options. We do not know, however, whether the ‘men’ 
serving under the King’s men, who became exempt from taxes 
through the Statute of Alsnö441 had to commend their land (if they had 
any) to their lords. The advantage to the lord of putting this on paper 
would have been questionable. 
The executors of Bo Jonsson's will gave away the castle-fiefs they 
were holding to Queen Margaret, and received them back as fiefs 
held from her, and even if these castles and territories were not their 
allodial property442, the mortgage fief system had by then evolved into 
a device for investment and speculation in property443 where allodium 
was not necessarily the most advantageous title to property in every 
case.  
So: most of the institutional alternatives of the feudal mix were 
available at least in 13th century Sweden, and the choices between 
them depended on the conjunctures in the feudal power game – like 
everywhere else in medieval Europe – and led to a different 
social/political/economic/institutional settlement than the norm, 
which is also true of every situation except the one that you have 
defined as the norm. 
                                                   
440 The conventional interpretation of the Statute is questioned by Bjurling 1952, 
Sjöholm 1988, and Bjarne Larsson 1994; in any case, the similar arrangement 
found in the Land Law of ca 1350 (MELL) is not presented as entirely novel, and 
should at least have been introduced at some point between 1280 and 1350.  
441 Or at some other date – the question of how to interpret this statute per se is 
not necessary for the argument. 
442 Some of the castles and fiefs in the testament may have been, but as Queen 
Margaret’s subsequent inquiry redefined the terms of landholding retroactively, it 
hardly mattered. 
443 And at the same time in political control – the objectives of fortune-hunting and 
political ambition were fused in this process in a way that would be very difficult 
to convey, were we to deprive ourselves of the term feudal. (Cf Gurevich) 
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Three-dimensional seigneurialism 
Duby (1980) describes a seigneur’s power as deriving from three 
sources:  
 
1. seigneurie fonciére is based on his ownership of land. This 
aspect of lordly power could be termed the proprietary 
dimension.  
2. seigneurie domestique is the power that derives from his 
household. He is the master of everyone working for him, 
including, very importantly, those armed retainers without 
whom his power might prove impossible to maintain. This I 
consider to be the patriarchal dimension of lordly power. 
3. seigneurie banale, finally, is the power derived from his 
public functions, as an administrator, judge or upholder of 
public monopolies (mills and other banalités). 
 
When a seigneur combines in his own person the triple force of 
these different forms of lordship, his authority would seem positively 
overwhelming. We should by no means imagine, though, that the 
three dimensions were always combined. An important aspect of 
Swedish feudalism is the subdivision of the public dimension into two 
complementary and competing aspects:  
 
3a. the castellan (slottsherre), captain (hövitsman), or bailiff 
(fogde)444 was responsible for the economic and military 
aspects of state power – levying taxes, fines, and other 
dues, protecting the region both against external attack and 
internal rebellion, organizing the material support of the 
castle, which included the stocking of necessary provisions 
and the conversion of the different articles of taxes in kind 
into those necessary for maintenance and military 
capability445.  
3b. the lawspeakers and hundred sheriffs were responsible for 
holding public courts of different instance 
 
This is what Lagerroth emphasizes in his comparison between 
Swedish fief system and general European feudalism:  
                                                   
444 The categories slide into each other, but appear to denote somewhat different 
delegations of authority (Fritz 1972:156ff). 
445 I e: solving what I term the ‘feudal realization problem’, in the final instance 
usually effected through trade (passive or active). Cf  page 46. 
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The Swedish fiefholder exercised his authority in the King’s name, 
and the immediate relationship between the King and his other 
subjects did not cease. One public function, the judiciary, was always 
excepted in Sweden (1947:151f; my translation) 
That may be true, but only to the extent that the King’s authority 
was also effectively exercised446; however, conditions of power were 
for a very large part of Swedish medieval history contested and 
therefore we may question the relevance of such statements: the 
‘immediate relationship to the king’ is not a constant given but 
something contestable. If it tends to disappear447, though, this can also 
be contested. This is why I argue that ambiguity, leading to 
contestation, is a dynamic element. 
Castellans and lawspeakers – any overlaps? 
In general, though, the top-down system of castle fiefs was held 
separate from the bottom-up system of villages, parishes, hundreds 
and provinces. When a lawspeaker also functioned as a castellan, 
which was not uncommon, he normally did so in another province. 
There are quite a few exceptions, though, primarily in marginal 
provinces: 
 
• in Finland first Nils Turesson (Bielke) and then Bo Jonsson 
(Grip) combined the functions of lawspeaker and castellan. In 
general, Finland often seems to have functioned as a province 
on conditions separate from the rest of Sweden, and became 
the closest Swedish equivalent of ‘feudal separatism’ at several 
points in its history. 
• Norrland, the vast Northern part of Sweden, belonged to the 
lawspeakership of Uppland, and at least the two lawspeakers 
Ture Bengtsson (Bielke) and Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik)448 were 
also castellans in Norrland (Faxeholm, in Ture’s case; Korsholm, 
in Nils’). In the core-land of the lawspeakership, the only 
example seems to be Karl Ulfsson of Tofta doubling as a 
castellan of Stockholm in 1364-65. This happens at the very 
moment when King Magnus is deposed by Albrecht of 
Mecklenburg, though, and when the exiled Karl Ulfsson is 
                                                   
446 Cf Reynolds 1984 (passim) for examples of public authority persisting 
throughout the Middle Ages. 
447 As when the king refuses to listen to peasant grievances, like Eric of Pomerania 
in 1432-34. 
448 Lawspeakers in 1407/09-1417 and 1417/21-32/37, respectively. 
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returning as a military leader of the invasion army. It is also a 
quite transitory arrangement. A more ambiguous case is Birger 
Petersson’s role as a tax-collector in Uppland under the Dukes’ 
regime (Rosén 1939)449. 
• in Värmland, Erik Kettilsson Puke and Agmund Hatt seem to 
have combined the two functions – explicitly in Agmund’s case, 
as he was officially both castellan and lawspeaker, and at least 
de facto in Erik’s (Nilsson 1997:55f, 70f).  
• in Småland, divided between the lawspeakerships of 
Tiohärad450  and Östergötland, (which still controlled the 
hundreds adjacing it to the south, as well as the coastal region) 
the important city of Kalmar grew up around a stronghold 
whose first known castellan is Magnus Bengtsson, lawspeaker 
of Östergötland and a nephew of Earl Birger. In a letter quoted 
by Yrwing (1952:69) he refers to himself as ‘legifer Osgotorum, 
prefectusque Kalmarniensis’ 451, so at least on the margins of his 
lawspeakership, he combined the functions. 
  
Larsson 1964:110f points out that during the middle 1330’s, parts of 
Värend452 belong to the mortgage fief of Kalmar, where Ulf 
Abjörnsson – son-in-law of the earlier castellan and present 
lawspeaker of Tiohärad, Sune Jonsson – is the castellan while the 
administration and taxation of Värend is ‘entrusted to their mutual 
relative Nils Dannes453’, whose cousin Gustav Nilsson at the same time 
has the castellany of Varberg, comprising northern Halland and 
Finnveden454. To Larsson’s picture can be added:  
 
1. While Sune Jonsson (Båt) was castellan of Kalmar, Erik 
Turesson (Bielke) – the elder brother of Nils Dannes – had  
been the lawspeaker of Tiohärad 
                                                   
449 Knut Jonsson of Östergötland also ’seems to have had administrative tasks in the 
province in excess of those motivated by his position as lawspeaker, High 
Steward and councillor.’ (Fritz1973:83; my translation) 
450 The old mini-provinces of Värend, Finnveden and Njudung in the central parts, 
bordering on Danish provinces to the south and southwest, and on 
Västergötland to the north and north-west. 
451 He may have been trying to emulate his eldest uncle, Eskil lagman, who labeled 
himself legifer visigotorum in 1219. See page 219. 
452 The dominant part of Tiohärad. 
453 Belonging to the Bielke family and married to Sune’s niece. The word “mutual” 
seems a bit exaggerated: Ulf’s and Nils’ wives were cousins – I cannot find any 
independent connection between them. 
454 Another part of Tiohärad.  
241 
2. When Ulf Abjörnsson (Tofta) appears in Kalmar his brother 
Nils has just become drots (High Steward), giving him ‘full 
authority over the castles, crown incomes and justice’ (op cit 
). If this group did function as a cohesive power group at the 
time – which is not at all certain as many of them had 
connections to other networks that might override their 
loyalties to this particular configuration – they would have 
controlled a belt reaching across the whole of Sweden and 
(potentially) cutting off the recently acquired province of 
Scania from the rest of Sweden. 
3. At least by 1339, Sune’s other son-in-law, Nils Turesson, 
(Bielke)455 becomes lawspeaker of the island of Öland (west 
of Kalmar), which might complete the imagined cut-off. The 
only lawspeaker that we know of there before him, is Sune 
Jonsson around 1319-22, so if someone else has held the 
office in between, it would very probably have been 
someone related to them. 
4. Gustav Nilsson and Ulf Abjörnsson would each in turn 
succeed Sune Jonsson as lawspeakers of Tiohärad, followed 
by Nils Turesson (who was also Gustav’s cousin) 
5. As Kalmar was a mortgage fief for some time after 1332 a lot 
of money must have been needed to acquire it. The family of 
Henrik Glysing, who had acted as the ‘banker’ of Magnus 
Ladulås (Gillingstam in ÄSF53f), had close connections with 
many in this network. One of his daughters married Sune 
Jonsson and the other Gustav Nilsson. His son married Erik 
Turesson’s daughter456.  
 
This example shows that the separation between the powers of 
military force and rent exaction on the one hand, and of regional 
justice on the other, might be combined in clandestine ways difficult 
for us to discern. Still, the kind of ‘collective banal lordship’ that 
might be constructed with such methods would be contingent and 
lacking institutional stability – it would hardly be more stable than 
other fleeting alliances pooling different kinds of power.  
Still, the particular network described here was so densely 
interconnected, and possessed such a strategic geographic position 
within the ‘crisis of the Swedish-Scanian commonwealth’ described by 
Sjöstedt 1954, that we might suspect them of having played a more 
                                                   
455 The brother of Erik Turesson and Nils Dannes. 
456 Also, Erik’s wife and Sune’s second wife were sisters. 
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central role than they do in his account. Within the group of 
magnates inciting prince Eric to his rebellion, Nils Turesson (Bielke) 
was one of the obvious leaders, together with Karl Ulfsson of Tofta, 
the son of Ulf Abjörnsson, and Earl Erengisle Suneson, the son of 
Sune Jonsson. These three457 were tied together through the 
intermarriages and interlocking interests in the key geographic area, 
and the three interconnected families they represented can together 
with in-laws  account for six or seven out of the fifteen known rebels 
(cf Sjöstedt 1954:171-177.). Sjöstedt argues that the diocese of 
Linköping was the ‘cradle of the rising’, (211) but a stronger case 
might be made for Småland.  
Divided lordships – freer peasants 
A divided lordship will of course leave more space for peasant 
freedom and communal self-regulation. A lord who has to rely on 
only one source of lordly power must with necessity have less 
coercive capacity than Duby’s triple seigneur, but there is also 
another aspect: if other lords with other pretensions to authority 
exercise their power in the vicinity, this may lead to competition 
between the lords: actively, if they try to encroach on each other’s 
power bases, or passively, in that peasants can try to balance one 
authority against another. 
As Robisheaux describes the conditions of lordship458 in Western 
Germany: 
Peasants might have one lord with rights over the land and its 
resources, another for personal bondage (serfdom), and a third for 
justice. Lordship could be exercised not only by the nobility, but also 
by princes, ecclesiastical institutions, towns and other corporations. 
(Robisheaux 1998:133) 
Where the roles of castellan and lawspeaker were held apart, 
which was usually the case, Swedish peasants should have had access 
to forms of legal protest already before the revolution against king 
Eric; in any case the outcome of this revolution confirmed the 
existence of such rights (see chapter 3). 
                                                   
457 Together with Bishop Nils Markusson of Linköping, they were the foremost 
members of the rebel party according to Sjöstedt 1954:212.  
458 Where he also discusses the reciprocal aspects of the right to protection and the 
peasants’ share in ‘the formal and informal processes of domination’. Here I am 
only discussing the aspect of multiple lordship. 
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THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE LAWSPEAKERS –
PERIOD BY PERIOD 
In order to analyze the recruitment and distribution of lawspeakers, 
we should subdivide the survey according to the general conditions 
of the statebuilding process. The following periods may be discerned: 
 
1. A formative period when a state apparatus capable of 
functioning also in the absence of a king (or a king-substitute) 
is slowly constructed (1219-1319). 
2. A period of state consolidation under competitive tension but 
also cooperation between monarchy and oligarchy  (1319-
1356).  
3. A conflict-ridden period where oligarchic oppositions 
repeatedly contest royal power leading to more or less constant 
civil war (1356-1389). 
4. A period of conscious attempts to remold the state into a royal 
instrument (1389-1434). 
5. A tumultuous period of revolution and ensuing power struggle 
where competing alternatives coalesce into a compromise 
between oligarchy and monarchy (1434-48). 
6. A new period of recurrent civil war where at least three459 state-
building alternatives compete for power on different geographic 
aggregation levels (1448-1521). 
 
Here I will only discuss the first four periods, as a closer analysis of 
the two last periods would have to consider the question of who did 
appoint each lawspeaker, and to situate them into the contexts of the 
mutable factions connected to the different state-building alternatives. 
I am not yet prepared to offer a detailed survey of those periods.  
I. Formation and formalization (1219-1319)  
The first period is characterized by the slow construction of a state 
apparatus based on castellanies, interrupted by a series of aristocratic 
rebellions, one of which ousts King Valdemar in favour of his brother, 
Duke Magnus. Also by the extension of the lawspeaker office to all 
                                                   
459 One oligarchic and two monarchic alternatives: the Union monarchy and a local 
Swedish principate. 
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the regions460,  the diffusion of provincial law-codes461 and by the 
gradual integration of lawspeakers into the King’s Council462. Before 
any of these processes is completed, the nascent state apparatus starts 
to subdivide, being sundered by the conflict between King Birger and 
his brothers, the Dukes Erik and Valdemar. During this, the 
lawspeaker office is politicized, and different demarcations between 
areas under the control of each side lead to changes of lawspeakers 
(Rosén 1939:239f, 262f, 307f). Jägerstad argues against Rosén that the 
council aristocracy largely tries to avoid choosing sides, as they prefer 
a splintered royal power to a strong and united one. Finally, the 
conflict culminates with the imprisonment and murder of the Dukes, 
and a general rebellion exiles the King.  
The provincial law-codes might be seen as a form of aristocratic 
counter-consolidation on the regional level, as Elsa Sjöholm has 
argued (1988). At least it makes sense to view the Uppland law code 
in this perspective. The consolidation of three earlier mini-regions 
into one, coterminous with the archsee and in some way co-ordinated 
with it, as the inclusion of the archdean Andreas And in the law 
commission seems to suggest, and strong enough to function as a 
balancing secular power centre upheld by the lawspeaker – as Birger 
Petersson’s position in the struggle over tithe alms shows (Rosén 
1939). The question of whether the lawspeaker institution originated 
in attempts at royal centralization or in aristocratic attempts to balance 
the centralization might not be possible to resolve, but at least at this 
point463 he would be capable of fulfilling either function – or both.  
                                                   
460 This process is not fully completed until later – incontrovertible evidence for 
Öland does not appear before 1339, although there is a good case to be made 
for 1319. Lawspeakers or deputy lawspeakers for Finland or part of Finland 
appear from 1324 onwards (Anthoni 1970), but not until 1362 does it become a 
fully independent lawspeakership, with a separate vote in the royal election 
ceremony (which Öland  never attains during the Middle Ages, and neither, it 
would seem, Värmland). Even discounting these two provinces, it is not until 
1305 that we can identify the lawspeakers for each of these seven provinces at 
the same time. 
461 Neither is this process completed during the period – indeed it never happens, 
as the Land Law is introduced before every province has acquired its own law 
code. 
462 This does not mean that all of the lawspeakers become regular council-members 
(as Birgitta Fritz points out), but that they are available for council duty, and may 
be called upon to augment it when necessary. 
463 But this might have been true already of Eskil. That I consider Sjöholm’s analysis 
believable in this aspect does not mean that I subscribe to her absurd dictum of 
two mutually exclusive theories: an ‘oral tradition’ theory and a ‘reception theory’ 
either one of which you have to embrace fully or not at all (Sjöholm 1988). 
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Lawspeakers during the first period:  
A. 1219-1296 and B. 1296-1305:  
My analysis of the first 26 lawspeakers goes up to 1296, and the 
five464 later entrants conform to the earlier pattern of relation to the 
royal family, except Svantepolk Knutsson who is related to Danish 
kings and an earlier Earl, and – through his wife – to an older 
Swedish royal house465. Two of the newcomers are related to 
predecessors. One, Knut Magnusson (lion), is the nephew of the 
Marshal Tyrgils Knutsson, the strong man of Birger Magnusson’s 
regency, who is executed in 1305. Knut becomes the first (or maybe 
the second466) case of a politically dismissed lawspeaker, but makes a 
return later, in another province.  
                                                   
464 I omit the totally unknown Sune in Närke 1301, who is the last case of this kind. 
His only other appearance in preserved medieval documents suggests that he 
may be related to lawspeakers descended from Earl Birger’s brother Elof. 
465 Also, through his mother, from the Dukes of Pommerellen, from where his 
unusual name derives. 
466 On the replacement of Knut Magnusson, cf Rosén 1939:108. The dismissal of 
Algot Brynolfsson in 1288, after his son abducted one of  Svantepolk Knutsson’s 
daughters and fled to Norway, is probably also, as Rosén argues (1939:17f), to be 
interpreted as the outcome of a political and diplomatic crisis rather than as a 
simple criminal case. 
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Chart 21: Lawspeakers 1296-1318 
 
As I’ve mentioned above, 1305 is also the first year for which we 
can identify lawspeakers in all of the provinces467 at the same time. 
Among these eight men, Magnus Gregersson is a grandson of Earl 
Birger, Bengt Hafridsson (lion) and Magnus Karlsson (Lejonbalk) of 
his sister, and Knut Magnusson (lion) of his niece. Lidinvard Ödesson 
(Örnfot) and Filip Ingevaldsson (Örnsparre) are married to his 
granddaughters, and Birger Petersson (Finsta) to a great 
granddaughter of his elder brother, Bishop Bengt. Furthermore, 
Magnus Karlsson is married to the daughter of another brother, Elof.  
Svantepolk Knutsson is a grandson of a Danish King and of an Earl of 
Östergötland. All of the other lawspeakers either carried a royal lion 
in their blazons, or were married (Birger, Lidinvard and Filip) to 
wives that did468.  
C. 1306-19: King Birger and the Dukes 
Two new entrants – Algot Jonsson (antlers) and Gudmar 
Magnusson (Ulvåsa) – have married into a sideline of the dynasty, 
while Knut Jonsson (Aspenäs), the son of an executed Folkung-rising 
leader, inherits the office of his father-in-law and of his maternal 
grandfather (Svantepolk). Politically motivated shifts (Rosén 1939:109) 
occur in six or seven cases (at least – there are gaps in the sources). 
Their replacements conform to the general pattern: Filip 
                                                   
467 Except Öland and Finland, which are added later. 
468 Svantepolk carried a royal Danish lion (leopard) on his shield. 
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Ingevaldsson, who remained on the side of the Dukes, was at the 
settlement of 1310 replaced by Stefan Röriksson (Staffanssönerna) 
married to Magnus Gregersson’s niece; Ture Kettilsson (Bielke), who 
replaced Magnus Karlsson for the same reason, was the son-in-law of 
an earlier Tiohärad lawspeaker (op cit 240). Ture was also the King’s 
treasurer. When he is later removed from this office, he is also 
replaced as a lawspeaker, by Tuke Jonsson (Läma)469. Knut Jonsson is 
also dismissed from the office of High Steward, but remains a 
lawspeaker until the opposition takes over. Then he is (temporarily) 
replaced by his son-in-law, Bo Nilsson (Natt och Dag) who had 
belonged to the Dukes’ men all along.  
It is possible that Bengt Hafridsson’s son-in-law Knut ?Jonsson470 
(Tre Rosor) also functions as a lawspeaker during the gap between 
Gudmar Magnusson’s death and Knut Magnusson’s. He appears in 
Stiernman’s list (SGH), but this claim does not seem to be backed by 
any supporting evidence. As his son-in-law Magnus Håkansson, who 
does not have any other obvious connection to lawspeaker families, 
later holds the office in Södermanland, and his grandson Knut 
Jonsson (see page 271) also becomes a Västergötland lawspeaker, it 
is by no means self-evident that he belongs to Stiernman’s mistakes. 
II. Consolidation and tension (1319-1356)  
The second period starts with the election of the three-year old 
Magnus Eriksson as a King in accordance with a ceremony probably 
never used before471, and at the same time the assembly proclaims 
what has been called the Swedish ‘Charter of Liberty’, a conjuration 
where the magnates promise to preserve all the ‘rights, freedoms, 
privileges, and ancient customs’ that duly belong to the Men and 
Churches of the Realm of Sweden, and declare that no new taxes 
may be collected in the future without first being announced and put 
forward to ‘all of us’. Then this is to be announced (‘by us’) to the 
community in the different parts of the realm, and only after a ‘careful 
deliberation and examination’ may new taxes be collected.  
Jägerstad 1948:250 points out that  
• the tumultuous period 1306-19 has brought the Church and the 
aristocracy together in that the earlier struggle between the 
privileged classes has been replaced by a common interest in 
                                                   
469 The brother of a Marshal and possibly a great grandson(sds) of Earl Birger. 
470 His patronymic is uncertain (ÄSF2), but if we believe Stiernman, it should be 
Jonsson. 
471 Cf Sjöholm 1988. 
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resisting the royal power concentration and the rising taxation 
pressure. 
• the twentyfive signatories do not style themselves a council – 
despite the general tendency of historians to describe them 
thus; neither do those who have been councillors use the title 
in the document, although they do so in other letters from the 
same time.  
• They do not in any way describe themselves as a regency, in 
which case they would reasonably be the ones responsible for 
announcing the need of new taxes. The signatories on the 
contrary expect to become the objects of future taxation 
demands. 
He therefore concludes that the promise to aid and advice the High 
Steward Mats Kettilmundsson and his successors show the purpose of 
the letter: the signatories formulate their conditions for supporting the 
regency 
His argument is quite convincing, but one thing he does not 
discuss is the role of the lawspeakers, who do use their titles in the 
list of signatories, in contrast to the councillors. Obviously they 
consider the subject of justifiable taxation to fall under their sphere of 
competence472. Also the general purpose of the assembly, to elect a 
king, had recently been declared to be the responsibility of the 
lawspeakers, which must have augmented the distinction of the 
office, and served to bind them together as a collective. As Jägerstad 
argues, there wouldn’t really have existed any council at the time, 
since the council is chosen by the king, and royal authority had been 
fragmented for more than a decade. However, the lawspeakers, 
together with the bishops, provided continuity, and the two groups 
together ensure the cohesion and regional balance of a country that is 
still far from integrated; maybe the lawspeakers can even be said to 
develop into some sort of quasi-representation473 by this time. 
The two decades of the regency474 are usually seen as a period of 
more or less collective rule, and of consolidation for the council. 
Jägerstad, on the other hand, considers the High Steward Knut 
Jonsson to have ruled the country in person, as the sole regent, while 
                                                   
472 Which may give a clue to their role in the rebellion against Eric of Pomerania. 
473 Cf the councils and meetings of lords listed in Beckman subdivided according to 
provincial affiliation, (Beckman 1954:542-547) and the example of an earlier 
lawspeaker filling in for his absent successor in a case put before the council 
(270). 
474 Leaving the first year under Mats Kettilmundsson’s aegis aside, as also the two 
years when the Duchess Ingeborg took command of the regency. 
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the council had little share in the business of government. Still he 
describes the evolution of the council into an  
ever more independent institution with a manifest character of 
estate representation and with fixed demands for influence on the 
governing of the country. The Swedish Realm during this time gives 
the impression of an aristocratic republic with the High Steward Knut 
Jonsson as its leader and the council as its senate(295; my translation),  
so the contrasting viewpoint seems to be no more than a change of 
emphasis.  
As four to six replacements are made before Magnus’ 
majority, the council must have become self-perpetuating 
through co-optation, as can be seen within the lawspeaker 
college, where there are two tendencies:  
1. more or less hereditary offices,  
but also  
2. a tendency that lawspeakers can move between provinces.  
These two tendencies almost seem like polar opposites, but both of 
them serve to integrate the group, and a combined form also appears: 
a lawspeaker’s son is appointed to office, but in another province (Ulf 
Gudmarsson). 
 During this period, the new chivalric class defined by the statute of 
Alsnö475 is amalgamated with the old magnate stratum, and hierarchic 
relations introduced on the model of Central European feudalism 
serve to integrate the frälse category. Of course this process has 
started already in the preceding period, and the promulgation of 
chivalric ideology through the Erikskrönika, written early in this 
period, marks the maturation of chivalry as an integrative aristocratic 
ideology for the frälse class. The promulgation of the Lawspeaker 
myth in law-codes and supplements, and the fabrication of the royal 
election legend, which elevates the lawspeakers into a position of 
electors, may be seen as a competing ideological context, stressing 
tradition (since heathen times!), wisdom, and responsibility. St Bridget 
provides yet another mode of discourse, with the added advantage of 
combining religious and secular propaganda, which is closely 
connected to dominant lawspeaker families, and to the rebellious 
factions476 of period III.  
                                                   
475 Or – if the objections to the traditional interpretation of the Alsnö meeting 
should be heeded – defined by the practice of tax-exemption which is soon to 
be codified in the Land Law. 
476 Engström’s ‘Birgittine party’ (1935). 
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Further law-codes are prepared and promulgated and on Magnus’ 
majority; there exists a rudimentary state which is no longer only a 
function of the King’s ability to rule477. During the rest of this period 
the tension between personal royal rule and institutionalized state 
power with a collective component does not preclude the further 
development of normative power and state machinery478, culminating 
in the proclamation of the unitary479 Land Law (MELL) around 1350. 
The financial crisis caused by the purchase of Scania and the ensuing 
warfare, and the King’s more and more desperate attempts to achieve 
greater freedom of action through replacements and reorganizations 
of the High Offices of the Realm, finally lead up to Bengt Algotsson’s 
rise to power through the new office of Duke, sparking a rebellion 
fronted by Magnus’ son Eric (Sjöstedt 1954, passim). 
Lawspeakers during the second period:  
A. 1319-1338: The ‘Charter of Liberty’ oligarchy 
The lawspeakers that solemnly elect the three-year old Magnus 
are basically the victorious faction from the Civil War: the 
Dukes’ Men, and although there has been a reconciliation 
between the two sides after the murder of the Dukes – for 
instance, also three of the lawspeakers who have now been 
replaced did sign the ‘Charter’ – the lawspeakers of 1319 all 
belong to the victorious side (Rosén 1939:299ff, 307f). The 
tension between the two sides seems to have abated, though, 
and two of the ‘royal’ lawspeakers return. One of these, Knut 
Jonsson (Aspenäs) becomes a High Steward (drots) and the 
leader of the regency, after an initial period  dominated by the 
military leader of the rebellion, Mats Kettilmundsson, and the 
King’s mother, the Norwegian princess Ingeborg (Beckman 
1954). During the Regency, the Council has become a self-
perpetuating group, styling themselves ‘Council of the Realm’, 
and co-opting new lawspeakers, usually among their own 
                                                   
477 Earl Birger and Tyrgils Knutsson in their respective regencies both seem to have 
acted more like kings themselves, and despite Jägerstad’s arguments against a 
collective regency, he is in effect saying something very similar. 
478 The council opposition against royal taxation in the 1340’s leads to a compromise 
regulating the conditions for taxation in the Land Law etc 
479 Not quite – towns were regulated according to the new Town Law, and the 
provincial law codes continued to be employed for quite a long time. Also canon 
law held its ground, and the ambition to include a church section in the land law 
seems to have failed. 
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circle. In this period, a new phenomenon is the mobility 
between regions. 
Chart 22: Lawspeakers 1319-1337  
 
 
Knut Magnusson, the executed Marshal’s nephew, has returned, 
this time as lawspeaker of Västergötland, Nils Björnsson (Färla I) in 
Närke is a son of the early Södermanland lawspeaker Björn Näf. 
These two, together with the slightly earlier (1315) reappearance of 
the replaced Filip Ingevaldsson från Södermanland as a (temporary) 
replacement for Birger Petersson in Uppland480, at first sight appear to 
represent an entirely new phenomenon. Suddenly the office itself 
seems to be a more important qualification than the represented 
province. This would seem to be confirmed by the cases of Sune 
Jonsson (Båt), moving from Öland in 1319 to Tiohärad in 1337, and 
Ulf Gudmarson (lion;Ulvåsa), son of a lawspeaker from 
Västergötland, who succeeds Nils Björnsson in Närke, founding a 
lawspeaker dynasty that will hold the office for over 50 years. 
However, it is (not yet, anyway) certain that it is the very 
lawspeakership, that qualifies for office in other provinces as well. All 
of the cases mentioned here still conform to the pattern of royal-
dynasty connection, and if that is the crucial point, local background 
                                                   
480 Rosén (1939:308) explains this as the consequence of a conflict with the 
archbishop. Filip was also one of the Duke’s men. 
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might have been secondary all along.481. As the Council is now self-
perpetuating, royal blood may be just an indicator of highly 
aristocratic descent. In either case, the picture of lawspeakers as local-
community powerholders is weakened.  
The final reconciliation with the Birger’s former men is marked by 
the return to office of Knut Jonsson (Aspenäs), who is reinstated as 
High Steward by 1322, and probably returns to his lawspeakership 
soon after (or at least by 1330). Greger Magnusson (illegitimate 
royal sideline) has already succeeded his father in Västmanland, after 
only a short interlude482, and while Ture Kettilsson does not return to 
office, his son Erik Turesson (Bielke) appears as the lawspeaker of 
his father’s old province, Tiohärad. Erik, however, belonged to the 
Dukes’ men, like Gustav Tunesson (Ving), who becomes 
lawspeaker of Värmland, though he appears to be based in 
Västergötland483, and the two sons of the Dukes’ High Steward, Ulf 
and Nils Abjörnsson (Tofta), who eventually become lawspeakers in 
Tiohärad and Västmanland. Algot Bengtsson (Algotssönerna) is the 
first new lawspeaker who does not seem to have taken part in the 
earlier struggles. 
During the regency this group is remarkably tight and 
homogenous, dominated by the two veteran lawspeakers Knut 
Jonsson (Aspenäs) and Birger Petersson (Finsta), who are both 
married to daughters of Bengt Magnusson, son and successor of Earl 
                                                   
481 Knut Magnusson and Ulf Gudmarsson both belong to families allowed to carry a 
royal lion in their blazon because of female-line descent from the dynasty. Filip 
Ingevaldsson is a grandson-in-law of Earl Birger, Nils Björnsson a great great 
grandnephew of Earl Birger and Sune Jonsson’s first wife was a 5th generation 
descendant of Earl Birger’s sister (and the second wife a 4th gen. descendant of 
his brother). Reasonably, at some point the connecting thread will wear too thin, 
but the very generous extent of incest bans at the time shows that we must not 
underrate the respect for also very distant kinship. 
482 At the beginning of the new regime Magnus Nilsson appears as a lawspeaker. I 
follow Beckman II:452f and Holmbäck-Wessén in Sdml p10n16 in accepting his 
title according to the Charter, pace Rosén 1939:302n12. Even if his 
lawspeakership in the ‘Charter of Freedom’, very possibly was a ‘temporary 
function’, I see no reason to impose standards for the title stricter than actual 
usage. As a member of the law commission for Södermanland he was obviously 
qualified enough to fill in as a temporary lawspeaker, whether he held any land 
in that province or not.  
483  His manor complex there may have been fortified (Lovén 1996:293ff), which is 
rare for the time and seems to suggest more permanent residence. He is listed 
under Västergötland in the Charter of Freedom, and according to Ranehök 
1975:105 he belonged to a small group of special judges commissioned by the 
King, which might indicate competence or confidence as a qualification, rather 
than localization. 
253 
Birger’s nephew Magnus Bengtsson. Lars Ulfsson (Ama), like Knut 
Jonsson belongs to one of the older branches of the Ducal dynasty; 
both are descended from executed Folkung rising leaders. Gustav 
Tuneson (Ving) is the grandson of a Folkung leader as well (Cf 
Yrwing1952:51) and a half-brother of Knut Jonsson’s. Greger 
Magnusson is the son of an earlier lawspeaker who was an 
illegitimate grandson of Earl Birger’s. Ulf Gudmarsson (Ulvåsa) is the 
son-in-law of Birger Petersson, married to his daughter, the future St 
Bridget. 
Chart 23: Lawspeakers 1338-56 
 
 
King Magnus probably attains majority at the age of fifteen around 
1331, but not until his coronation at 1335 does he seem to start ruling 
by himself. 1338 he dismisses the High Steward Gregers Magnusson, 
and replaces his office, the most prestigious of the High Offices of the 
Realm, with a new, more proscribed functionary, the General Official. 
Jon Kristineson, who is the first holder of this title, is not a member of 
the council and not closely related to the old magnate families. The 
constant tension between King and magnates seems to abate around 
1350 when Israel Birgersson (Finsta) becomes General Official, and 
soon after the title of High Steward (drots) is restored to Nils 
Turesson (Bielke); both of them are lawspeakers 
(Sjöstedt1954:232ff). Around this time the Land Law is completed, and 
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the Statute of 1352 seems to show mutual willingness to compromise 
during hard times (Bjarne Larsson 1994) – the Black Death has just 
struck. However, when Bengt Algotsson is made a Duke, the council 
seems to be defunct and prince Eric fronts a rebellion against his 
father (Sjöstedt 1954). The lawspeaker group is remarkable stable also 
over this subperiod. Father-to-son shifts occur in Uppland, Närke and 
Östergötland, while Lars Ulfsson (Ama) spans almost the entire 
period, until suceeded by Gustav Arvidsson (Vik), married to Knut 
Jonsson’s niece, and himself the grandson of Birger Petersson’s 
predecessor. Algot Bengtsson (Algotssönerna) is the grandson of an 
earlier Västergötland lawspeaker. 
III. Oligarchic contestation (1356-1397) 
 The third period is one of open or latent civil war and external 
interventions, with shifting conflicts and alliances, and an increasing 
emphasis on localized power enacted through the castellans, who 
control the nexus of physical and economic power within the range 
of action of their castle. The general economic crisis is compounded 
by plague, warfare, plunder and vain attempts to make the 
investment in conquest  pay off. The competing factions of the 
Swedish aristocracy compromise in order to neutralize the 
professional occupation forces, and Bo Jonsson (Grip) embarks on a 
project of redeeming mortgaged fiefs with the help of heavy loans 
from church funds. This culminates when the extraordinary private 
trust constituted by his testament offers the Crown to Queen Margaret 
and confers sovereignty upon her through transferring the allegiance 
of all the castles controlled by the trust onto her. It ends with the 
failure of the trustee ‘party’ to bind Queen Margaret to their 
oligarchic/constitutional programme through the ‘Unification letter’ of 
Kalmar. (Engström1935, Sällström1951, Sjöstedt 1954, Linton1971)  
Lawspeakers during the third period 
A. Rebellions against Magnus Eriksson (1356-71) 
Sjöstedt, who has analyzed the conflict between Magnus and prince 
Eric, gives the picture of a conciliar aristocracy massively siding with 
the rebellion484, while the king's quasi-absolutist party is dominated by 
upstarts. If we just look at the lawspeakers, however, who should 
                                                   
484 Even more strongly put in Engström1935:19. Sjöstedt1954:177-89 contains his 
social background analysis. 
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reasonably have been at the focus of any constitutionalist opinion, 
not more than two join the first rebellion – Nils Turesson (Bielke) and 
Gustav Arvidsson (Vik) – while Nils Abjörnsson (Tofta) supports King 
Magnus.  
Chart 24: Lawspeakers 1356-71 
 
In the second rebellion, only485 Nils Turesson remains with Eric, 
while Magnus Gregersson (illegitimate royal sideline) enters on 
Magnus' side486. What about the others? Gustav Tuneson is still alive 
according to evidence presented in Sjöstedt 1954:21, but may have 
been too old to take active part in the struggle. There is no reason to 
expect him to have supported Eric, though (cf 1954:213). Algot 
Bengtsson (Västergötland) and Magnus Knutsson of Aspenäs 
(Östergötland) are not mentioned anywhere in connection with the 
civil war, although Sjöstedt’s geographical analysis of the parties leads 
him to conclude that the province of Östergötland, or rather the 
somewhat more extensive diocese of Linköping, can be viewed as the 
                                                   
485 Sjöstedt1954:61f points out that evidence for allegiances during the second civil 
war is more incomplete, so we shouldn’t make too much out of Gustav 
Arvidsson’s absence from list 2. 
486 Despite (or because of?) his lawspeakership having been transferred to Eric’s 
part after the first rebellion. 
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‘cradle of the rising’487. Neither does Karl Ulfsson of Ulvåsa – St 
Bridget’s eldest son – appear to have taken part in the conflict488. 
When king Eric suddenly dies, the rebel side holds together awaiting 
the birth of his posthumous child489  
During the next outbreak Håkan – Magnus’ second son and king of 
Norway – becomes the rallying point for a new490 configuration of 
magnate rebels. Although Magnus is imprisoned by the rebels allied 
to Håkan, the two kings are soon reconciled, and the magnates who 
are blamed for the lése-majestaite are exiled.  
The exiled lawspeakers Karl Ulfsson of Tofta, Karl Ulfsson of 
Ulvåsa, and Nils Turesson (Bielke) return together with Albrecht’s 
troups to conquer Sweden, and the following seven years witness a 
recurrent civil war interrupted by truces (Engström1935:78ff), where 
most of Western Sweden – Värmland, Dalsland, and the largest part 
of Västergötland – is held by castellans faithful to Magnus and Håkan. 
Magnus’ marshal, Erik Kettilsson (Puke) holds Värmland as a 
castellan but also, it seems, in his capacity of marshal with some kind 
of overlordship comprising the entire unconquered Western Swedish 
area. No Värmland lawspeaker is in evidence during the three 
decades that Erik is in power – maybe he incorporated that function 
as well (see page 262). 
King Magnus is captured at an early stage (1365), and the civil war 
is compounded by a Danish invasion in 1366; two years later the 
Danes were driven back, and Scania briefly reconquered in alliance 
with the Wendish Hanse cities (Engström 1935:110ff;120ff). The 
period ends with a combination of something that may have been a 
general rising, and an armed attack on Stockholm by Håkan in order 
to set his father free (Engström 1935:158-180; the interpretation of 
Andersson 1929 is criticized on p79) 
                                                   
487 Sjöstedt 1954:211. The leading role he attributes to bishop Nils of Linköping 
seems to be his strongest argument for this, but the table of geographic 
affiliations on p202 is hardly conclusive. The lawspeaker Magnus Knutsson might 
reasonably have taken the same position as his grandnephew and eventual 
successor Bo Jonsson (Grip), King Magnus’ marshal during the second 
rebellion(Engström 1935:28). 
488 Engström1935:26 with n86, points out that the register of ST II is mistaken in 
identifying him as a signatory on one of Erik’s letters of enfeoffment (Karl 
Ulfsson of Tofta must have been the signatory in question). 
489 Karl Ulfsson of Tofta is reported to have functioned as the regent of Erik’s party 
during this period (Engström 1935:27). 
490 Karl Ulfsson of Ulvåsa and king Magnus’ former Marshal Bo Jonsson (Grip) have 
now joined Nils Turesson (Bielke) and Karl Ulfsson of Tofta in the third rebellion 
against Magnus. 
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The new lawspeakers during the early Mecklenburg period are Nils 
Jonsson (Rickeby), a brother-in-law of Karl Ulfsson of Tofta who 
replaces Magnus Karlsson (Aspenäs) in Östergötland during the 
change of regime. Magnus – who probably had been opposed to the 
invasion – returns to office shortly afterwards, but on his death in 
1367, he is succeeded by his grandnephew Bo Jonsson (Grip). Nils 
Turesson’s nephew Erik Karlsson (Örnfot) becomes lawspeaker of 
Västmanland. These three appointments are clearly tied to the 
dominant magnate faction, while Magnus Finvidsson (Magnus 
Marinason’s lineage) in Södermanland and Lars Björnsson (fess) in 
Västergötland lack obvious connections to this group491. On the 
contrary, Lars’ father-in-law was king Magnus’ justiciar and a 
prominent member of his faction in the earlier rebellions. Both Lars 
Björnsson and Magnus Finvidsson had some connection to earlier 
lawspeakers, though. Lars’ granduncle-in-law was the lawspeaker and 
High Steward Greger Magnusson. Magnus Finvidsson’s grandfather-in-
law492 was the Västergötland lawspeaker Bengt Hafridsson. 
B. The disentanglement from Mecklenburg (1371-89) 
The settlements in 1371-2 lead to a formal reunification of the 
country under Albrecht, and to a reconciliation between the inimical 
council factions who also forced Albrecht to accept conditions vesting 
de facto royal power in the council (Engström1935:172-80,295ff), but 
in effect, the separation as well as the struggle of power between 
king and council were soon resumed. 
 
                                                   
491 Unless Magnus’ marriage to the widow of Halsen Petersson, who had belonged 
to king Eric’s faction (Sjöstedt 1954:184, ÄSF 173) is an indication of his 
allegiance. 
492 His father-in-law may also have been a lawspeaker (see above: Knut Jonsson in 
chart 21 and the comment in section 1C) 
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Chart 25: Lawspeakers 1371-89.  
 
In 1375 Bo Jonsson – now a High Steward (drots) – takes over 
Albrecht’s father’s mortgage fiefs, which marks a new stage in the 
power struggle. The testamentarial trust which Bo Jonsson forms in 
order to fullfil his reunification project contains magnates from both 
of the camps of the civil war, and is in this way a continuation of the 
short-lived compromise council from 1371. The relations between this 
trust and the lawspeaker college is of crucial importance for the 
further development, and most of the lawspeakers during this period 
are discussed within that context below. In the beginning of this 
period Erik Karlsson (Örnfot) still appears to be lawspeaker 
(formally) of Västmanland, but like Bo Jonsson he generally leaves 
the business of holding moots and courts to his deputy, while 
attending to his duties as a captain of Stockholm, Öland and finally 
Östergötland (Engström 1935). 
Excursus: Lawspeakers and the testamentarial trust: 
Sällström (1951:18) has argued that the executors constituted a 
majority of the lawspeakers at the time, and therefore were in custody 
of the constitutional right of royal election, which the kungabalk of 
the Land Law empowered them to use against a king who had 
broken his oath. The lawspeakership situation at that moment is far 
from clear, however. Karl Ulfsson of Tofta (Uppland), Anund Jonsson 
(Öland) and Jakob Djäkn (Finland), are the only ones of whom we 
know for certain that they were acting lawspeakers both before and 
after the culminating war years of 1388-9.  
Karl Ulfsson av Tofta was one of the leading testamentarii and 
had been a prominent member of the aristocratic party from the very 
beginning of the civil war period 1356-65. As this was not his first 
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venture into king-making, he was certainly well aware of the 
possibilities theoretically open for lawspeakers to exploit the electoral 
role first formulated – as far as we know! – in the Law Code of 
Uppland 1296, and first applied in the election of the three-year-old 
Magnus Eriksson in 1319. Both his father and his uncle had been 
lawspeakers and members of the commission that formulated the Law 
Code of Södermanland in 1327. His uncle had also been a drots 
(‘High Steward’ – an office holding the highest responsibility for 
justice in medieval and early-modern Sweden), as his grandfather had 
also been. In addition he was married to Helena Israelsdotter, a niece 
of Saint Bridget and a granddaughter of  the lawspeaker Birger 
Petersson, who had been the leader of the commission formulating 
the Uppland Law Code.  
As if this was not enough, he was also one of the very few 
medieval lawspeakers who had received formal academic training493. 
He had spent some years at the University of Paris together with 
Nicolaus Hermanni, who was now the Bishop of Linköping and 
evidently some kind of chairman for the testamentary i(of some of 
the testimonials in his canonization process, PCNL) Neither of these 
did sign the letter of allegiance, though, and as also the other spiritual 
member, Tord Gunnari – who had taught canon law at the University 
of Prague, and has been described as ‘probably the most erudite 
Swede of his day’ (Collmar 1977) – is missing, this might have some 
significance.  
Did the juridical specialists have any objections to the letter? Or 
was their absence a calculated move to retain freedom of action for a 
while longer? The bishops had been deeply involved in the financial 
machinations of Bo Jonsson, lending him money to redeem mortgage 
fiefs against security in these (or other) fiefs, and two months after 
Bo’s death, the executors had mortgaged parts of his estate to Bishop 
Tord, in order to put them under ecclesiastical protection. Less than 
five months after the letter of allegiance Karl Ulfsson sells estate at a 
value of 1000 marks to Henricus Caroli, the archbishop of Sweden, 
and during the period up to the recess of Nyköping 1396494 and the 
                                                   
493  This makes him the probably most well-educated medieval lawspeaker, except 
for his brother-in-law, magister Nils Jonsson. 
494 Where a decision was taken to reclaim all Crown property that had been 
alienated since the conflict between King Magnus Eriksson and the aristocracy 
broke out around 1356. 
260 
Kalmar negotiations in 1397 he sells, mortgages or donates all of his 
landed property to churches, monasteries and co-executors495.  
These manoeuvres may have been the reason that he postponed 
his formal allegiance to the new monarch, but there might have been 
a simpler reason. As he was staying in Finland, holding its principal 
castle of Viborg, he might have been unable to communicate with the 
others – after all large parts of Finland were still in Albrecht’s hand, 
and Karl’s military obligations might have got in the way. On the 
other hand, he did manage to communicate with the archbishop, and 
find time to look after his personal fortune. Another possibility is that 
he was still negotiating with Albrecht’s side. After all, he had himself 
been instrumental in putting Albrecht on the throne, and might have 
had business to conclude before openly emerging on Queen 
Margaret’s side, or before deciding whether that was what he should 
do.496 
Anund Jonsson (Lejonansikte), had through his marriage to 
Ramborg Israelsdotter, Saint Bridget’s niece, gained entrance to Bo 
Jonsson’s circle and had become a councillor by 1369, when he takes 
part in the issuing of a charter authorizing Bo Jonsson to be the 
King’s officialis generalis, in principle empowered with full fiscal and 
administrative control over the country.497 Reasonably he would be 
prepared to support the trust (he also made large donations to 
Vadstena).  
Jakob Djäkn’s case was a very different matter. Although he had 
originally been a subcastellan of Bo Jonsson’s, he had changed sides 
quickly after his master’s death, kept the command of the castle 
(Åbo) and succeeded to make Albrecht appoint him not only a 
                                                   
495 Sällström 1951:13, 27-30. Sällström notes that seven years after the final 
mortgage, he is still able to make two substantial land donations to the Cathedral 
of Uppsala. 
496 He might have had misgivings about joining her side, as he had once been 
exiled by her late husband Håkan. After prince Eric’s rebellion and subsequent 
death, the magnates who had pitched him against his father king Magnus, instead 
managed to incite his younger brother, Håkan, king of Norway, to arrest and 
depose his father. After the reconciliation between the two kings, the magnates 
accused of having caused the conflist were exiled by Håkan: Karl Ulfsson was by 
the time we are discussing the only survivor of this group, which had also 
included Bo Jonsson (cf Engström 1929). Margareta’s räfst, a general inquiry on 
all tax-exempt land designed to revoke all ‘unauthorized’ tax exemptions and 
patents of gentility, and to resume alienated Crown land, was instructed to 
revoke any benefits granted after the rupture between king Magnus and the 
magnates (Rosén 1950). As Karl Ulfsson had been one of the chief instigators 
also of every subsequent magnate coup, he should have had misgivings. 
497 Engström 1935:126f. Engström presumes that Anund replaced Karl Ulfsson of 
Ulvåsa, Saint Bridget’s eldest son, who was travelling to his mother in Italy. 
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castellan in his own right, but also the lawspeaker of Finland. 
(Sällström 1951:14, Anthoni 1970:137) 
What about the other lawspeakers? It seems quite reasonable that 
the drying up of evidence for courts of justice at this moment is due 
to the outbreak of open civil war, but that leaves us with no 
indication of when replacements were made. Among the other 
lawspeakers who had been in office at that point were two members 
of the executorial college: Karl Ulfsson’s son Knut Karlsson 
(Södermanland) and Birger Ulfsson (Närke). Knut Karlsson (Tofta) 
died during the war, in 1389. He never signed the letter of allegiance, 
but then again he was only a deputy member for his father, who had 
not signed either. However, Knut may already have been replaced as 
a lawspeaker, by Erengisle Nilsson (Hammersta), whose first 
documented appearance in that capacity comes from 1390. Erengisle 
was also a member (regular) of the trust and did sign the letter, but it 
remains to be explained why Knut should have resigned or been 
replaced.  
Birger Ulfsson (Ulvåsa), another leading executor, the younger 
son of St Bridget, and the spokesman for the trust in the negotiation 
with Queen Margaret, presents yet another kind of problem. He had 
recently transferred himself from the province of Tiohärad (Småland) 
to that of Närke, where his father and his elder brother had preceded 
him. There are no charters extant to prove that he acted as 
lawspeaker after 1384, though. His nephew, Karl Karlsson, had 
succeeded him in Närke at least by 1390, but we don’t know if that 
might have happened earlier. There is no reason to assume that 
Birger had retired, though. He was still an active member of the trust, 
and his collaborators still refer to his opinion on the matter under 
consideration two years after his death in 1391, which occurred only 
seven months after he had judged his last case as 
konungsdomhavande (‘judge on behalf of the King’). He must 
certainly be counted among the lawspeakers still in 1388, but there is 
a possibility that his appearance in Närke was just a short-term fill-in 
between the death of his brother and the accession of his young 
nephew498. In that case he himself might still be representing 
                                                   
498 Despite his youth, Karl Karlsson had made his first appearance as a hundred 
sheriff, leading a court on the level beneath the lawspeakership, already in 1383. 
He may still have lacked the full authority necessary for a lawspeakership, 
though. 
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Tiohärad499 – or: could he be representing both provinces at the same 
time?  
The only known instance of double lawspeakership is Bo 
Jonsson’s, when he took over the office in Finland on the death of 
Arvid Gustavsson, while still nominally retaining the position as 
lawspeaker of Östergötland. Of course, Finland was a special case, 
and so was Bo Jonsson. In Östergötland his office had usually been 
upheld by his deputy Peter Djäkn, who continued to serve in that 
capacity after Bo Jonsson’s death in 1386. He does not seem to have 
been promoted into a lawspeaker in his own right, as he later 
continues to serve under Ulf Jonsson (Aspenäs), who is mentioned 
as lawspeaker from 1389. Ulf, who was Bo Jonsson’s mother’s cousin 
and a major legatee of the testament, also signed the letter of 
allegiance. 
Without doubt Sten Stensson (Bielke) – a cousin of the brothers 
Sten and Ture Bengtsson (Bielke) and married to St Bridget’s 
granddaughter – was also an executor. He signs the letter of 
allegiance as number 5, in advance of two of the regular members, 
and must have joined the trust as a co-opted member.500  Sten 
Stensson was the lawspeaker of Västmanland, but his last recorded 
judgment is in 1386, and the next lawspeaker is not in evidence until 
1394501. He is Tord (Röriksson) Bonde, who is Erengisle Nilsson’s 
deputy in the trust, so in all probability either of these two is acting 
lawspeaker in 1388. As both of them signed the letter, the 
lawspeakership of Västmanland should present no problem. The 
remaining two provinces, Värmland and Västergötland, may have 
lacked functioning lawspeakers at the time. Värmland seems to have 
lacked a lawspeaker at least since 1357, if not 1349. However, the 
next incumbent, Agmund (or Anund) Hatt, (the younger) also 
replaced Erik Kettilsson Puke as a castellan over basically the same 
                                                   
499 Where we don’t find any sign of a new lawspeaker before the seemingly 
undistinguished and anonymous Karl Magnusson in 1400; he is not to be 
confused with his namesake of the Örnfot lineage, who belonged to the 
executorial trust. 
500 The detailed instruction in the testament (printed in Rosman 1923) prescribes co-
optation, under carefully specified conditions, as when an executor ‘dies, goes 
abroad, becomes an enemy of the realm, or do not want to fully take on the 
responsibility’ etc. Sten may have replaced Erik Kettilsson’s deputy and nephew 
Kettil Jonsson, who had not been mentioned as alive since 1386. There were 
two co-opted signatories, though, as Gregers Bengtsson also signed the letter. 
Either of them must therefore have replaced Knut Karlsson, although he was still 
alive. 
501 In 1395 Sten Stensson enters the Monastery in Vadstena after his entire family 
has died in the plague. 
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area (Fritz 1973:76), so it might be possible that also Erik had been 
both castellan and lawspeaker. In that case it may have been his title 
of Marshal, that somehow ‘crowded out’ a potential lawspeaker title 
which we, however, have no evidence for. Another possible 
explanation is that he partly fulfilled the same function502, and thus 
precluded the need for a lawspeaker in Värmland at that time, even if 
he did not hold the same office.Värmland was under allegiance to 
King Håkan of Norway, and therefore, together with Dalsland and 
most of Västergötland separated from the rest of Sweden, which may 
account for the irregular administration.  
Does this explain also the lack of a lawspeaker for Västergötland? 
Maybe, but here there had been a lawspeaker – Lars Björnsson – in 
office at least until 1382. He is not mentioned in any sources after 
1383, though (ÄSF 210). The next lawspeaker, Erik Erlandsson, 
appears to have come to the fore through the inquiry courts during 
Queen Margaret’s reduction, and is not mentioned before this. It is 
possible that Algot Magnusson, another deputy executor, who 
signed a separate letter of allegiance, like Erik Kettilsson, ‘replaced’ 
the lawspeaker as a castellan of Axvall503. Possibly the war situation 
postponed the replacement of lawspeakers. It is also conceivable that 
these provinces were under some kind of martial law at the time, and 
that the office therefore was suspended.  
Out of the ten lawspeakers, only one, Jakob Djäkn in Finland, was 
on Albrecht’s side. If all of the successions taking place over the war 
years had been effected without complications, five lawspeakers 
belonging to the trust could have formed a narrow majority for 
Margaret. Six, if we make the assumption that Erik Kettilsson was a de 
jure lawspeaker. The vacancy in Västergötland seems impossible to 
solve, but if Birger Ulfsson had returned to Tiohärad, Karl Karlsson 
could be expected to vote with his uncle, and if Anund Jonsson also 
agreed, a theoretical basis of eight votes out of nine possible at least 
gives the appearance of optimal compliance with constitutional rules. 
Of course there had been no formal convocation of delegations for 
each lawspeakership, taking part in the decisions, but in a civil war 
situation, that would not have been very realistic anyway.  
However, if the intention had been to make a constitutional 
designation, why didn’t Karl Karlsson and Anund Jonsson sign the 
                                                   
502 At least he appears to have had also judicial functions during his long tenure. 
503 The credentials of his subcommanders signing at the same time do not inspire 
confidence in a legalistic interpretation of the Crown offer. Jacob Mus, Nils 
Svarteskåning, Abraham Brodersen and Sven Sture all belonged to the category 
treading the thin line between professional warfare and brigandage (ST II:411a).  
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letter? Why didn’t the foremost lawspeaker, Karl Ulfsson, who, 
according to the law, was required to lead the whole election 
ceremony, sign the document, and, finally, why didn’t they identify 
themselves as lawspeakers in the document? 
 In this letter of allegiance, they explicitly identify themselves as Bo 
Jonsson’s testamentarii, being responsible for the castles and fiefs 
held by Bo Jonsson, and bequeathed by him to a foundation for 
which they are the formally appointed board of direction, and in this 
capacity they transfer their formal allegiance and fealty from Albrecht 
onto Margaret. This is a complex combination of private and public 
institutions, making deliberate use of the ambiguities inherent in the 
co-existence of feudal customary law, private property law and canon 
law. 
That Karl Ulfsson was withholding his signature (he did not sign 
the letter of ratification in May 20th either) may have been pure tactics 
– probably the trust did not want to give Queen Margaret the 
constitutional legitimacy which they would no doubt have been 
capable of conferring upon her504, before she had given any 
constitutional guarantees. Such guarantees are demanded in a letter to 
her from 1389, where Karl Ulfsson does sign, together with ten other 
executors and as one of six or seven (counting Puke) lawspeakers 
(Linton 1971:173) The contested Unification letter from Kalmar 1397 – 
the last attempt to bind her to formalities – carries his seal as the first 
secular signatory.  
C. 1388-1396: Queen Margaret’s rise to power 
As discussed above, three to five executors are lawspeakers at 
Queen Margaret’s accession, and Erik Kettilsson (Värmland) may at 
least have had parallell functions. Anund Dansson (Öland) is an 
established councillor belonging to the same circles as the executors. 
Jakob Djäkn (Finland) remains in office until Finland is brought under 
control. Some replacements have been made either by Queen 
Margaret or by the trust before they call her in. All of these are 
executors except Karl Karlsson (Närke) who is the nephew of an 
executor, and the son of one of the leading magnates of period III. 
Ivar Nilsson (Östergötland) is the only replacement that must have 
been made after her accession, and he is quite possibly a co-opted 
                                                   
504 Jakob Djäkn’s title could of course have been disputed, and Algot Magnusson 
might have been a reasonable candidate for Västergötland. In addition to 
commanding two of the local castles, he owned estate in several hundreds there 
and his maternal grandfather and double namesake had belonged to an old 
lawspeaker family in that province (ÄSF 3, 203).  
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member of the trust (he appears together with trust members as an 
executor of Karl Ulfsson, and seems to take an active part in his 
machinations) 
IV. Royal recentralization (1396-1434) 
 The fourth period starts with Queen Margaret’s new strategy: to 
rule through personal ties of dependence, and to move around 
castellans frequently. She lets the offices of the realm fall into 
desuetude and largely replaces the bottom-up moot (ting) system of 
adjudication with ad hoc royal inquiry commissions. Financial 
restoration proceeds through resumption of ‘illegal’ fiefs, revoking all 
grants and tax exemptions made during the third period, and stability 
is achieved through ‘freezing’ the proportions between the state 
sector and the private sector of tax-exempt noble land. The mortgage 
fief principle, which removed large parts of the economic base from 
the state, while also leaving the enfeoffed areas open to destructive 
short-term exploitation, was discreetly reformed. As the lack of liquid 
assets was still an urgent problem, Queen Margaret started to employ 
church institutions to solve her realization problem (Linton 1971). She 
made them advance ready money, and in return alotted them 
temporary fiefs whose rents were discounted against the loan until it 
was fully repayed and the fief returned. Linton argues that this gave 
her three advantages:  
(1) fast access to cash when necessary 
(2) interest-free loans 
(3) the problem of exacting the rents was passed on to the 
creditor 
I would add (4) that the fundamental  problem of realization was 
also transferred to the personnel of the church, and (5) that the risk 
of counterproductive over-exploitation was minimized, as the church 
had an interest in long-term viability at least equal to the Crown’s. 
Also, (6) legitimacy problems were reduced, and chances were that 
ecclesiastical exactors would tend to use their powers of persuasion 
to a higher extent, and tone down the physical intimidation aspect. 
The ´feudal realization’505 of point 4, however, not only solves a 
problem for the Crown, but also opens the possibility for 
administrators specializing in making this conversion profitable506 
Still, continuing warfare necessitated even larger amounts of cash, 
and the new and harsher level of taxation led to popular turmoil. A 
                                                   
505 See p 46. 
506 Lönnroth’s examples include Hans Kröpelin, Christiern Nilsson (Vasa), Nils 
Gustavsson  (Rossvik) and Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag). 
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small group of three councillors (all of them members of the 
testamentarian trust) deviced a tax reform attempting to protect gentry 
tenants but also to reduce opposition through minimizing peasant 
transaction costs, putting together groups of four peasants, who were 
to pay the largest part of the tax in kind (Dovring 1951). The taxes 
remained at more or less the same level – for tax and crown peasants 
– but arguably the new exaction method may have made it appear 
less oppressive – at least to begin with. The transaction costs were 
largely removed from the tax-payers’ concerns507, and the system of 
gärder, collective tax-paying units, exploited the principle of 
solidarity through mixing wealthy and impoverished peasants in 
equal proportions, giving them the collective responsibility for raising 
the full amount. This may have been a dangerous  route, though, as it 
might tend to strengthen the peasants’ collective responsibilities and 
thus also their capacity for collective resistance. At the same time the 
full tax exemption of the frälsebönder had been restored, as they 
remained outside the gärd system, and this might have served to 
alleviate the labour shortage for the gentry. 
Lawspeakers during the fourth period:  
A. 1396-1412: Queen Margaret’s reign after the Kalmar 
negotiations 
Some of the new lawspeakers conform to the earlier pattern, like 
the two executors Ture Bengtsson (Uppland) and Sten Bengtsson 
(Öland), two brothers belonging to the family of Bielke. Sten is later 
followed by his son Ture Stensson as Nils Erengisleson 
(Hammersta) succeeds his father in Södermanland. Agmund Hatt 
(Värmland) replaces Erik Kettilsson as a castellan, but is at the same 
time appointed a lawspeaker508. Others are ‘new men’ with an only 
                                                   
507  That might have been an advantage also for the Crown, which became insulated 
against inflation, provided that the ‘realization problem’ was solved (see p 139).  
508 He also resembles Erik in that he appears to have a closer personal allegiance to 
the royal family. King Håkan calls him ’vår mågh och tjänare’ in a letter from 
1371 (Engström 1935:177n265), which shows that he not only had entered the 
King’s service, but also had married into the royal family. Actually, his wife was a 
granddaughter of Magnus Birgersson, the son of king Birger. Magnus was 
executed after the murder of the Dukes and Birger’s escape abroad. Still King 
Håkan, the grandson of one of the murdered Dukes, uses the word ‘måg’ which 
to us means ‘son-in-law’ to describe his second cousin’s son-in-law. This may 
serve as a warning not to underestimate the possible importance of distant 
kinship. 
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marginally gentile background, risen in her service as royal inquiry 
judges: Both Erik Erlandsson and his successor Gustav 
Magnusson509 (Västergötland), maybe also Karl Magnusson 
(Tiohärad), whose first recorded appearances are in inquiry courts, 
but who from the beginning is defined as judging on behalf of the 
lawspeaker, together with other judges acting as 
konungsdomhavande (judging on behalf of the King – or in this case 
the Queen)510.  
Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag) in Närke might appear to fit into 
the first pattern, as he is the son of an executor, Sten Bosson. If 
Sällström (1951:61) is right, however, the fact that Sten Bosson takes 
over the sole responsibility for the remainder of Bo Jonsson’s estate in 
1390, means that he has entered her service and become estranged 
from the group – something further confirmed, Sällström argues, by 
his absence from the list of signatories in the Unification letter. If this 
is correct, Bengt may be more comparable to the second group, or 
maybe rather to Agmund Hatt, as he is one of the few Swedes who 
are also entrusted with a castle-fief (not within his own 
lawspeakership, though).  
Eric of Pomerania during his first twenty years of rule seems to 
have tried to achieve better relations with the Swedish aristocracy, 
especially through authorizing more permanent and independent 
inquiry courts, and delegating to these the treatment of complaints 
and revisions of earlier verdicts. them a chance to revise earlier 
(Bjarne Larsson 1994, chapter 4). Probably the relative lack of serious 
conflicts before 1430 was largely due to the role of the Queen, 
Philippa (a sister of Henry V of England) whose extensive dower was 
located in Sweden, and whose chancellor, bishop Thomas (cf 
Schück1976), was an efficient and diplomatic administrator. After her 
death, however, Eric proceeds to alienate an exceedingly wide 
spectrum of social groups in Sweden through his further development 
of Margaret’s mode of rule.  
Many of her castellans had certainly been tough and unpopular, 
but her constant supervision and redispositions must have held their 
self-indulgence under tighter control than would have been possible 
under Eric’s policy of long mandates and independence from local 
power networks. Although he had made important concessions in the 
adjudicatory dimension, the fiscal-military administration of castle fiefs 
was held strictly separate, as during the preceding period. This 
                                                   
509 Gustav Magnusson is a partial exception or compromise, as his mother-in-law is 
the daughter of an earlier lawspeaker (ÄSF 3) 
510 In any case, his social background is similar to the others. 
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certainly opened for conflicts of competence, and in the general 
rebellion from 1434, I consider the role of the lawspeakers to be 
crucial. The rebellion I have analysed in a separate article511, and here 
I will only discuss the individual lawspeakers. 
C. 1412-1434: Eric of Pomerania before the rebellion 
In the beginning of his reign, Eric starts out with a mixed lot of 
lawspeakers inherited from Margaret: two executors, one possible co-
opted executor, three sons of executors (one of whom may have 
been estranged from the group512) and two or three ‘new men’. The 
eight to eleven lawspeakers513 appointed before the rebellion breaks 
out in 1434, I will discuss one by one, as one of the complaints 
against Eric is that he has forced unworthy lawspeakers and hundred 
sheriffs onto the communities514. Number 1 may have been appointed 
by Margaret and number 11 by the insurgent council. 
1. Värmland 1406/13 Olof Björnsson (Sparre i 
Västergötland)  
Seems to have had connections with the family of his predecessor 
Agmund Hatt from at least 1389. Appears as a witness in his family 
transactions, but does not seem to have had any important 
connections otherwise. Lower or middle gentry background. The 
family attribution above is taken from table 124 in SMV where Raneke 
combines several ‘persons mainly domiciled in Västergötland, but 
whose genealogical connections are unclear’ all carrying a chevron515 
in their blazons. Apart from Olof, six of these were hundred sheriffs, 
                                                   
511 Chapter 3 above. 
512 However, many of the old executors continued to serve under Margaret without 
any open dissent, and appear to have accepted their defeat and devalued their 
ambitions – at least outwardly. There seems to be no other indication of the 
presumed ‘break’ in the group, than Sällström’s own interpretation of the way the 
testament question was settled. 
513 I leave the Finnish lawspeakers out of the picture as I haven’t found any 
authoritative list. The discussion in Anthoni 1970 suggests that they would in 
general have conformed to Margaret’s ‘new men’ pattern. 
514 Huitfeldt 
515 My translation. As the chevron is a common charge (22 tables in SMV), and the 
tinctures are unknown, their relationship is quite uncertain. However, there are 
several aristocratic families with uncertain interrelations carrying a chevron, and as 
many of these have been lawspeakers (four members of the Tofta lineage, 
Gustav Arvidsson and his son Arvid), they may have had clients among their 
hundred sheriffs adopting similar arms (this argument may also be applicable to 
Erik Erlandsson, see above). 
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which might reflect a strong background in the local judiciary level 
(however, not more than one of these predated Olof; on the other 
hand office-holders in the preceding period are only partly known).  
2. Uppland  1415/21  Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik)   
One of the more spectacular careers of the period – from an 
insignificant country gentry background he reached a position 
otherwise only open to the most splendid among the magnates (see 
page 185ff). One of the crucial actors in the events leading up to the 
general revolution against Eric of Pomerania. See below. 
3. Västmanland 1417/22  Karl Tordsson (Bonde). 
The son of one of the executors, who had also been one of 
Margaret’s most trusted castellans in Finland. Karl Tordsson’s role in 
the rebellion is unclear – he might have stayed loyal to Eric or tried to 
keep away from the conflict – he should reasonably have been the 
first instance responsible for solving the Jens Erikssen problem, as 
Västerås belonged to his lawspeakership, but it is also possible that 
he was holding a castle in Finland at that time(see page 193 above). 
4. Östergötland  1418/20  Magnus Eriksson (Örnfot) 
An aristocrat with close ties to the testamentarial trust. His father, 
Erik Karlsson, had been a prominent member of the council during 
Albrecht’s reign. Linton considers him to have been a camerarius or 
treasurer, although he is not mentioned with that title in any official 
document. He had been a lawspeaker, a captain of Öland and then of 
Östergötland. Magnus’ cousin had been a member of the trust, and he 
married the daughter of another member: Sten Bosson (Natt och 
Dag). Magnus became castellan of Ringstaholm in 1419, and thus 
appears to have combined castellany and lawspeakership. 
5. Öland 1424   Bengt Dansson (Båt/Sune 
Jonsson’s line) 
Belonged to a well-established aristocratic family with important 
trade contacts having played a central role in the border area for a 
long time (see above, page 240). His mother-in-law was the daughter 
and granddaughter of lawspeakers from Östergötland, and a niece of 
Sune Jonsson (ÄSF 13). According to Raneke (SMV 560) Bengt should 
have been a nephew of Sune – the first known lawspeaker of Öland 
(in 1319) – and thus also a cousin of Earl Erengisle Suneson of 
Orkney. Chronologically, this sounds a bit unlikely, but if his 
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presumed father Dan Jonsson was born at the time of his father’s 
death, and was 55 when Bengt was born, the latter would have 
become a lawspeaker at 55. Neither of these assumptions is 
unrealistic, and a little leeway on either of them is quite imaginable. 
6. Värmland  1424    Nils Tykesson (Välinge) 
Brother-in-law of his predecessor Olof Björnsson (above, nr 1). Not 
much is known about him, typically lower-gentry background. 
Possibly also a castellan (H. Nilsson 1997:96) 
7. Östergötland  1426    Gert Jonsson (Vinäs) 
Son of a hundred sheriff of gentry background. His mother 
belonged to a noble German immigrant family (Moltke) with 
important aristocratic connections, and he married into the Sture 
family. No connections to earlier lawspeakers though. Possibly also a 
castellan516. 
8. Östergötland 1426/28  Olof Ragvaldsson (Lindö) 
An unclear case. A castellan of the same name is chased out when 
the castle of Piksborg is burned during the rebellion, but on the other 
hand Olof, the lawspeaker, takes part in the revolutionary council 
meeting of 1435. Through his mother he was related to several earlier 
lawspeakers, including his granduncle Ulf Jonsson (one of the 
testamentarii). 
                                                   
516 According to an ‘undocumented reference’ by Styffe (Fritz 1973:89n4). 
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9. Tiohärad 1427    Arvid Svan 
Had been in the service of Ture Stensson (Bielke), the earlier 
lawspeaker of Öland. Strictly lower-gentry, possibly German, 
background. Takes part in the rebellion. Army commander with a 
ruthlessness matching Karl Knutsson’s (Kumlien 1933:107), and 
already at an early stage allied to him. Later executed for treason. 
10. Västergötland 1434   Knut Jönsson (Tre rosor av 
Mörby) 
A very disconcerting case: a great grandson of the prominent 
aristocrat Bengt Hafridsson, of semi-royal descent, but after that his 
family seems to have been undistinguished for a couple of 
generations. Knut’s grandfather, Bengt’s son-in-law, may have been a 
lawspeaker for one or two years during the civil war (according to 
Stiernman’s notoriously unreliable list in SGH). Knut paid penance for 
killing the earlier Västergötland lawspeaker Erik Erlandsson – one of 
Queen Margaret’s favourite inquiry judges and therefore probably a 
zealous and ruthless prosecutor – at some time between 1403 and 
1421.  
Knut succeeded Gustav Magnusson, who had been working in 
close cooperation with the slain lawspeaker, and who carried the 
same blazon as Knut, although the probable relation between their 
families is undocumented. He seems to have joined the rebellion 
from the very beginning, and was appointed one of Engelbrekt’s 
subcommanders, sharing the captaincy for Västergötland517 with the 
local bishop, Sigge of Skara. 
11. Värmland 1428/35  Björn Nilsson (Vinge) 
According to letters printed in Nilsson 1997 (1391 28/7, 1397 12/3) 
his father Nissa Björnsson had been an alderman (rådman) in Oslo, 
with important trading and landholding interests in Värmland. Maybe 
an example of the ‘feudal realization’-type administrator, although he 
is not mentioned as a castellan. Although his title is not in evidence 
before 1435, he is probably also appointed by King Eric. If he had 
been appointed by the revolutionary council, he should reasonably 
                                                   
517 He was the only one among the subcaptains without any identifiable relation to 
the estate of Bo Jonsson. Bishop Sigge was a relative of Bo Jonsson and a 
legatee of his will. 
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have taken part in the rebellion, but he does not appear in any of the 
documents from the rebel side. 
The rebels’ protest against the appointment of ‘unworthy’ 
lawspeakers seems a bit puzzling, as the most likely suspects, the 
lower-gentry roughneck commander Arvid Svan, and the possible 
murderer Knut Jonsson (Tre Rosor) belonged to the early insurgents. 
From a really aristocratic standpoint, Nils Gustavsson’s appointment 
might have been the most objectionable one.  
Or was the protest actually directed against an earlier generation 
appointed by Margaret – Erik Erlandsson, for instance – although the 
blame was pinned on Eric? Most probably, the discontent was 
directed primarily at the lowering of the social status level of the 
lawspeakers, and that had started already under Margaret, though it 
was of course rhetorically more effective to accuse the king whose 
authority was being contested. 
Nils Gustavsson’s dilemma – the double role of the 
upstart 
Nils Gustavsson (Rossvik) was, together with Bengt Stensson (Natt 
och Dag) in Närke and the future High Steward Christiern Nilsson 
(Vasa) one of the very few Swedes entrusted with a castle-fief by Eric 
(large parts of Norrland; cf Fritz 1972, 1973 for particulars of 
castellanies). These three seem to have had important functions in 
Eric’s mode of resolving ‘feudal realization’, converting the in-kind 
taxes into hard cash through extensive trading. The commutation of 
taxes specified in kind into monetary taxes converted at inflationary 
rates is cited as one of the major causes of general protest in 
documents from the rising as well as in the ‘Engelbrekt Chronicle’, 
but there may be reasons to suspect a discontent also among those 
administrators who must have seen their pivotal and profitable trader 
function deteriorate.   
Christiern Nilsson (Vasa) and Bengt Stensson (Natt och Dag) with 
their extensive family networks played more cautious roles in the 
rebellion, but Nils Gustavsson was a homo novus, who must have 
been lifted into his double role as the highest judiciary in Sweden (in 
the absence of a High Steward) and as the government official most 
well-positioned to profit by the important Norrland fur trade 
(Olofsson 1962, Fritz 1973), solely by the favour of Eric518. When Eric 
relegated to the Swedish judicial system the solution of the grievances 
                                                   
518 Or possibly Margaret, depending on how and when his career took off. 
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against the Västerås castellan Jens Erikssen, whose role in the iron 
trade519 must have parallelled Nils Gustavsson’s in the Norrland fur 
trade, he had surely not intended that the leeway given Swedish 
judges to revise too unpopular verdicts against fiefholders and 
churches, would be extended to discontented miners and peasants. 
Nils Gustavsson was forced to choose between his two incompatible 
roles, and preferred insurgency to giving up his hard-won authority 
and central position in the Swedish eliste, as the successor of men 
like Birger Petersson and Karl Ulfsson, beside Bo Jonsson (Grip) the 
most formidable Swedish magnate of the later 14th century.    
The recruitment of lawspeakers, period I-V 
Using indexes for social background, we can get an overview of 
the changing recruitment during these period. My ‘Nobility index’ is 
based upon the standard delimitation of Swedish medieval aristocratic 
status (högfrälse) where the titles of riddare (knight) or riksråd 
(councillor) are taken to signify noble rank520, and upon the common 
notion of four generations of noble ancestors as a requirement for full 
noble status (Cf SMV). As female noble status is difficult to verify 
consistently enough, my operational definition of ‘full nobility’ 
(Index=100) requires that every male in the four preceding generation 
is either a knight or a councillor (as I also assume that one ancestor 
with both titles can compensate for one without either, provided that 
they belong to the same generation, it becomes possibly to rate more 
than 100).  
The index is therefore constructed like this: If kn = the number of 
knights in the nth generation of ancestors, and cn = the number of 
councillors in the same generation, than the nobility index is defined 
by: IndexN = 25 * Σ (kn + cn) when n goes from 1 to 4.521  
                                                   
519 As his extensive activities as a buyer of land indicate, he must have had an 
important role in converting tax objects into cash (cf the discussion of the ‘feudal 
realization problem’ on page 46). 
520 When the Swedish nobility is constituted as a corporate body in the ‘House of 
Knights’ (Riddarhuset) in 1626, the second or knightly class was defined as 
comprising those descendants of councillors who had not been elevated into 
comital or baronial rank by the reforms of Eric XIV and John III.  
521 The multiplicator 25 is required to bring ‘full nobility’ up to the level of IndexN = 
100. 
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The office index counts lawspeaker titles, but also higher titles (‘the 
High Offices of the realm’: marsk, drots, camerarius522 but also Jarl 
and bishop)523. 
As the practices of dubbing knights (Löfqvist 1935) and appointing 
councils (Jägerstad 1948) both are institutions even younger than the 
lawspeakership, the indices are hardly applicable before 1305, the 
earliest year for which we can identify a complete list of lawspeakers. 
The low scores for the first periods also reflect the recent introduction 
of aristocratic titles, and thus the steady rise from 1305 up to the later 
Mecklenburg period of 1371-89 is in part just a measure of the speed 
with which these titles proliferate. All this, however, just makes the 
sharp contrasting break after Margaret’s accession appear even more 
drastic, and the first 22 years of Eric’s reign push down the index 
rating even lower. If we look at the ratings for new appointments the 
contrasts are intensified, and the period of de facto council rule 1371-
88 becomes the only period where ‘full nobility’ is the general rule. 
                                                   
522  A person who becomes a lawspeaker and a Marshal, for instance, is counted 
twice, but I count only one of the High Offices per person, in the same way as I 
do not count more than one lawspeakership for one individual.  
523 The office index becomes considerably more exclusive. The highest recorded 
office index is 88: Magnus Knutsson (Aspenäs) of Östergötland, while the 
highest nobility index for a medieval lawspeaker is 141. This is scored by 
Magnus Bengtsson (Natt och Dag) of Närke, Engelbrekt’s murderer and later for 
18 years the highest guardian of justice in the province where the murder was 
committed. 
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Chart 26: lawspeakers: levels of aristocratic background 
 
Despite a certain influx of lower gentry in the revolutionary 
coalitions of the 1430’s524, the aristocratic component is visibly 
strengthened during the period of struggle against King Eric, and 
during the reign of King Christopher of Bavaria, when local power 
was wielded by a college of four regents who had all played 
important roles in the rebellion.  
As far as I can see from my preliminary results for the remainder of 
the Middle Ages, the further increase of lawspeakers with an 
aristocratic background during the next period – dominated by 
tripartite power struggles between Karl Knutsson, Christian of 
                                                   
524 See my analysis of the ‘revolutionary council’ of 1435 in Chapter III.  
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Oldenburg, and the Swedish episcopate – is a short-lived525 exception. 
The aristocratic background of the lawspeakers would never more526 
reach the level held by the time of King Eric’s accession in 1412, let 
alone the apex from the era of Karl Ulfsson of Tofta and Bo Jonsson 
(Grip). 
The survey in this essay has demonstrated that the traditional 
notion of lawspeakers as representatives of a strong regional power 
rooted in peasant communities finds no support in the social 
backgrounds of the early lawspeakers. On the contrary, the typical 
early lawspeaker had close family ties to the royal dynasty527. The 
lawspeaker group also shows a high degree of coherence and 
continuity over time, and appears to have been one of the most 
stable institutions in the medieval state.  
The disjunction between the authorities of lawspeaker and 
castellan528 is another important finding, as is the decline of the 
lawspeaker’s aristocratic status from Queen Margaret onwards. 
                                                   
525 The effect is due to appointments made in 1450-52, including Engelbrekt’s 
murderer Magnus Bengtsson (Natt och Dag) and Karl Knutsson’s halfbrother and 
halfbrother-in-law. 
526 Never during the Middle Ages, that is. When the lawspeaker institution is 
redefined as a component of the new administrative apparatus of early-modern 
Sweden, the title will, once more, become attractive also to the very highest 
aristocracy. 
527 This appears to decline over time – probably reflecting a growing social distance 
between royalty and aristocracy. 
528 At least up to the Engelbrekt rebellion, with a few exceptions noted above, 
page 239f. The investigation of the later part of the middle ages is not yet 
concluded. 
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Appendix on genealogical argumentation 
In a relatively large part of the genealogical material, there are 
conflicting views as to the proper interpretation of relations between 
lawspeaker families. As I have had to enter a field of argumentation 
which is quite new to me, and which seems fairly dangerous for 
unarmed trespassers, I think that it might be necessary to make a few 
comments. In a few cases I have accepted – albeit with reservations – 
identifications from older literature although they have been disputed 
by modern expertise. 
As I do not want to appear neglectful, I find it prudent to account 
for my decisions.   
Case 1: The identity of Bero, lawspeaker of Södermanland. 
Gillingstam (ÄSF 139) has rejected the customary identification of 
Björn Näf and the 'Bero legifer sudermanniae' appearing in SD 811 
and DS 913, claiming that BN was a knight already when he first 
appears in 1276 (DS 618), while his lawspeaker namesake was not. 
However, if we presuppose that appearance in a list of signatories 
preceded by the intitulation 'domini' is a secure indication of 
knighthood even at this early date, then Bero legifer could on the 
same grounds be presumed to have been a knight. However,when 
Löfqvist makes an admonition against this type of presumption, he 
refers to DS 1, p512 (Löfqvist 1935:77, n36), which is the only charter 
listed in K H Karlsson's register where Björn Näf is identified as a 
knight! That he also explicitly rejects the list in this charter for the 
specific case of Björn Näf's chivalric status is evident from p85 where 
he states that BN was not a knight even by 1285-86. This is the very 
list cited by Gillingstam (618 is the charter number, while Löfqvist 
refers to the page number, 512).     
Case 2: Could Bengt Hafridsson, lawspeaker of 
Vätergötland, have been a son of the earlier lawspeaker 
Gustav? 
Gillingstam in ÄSF116 considers the use of metronymic and 
patronymic, respectively, as an indication that BH and his known 
sister Ramfrid Gustavsdotter would most likely have been half-
siblings, in which case Bengt could not have been the son of the 
earlier Västergötland lawspeaker Gustav. The silent assumption 
behind that conclusion must be that the motivation for chosing a 
metronymic could not be gender specific. The surnames of men like 
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Bengt Hafridsson, Karl Ingeborgason, Karl Estridsson and Nils 
Sigridsson are generally assumed to have constituted claims on a 
share in the higher status of their maternal kin in preference to their 
less distinguished paternal affiliation, and even if Bengt's father would 
have been one of the earlier Westgothian lawspeakers - as has been 
widely assumed in the genealogical literature - a relationship with the 
ducal/royal family would have been more important to signal (as the 
lion in his blazon is also supposed to have done). In his sister's case, 
however, we have no reason to assume that she had any choice. The 
role of women as pawns in the matrimonial dowry market seems to 
have left no space for individual aspiration markers like high-status 
metronymics. If it had, why don't we have a single clear-cut 
example529? 
In the index of Raneke's medieval Swedish armoury (SMV), I have 
only found one possible case of a female metronymic. It is difficult to 
compare with the number of female patronymics, as I suppose that 
they in a considerable number of cases will have been supplied (for 
easier identification) by the author. Still, at least 2,040 cases are listed 
against the single possible exception: Cecilia Helgadotter, whose 
name might be interpreted as either a patronymic formed from the 
male name Helge (possessive form Helga- or Helges-) or as a 
metronymic from the corresponding female name Helga. It is 
interpreted as a metronymic on page 799-800 (her mother's name is 
there assumed to have been Helga). On page 804 an alternative 
filiation where the name is attributed to her possible father Helge or 
Hägge is offered. The only documentary reference supplied is to SD 
1015, which the editors of SMB have reprinted for the electronic 
register, normalizing her surname as 'Helgesdotter' (SMB 1711) , thus 
interpreting the name as a patronymic. 
Thus I can see no reason to assume that Bengt Hafridsson’s father 
was not Gustav lagman, which seems to make sense in view of the 
high frequency of inheritability – at least 42%, even if we subtract 
Bengt Hafridsson’s case. 
                                                   
529  I have consulted Dr Audur Magnusdottir on this matter, as she is an expert in 
gender history as well as in medieval history, and – being an Icelander – carrying 
a patronymic in accordance with the still unbroken medieval custom. She could 
not recall having heard of a single case of a medieval woman carrying a 
metronymic. 
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